Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001634

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68126/2023
LP/03989/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
10th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

MH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Chowdhury, Legal representative from Londonium Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Hulme, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity and is to be referred to as MH because this appeal involves a claim for protection.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 17 February 2025 dismissing his protection and human rights appeal against a decision by the Secretary of State dated 19 December 2023 refusing both claims.
Background and appellant’s claim
2. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered the UK on 12 December 2010 on a working holidaymaker visa. On 26 April 2014, he made an application on the basis of his family/ private life which was refused on 13 March 2024. Thereafter, he became an overstayer. He claimed asylum on 25 March 2019 after being apprehended and arrested for taking photographs of children in a park. No further action was taken.
3. The basis of his claim is that he became actively involved with the BNP in 2008 and by 2009 he was politically active, delivering leaflets, attending meetings and demonstrations. He was then threatened by the Awami League. He has actively supported the BNP since being in the UK. He claimed that a false case was brought against him in 2018 and that he would be arrested, detained and tortured on his return to Bangladesh, primarily because of the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant.
The Respondent’s case
4. The respondent did not accept that the appellant is affiliated with the BNP nor that he had come to the adverse attention of the Awami League nor the Bangladeshi government. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had been politically active in the UK. The respondent pointed to the lack of details about his role in the BNP, his failure to provide details of demonstrations in Bangladesh and general lack of detail. The respondent further noted that the appellant had been inconsistent about his family’s involvement in the BNP and that he was able to leave Bangladesh on his own passport. Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 was said to apply because the appellant claimed asylum after being arrested. On review, the respondent submitted that the FIR and arrest warrant were not genuine documents and in any event that the political landscape had changed in Bangladesh such that there was a reduced risk to the appellant. Leaders and supporters of the BNP are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state.
The Hearing and the Judge’s Decision
5. The appellant applied at 7.58pm on the evening before the hearing to have his appeal decided without a hearing. There was no application for an adjournment. The appellant stated that he had ongoing health problems and that all documents had been submitted. The respondent objected to the appeal being decided without a hearing on the basis that the respondent wanted to make submissions. The judge noted that a hearing should be held whenever credibility is at issue. The judge noted that the application was extremely late and the medical evidence submitted was from 24 July 2024, over seven months prior to the date of the hearing. The judge noted that the medical evidence did not demonstrate that the appellant was unfit to attend the hearing and also noted that the previous hearing was adjourned because the appellant was said to have chest pains. No evidence was subsequently supplied of this. Having taken all of these factors into account the judge decided that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with an oral hearing of the appeal in the absence of the appellant or his representative. The judge noted that all of the documents had been uploaded onto the Case Management system.
6. Since neither the appellant nor any witness attended the hearing there was no cross examination and the appeal proceeded by way of submissions only.
7. Having considered all of the evidence the judge found at [26] based on the documentary evidence submitted in support of the appeal that the appellant was involved with the BNP in Bangladesh, at a low level [29] and that he has been a member of the BNP in the UK [29]. The judge did not accept however that the appellant had to leave Bangladesh quickly because he did not leave until two years after applying for a working holiday maker visa in 2008 and also because he accepted in his witness statement that he did not face direct persecution in Bangladesh.
8. The judge made adverse credibility findings against the appellant because of the timing of his claim for asylum and found that there were discrepancies in the FIR and arrest warrant as well as no reasonable explanation why the arrest warrant should be issued eight years after his departure from Bangladesh [29] and [30]. The judge concluded by finding that there was no real risk of serious harm in Bangladesh either as a result of his low level activities in Bangladesh or sur place activities in the UK and this view was fortified by the change of political landscape as set out in the objective evidence and the respondent’s CPIN. The judge dismissed the asylum claim, the claim for humanitarian protection and the Article 3 ECHR claim. The judge also found that it would not be a disproportionate breach of the appellant’s article 8 right to private life to remove him from the UK.
9. Permission was granted on 2 June 2025. The respondent prepared a rule 24 response opposing the appeal. At the error of law hearing, I heard submissions from both parties which are recorded in the record of proceedings and to which I make reference in my discussion below. I had before me a 589 page PDF bundle of documents as well as sight of the email and whatsapp message sent by the appellant to the First-tier Tribunal on the day prior to the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal.
Grounds of appeal
10. The grounds were poorly drafted and are found in a document with 15 paragraphs. At the outset of the appeal Mr Chowdhury clarified that he no longer relied on paragraphs 7 and 8 of the grounds. These referred to the case of C-148/13 to C-150/13 A B and C v Staatssecretaris Van Veiligheid en Justitie which he conceded related to late disclosure of sexual orientation which he conceded was not relevant in this appeal. He also withdrew the reference to M v SSHD [2014] UKUT 589(IAC) agreeing with Mr Hulme that he could not find any reference to this authority in baili or elsewhere. A separate show cause letter will be issued in respect of the use of this unknown authority.
11. Secondly, and for the sake of clarity, Mr Chowdhury confirmed that there was no assertion in the grounds that it was procedurally unfair for the Tribunal to proceed with the oral hearing in the absence of the appellant. I am in agreement that there was a clear and unambiguous request for the appeal to proceed in the absence of the appellant, that the judge took into account all of the relevant factors including the previous adjournment on account of a medical problem for which no subsequent medical evidence was produced, the lack of medical evidence that the appellant was unfit to attend the current hearing and the need for an oral hearing where credibility was at issue. I am satisfied that the judge’s decision to proceed with the oral hearing in the interests of justice was not vitiated by procedural unfairness.
12. I also observe that Mr Chowdhury did not seek to expand on the grant of permission (quite properly in my view) in which it was said that the judge failed to take into account how the appellant’s diagnosis of anxiety and depression impacted on his evidence. I take into account that this was not a ground of appeal formulated by the appellant and no application was made to amend the grounds of appeal. Secondly, the judge did observe that there was a doctor’s letter dated 24 July 2024 which stated that the appellant has a diagnosis of anxiety and depression and the judge took this evidence into account, thirdly the judge properly noted that the letter was seven months out of date by the time of the hearing and was not recent, and fourthly the appellant did not attend the hearing to give oral evidence in any event. The judge when making her findings did not give weight to inconsistencies in the appellant’s oral or written evidence. At [22] the judge did note that the appellant was unable to say in his asylum interview how many demonstrations he had attended in Bangladesh, that he did not recall the contents of the leaflets he distributed and gave little detail about this period. The judge’s observation that there was no medical evidence that the appellant had difficulties with recall at this stage was reasonable and rational and in any event the judge accepted in the light of the background evidence of harassment of BNP members by the AL in 2008 and the letters adduced by BNP members that the appellant had been involved in the BNP in Bangladesh and the UK. There was no error in the judge’s approach.
13. Mr Chowdhury also indicated that he would not rely on paragraph 13 again in my view quite properly as this paragraph is nonsensical and does not disclose an error of law.
14. Mr Chowdhury focused on the following grounds:
Ground 1 – The judge erred in the approach to credibility (a)
15. The judge failed to unreasonably assess whether the appellant harbours a genuine fear of persecution and his adverse credibility findings appear to stem from a failure to evaluate key evidence and a misinterpretation of material facts. It was flawed and made on erroneous conclusions. There was reference to a mistake of fact. I agree with Mr Hulme that this ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the decision. The ground is generic, poorly particularised and comes nowhere near identifying an error of law. In particular, Mr Chowdhury was not able to identity what error of fact the judge was asserted to have made. Ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2- The judge erred in approach to credibility in respect of s8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and the timing of the claim (b)
16. Mr Chowdhury submitted that the appellant should not have been penalised because the claim was not made at the earliest opportunity. The appellant entered the UK in 2010. The written grounds assert that a delay especially where an individual has lawful immigration status should not automatically be treated as indicative of dishonesty. It is said that many individuals rely on their temporary lawful presence and the judge failed to take this into account. The credibility finding based on the timing of the claim is said to be unsafe and inconclusive.
17. In his oral submissions, Mr Chowdhury further submitted that the delay in claiming asylum was also based on the fact that the FIR was not issued until February 2018 which is what led to the claim for asylum. Mr Hulme submitted that the judge’s approach to credibility was lawful and she was properly entitled to take into account the timing of the claim.
18. I am satisfied that the judge’s approach to credibility was entirely lawful. At [14], [15] and [16] the judge directed herself appropriately to the approach to credibility in assessing asylum claims. She reminded herself that it is a holistic exercise which must be made against the background evidence in the cultural and societal context, looking at all of the evidence in the round including sufficiency of detail, internal consistency and external consistency. The judge then went on to assess the claim against the background evidence and supporting documentation.
19. The judge turned to the timing of the claim at [27]. The judge noted the appellant’s evidence that he did not intend to claim asylum on arrival but wanted to gain skills and distance himself from threats. He said that he hoped his party would get into power in the elections of 2014 and 2018 but they did not. Firstly, the appellant was no longer lawfully in the UK after 2014 which somewhat undermines the written grounds. Secondly, I am satisfied that that it was reasonably open to the judge to decide that that the appellant’s explanation does not explain why he did not make a claim for asylum until 25 March 2019, the day after his arrest. In his screening interview the appellant does not record any medical problems apart from eczema and he only became aware of the false case against him after his screening interview and substantive interview. The judge was manifestly entitled to find that the timing of his claim, eight years after he entered the UK and immediately after he was arrested, adversely affected his credibility pursuant to s8 of the 2004 Act.
Ground 3 – The judge’s approach to the FIR and arrest warrant was flawed.
20. In the written grounds it was asserted that the judge expressed concerns about inconsistencies in the documents and applied an “unduly high standard of proof”. In his oral submissions, Mr Chowdhury further submitted that the respondent should have undertaken further verification checks in respect of this documentation in accordance with the authority of QC (verification of documents: Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC). I observe that the oral submissions go well beyond the original written grounds and there was no application to amend.
21. The FIR and arrest warrant were notarised in August 2024 although there is also a stamp on a translation dated December 2023. They appeal to have been sent to the appellant by whatsapp by a Mr Islam in 2023. The respondent’s position on review is that these documents are unreliable because they contain inconsistencies, and because of the ease with which false documents can be obtained in Bangladesh. The judge gives consideration to these documents at [28] and [29]. The judge states:
“The appellant relies on an FIR from February 2018 and an arrest warrant. The respondent contends in the review that these are not genuine documents. The respondent states:
“It is further noted that the arrest warrant notes that the A's age is 30 (AB page 25 accused number 6) and further states that accused number 6 is on bail which is at odds with the A’s evidence (AB page 27). The R will test these further at the tribunal hearing”.
“The appellant was aware of the respondent’s position and failed to attend the hearing to be cross examined. I have found that the appellant’s credibility is adversely affected. I accept that he was a low level member of the BNP in Bangladesh and that he has been a member in the United Kingdom. However, I find that the FIR is not a genuine document as it is contradicted by the appellant’s evidence and the age does not correspond to the appellant’s. In view of the appellant’s low level activities in Bangladesh, I find that there is no reason relation why a false FIR would be issued 8 years after his departure. Fraudulent documents can easily be obtained in Bangladesh (CPIN Bangladesh 2020, paragraph 5.2)”
22. Mr Chowdhury submitted that given that the charges were false that it is unsurprising that the documents contained errors but in my view this is an attempt to reargue the appeal. I am satisfied that the judge has given adequate, cogent and sustainable reasons grounded in the evidence for finding that the FIR and arrest warrant were not reliable documents. These included the fact that the documents stated the incorrect age of the appellant, the fact that he is said to be on bail in 2018 when he had been in the UK for eight years and this was inconsistent with his own evidence, the implausibly of a false case being issued against him eight years after he carried out low level activities in Bangladesh and left the country and the ease with which false documents can be obtained. The appellant also chose not to subject himself to cross examination. I am satisfied that the judge has not erred when finding that the documents are not reliable. I am not satisfied that the judge applied a higher standard of proof. The judge manifestly referred to the correct standard of proof at [9].
23. I also disregard Mr Chowdhury’s submission that the respondent should have verified the documents pursuant to the authority of QC. Firstly this was not submitted in the skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal and secondly neither the appellant nor his representative attended the hearing to make these submissions. The burden was on the appellant to prove his case and the onus was on the judge to consider the documents in the light of all of the evidence which is what she did. QC is not authority that all documents (and particularly not arrest warrants which are frequently placed before the Tribunal) should be verified. It is said that only exceptionally should documents be verified. The authority of QC which referred to Singh v Belgium [2012] ECHR 33210/11 which emphasised that documents should only be verified where they can easily be authenticated. An arrest warrant of this nature is clearly not a document that could be easily verified by the respondent and the judge was never asked to consider this issue in any event. This ground is not made out.
Ground 4 Political changes in Bangladesh
24. Mr Chowdhury’s final ground was that the judge’s finding that the appellant was no longer at risk in Bangladesh due to the regime change was flawed and material to the outcome of the appeal. He submitted that the finding that it is safe for BNP members to return is not supported by the background evidence and that there is ongoing political repression against opposition activists.
25. The judge manifestly had regard to the all of the background evidence before her in respect of the political changes in Bangladesh which is apparent from both [18] and [30] where she states that she has reviewed all of the objective evidence from both the appellant and the respondent including the CPIN which indicated that hundreds of senior officials and AL leaders under the former government have been arrested and remanded in custody.
26. Mr Chowdhury quite properly emphasised that although the Sheikh Hasina has been ousted, the BNP are not in power, no election has taken place and that some BNP leaders are in exile still. He also pointed to the wording of the CPIN that “some” cases are being dropped which indicates that not all cases are being dropped and that charges are “expected” to be withdrawn. I accept his submission that the situation in Bangladesh is still chaotic. However, I reject his submission that there must have been a durable and non-temporary change for the appellant to no longer to be at risk because this test applies to the situation of cessation where an individual has already been found to be at risk of serious harm and recognised as a refugee, unlike the appellant in this appeal.
27. The risk to the appellant as a low level supporter of the BNP who has never come to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities (at the time when the AL was still in power) is summarised in the respondent’s second review which refers to the CPIN Bangladesh: political parties and affiliation version 3 September 2022. This states “in general low level members of opposition grounds are unlikely to be of ongoing interest to the authorities and are unlikely to be subject to treatment that is sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition to amount to persecution”. The judge has found that the appellant was a low level BNP supporter who was not persecuted in Bangladesh and that he is not subject to outstanding charges or an arrest warrant. Interference with these findings is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’. I have found that the judge’s findings in this respect were adequately reasoned and sustainable and indeed the grounds do not challenge the judge’s finding that the appellant was a low level BNP supporter.
28. In these circumstances the judge’s conclusion that the appellant is not at risk of serious harm is manifestly sustainable. It would have been sustainable even before the regime change and the judge’s conclusion that the risk is even lower since the regime change for an individual with the appellant’s particular profile is reasonable, rational and lawful. In the circumstances of the appellant’s profile where there is no warrant for his arrest, he is a low level supporter, has not previously been persecuted in Bangladesh, has family members living there, and the AL are no longer in power, the judge’s conclusion that he is not at risk of persecution, serious harm, or treatment contrary to Article 3 is entirely lawful.
Conclusion
29. It follows that none of the appellant’s grounds of appeal are made out and the appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
30. The decision of First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appellant’s asylum, humanitarian protections and article 3 and 8 human rights appeal dated 17 February 2025 stands.

R J Owens

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 October 2025