Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001664
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52176/2023
LP/01252/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

TA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E Fripp, counsel, instructed by Fisher Jones Greenwood LLP
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 January 2026 and 2 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This determination follows the re-hearing of the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim following his appeal to this Tribunal against the dismissal of that claim in the First-tier Tribunal. I found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s judgment and set it aside with no factual findings preserved.
2. This matter was listed for a rehearing on 17 November 2025 but I adjourned the hearing upon the Appellant’s application to allow for Dr Hedayati-Kakhki to give oral evidence following criticisms of his report by the Respondent. Oral evidence was heard on 13 January 2026 but the matter went part-heard and I received closing submissions from both parties on 2 March 2026. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my judgment. A very substantial amount of work has gone into the appeal by both parties, for which I thank them.
3. For the reasons set out below, I allow the Appellant’s appeal.
Appellant’s claim
4. The Appellant is an Iranian Kurd, born in that country in 2005. The Appellant’s case is that his father was a ‘kolbar’, i.e. a smuggler, involved in the transport of contraband across the Iranian border. The Appellant’s case is that he assisted his father in this work from approximately 2019/2020 onwards. He states that one day, whilst travelling with other kolbars, he heard gunshots and his father was injured. The Appellant ran to a family friend’s home and was able to speak to his mother, who told him not to return home as government officials had raided the village. She told him to go and stay with his uncle, which he did, until such time as arrangements were made for him to leave Iran.
5. The Appellant arrived in the UK and claimed asylum on 3 November 2021. It is not in dispute that he was 16 years old at the time.
6. Since arriving in the UK the Appellant has engaged in some sur place political activity, which I describe below.
7. The Appellant’s protection claim is based on the risks he submits he faces upon return to Iran from the Iranian authorities as a result of the individual and / or cumulative effect of:
a. His status as Kurd;
b. His history in Iran, including his work as a kolbar the incident in which his father was shot and he left the country;
c. His political activity in the UK; and
d. The circumstances of his return.
8. This is a pre-Nationality and Borders Act 2022 claim and therefore I apply the lower standard both to the question of the Appellant’s account of his past, including the disputed events in Iran, as well as the assessment of future risk.
Respondent’s position
9. The Respondent accepts the Appellant’s identity, nationality, and Kurdish ethnicity. She also accepts that the Appellant left Iran illegally.
10. The Respondent does not accept the Appellant’s account of coming to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities as a result of his work as a kolbar. More broadly, she does not accept that the Appellant will be at risk on return as a result of the individual or cumulative effect of his ethnicity and illegal exit.
11. The Respondent also makes wide-ranging criticisms of the Appellant’s credibility, which are set out in the Refusal Letter, Respondent’s Review and skeleton arguments.
Evidence
12. There was extensive documentary evidence before me in this appeal, which grew during the course of the various hearings noted above. I have received, and have carefully considered, the following:
a. The 400-page consolidated bundle;
b. The 140-page supplementary bundle;
c. The 140-page additional supplementary bundle;
d. Two skeleton arguments for both parties.
13. I heard lengthy oral evidence at the hearing of 13 January 2026. The Appellant gave evidence and was cross-examined as was his partner whom I shall call Ms M (her relationship to the Appellant was disputed by the Respondent but, for the reasons given below, I reject that submission). Finally, Dr Hedayati-Kakhki gave evidence and was cross examined.

Appellant’s credibility
14. I found the Appellant to be a truthful witness and I accept his account for the reasons which follow, having assessed the documentary and oral evidence holistically. In considering his account, I bear in mind the fact that he arrived in the UK as a child (which the Respondent does not dispute) and that he has had only limited education, both in Iran and the UK.
15. The Respondent has not disputed the Appellant’s identity, age, or his illegal exit from Iran. Ms Ahmed stated at the hearing before me that the Respondent’s position is that she neither accepts nor rejects the Appellant’s account of being a kolbar. I note that the Refusal letter states “in your asylum interview you gave a detailed account about how you started working as a Kolbar, the things you transported, how you transported them, the routes you used, and how long you worked as a Kolbar […] Your account was broadly consistent with background information”. I agree with that description and I accept that the Appellant was a kolbar. He has given clear, coherent, consistent and plausible evidence about his experiences.
16. The Respondent actively disputes the Appellant’s account of him and his father being encountered by the Pasdars, their being shot at, his father being injured, his flight and subsequent contact from his mother telling him to flee the country and making arrangement for him to do so. The Refusal Letter points to a number of matters which are described as inconsistencies between the Appellant’s screening and asylum interviews as well as his witness statement. I am not persuaded that any of these ‘inconsistencies’ can properly be treated as damaging the Appellant’s credibility:
a. The Respondent contends that the there is a discrepancy between the claim in the Appellant’s witness statement ([24]) that his mother told him the Pasdars had searched the houses in the village and the claim in his interview that the family home had been raided and his father was being searched for (AIR 133). The Appellant’s witness statement reads: “My mother told me not to come back to the village because the Pasdars had raided the village, the Pasdars knew what was happened and had searched all the houses. I believe our names must have been given to the Pasdars that night”. His asylum interview reads: “my mother said that authorities raided the house looking fr [sic] us” and at AIR 139 the Appellant’s answer is recorded as “they went to my house after they arrested my father from my father they would realised [sic] I was with him and they raided other peoples [sic] houses as well”. I do not see any significant inconsistency here, especially taking into account the Appellant’s status as an unaccompanied minor at the time of his interview. The Appellant has never suggested that he had direct knowledge of what occurred in his village after the encounter with the Pasdars and some imprecision, especially between different accounts given in different circumstances, is wholly unsurprising.
b. The Respondent in the Refusal Letter also treats the Appellant’s credibility as damaged by his giving a “speculative” answer in his interview about whether he was identified by the Pasdars. The Appellant’s explanation was “I doubt our [sic] I feel that I [sic] had been arrested or might have died because of his injury […] Im [sic] not sure whether he has been arrested or not” (AIR 139). It appears likely (as the Appellant described in oral evidence) that there was some error in the translation or recording of the interview here as it is clear that the Appellant was talking about his father and his answers plainly appear to have been misrecorded. The Appellant could only speculate about whether his father was captured or killed and what information the Pasdars might have about him. This is not a reason to impugn his credibility. For the same reason, I reject the Respondent’s position in the Refusal Letter that the Appellant’s credibility was damaged by his speculation about rival kolbars giving his details to the Pasdars. I accept that the Appellant has given such evidence as he can in the circumstances.
c. Finally, the Refusal Letter rejected the Appellant’s credibility on the basis that his information about adverse interest from the Iranian authorities came from a third party (his mother). I am unable to follow the basis on which the Respondent contends that this impugns the Appellant’s credibility. While the fact that his information came from a third party may affect the weight which attaches to it, it does not mean that the Appellant is being untruthful.
17. I therefore do not accept that any of the matters set out in the Refusal Letter, by themselves, warrant a finding that the Appellant is not telling the truth or that his credibility has been damaged. I will now consider the oral evidence he gave.
18. The Appellant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined exhaustively by Ms Ahmed. At no stage did any of his answers give me reason to doubt his credibility. He gave evidence which was consistent with his account as previously set out in his witness statement and I found him to be truthful. Ms Ahmed repeatedly put to the Appellant that he was not being truthful about his account of his experiences in Iran but did not identify anything substantive on which to base such an assertion. Ms Ahmed did not address me in closing on the Appellant’s credibility in any detail.
19. I also find that the Appellant’s credibility is supported by the evidence of Dr Hedayati-Kakhki. I address the criticisms made of the expert below. Having rejected those criticisms and found him to be a reliable expert who gave evidence in this case on which I can properly place weight, I accept his conclusion that the Appellant’s account is plausible and consistent with the background country evidence. This is consistent with my view that the Appellant is a witness of truth.
20. Various points were taken by Ms Ahmed about the Appellant's credibility in relation to his sur place activities. I deal with this below but, in summary, I do not consider that anything in his evidence on those activities should lead me to conclude that he was untruthful with the Tribunal.
Evidence of Ms M
21. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant was in a relationship with Ms M. This was unlikely to be a significant feature in the appeal in any event, as the Appellant did not raise any freestanding Article 8 claim on the basis of the relationship. However, Ms M (who attended the tribunal with the Appellant in November and January – neither attended in March) was called to give evidence to address this point.
22. Ms M stated in evidence that she is a Latvian national in the UK who holds pre-settled status. She confirmed that she was the Appellant’s girlfriend. She spoke candidly and seemed genuinely surprised that her honesty was being impugned.
23. There was no basis upon which to challenge Ms M’s veracity. She attended the Tribunal on two occasions to support the Appellant and behaved in a way wholly consistent with being his girlfriend despite being unaware that their relationship would be put in issue. I accept that she is the Appellant’s girlfriend, albeit nothing turns on this fact for the purposes of the appeal.
Evidence of Dr Hedayati-Kakhki
24. Dr Hedayati-Kakhki is a Visiting Professor at Durham Law School with a particular research interest in Iranian and Islamic law matters. He obtained his PhD from that university in 2008, which focussed on Iran. He is a special advisor at the Centre for Criminal Law and Criminal Justice at Durham University and lectures on comparative law. These and his other qualifications are set out in an appendix to the first report prepared for this appeal. I note that he says he has provided research and commentary regarding Iran for various countries’ Country of Origin Information Reports. As I note below, he has given evidence in various country guidance cases. He provided a very lengthy report in his matter, which was supplemented by an addendum report dated 11 November 2025. That evidence was challenged by the Respondent on various grounds in submissions dated 11 December 2025. The Respondent summarised her criticisms as follows:
a. “Unclear instructions to expert and/or departure from instructions.
b. Unsuitable methodology used.
c. Limited and selective consideration of country guidance, and departure from country guidance.
d. Assuming the role of an advocate.”
25. Dr Hedayati-Kakhki provided a response to these submissions and also gave oral evidence.
26. One of the Respondent’s criticisms can be disposed of directly and was discussed during the submissions hearing. The Respondent criticised Dr Hedayati-Kakhki for departing from country guidance. Ms Ahmed submitted that experts are required to follow Country Guidance cases. This is a question of law and I do not accept the Respondent’s analysis. Experts are not bound to follow Country Guidance cases. The relevant principles, which binds the Tribunal rather than witnesses to it, is set out in SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 at [47]:
“…decision-makers and tribunal judges are required to take country guidance determinations into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, are adduced justifying their not doing so.”
27. Thus, even the Tribunal is not bound to follow a Country Guidance case (albeit the circumstances in which it may depart from such a case are limited). SG recognises that witnesses may seek to submit “cogent evidence” as a basis for inviting the Tribunal to depart from Country Guidance.
28. In any event, I do not read Dr Hedayati-Kakhki’s report as departing from any of the Country Guidance cases on Iran. As is unsurprising, it reaches a more nuanced and fuller picture of the current country situation which more directly addresses the Appellant’s position than is possible in a Country Guidance case, but I do not accept that he has substantially departed from any of the Country Guidance cases. I also do not accept that his evidence is selective or unrepresentative of the Country Guidance evidence. The expert’s conclusions are consistent with my reading of the Country Guidance cases.
29. Ms Ahmed also submitted that Dr Hedayati-Kakhki had been criticised by the Tribunal in Iranian Country Guidance cases and that this should be held against him. The Respondent particularly relied upon SB (risk on return – illegal exit) Iran CG [2009] UKAIT 53 at [60], which concludes that his report did not take a “properly empirical approach” and that he “appears to be too ready to rely on sources without seeking to check whether they are corroborated/substantiated […] to jumble together quite different items of evidence […] and to draw over-generalised inferences”. An important principle which also features in this paragraph is that “each report by an expert stands to be considered on its merits, unless, of course, past criticism is in very strong terms”. That is the approach I adopt here; there has been no very strong criticism of the expert and his evidence has been accepted in cases since SB (which is now more than 15 years old and dates from shortly after the expert obtained his PhD). His evidence was cited at length throughout SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC) without any significant criticism. I do not consider that SB provides any basis for me, in 2026, placing any lesser weight on Dr Hedayati-Kakhki’s evidence.
30. On the point of instructions, these were supplied after the Respondent’s submissions. There is nothing in the instructions or the expert’s response to them which impugns his evidence.
31. The Respondent also criticised Dr Hedayati-Kakhki for not setting out his methodology. His methodology is clear from the report and was in any event explained in detail in oral evidence. It is the standard methodology used by country experts who do not undertake field research in the course of preparing the report, namely a review of contemporaneous sources and documentary evidence, supplemented by the expert’s own knowledge and understanding of the country situation. Dr Hedayati-Kakhki explained that, although he has contacts in Iran, he did not consider it safe to contact them for further information. As is unsurprising, it was not safe for him to go to Iran personally.
32. Ms Ahmed placed heavy reliance upon her submission that Dr Hedayati-Kakhki was assuming the role of an advocate. She suggests that his analysis is not independent and is “one sided”. I do not accept that criticism. Dr Hedayati-Kakhki is clear and firm in his evidence which supports the Appellant’s case. This is not inherently suspect. He was clear in his oral evidence that he understood his obligations to the Tribunal and had complied with them. His evidence is broadly consistent with the other country evidence (including the Country Guidance cases) provided in this claim and I do not consider that he is seeking to advocate for the Appellant.
33. While some fair minor criticisms of the report are made (such as several footnotes being inaccessible), none of the criticisms made justify my placing diminished weight on the expert’s conclusions. In any event, I do not consider that his conclusions materially differ from the key aspects of the Country Guidance (as I set out further below). Dr Hedayati-Kakhki is an appropriately qualified and highly experienced expert who has provided extensive evidence both in writing and orally. He gave clear and persuasive oral evidence which did not seek to bolster one side of the claim improperly. I accept his evidence.
Sur place activities
34. A distinct element of this claim is the political activism which the Appellant states he has been involved in whilst in the UK. I consider this as part of my holistic assessment of the Appellant’s credibility.
35. The evidence of the Appellant’s activism takes the form of a fairly limited number of Facebook posts (written in both Kurdish Sorani and English) and some photographs of the Appellant protesting outside the Iranian embassy.
36. The Respondent’s position was that someone else was writing the Appellant’s Facebook posts as they were inconsistent with his level of English and his lack of education in Kurdish Sorani. I was invited to find that these were bad faith attempts to bolster his claim. The Respondent also criticised the Appellant for not providing the full ‘Download your Information’ data for his Facebook account. The Appellant explained that this was genuine and that he opposed the regime. He said that he had used Google Translate to translate his Kurdish phrases into English.
37. While I accept that the sur place activity is limited, on balance I accept that the evidence is genuinely that of the Appellant and that he genuinely holds political beliefs opposed to the Iranian regime. The Appellant was able to explain coherently in oral evidence – in simple terms consistent with the limited education he has received – about the violence which protestors in Iran face, about the financial problems in Iran, about the restrictions on freedom of expression, and about Iranian state violence. I find it plausible that a Kurdish young man who understands that his father was likely killed or detained by the authorities and who had to flee state repression in Iran would wish to express opposition to the regime. I accept the submission that the Appellant has only attended a small number of protests, but this is not inconsistent with his account being truthful. Moreover, the absence of more regular attendance was plausibly explained by the fact that the Appellant previous received money from the local authority as part of the support he received, but no longer receives enough money to allow him to travel in to London. There is some material in the bundle confirming that the Appellant was supported by Suffolk County Council and in any event the timeline he provides is consistent with the support he would likely have received as a child in care and then a care leaver. I note Ms Ahmed’s submission that the Appellant had not been educated in Iran and would not be able to write in Kurdish Sorani, but I accept that by the time he was posting in the UK he was in a position to prepare the limited phrases relied upon, with the help of the internet and having learned to write in Kurdish from some other Kurds in his accommodation (as he explained in oral evidence).

Factual findings
38. In light of the foregoing analysis, I conclude that:
a. The Appellant is an Iranian Kurd.
b. His father was a kolbar and the Appellant joined his father in that work.
c. The Appellant and his father had an encounter with the Pasdars during a smuggling expedition, were shot at, and the Appellant’s father was injured.
d. While the Appellant does not have direct knowledge of what happened afterwards, he believes from conversations with his mother that his village was raided and that he was potentially identified as a person of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities. The fate of his father is unclear but it is feared he was detained or killed by the regime.
e. Thereafter, the Appellant fled Iran with the assistance of his family and arrived in the UK as a child.
f. The Appellant has engaged in limited but genuine political activism in the UK and holds genuine beliefs which oppose the Iranian regime. He has posted about this on Facebook and attended protests.
Risk on return
39. This appeal has arisen at a time of extreme volatility in Iran. By the time of the January 2026 hearing there had been escalating protests in Iran, which had met with brutal state repression. Between receiving the parties’ skeleton arguments on 27 February 2026 and the hearing in this matter on 2 March 2026 the USA and Israel engaged in strikes on Iran, leading to Iran firing missiles at various targets in the region. The region is in a state of active and ongoing conflict.
40. I invited Mr Fripp and Ms Ahmed to make submissions on what they wished me to do in light of this changing situation. Both invited me to issue a determination at this stage and resisted any further delay in concluding the appeal. I was (understandably) not addressed on the current situation at any length by either party, but they sensibly proceeded on the basis that the theocratic, repressive regime was still in place and invited me to apply the Country Guidance framework, albeit within a newly volatile situation where the state’s ‘hair trigger’ response is likely to be even more sensitive. I agree with that analysis.
41. I find that the Appellant would be at risk on return as a result of his actual and / or imputed political opinion and / or ethnicity if he were to return to Iran. I find that this risk arises as a result of the following overlapping characteristics and circumstances:
a. The Appellant is a Kurd. By itself, this does not place him at risk but may be a risk factor when combined with other factors which can lead to a real risk of persecution or serious harm: HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC).
b. The Appellant has already been subjected to direct threats of serious harm (by being shot at) and consider that, in line with Rule 339K, this gives rise to a serious indication that his claim is well-founded.
c. I accept that there is a realistic degree of likelihood that he has been identified (and / or his family has been identified) as acting as kolbars and has come to the Iranian regime’s attention as a result. I accept the evidence of Dr Hedayati-Kakhki that work as a kolbar is not only criminal, it is also liable to be seen as politically subversive by the regime. The Appellant cannot be expected to lie about these events upon return and is liable to be identified as someone involved in criminal and / or dissident activity (smuggling).
d. The Appellant exited Iran illegally and would be returned on a travel document as an enforced return. This again is not sufficient by itself to give rise to a risk on return (SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC)) but means that he may come to the regime’s attention. I note that SSH states that enforced returnees in respect of whom no adverse interest has previously been manifested are not at risk. As set out above, I find to the lower standard that the Iranian regime has expressed adverse interest in the Appellant.
e. The Appellant has been politically active in the UK. Even if he were to delete his Facebook account before being returned, he cannot be expected to lie to the authorities and, if questioned, would have to confess involvement in anti-regime activism.
f. The Appellant is genuinely opposed to the Iranian regime and its activities. If he were to express those views upon return to Iran he would be at a real risk of persecution.
42. These characteristics and their combined effect will place the Appellant at a real risk of persecution on return to Iran, especially at the ‘pinch point’ of interrogation on return. The current climate is likely to make the Iranian regime even more extreme in its suspicion of individuals such as the Appellant and in its response to any such suspicions. I consider that, even without that exacerbation in risk, the Appellant satisfies the criteria for risk on return identified in the Country Guidance caselaw (in particular HB (Kurds)).
43. There is no question of sufficient protection or internal relocation in this case as the risk emanates from the state and exists throughout the country. My findings are sufficient to dispose with the question of humanitarian protection and Articles 3 and 8 ECHR but, for the avoidance of doubt, even if I were wrong about the existence of a Convention reason, I find that the Appellant is at a real risk of serious harm on return to Iran and / or faces insurmountable obstacles to reintegration there.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 March 2026