Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001668

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/633857/2023
LH/07240/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Promulgated

On 24th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUTCHINSON

Between

EVERTON WHITE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Aziz, counsel instructed by The Legal Guys
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Background

1. The background to the Appellant’s appeal is contained in an Error of Law decision of this Upper Tribunal panel, (UTJ Hirst and DUTJ Hutchinson) dated 11 June 2025, set out in the Annex to this decision.
2. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal for remaking. For the purposes of this appeal, the Appellant asserts a right to remain in the UK on the basis of his private life because he claims that he meets the requirements of Appendix Private Life (PL) of the Immigration Rules, on the basis of 20 years continuous residence in the UK. In the alternative, the Appellant claims that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration on return, or in the further alternative, that there are exceptional circumstances in the Appellant’s case, which satisfy GEN 3.2 of the Immigration Rules.
3. In our Error of Law decision, the findings of the First-tier Tribunal at paragraphs 19, 30-33 and 48 were preserved. These findings accept the Appellant’s genuine and subsisting relationship with his wife, his date of entry on 11 February 2002 and his attempts to regularise his stay. It was accepted that the Appellant’s passport had been retained by the Respondent in 2016. The preserved findings also accepted that the Appellant had been continually resident in the UK since his marriage on 24 August 2013. The judge’s findings in relation to the important role he has played in his son’s and grandchildren’s lives in the UK were also preserved.
4. It is the Appellant’s case that since arriving in February 2002, he has never left the UK. The Respondent in the Reasons for Refusal letter dated 12 November 2023 and the Respondent’s Review dated 31 May 2024, did not accept that the Appellant had evidenced his claim to have lived in the UK for at least 20 years.
Hearing
5. We heard evidence in English from the Appellant and four additional witnesses – the Appellant’s wife Mrs Anderson White; the Appellant’s son Mr R White; his grandson Mr A White and his friend, Ms A Reid. We also had before us in the consolidated bundle, a number of additional letters from a number of individuals who claim to have known the Appellant in the UK. The documentary evidence in the bundle included (provided by the Respondent pursuant to our Directions) a copy of the Appellant’s passport which has been retained by the Respondent since 2016 and documents including correspondence from the Appellant’s GP and building society passbook extracts. We heard submissions from Mr Hulme and Ms Aziz and reserved our decision.
Legal Framework

6. The burden is on the Appellant to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that he meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules. If so this is determinative of his appeal, in accordance with TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109.
7. PL 5.1. Where the applicant is aged 18 or over on the date of application:
(a) the applicant must have been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years; or
(b) where the applicant has not been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years, the decision maker must be satisfied there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country where they would have to live if required to leave the UK.”
Findings
8. We accept that in order to satisfy the Immigration Rules, the Appellant must demonstrate continuous residence in the UK since at least 14 October 2002, 20 years before his application for leave to remain. On the basis of the preserved findings, the period still in dispute is from 8 August 2002 (when it was accepted the Appellant made an application for leave to remain as a student) until the date of his marriage on 24 August 2013, a period of 11 years.
9. The Appellant must establish that he meets the Immigration Rules on the balance of probabilities.
10. The Appellant in our findings has been clear and consistent in his evidence that he arrived in the UK in February 2002 and has remained living in London at various addresses, since that date. His son gave evidence, that was not disputed, that he himself arrived in the UK in November 2002. The Appellant’s son gave what we found to be consistent and credible evidence that his father had never left the UK in all the time he himself had been here and that since 2002 he has seen his father every week: currently he sees him ‘once or twice a week’ and when they were both first in the UK from 2002 onwards he saw his father ‘almost every day’. He explained to the Tribunal that when he first arrived his father had been staying with a friend in Cunningham Road and that during the period 2002/2003 his father had also stayed with an individual that his son knew and that sometimes his son also stayed at that accommodation with him.
11. Although Mr Hulme submitted that there were some discrepancies in the witnesses’ evidence, having considered the oral and written evidence holistically, we do not draw any adverse inference from any claimed inconsistencies, including in relation to exact places of residence in the UK at particular points of time; given the passage of time and what we are satisfied was a very transient lifestyle for the Appellant from 2002 until at least 2006 when we accept that he met his wife.
12. We take into account that those living in the UK in such circumstances, where they have no leave to remain, may struggle to provide documentary evidence of their residence at the time. It is not unusual for multiple informal living arrangements (with no tenancy agreements for example) to be a feature of such lives. It is not the case that a lack of documentary evidence covering each and every year is therefore fatal to the Appellant’s claim.
13. Considered in the round, we found the witness evidence in relation to the core of the Appellant’s account, i.e., that he has lived continuously in the UK since February 2002 without leaving the country, to be generally internally and externally consistent. This included the Appellant’s wife, who confirmed that they met in 2006. Although it was not entirely clear when they formally started living together, we accept that the couple were permanently living together at least six months before their 2013 marriage and that they regularly stayed with each other prior to this, with Ms Anderson White telling the Tribunal that they were ‘visiting each other’ from 2006 until they moved in together. We found this to be consistent with the Appellant’s oral evidence that he ‘used to go back and forward with her until it got serious’. We take into account in the round, that Ms Anderson White’s witness statement evidence in relation to their marriage and life together since 2013 had been accepted as credible by the previous Tribunal (and recorded in the preserved findings). We accept on balance her further oral evidence that she met the Appellant in the UK in 2006 and has known him to be in the UK since that time.
14. We further take into account that the Appellant’s 18 year old grandson, Mr N White, provided what we found to be credible written and oral evidence, consistent with both the Appellant’s evidence and that of the Appellant’s son, that he has known the Appellant in the UK for the whole of his life (his grandson was born in 2007). Mr N White told the Tribunal that ‘as long as I’ve been alive he has been around’. We have considered that Mr Hulme did not substantively challenge either Mr N White (in relation to 2007 onwards), or Mr R White (his father)’s consistent oral accounts corroborating the Appellant’s claim that he has lived continually in the UK since arrival.
15. Equally, the oral evidence from Ms Reid, whom the Appellant indicated was a bridesmaid at his wedding, was consistent with the evidence as a whole, including with the Appellant’s oral evidence, with Ms Reid confirming that she first saw the Appellant in the UK in 2006, as she works in Enfield, which is where the Appellant lives. When asked in cross-examination, how many times she would have seen the Appellant in an average year, she explained that they would meet for a meal at his and his wife’s house ‘most times on a Friday’ with these occasions ‘not as regular’ before the Appellant and his wife married, and that she would also see him at family occasions/parties.
16. We have considered the oral and witness statement evidence (including the additional evidence in letter form from other individuals not present, but who have confirmed their knowledge of the Appellant living in the UK). We are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the weight of this evidence supports the Appellant’s account of continuous residence in the UK since his arrival in February 2002.
17. In reaching these findings, we have taken into account that the respondent has now produced the Appellant’s passport (held by the respondent since 2016) which shows the Appellant’s entry stamp on 11 February 2002 at Gatwick airport with no further entry, exit or travel stamps. We also take into account that the expiry date for the passport was 21 February 2011.
18. Whilst we accept that such passport evidence does not in itself preclude an individual leaving and re-entering the UK clandestinely without being apprehended, in our findings it is more likely than not, that in reality the Appellant has since arriving in 2002, continued to live what appears to be a relatively quiet existence in north London, living mostly with friends/acquaintances before moving in with his wife, and socialising with immediate family, including his son and grandchildren and subsequently his wife and friends. The evidence before us was consistent with the preserved findings that the Appellant plays an important role in lives of his son and grandchildren.
19. We also had the benefit of documentary evidence in support, including correspondence from the Appellant’s GP surgery in St Ann’s Road, N15. Whilst we note that there were two letters dated 24 August 2023, one referring to attendance from January 2005 and one referring to attendance from 2001, we accepted the Appellant’s candid explanation that he could not answer for the difference, but believed that it could be because the surgery he had originally attended had moved locations and had moved from paper records to electronic files, with his GP telling him he did not have the original paper records, which may account for the error.
20. We considered this evidence in the context of what we found to be the Appellant’s detailed and cogent oral evidence about his attendance with his doctor and why he has remained with this GP surgery since coming to the UK. This included the Appellant explaining why he continued to use one of the first addresses he had in London for his GP, even after he moved including after he moved in with his wife. This appeared in large part to be due to his wish to remain with this GP and his concern that he might be deregistered if he provided his new address, which was a number of miles away. The Appellant explained that he received text messages from the surgery including when there was written correspondence for him. He also explained how he was able to return to his previous address and obtain any correspondence sent there for him. We accept on balance that the Appellant has been attending his GP, which is now located at St Ann’s Road, since shortly after his arrival in the UK.
21. The Appellant also relied on the Abbey National passbook evidence which was in both the Appellant and his wife’s name. This includes deposits and withdrawals from 2007 until 2013. Whilst Mr Hulme pointed to the fact that many of the entries in earlier years appeared to be interest paid, rather than any transactions, we accept the Appellant and his wife’s consistent evidence that she had another account and that his wife provided financially for him, over and above this bank account. We accept the Appellant’s consistent oral evidence that after 2013 this account was cancelled due to the Appellant not having immigration status. It is within the knowledge of the Tribunal that the Immigration Act 2014 required banks and building society’s to close/restrict access to accounts where the holder did not have leave to remain in the UK.
22. We have attached weight therefore to the broadly consistent oral and documentary evidence from a variety of different sources covering the Appellant’s life in the UK since his arrival in 2002. It is unsurprising in our view that the Appellant has less documentation for the earlier part of his life in the UK, including given the passage of time and the Appellant’s reliance for long periods on the assistance of friends and acquaintances. On the basis of all the evidence relied on, we are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant has lived in the UK continuously since arriving in February 2002.
23. Considered in the round therefore, we find that the Appellant has established that he has resided in the UK continuously since February 2002, a period of over 20 years at the date of his application for leave to remain. Therefore, the Appellant satisfies the requirements of Appendix PL5.1(a).
24. Relying on our findings, the Appellant meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules and there is therefore no public interest in refusal. As the Appellant’s appeal succeeds on long residence grounds, we need not consider the remaining grounds.
Notice of Decision
The decision of Judge Anzani involved the making of an error of law and is set aside. We remake the decision by allowing the appeal on human rights grounds.
We make no fee award.

M M Hutchinson

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 September 2025

Annex – Error of Law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001668

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/633857/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUTCHINSON

Between

EVERTON WHITE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Aziz, counsel instructed by The Legal Guys
For the Respondent: Ms Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 21 February 2025, dismissing his appeal against the refusal of leave to remain as the spouse of a British citizen.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 10 April 2025. On 22 April 2025 the Respondent filed a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, conceding that there was a material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
3. The appeal came before a panel of the Upper Tribunal (UTJ Hirst and DUTJ Hutchinson) at an error of law hearing on 10 June 2025. Having heard submissions from the parties we gave our decision with reasons to follow, which are set out below.

Background
4. The Appellant is a citizen of Jamaica. He first entered the UK as a visitor on 11 February 2002. On 8 August 2002 he applied for leave to remain as a student. That application was rejected on 18 September 2002. The Appellant maintains that he has not left the UK since 2002.
5. In January 2006 the Appellant met his wife, who is a British citizen. They were married on 24 August 2013. Thereafter the Appellant made a number of unsuccessful attempts to regularise his status. On 14 October 2022 the Appellant made his third application for leave to remain as the spouse of his wife. The Respondent refused that application on 12 November 2023. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant met the suitability and eligibility relationship requirements of the Immigration Rules, but he could not meet the eligibility immigration status requirements of paragraphs E-LTRP 2.1-2.2 as he did not have valid leave to remain. The Respondent maintained that paragraph EX.1 of Appendix FM was not met as there were not insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK.
6. The appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on 17 February 2025. The First-tier Tribunal found (§30) that the Appellant had arrived in the UK on 11 February 2002 and had applied for further leave on 8 August 2002, and accepted (§33) that the Appellant had been continuously resident in the UK since 24 August 2013. The First-tier Tribunal did not however accept that the Appellant had been continuously resident in the UK between August 2002 and August 2013. The Tribunal found that the Appellant had not established 20 years’ continuous residence in the UK and that there were not very significant obstacles to his integration in Jamaica, and that there were no exceptional circumstances under paragraph GEN 3.2. The appeal was dismissed under the Immigration Rules and Article 8 ECHR.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 10 April 2025. Following the grant of permission, on 22 April 2025 the Respondent filed a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Paragraph 2 of the response stated:
“The respondent does not oppose the appellant’s application for permission to accepts that the Judge may have erred in his assessment of the length of the appellant’s residence. The appellant arrived in the UK in 2002 and made his application for leave to remain in 2022 which resulted in the decision under appeal.” [sic]
Discussion and decision
8. The wording of the Rule 24 response did not make clear the Respondent’s position on the appeal. As the response was filed after the grant of permission to appeal, it was otiose to state that permission was not opposed. Further, the response did not make it clear whether the Respondent now accepted that the Applicant had accrued 20 years’ residence, which was a central issue in the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal.
9. At the outset of the hearing, I therefore asked Ms Tariq to clarify the Respondent’s position and offered her time to take further instructions. She was not able to obtain further instructions on whether the Respondent accepted the Appellant’s residence, and was able to confirm only that the Respondent accepted that the judge had made a material error in his assessment of the Appellant’s long residence under Appendix Private Life as set out in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal.
10. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal, which were unclear and difficult to follow, criticised the First-tier Tribunal’s approach to Appendix Private Life in several respects. First, the Appellant asserted that the First-tier Tribunal had erred (at §37) in its interpretation of a passage in the Respondent’s previous refusal of leave dated 2 August 2016. The passage in question stated:
“…it is noted that you are a national of Jamaica and that you entered the UK on 11 February 2002. At the date of your application you were 55 years old.
You have therefore lived in the UK for 14 years and it is not accepted you have lived continuously in the UK for at least 20 years….”
11. At §37, the judge rejected a submission by the Appellant’s representative that that passage should be interpreted as the Respondent acknowledging that the Appellant had been continuously resident in the UK for 14 years at the time of the 2016 decision. She stated,
“In my view, the Respondent was merely assessing the Appellant’s claim, taking his account at its highest, rather than making a definitive finding that he had been continuously resident in the UK for 14 years as of the decision date.”
12. On behalf of the Appellant, Ms Aziz submitted that the judge had erred by wrongly applying an approach used in certification of claims as clearly unfounded under s94 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Further, it was procedurally unfair for the judge not to make the Appellant aware of her interpretation of the letter at the appeal hearing.
13. I do not accept either submission. The use of the phrase “taking his account at its highest” did not, on a fair reading, indicate that the judge was approaching the 2016 refusal letter in the same way as a clearly unfounded certification; rather, the judge was simply reading the refusal letter as a whole. The statement in the 2016 letter that “You have therefore lived in the UK for 14 years” was only sensibly read together with the preceding paragraph and interpreted in the sense of “even on your own case, you have only lived in the UK for 14 years”. It is in that sense that the First-tier Tribunal judge used the phrase “taking his account at its highest”. I therefore do not accept that the judge erred in her interpretation of the Respondent’s 2016 letter.
14. Nor do I accept that it was procedurally unfair for the judge not to raise her interpretation of the 2016 letter at the hearing. Throughout the Appellant’s numerous previous attempts to regularise his status and in this appeal, the Respondent’s consistent position has always been that the Appellant’s continuous residence from August 2002 was not accepted. The Appellant’s positive case, presented at the hearing and recorded by the judge at §37, was that the 2016 letter should be interpreted as acceptance of the Appellant’s residence. Having heard argument, the judge was obviously not bound to accept that submission and she was not required to raise her conclusion with the parties at the hearing.
15. The second ground on which the Appellant challenged the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was the judge’s approach to the evidence of the Appellant’s witnesses. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal asserted that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to indicate which evidence it accepted and which it rejected. Further, the judge had failed to consider the evidence in its totality.
16. The evidence before the First-tier Tribunal included the Appellant’s witness statement, a statement by the Appellant’s son Mr Rohan White, supporting statements from family friends (Mr McDonald, Mr Simms, and Ms Hazle) and a very brief letter from the Appellant’s wife which simply confirmed that she and the Appellant had been married and lived together since 24 August 2013. The Appellant’s wife did not attend to give oral evidence. Mr Rohan White, Mr Simms and Ms Hazle attended and gave oral evidence.
17. After careful consideration I conclude that the judge erred in her approach to the witness evidence in two ways. First, as asserted in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, the decision did not make it sufficiently clear which parts of the witness evidence were accepted and which rejected, nor why the evidence, which in important respects appears to have been unchallenged, was not accepted.
18. The judge accepted (§38) that the witnesses had attended in good faith. Despite expressing reservations about the Appellant’s wife’s non-attendance at the hearing, the judge accepted her evidence, which materially formed the basis for the finding at §33 that the Appellant had been continuously resident in the UK since his marriage on 24 August 2013.
19. Mr Simms’ witness statement stated that he had known the Appellant in Jamaica and had met up with him some 20 years later when the Appellant came to the UK; his evidence was that “over the last 20 years we see one another almost weekly. We live close to each other so we visit one another regularly and chat and reminisce the years we spent in Jamaica [sic]”. From the decision and documents, there does not appear to have been a significant difference in the quality of Mr Simms’ evidence to that of the Appellant’s wife (if anything, Mr Simms’ statement was considerably more detailed), and there judge did not record any challenge to Mr Simms’ credibility or truthfulness. The judge noted (§40) that Mr Simms had been unable to provide an exact date when he had reconnected with the Appellant in the UK and on that basis concluded that she could not be satisfied that he was in contact with the Appellant during “all or part of the period from August 2002 to August 2013”. The judge did not in my view adequately explain the difference in her approach to Mr Simms’ evidence to that of the Appellant’s wife. Nor did her reasons adequately explain why Mr Simms’ inability to provide an exact date for an event which had taken place over 20 years previously meant that none of his evidence about his frequent contact with the Appellant was accepted.
20. Similarly, Mr Rohan White’s equally brief statement included evidence that when his children were young the Appellant and his wife had taken care of them including through sleepovers at the Appellant’s house. Again, there does not appear to have been any challenge to Mr White’s credibility or truthfulness and his evidence was supported by letters from the Appellant’s grandchildren which both stated that the Appellant had usually taken care of them when their parents were working. The judge accepted that evidence (§48) but noted (§39) that Mr White had not been able to “unequivocally establish” that the Appellant had not left the UK during the periods in question, and that he had not asserted that he lived continuously with the Appellant. Again, the judge did not in my view explain adequately whether she accepted any of Mr White’s evidence as to his father’s presence in the UK, nor is it clear from her reasoning whether she gave any weight to the Appellant’s care for his grandchildren as evidence of his presence in the UK during the relevant period.
21. Similarly, Ms Hazle’s evidence was that she had known the Appellant for over 20 years and that from 2005-2006 he would look after her daughter while she was at work. The judge did not make any finding as to whether that evidence was accepted or rejected. Mr McDonald’s statement was admittedly very brief and lacking in relevant detail; but no reference was made to it at all in the decision.
22. I have some sympathy for the judge, because the witness statements before her were all lacking in detail; the letter from the Appellant’s wife in particular was startlingly short. Whilst the judge was not bound to accept the witness evidence, she was required to explain with reasons which parts she accepted and which were rejected. I consider that the judge’s reasoning did not adequately do so, nor explain the apparent difference in treatment of the Appellant’s wife’s evidence and that of the three witnesses who attended. I also accept the Appellant’s submission that the judge did not consider the body of evidence before her as a whole.
23. Further, the judge’s reference (at §39) to the lack of evidence to “unequivocally establish that the Appellant had not left the UK during the periods in question” indicates an error of approach to the Appellant’s long residence claim. To establish continuous residence, the Appellant was not required to demonstrate that he had not left the UK, but only that he had not been absent from the UK for periods in excess of six months during the relevant period. Further, the relevant standard of proof was the balance of probabilities; “unequivocal” proof was not required.
24. For those reasons I agree with the parties that the First-tier Tribunal erred materially in law and that the decision should be set aside.
25. The Appellant relied on a further ground of appeal challenging the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion (at §51) that there were not exceptional circumstances which satisfied GEN 3.2 of the Immigration Rules. The grounds of appeal are somewhat unclear, but I do not accept that the First-tier Tribunal erred in its consideration of the relevant factors at §47-48. However, in light of the findings at §50 as to the proportionality of the Appellant making an application for entry clearance from abroad, I consider that on rehearing further consideration may need to be given to the effect of the recent Court of Appeal decision in Butt v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 189, which post-dated the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on this appeal.
Disposal
26. The parties left the question of disposal to the panel. I consider that the appeal can and should be reheard in the Upper Tribunal in accordance with the relevant Practice Direction and have made appropriate case management directions below.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law and is set aside. The appeal is to be reheard by the Upper Tribunal.

There is no challenge to the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that there were not insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Jamaica and the rehearing will not reconsider that issue. The findings of the First-tier Tribunal at paragraphs 19, 30-33 and 48 are preserved, namely the findings as to the Appellant’s genuine and subsisting relationship with his wife, his date of entry, his attempts to regularise his stay, the retention of his passport by the Respondent in 2016, and the important role he has played in his son’s and grandchildren’s lives.

Case management directions

1. The Appellant shall by 4pm on 4 July 2025 file and serve an application under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 together with any further evidence on which he proposes to rely.
2. The Respondent shall by 4pm on 4 July 2025 investigate the whereabouts of the Appellant’s passport which was retained during his 2016 application for leave, and file and serve either (i) a copy of the passport, or (ii) an explanation of why the passport is not available and what efforts have been made to locate it.
3. The Respondent shall by 25 July 2025 file and serve a further review of the Appellant’s case, and confirm in particular whether she accepts that the Appellant was continuously resident in the UK between 8 August 2002 and 24 August 2013, and if not whether any periods of residence during that time are accepted.
4. The appeal shall be listed for rehearing with a time estimate of 1 day on the first available date after 25 July 2025.
5. The Appellant must file on CE-file and serve an electronic bundle of all relevant documents, paginated continuously and hyperlinked, which complies with the President’s guidance on the format of electronic bundles in the Upper Tribunal, no later than 7 days before the hearing.
6. No later than 3 days before the hearing, the parties must file on CE-file and serve any skeleton argument on which they intend to rely.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 June 2025