Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001665

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54105/2024
LP/10337/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

AA
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant

and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No Appearance
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 18 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claims.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Turkey of Kurdish ethnicity born on 11 September 1992. He arrived in the UK on 7 March 2022 on a Temporary Work (Exchange) Migrant visa and was issued with a resident permit valid until 16 February 2023. He returned to Turkey in July 2022, but came back to the UK the same month. On 30 January 2023 the appellant claimed asylum. He attended a screening interview on 8 February 2023 and completed a preliminary information questionnaire on 6 November 2023. He attended a substantive asylum interview on 3 January 2024 and on 9 January 2024 he made further representations clarifying issues in his interview. His claim was refused on 2 February 2024 and he appealed against that decision.
3. The appellant’s claim can be summarised as follows.
4. The appellant claimed that he supported the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey and to have attended protests against the government. He claimed that he was arrested, detained and tortured by the Turkish authorities on two occasions, on 11 March 2014 and 16 February 2021: the first occasion when he was attending a peaceful protest at his university against an attack on an HDP building and when he and around seven other students were handcuffed and detained; and the second occasion when he was protesting against the imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan. On the second occasion the police took him from his home and interrogated him about his family links to the PKK, in particular about his uncle, and he was pressurised for names of PKK members. On each occasion he was released after two days because no evidence was found to prosecute him. The appellant claimed that his father was detained from home in December 2019, accused of being a member of the PKK, and that the special team forces raided their house looking for weapons and tortured his father before taking him away. He claimed that his father spent six months in Diyarbakir prison and was released whist his case continued but was then sentenced in 2020 to three years and two months in prison. He claimed that his father appealed the sentence and the case was still ongoing in the supreme court. He claimed that many of his family members were at times detained and charged for being involved with the PKK and that his uncle fled the country and applied for asylum and was currently a refugee in the UK.
5. The appellant claimed that his brother joined the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2014. He claimed that he found out, on 4 July 2022, that his brother had been killed and he travelled back to Turkey to support his family. Whilst there, he was detained for a third time by the Turkish authorities on 14 July 2024 when the police raided the mourning tent set out for his brother and he had a verbal altercation with them. He was detained for one day at the police station and was beaten up and punched. He realised that he had to leave Turkey and he returned to the UK. The Turkish authorities raided his family house on 18 December 2022 and arrested his father. His father was informed that he (the appellant) was wanted because of his association with the PKK. His cousin told him that two of his close friends were detained and questioned about him in December 2022 and it was after that that he decided to claim asylum, as he feared the Turkish authorities if he returned to Turkey.
6. The respondent, in the refusal decision, did not accept the appellant’s account of his involvement with the HDP party in Turkey and subsequent adverse attention and did not accept that he was of adverse attention to the Turkish authorities as a result of his brother’s involvement with the PKK and his father’s political activism. The respondent identified various inconsistencies in the appellant’s account and did not accept that he would be at any risk on return to Turkey.
7. The appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 7 January 2025. The appellant was represented at the hearing by counsel, instructed by Saxon Solicitors Ltd, and he gave oral evidence in support of his appeal.
8. The judge accepted that the appellant attended a protest at the university in 2014 and that he was detained on that occasion, but did not accept his account of having attended a protest in February 2021 or that he was an active supporter of the HDP. The judge placed little weight upon a letter purporting to be from the appellant’s local Mukhtar, but she did accept the appellant’s claim that his brother was involved with the PKK and died as a martyr. The judge also accepted, on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted, the appellant’s claim that his father was imprisoned for approximately six months and sentenced to approximately three years imprisonment for being a member of an armed terrorist organisation, and that his case was currently being appealed to the supreme court. The judge noted that the appellant’s uncle’s appeal in the UK had succeeded in 2021 and she accepted that the Turkish authorities were aware of the appellant’s connection to his uncle. The judge accepted that the appellant was detained, but she did not accept that he was arrested and she was not satisfied that he experienced torture or persecution. Whilst she accepted that the appellant met various risk factors, she did not accept that the Turkish authorities viewed him to be a threat and she did not accept that, if he was stopped and detained and questioned at the airport on his return, he would be subjected to treatment amounting to persecution. The judge found that the appellant had neither a subjective nor an objectively well-founded fear of persecution in Turkey and she accordingly dismissed the appeal on all grounds, in a decision promulgated on 11 January 2025.
9. The appellant sought permission to appeal the decision on the grounds that the judge had failed to carry out a careful scrutiny of the evidence in line with the CG case of IK( returnees- Records- IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312, and that the judge had made contradictory findings.
10. Permission was granted on all grounds in the First-tier Tribunal, as follows:
“2. The appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Turkey, who appeals against refusal of his protection claim, made on the basis of a fear of the authorities because of his extensive family connections to Kurdish politics. The respondent refused the claim on grounds of credibility.
3. The Judge has, however, concluded that the core facts of the claim are credible, including that the appellant’s brother was a PKK fighter who was ‘martyred’, that his father was imprisoned and tortured, and the appellant too had been previously detained on suspicion of political connections. Despite this leading to the conclusion that the appellant would very likely be detained on return to Turkey, it was not accepted that said detention would lead to ill-treatment.
4. The appellant now seeks permission to appeal, contending in grounds settled by counsel that the Judge has erred in law through failing to give adequate reasons supporting the conclusion that the appellant would not face ill-treatment, in light of the acceptance of much of his case, including several of the risk categories identified in the country guidance caselaw.
5. I have decided that there is arguable merit in the challenge, and that all grounds may be pursued. Permission to appeal is therefore granted. “
11. The matter came before me for a hearing on 18 July 2025. The appellant was not in attendance and neither was anyone present on his behalf. Prior to the hearing, on 8 July 2025, an email was received by the Tribunal from the appellant’s solicitors, Saxon Solicitors Ltd, applying to come off the record as representatives and advising the Tribunal that, despite numerous attempts to contact the appellant they had received no response from him and were no longer in a position to continue acting in the matter. In the circumstances, and having confirmed that the notice of hearing was sent to the appellant in person by email and post and was properly served on his last known address, I was satisfied that he would have been aware of the hearing but had chosen not to attend, and I saw no reason not to proceed with the appeal in in his absence. I did not consider there to be any unfairness in proceeding without him in the circumstances.
12. Ms Nolan made submissions before me. She submitted, with regard to ground one, that the judge applied the country guidance in IK and considered the risk factors referred to at [133] of IK. She referred to [133(10)] of IK which made clear that the risk factors should not be used as a checklist. As for ground two, Ms Nolan submitted that the judge did not make contradictory findings at [48] of her decision, but was distinguishing between ‘detention’ and ‘arrest’, as [133(1)] of IK required, and that the judge did not conflate the standards of proof.
Analysis
13. It is asserted in the grounds upon which permission was granted that the judge ought to have allowed the appellant’s appeal on the basis of the positive findings made, namely that the appellant’s brother was a PKK fighter who was ‘martyred’, that his father was imprisoned and tortured, and that he had been previously detained on suspicion of political connections. However I agree with Ms Nolan that the judge gave full and cogent reasons why those positive findings did not lead to a conclusion that the appellant would be at risk on return to Turkey.
14. The judge did so by carefully addressing the various risk factors as set out in IK. The risk factors are set out at [14] of IK, with reference to [46] of A (Turkey) CG [2003] UKIAT 00034 and it is clear from a reading of the judge’s decision that she addressed each factor in turn, from [18]. By way of example, she started, at [18], with findings on the appellant’s level of involvement in a separatist organisation ([18] to [23]), in line with [46(a)] of A (Turkey), where she found that the appellant was not an active supporter or member of HDP. At [19] the judge considered any sur place activities in the UK, in line with [46(n)] of A (Turkey), finding there to be no meaningful involvement in such activities. The judge considered at [24] to [26] the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant in support of his claimed political involvement and adverse interest by the authorities, concluding that little weight could be given to that evidence. The judge gave careful consideration to the appellant’s claim in regard to periods of detention, at [21] to [22], [37] to [40], [45] to [46] and [48], in line with [46(b) and (c)] of A (Turkey), having regard to the distinction identified at [133(1)] of IK between arrests and detention. At [27] to [35] the judge considered the appellant’s family connections to separatist organisations, in line with [46(f)] of A (Turkey), and at [36] to [38] and [45] she considered the degree of ill-treatment to which he was subjected in the past, as consistent with [46(e)] of A (Turkey). The judge’s findings at [56] addressed the issue of whether the appellant was charged with anything or placed on reporting instructions, as consistent with [46(d)] of A (Turkey), and at [42] the judge addressed the risk factor at [46(g)] of A (Turkey). At [53]the judge considered the status of the appellant’s passport, as consistent with [46(k)] of A (Turkey).
15. Given the judge’s detailed analysis of the appellant’s evidence as against the various risk factors in A(Turkey), it cannot possibly be said that there was a failure by the judge to carry out a careful scrutiny of the evidence. The fact that the judge found various risk factors to have been made out does not, as the grounds appear to suggest, lead to an inevitable outcome for the appeal. As Ms Nolan properly submitted, the judge’s overall conclusion was entirely in accordance with the guidance at [133(10)] of IK, where it was found that “Many of the individual risk factors described in A (Turkey) comprise in themselves a broad spectrum of variable potential risk that requires careful evaluation on the specific facts of each appeal as a whole. The factors described in A (Turkey) were not intended as a simplistic checklist and should not be used as such. “
16. The judge provided clear reasons as to why the risk factors identified were not considered to be sufficient to demonstrate that the appellant was a person of interest to the Turkish authorities and as to why, whilst he may well be held for questioning on return to Turkey on account of his lack of an up-to-date passport and on account of his ethnicity, he would not be at risk of being subjected to ill-treatment amounting to persecution. The judge provided cogent reasons for concluding that, despite his family connections to separatist activity, the appellant was not of interest to the authorities himself. It was the judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s periods of detention followed incidents at which he was, or was considered to be, one of any participants and that they were not due to any specific interest in him on the basis of any activities he had undertaken himself or on the basis of his links to his politically active family members. The most recent detention was considered by the judge to have resulted simply from the appellant’s altercation with the police at his brother’s funeral and, again, not through any political profile he had which gave rise to an adverse interest. The judge noted that the appellant had never been arrested or charged with any offence. The judge considered that the fact that the appellant felt able to return to Turkey suggested that he did not consider himself to be at any risk, that the fact that he entered and exited Turkey freely without problems suggested that he was of no interest to the authorities, and that the timing of his asylum claim coincided with the ending of his leave to remain in the UK rather than as a result of any genuine fear of returning to Turkey. The judge concluded that any questioning the appellant would be subjected to on his arrival at the airport in Turkey would result in him being released without ill-treatment amounting to persecution on the grounds that he would not be seen as a threat to the authorities.
17. Accordingly, there is no merit in the assertion in the first ground that there was a failure by the judge to explain why the appellant would not be at risk on return to Turkey. On the contrary the judge gave a detailed account of her reasons for so concluding, following a careful analysis of the evidence, in accordance with the country guidance and the background country evidence. The judge was perfectly entitled to conclude that the appellant’s profile was not such as to give rise to any adverse interest in him.
18. Likewise, there is no merit in the second ground in which it is asserted that the judge made contradictory findings, at [48] of her decision, and conflated the standards of proof. As this was a case in which the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applied, the judge had to determine on the balance of probabilities whether the appellant’s account was a credible one and one which credibly demonstrated his claim to be in fear of persecution. The judge properly self-directed herself in that regard at [1] and [14] of her decision. At [48] she made her findings in accordance with that standard of proof, concluding that the appellant had made out his claim to have been detained in 2014 and 2022 but not in regard to his account of events in 2021. She went on, however, to apply the more generous approach in the lower standard of proof and assess the question of risk on return on an acceptance that all three periods of detention were accepted. The judge did not conflate the two standards of proof but rather simply gave the appellant the benefit of a more generous approach. There was no disadvantage or prejudice to the appellant in that approach and no error of law arose as a result.
19. For all these reasons the grounds are not made out. Having fully and carefully assessed the evidence, the judge made cogently reasoned findings and reached conclusions which were fully and properly open to her.

Notice of Decision
20. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 July 2025