Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001653

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/59416/2023
LH/06713/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

DA
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Dingley of Counsel, instructed by Halliday Reeves Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 11 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered ex tempore at the hearing today.
Background
2. I shall refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal whereby First-tier Tribunal Judge Forster (“the Judge”) had allowed the Appellant’s appeal on protection grounds by way of a decision dated 3 January 2025.
3. The Secretary of State had been granted permission to appeal against that decision by First-tier Tribunal Judge Roots in a decision dated 10 April 2025. The learned First-tier Tribunal Judge had said when granting permission to appeal,
”2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters, specifically by failing to resolve the conflict of fact or an opinion as to whether the Appellant is at risk from members of the PUK, and has failed to resolve the central issues of whether the family in question were members of the PUK and their rank etc. These issues were at the core of the claim. It was claimed that her father was a military brigade general in the PUK.
3. The grounds are arguable. It is arguable, as submitted, that the Judge has failed to resolve - see for example paragraph 34 of the decision - a central dispute of fact as to whether the family in question were members of the PUK etc.”
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. The fuller background to the case is set out within the Judge’s decision and to which I refer. The Judge had summarised the case whereby the Appellant, a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, was in a relationship with a girl named ‘B’. Her family had found pictures and a video of her with the Appellant. B’s father and brother worked for the PUK and her father was claimed to have been a military brigade general. The Judge noted that thereby the Appellant would be at risk on return from B’s family because of the Appellant’s relationship with B and that the Appellant would become the victim of honour-based violence.
5. The Judge had noted that whilst the Secretary of State’s accepted certain aspects of the case, she also concluded that the Appellant had failed to provide sufficient detail about members of B’s family being members of the PUK. The Judge noted that the Respondent’s case was that this part of the claim was based on hearsay and that the Respondent concluded there would be no risk on return to the Appellant.
6. Importantly, the Judge said at paragraph 8,
“The Respondent puts the Appellant’s credibility at the heart of the appeal. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant was in a relationship with B but rejects his claim to be at risk from her family.”
The Judge referred to the evidence which he had heard during the hearing and said at paragraph 14:
“14. The discovery of the photographs and video led to the Appellant being threatened by B’s brother. It was as a result of the threats that the Appellant left Iraq, he says in fear for his life. He used his savings and gave his car to an agent to get him out of the country and to the UK.”
7. At paragraph 17 the Judge said:
“17. The Appellant has now produced one photograph of himself with B and two of B with her father, in one of these the man said to be her father is in uniform. Attention is drawn to the badge on the man’s uniform. The translator has not translated the badge because of the poor quality of the image. The photograph by itself does not enable me to identify the man as a brigadier general in the PUK.”
8. In this regard, Mr Diwnycz today said that he was making a ‘conditional concession’ that although one cannot see the badge because of the blurry image in the photograph, the epaulette does indeed confirm that that he is wearing a brigadier level uniform. Mr Diwnycz did not concede that this necessarily mean the man in the photograph is the claimed PUK officer. For example, because people can borrow uniforms, but it was conceded that the uniform does accord with brigadier level.
9. Continuing with the Judge’s decision, the Judge noted that the reason why the Appellant had a photograph of each other’s family is because these were exchanged at the time during the relationship. The Judge noted at paragraph 23,
“23. The Respondent’s main argument is that it is women in Iraq that are at risk from honour crimes and not men. It is said that the Appellant’s claim to be at risk from B’s family is inconsistent with the available background evidence about honour crimes in Iraq. It is submitted that this difference undermines the basis of the Appellant’s claim.”
10. The Judge noted at paragraph 26, with reference to the 2021 CPIN (there is now a 2024 CPIN as well) that in fact honour-based violence affects both men and women and that men are also punished out of revenge for violating the family.
11. Importantly the Judge noted at paragraph 30 onwards,
“30. The relationship between the Appellant and B is not in dispute. To this extent the Respondent accepts what the Appellant’s account [is]. I find that the Appellant has given cogent evidence about how his relationship with B began and how it progressed.
31. I look at this in the context of known conservative social attitudes in Iraq. As described in the 2021 CPIN, gender roles are clearly defined. Traditional attitudes to women endure in Iraq and stepping outside these norms is perceived as shameful and brings dishonour on the woman’s family.
32. I find the Appellant’s account of his relationship with B and her family’s response to it to be credible. I gave particular weight to his evidence that B was beaten by her family and that she was pregnant.
33. I do not accept the Respondent’s submission that I should reject parts of the Appellant’s evidence because it is hearsay. This is not a point which in the present proceedings carries a great deal of weight. I look at all the evidence in the round.”
Then at paragraph 34, which is specifically cited in the Secretary of State’s grounds of appeal and in the grant of permission, it says:
“34. The Appellant’s evidence about B’s family’s involvement in the PUK is inconclusive. The photographs do not assist me and the conflicting evidence about her father’s rank is uncertain. However, I find that this does not undermine the Appellant’s overall credibility.”
The Judge also said at paragraph 35:
“35. I find that the behaviour of B’s family as described by the Appellant conforms to persistent attitudes to women in Iraqi society. The relationship resulted in B’s pregnancy outside of marriage which will have increased tensions within the family. I find that B was beaten by members of her own family and that threats were made against the Appellant.”
Then at paragraph 37 the Judge said:
37. However, I find the evidence about how B’s family reacted to her relationship with the Appellant to be more compelling than the Respondent’s assertions.”
The Judge then also further referred to further background material.
The Respondent’s Grounds of Appeal
12. The grounds of appeal contend that the Judge had failed to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters. Specifically there is reference to paragraph 17 of the Judge’s decision, which said that “The photograph by itself does not enable me to identify the man as a brigadier general in the PUK” and that at paragraph 34 the Judge said, “The Appellant’s evidence about B’s family’s involvement in the PUK was inconclusive”.
13. Although Mr Diwnycz made clear he was not able to make, as he put it, a ‘complete concession’ in this case, having considered all the factors, he said his approach was to present the case in a fair and measured way. I acknowledge and approve of such an approach by all parties in these cases. It furthers the overriding objective.
Analysis and Consideration
14. In my judgment Mr Diwnycz was right to take the approach that he did. In my judgment Mr Dingley is correct that the rank of brigadier was really, as he put it, ‘neither here nor there’.
15. Ultimately what the Judge had found, on a very clear basis, was firstly that the Secretary of State had said (recorded at paragraph 30) that relationship between the Appellant and B was not in dispute. Therefore, the Secretary of State had accepted that part of the Appellant’s case. The Judge also made clear, at paragraph 30, that the Appellant had given cogent evidence about how his relationship with B had begun and how it had progressed.
16. Secondly, the Judge then applied that accepted version of events and findings to the context of known conservative, social attitudes in Iraq. That included by reference to the CPIN.
17. Thirdly, the Judge had specifically found the Appellant’s account of his relationship with B and her family’s adverse response to be credible and he gave particular weight to the Appellant’s evidence that B was beaten by her family and that she was pregnant.
18. Fourthly, the Judge specifically rejected the Respondent’s submission that the Appellant’s evidence ought to be rejected because it was hearsay. The Judge was plainly right about that because in this jurisdiction, hearsay is admissible, as it always has been for very clear reasons when dealing with protection claims.
19. Fifthly, the Judge correctly identified that he had to look at the evidence in the round. The Judge also found that even though he could not decide whether or not B’s father was a brigadier, he still concluded that that matter did not undermine the Appellant’s overall credibility. The Judge noted that the approach of B’s family, as described by the Appellant, conformed to persistent attitudes towards women in Iraqi society. The Judge had found that B was beaten by members of her own family and that threats were made against the Appellant.
20. In my judgment the Judge did deal with all the issues which were raised as disputed issues by the Respondent. The Judge dealt with the case in the round. The Judge did not accept every part of the Appellant’s case. The Judge clearly was not satisfied, for example, in relation to whether or not B’s father was a brigadier, but as the Judge made clear, that ultimately did not take away from the core aspect of the claim having been credible. The Judge thereby found the core claim as being truthful and as a consequence of which the Appellant would indeed be at risk on return. The Judge made clear why to the lower standard of proof the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason. Namely that because the Appellant was a member of a Particular Social Group as he was at risk of honour crimes. The Judge also dealt correctly with sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, in view of the links of B’s family to the authorities.
Conclusion
21. I remind myself that before interfering with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, I must be cognisant of the settled law in respect of decisions of the expert First-tier Tribunal.
22. In the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, in MH (Bangladesh) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 (9 June 2025) Lord Justice Arnold, with whom Lord Justice Singh and Lady Justice King agreed, said as follows:
“The role of an appellate court or tribunal
29. There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
23. In addition, of course, the Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and from the Appellant’s Advocate and from the Secretary of State’s Advocate.
24. In my judgment, there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. In the circumstances, the decision of Judge Forster, which had allowed the Appellant’s protection claim stands and I dismiss the Secretary of State’s appeal. That is my judgment.

Notice of Decision
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had allowed the Appellant’s appeal stands.
The Secretary of State’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
The anonymity order is continued.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 June 2025