Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001621

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63647/2023
LP/09446/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

R A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Heybroek, Counsel instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Iraq, of Kurdish ethnicity, formerly resident in Halabja, part of the Kurdistan region. He arrived in the UK on 17 June 2021 and claimed asylum on arrival. He claimed to be at risk from his paternal uncle and cousins as they challenged his becoming the next leader of the Lek tribe, at risk from his ex-girlfriend’s family due to the nature of their relationship and at risk from the authorities because of his sur place activity. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim accepting only the appellant’s identity, nationality and ethnicity and attendance at a demonstration and considering that any political activism was low-level and not of interest to the authorities. By decision promulgated on 19 February 2025, a First-Tier Tribunal judge (“the FTJ”) dismissed his appeal, finding the appellant not to be credible on the core aspects of his claim, to be at most a low-level activist who had not brought himself to the adverse attention of the authorities, and considering that the appellant had not shown he could not rely upon his family to assist him in receiving his INID card and supporting him on return to Iraq.

2. The First-Tier Tribunal granted the appellant permission on ground A only, namely that the adverse credibility findings were not reasonably open to the FTJ.

Anonymity
3. I continue the anonymity order made in the First-Tier Tribunal. I consider that the public interest in maintaining confidence in the asylum system, by ensuring vulnerable people are willing to provide candid and complete information in support of their applications, outweighs the public interest in open justice.

Discussion of the issues at the hearing
4. The appeal was adjourned by UTJ Kamara and DUTJ Murray on 13 June 2025 so that the recording of proceedings could be obtained, listened to by the representatives, and they could agree what matters had been put to the appellant during evidence in relation to the issues raised at paragraphs 6 to 8 of the grounds of appeal. The representatives were then invited to inform the Upper Tribunal if the evidence could be agreed and a rule 24 response filed by the respondent by 25 July.

5. A listening appointment was not obtained until 30 September, but the rule 24 response was only dated 14 November, without explanation. In that response, Ms Kerr, who had appeared at the adjourned hearing, accepted that (i) the appellant had not been asked at the hearing about who had told his family about his relationship with his claimed girlfriend and specifically whether he had asked his cousin who the informant was and (ii) the appellant had not been asked at the hearing why he had not remained in contact with his claimed girlfriend after leaving the KRI. She said nothing about (iii) the issue at paragraph 8 of the grounds about whether the appellant was asked at the hearing if he had discussed the claimed threats by the uncle with his father. Fortunately, Mr Nappey said that he had on file a note of the evidence from the First-Tier Tribunal hearing and having read that note, he could confirm that the appellant had not been asked at the hearing about discussing the threats with his father.

6. The respondent therefore agreed with the appellant as to the relevant evidence given or not given at the hearing.

7. That did leave an issue as to whether the FTJ had been referred in submissions to the CPIN in respect of honour-based violence (see paragraph 5 grounds and paragraph 6 of the rule 24 response) but Ms Heybroek pragmatically accepted my indication that it was not her best point and accordingly we did not need to enquire whether the recording was available for us to listen to before I heard submissions.

8. There was a further issue as to the extent of the grant of permission. From the way the adjournment decision was worded, it seemed as if the judges at the hearing in June 2025 appeared to consider that the case of Rai and DAM (grounds of appeal, limited grants of permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 meant that the limited grant could somehow be treated as a full grant of permission. Whilst that part of the headnote might be seen as ambiguous read on its own, in context the relevant part is an exhortation to the First-Tier Tribunal not to limit permission in cases where the grounds could or even might overlap, rather than allowing the Upper Tribunal to treat an appeal as if the permission were not limited. The note of the issues contained in the directions issued on 23 June 2025 was however that the parties had agreed to treat the grant as a full grant of permission. I doubted whether that could in fact operate to grant permission, but the issue might have been academic if the parties had acted as if the grant were a full one. Unfortunately, in the rule 24 response, Ms Kerr noted that permission to appeal on ground 2 had been originally refused, and the appellant “cannot resurrect it at this stage”.

9. That being said, Mr Nappey accepted that if the findings on the appellant’s credibility were flawed and could not stand, clearly the issue about whether the appellant could rely on his family to assist in obtaining an INID card would also have to be revisited. After discussion about the strength of the remainder of ground B, Ms Heybroek decided that we should consider just ground A on which permission had been granted expressly by the First-Tier Tribunal.

The grounds, discussion, conclusions
10. A central part of ground A was that the FTJ had made critical findings adverse to the appellant on 3 points which it was now agreed had not been put to the appellant.

11. I considered it was instructive to look at the rule 24 response. That said that the FTJ had given multiple, independent and sustainable reasons for rejecting the appellant’s core account, so that the issues were not material to the findings.

12. Considering the issues in turn therefore, at [35] the FTJ found that the appellant had provided inconsistent evidence. However she did not say why she had not accepted the appellant’s explanation on the point. The appellant said in his first asylum interview, when asked what rank as a peshmerga his paternal uncle held, that he was “brigade general”. In his second interview he was asked how he knew the rank (qn 20), and he said, “he’s my uncle and I know about that”. He was subsequently asked (qn 23) “when you say that your uncle is a member of the PUK, does he have any particular role” and he responded, “I am not a politician so I don’t know about that”. The appellant explained at paragraph 3 of his witness statement the difference between knowing the uncle’s rank and not knowing what precisely the uncle did for the PUK. There is a clear difference between the meanings of “rank” and “role” in English and absent further explanation I agree with Ms Heybroek that the FTJ’s conclusion was irrational in the sense there was no reasoning given as to why there was an inconsistency; that there was an inconsistency is by no means obvious as it seems the appellant was being asked about different things.

13. The next credibility point at [36] is the questioned issue at paragraph 6 of the grounds (the appellant not being asked about whether he had asked his cousin how he knew the relationship had become known). At the end of the paragraph is the questioned issue at paragraph 5 of the grounds (the appellant not being asked why he had not remained in contact with his girlfriend). Sandwiched between is an independent credibility finding namely that the appellant did not give detail of the indirect threats from his girlfriend’s family.

14. The final credibility point at [37] was the questioned issue at paragraph 8 of the grounds (the appellant not being asked about whether he had discussed the threats with his father).

15. Those were the reasons the FTJ identified for concluding that the appellant was not a credible witness and she did not accept the core aspects of his claim; only one sustainable reason beyond the three questioned issues. Contrary to what is said in the rule 24 response, the FTJ did not rely on the complete absence of corroboration and did not suggest that she expected there to be corroborative evidence to clarify the uncle’s position in the PUK.

16. Of course, it is right that not every single point has to be put to an appellant. These points were however three out of the four potentially sustainable reasons given by the FTJ for finding the appellant’s account not to be credible.

17. So far as the non-contact with the girlfriend was concerned, it might well be right to draw adverse inferences simply from lack of contact if a couple were in a relationship in Western Europe. Drawing an adverse inference without more from lack of contact when the appellant’s case is that the relationship was discovered and bearing in mind the culture of Kurdish society in Iraq he was at risk of honour killing, and therefore presumably also his girlfriend was at risk, falls into the trap explained in the case of Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 of finding an account incredible merely because it would not seem reasonable if it had happened in this country.

18. I do not consider that it follows obviously, without further explanation that if the appellant were telling the truth he would have asked his cousin who was the source of the information and then have been able to provide the identity of the person who had witnessed him and his girlfriend together. He might have asked the cousin, and the cousin might not have known for example. The finding that it seems inconceivable that the appellant would not have asked the cousin (and, by implication that the appellant would then have had the answer) is insufficiently reasoned. It is also difficult to see how the FTJ can have drawn an adverse inference from there being no evidence of the appellant having discussed the threats on his life with his father. The appellant was not asked in interview whether he had discussed the threats with his father, and his only witness statement is a response to the reasons for refusal (which answered the specific points made in that letter and explained that he had not been represented earlier). In those circumstances the FTJ’s conclusion, finding that the absence of evidence was itself evidence, is simply unreasoned.

19. There is therefore only one sustainable reason given by the FTJ why the appellant is not credible (the lack of detail about the indirect threats from the girlfriend’s family). In those circumstances the errors on the other three points must be material errors; if the appellant had been asked questions on the relevant points his answers might, or might together, have made a difference to the ultimate conclusion on credibility.

20. As I discussed the points with the representatives Mr Nappey agreed that the FTJ appeared to have drawn many inferences and he would struggle to say that there was no material error.

21. For the reasons I have given, I therefore consider that the FTJ’s decision must be set aside. Regretfully I agree that as credibility must be decided afresh, the appeal should be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal for remaking before another judge.

22. No findings are preserved. Credibility is also relevant to the question whether the appellant can obtain documents or redocument. It would not be right to preserve any findings about how documents may be obtained when there are frequent updates to CPINs, and we are awaiting country guidance.

Notice of Decision

The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.

The appeal is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal at Taylor House for rehearing before another judge.

No findings are preserved.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 November 2025