Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001674

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50617/2024
LH/03985/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 August 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SKINNER

Between

BB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. West, Counsel, instructed by Law Lane Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a citizen of Albania who has victim of human trafficking and appalling sexual violence. She claims to be at risk on return to Albania from her father and from her traffickers. She sought asylum on that basis on 30 September 2022 having arrived by small boat from Belgium, where she had resided for just over a year, that day.

2. By virtue of s.1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, the Appellant is entitled to anonymity as a result of the nature of her claim. I therefore make the order set out above anonymising her identity and restricting the reporting of it.

3. By decision dated 9 January 2024, the respondent refused her claim. She appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”), which, by decision dated 30 January 2025, dismissed her appeal on both protection and human rights (Article 8) grounds.

4. Permission to appeal to this Tribunal was sought in respect of both the protection and Article 8 aspects of the FTT’s decision, but, by a decision dated 12 May 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds granted permission in respect of Article 8 only.

5. This appeal was listed to be heard by a Panel comprising Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick and me and the hearing commenced before the Panel as intended. However, during the hearing Judge Ruddick became unwell and was unable to continue hearing the appeal. In the circumstances, we considered that it was in accordance with the overriding objective for me to continue to hear the appeal alone to avoid the need for an adjournment. I canvassed this possibility with the parties, both of whom agreed with that approach. After the hearing, the Principal Resident Judge (to whom the relevant powers are delegated) made a transfer order to facilitate this, pursuant to paragraph 9.1(b) of the Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal of 11 June 2018 on the basis that it was not practicable for the Original Tribunal (as defined) to complete the hearing. While Judge Ruddick and I discussed the case prior to the hearing and began hearing the case together, I should emphasise that this decision is mine alone.

The decision of the FTT

6. While this appeal is focused only on the FTT’s decision so far as it relates to Article 8, the FTT’s reasoning in relation to Article 8 cross-refers to what it had said about the appellant’s protection claim. It is therefore necessary to set it the FTT’s reasoning as a whole relatively fully.

7. After summarising the nature of the appellant’s claim, the legal framework and the issues for resolution the FTT turned to its findings at para 12.

8. At paras 12-13 it was noted that there was no dispute about the appellant’s membership of a particular social group or that the appellant had a subjective fear of persecution in Albania, there being no credibility challenges to the appellant’s account.

9. At paras 14-19, the FTT noted the issues that had to be decided (whether the appellant would be persecuted, whether there would be sufficient protection available and whether she could internally relocate) and made various cross-cutting findings relevant to each of them. In particular, at para 15-17, the FTT noted that it had taken into account three relevant CPINs, noted the Country Guidance case of TD and AD, and concluded that while the Albanian state has made good, ongoing, progress in implementing reforms and measures to tackle trafficking generally, female victims who return to Albania may face a risk of re-trafficking, discrimination and stigma (although discrimination and stigma would not amount to persecution) depending on the circumstances.

10. Further, at para 19, the FTT considered the factors required by TD and AD, which the FTT considered were relevant to each of the risk in the appellant’s home area, the likelihood of her being able to avail herself of protection and the reasonableness of relocation away from her home area to a different part of Albania. In this respect, the FTT found as follows:

a. “With regard to her background, her father was a miner and her mother worked in a shop but they were able to pay for her and her brother to live in Tirana whilst she was at university and are therefore not without financial resources or an interest in education.
b. Her family are from the northern part of Albania. She describes her father as a strict Muslim who felt entitled to decide whom she married.
c. She will have no family network support on return. The respondent has accepted that the appellant has experienced family breakdown. Her evidence was that she had not had any contact with her mother since 2021 and had been told not to contact them again.
d. She has a nursing degree. She has not had any paid work experience as a nurse but did voluntary work during the pandemic. She has potential, with the right support, to be able to get a good job working as a nurse.
e. She has mental health problems. The medico-legal report states that she meets the criteria for moderately severe depression and severe anxiety and has symptoms of PTSD and required medication and psychological therapies. She is prescribed medication by her GP and is awaiting a referral for talking therapies. The psychiatrist formed the view that she was at risk of an increase in suicidal thoughts if returned to Albania, but she has no history of suicidal behaviour and her children are described as protective factors. Her mental health problems are not significantly impacting on her functioning at present – she is able to look after her children and spoke confidently at the hearing about being able to do any kind of job in the UK.
f. She has 2 children, both very young, both illegitimate, one of whom was born through prostitution and the other conceived and born in the UK but has no father involved.
g. She is now 27.”

11. At paras 20-22 the FTT then considered whether the appellant would be at risk of persecution in her home area. With regard to the risk from those who previously trafficked her, the FTT took into account that although they were Albanian nationals, one of whom said he had a business in Albania, the appellant met them in Belgium and the exploitation and trafficking was confined to Belgium and was not carried out by people from her home area or who have connections to it. She would accordingly not be at risk of serious harm from her traffickers. As to the risk in her home area from her father and/or the person she was supposed to marry, the FTT accepted that there would be a risk of domestic abuse or of being ostracised and of her being left in a very vulnerable position putting her at risk of further exploitation by criminals.

12. At paras 23-25, the FTT considered the reasonableness of internal relocation for the appellant. At para 24, the FTT noted that the evidence showed that: she would be able to gain entry into the Albanian NRM and a reception and reintegration programme and be referred to a shelter; she would be provided with accommodation, food and basic healthcare and would have access to mental health support there; childcare would be available; her stay there could be up to 2 years; she may receive assistance in respect of employment and skills; mental health support is generally available with shelters providing treatment by trained psychologists; a person may stay in a shelter for 3 to 5 years if mental health issues necessitate this.

13. At para 25, the FTT acknowledged that the background material indicated that there is room for improvement in the support available to victims of trafficking in Albanian and that there are characteristics that make the appellant vulnerable, in particular her mental health and having two young children. However, the FTT found that internal relocation and entering the reception and reintegration programme and shelter would be a reasonable option for the appellant and would provide sufficient protection to avoid the risk of persecution. The difficulties she would face, such as having to contemplate eventually living on her own, juggling employment with having 2 young children, the social stigma of living without the wider family, although challenging, would not meet the threshold of persecution.

14. At paras 26, the FTT considered Article 8. Given that this reasoning forms the focus of the appeal before me, it merits setting out in full:

“26. Based on the same factors I am not satisfied that the appellant would face circumstances that would reach the threshold of very significant obstacles to her re-integration in Albania because of the support available. Her family life is with her 2 children who would return with her. Their best interests are to remain with their mother and they would have access along with her to support, childcare and protection under the reception and reintegration programme.”

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

15. The Grounds of Appeal set out a root-and-branch attack on the FTT’s findings. Given, however, that the appellant only has permission to appeal in relation to them FTT’s approach to Article 8, it suffices to note the grounds challenging that aspect of the decision. Mr West helpfully articulated them at the hearing as follows:

a. Ground 1: the FTT failed to consider the factors it had considered in relation to the protection claim separately through an Article 8 ‘prism’;
b. Ground 2: there were additional factors to those considered in relation to the protection claim which were relevant to the Article 8 assessment and which the FTT failed to take into account; and
c. Ground 3: the FTT failed to conduct any express proportionality balancing exercise.

16. The respondent opposed the first two of these grounds, but accepted that there had been a failure to sufficiently set out a proportionality balancing exercise. In relation to that however, Mr Nappey submitted that such failure was immaterial. The respondent accordingly submitted that the appeal should be dismissed, notwithstanding the acknowledged error. I am content to proceed on the basis of the concession in respect of ground 3, although I have my doubts about its correctness and I should not be taken to endorse it.

17. As to the first ground, I do not accept that the FTT failed to consider the factors which it had considered in relation to the protection claim through the Article 8 ‘prism’. Mr West was unable to point me to any express misdirection made by the FTT in relation to the Article 8 claim and I am not confident from the FTT’s express reasoning that the Article 8 aspect of the FTT’s decision is based on any implicit misdirection. Indeed, I am confident that it was not. The FTT, having considered the appellant’s protection claim, set out a new heading (“Article 8”) and stated that it was not satisfied that there would be very significant obstacles to reintegration, which is plainly a consideration of Article 8, not protection. The high point of Mr West’s submission in this respect was that the FTT’s assessment of Article 8 was “Based on the same factors” as the protection claim. That however is not indicative of an erroneous approach, merely that the same factors as were taken into account in looking at the claim through the prism of protection were also considered to be relevant when one looks at the claim through the prism of Article 8. Indeed, there was no dispute about this: Mr West’s skeleton argument before the FTT accepted at para 41 that there was “much overlap” between the two claims. I therefore reject ground 1.

18. In relation to the second ground, Mr West submitted that there were four factors additional to those considered for the purposes of the protection claim which the FTT was required to, but did not, take into account. Taking these in turn:

a. First, it was said that the FTT did not take into account the social stigma that the appellant would face on return. However, in my judgment this plainly was taken into account. It was noted by the FTT as an issue faced by female victims of trafficking in para 17, the risk of the appellant being ostracised by her family considered in para 22 was in my judgment a reference to the sort of social stigma that she would face (albeit only how it would be manifested by the appellant’s family), and in para 25, the FTT refers to the difficulties the appellant would face “such as…the social stigma of living without the wider family”. There was no suggestion that this was a different sort of stigma to that said by Mr West to have been omitted from consideration. When the FTT stated at para 26 that the assessment of Article 8 was “[b]ased on the same factors” as the decision on the protection claim, this, in my view, included consideration of social stigma.
b. Second, Mr West submitted that the FTT had not considered that the psychological report had stated that the appellant was not fit to fly. It is correct that this was not referred to expressly by the FTT in relation to Article 8, but I do not consider that this is demonstrative of any error. The appellant’s fitness or otherwise to fly is not, of itself, relevant to Article 8. Whether her mental ill-health would interfere with the safe conduct of the flight or whether the flight environment would exacerbate her condition is not relevant to her ability to integrate once she has landed. It is, rather, indicative of the severity of the mental health difficulties which themselves may prevent her integration on return, and it is clear, in my judgment, that the FTT was fully appraised of and took into account the appellant’s mental ill-health. As set out above, this (and the expert report) were expressly considered in para 19(e) and, at para 24, a significant portion of the FTT’s reasoning in relation to the reasonableness of internal relocation was based on the availability of mental health support in shelters to which she would have access on return. Her mental health was also recognised as a “particular vulnerability” in para 25. Her mental health, of which her unfitness to fly was simply one aspect, was accordingly one of the factors which the FTT took into account.
c. Third, it was submitted that the FTT failed to take account of the appellant’s social networks in the UK, which were relevant to the private life she had built up while in this country. I asked Mr West what the evidence before the FTT of her social networks was and he took me to para 16 of the appellant’s witness statement and paras 7.8 and 7.20 of the medical report. Para 16 of the appellant’s statement does not however mention her social networks in the UK (nor indeed in Albania); it is principally about the ease with which she perceives she might be found by her father on return. Para 7.8 of the medico-legal report refers to a social network that she “may” have and para 7.20 appears to be predicated on the assumption that she has friends in the UK and so those paragraphs do not advance Mr West’s case to any significant degree. However, it is right to note that para 7.19 of the report states, “She has a range of close trusted friends whom she relies upon for moral support” and this appears to be based on what the appellant told Dr Hameed, which is recorded at 4.14 as, “Having lived in the UK since 2022, she has established a wide circle of friends here who support her morally.” It is not clear to me why I was not taken to these paragraphs of the report, which are plainly the more relevant. There are nonetheless two answers to Mr West’s submission:
i. The first is that the absence of reference to a particular factor does not mean that it has been left out of consideration. Indeed, this Tribunal is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the FTT has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration: Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48 at [2(iv)]. There is no compelling reason to depart from this assumption here. The only reason Mr West gave as to why he said this evidence had not been taken into account was the absence of express reference to it, which, as Volpi establishes, is generally insufficient. The FTT had plainly read the report – it is referred to a number of times. I am not satisfied that this aspect was omitted from the FTT’s consideration simply because it is not referred to in the decision.
ii. Second, even assuming that the FTT did leave out of consideration the evidence of the appellant having a social network in the UK, it seems to me that, at least on its own, this is incapable rationally of making a difference to the outcome. The evidence given was vague – what the appellant told Dr Hameed is not reported verbatim, no details of the friends is given, nor is the type of support they provide beyond it being ‘moral’. It is said they live in London, whereas the appellant lives in Southend, but the evidence did not indicate whether she sees them in person, or communicates with them via telephone and other electronic means. There was nothing to suggest that she could not continue to rely on them for the moral support they currently provide on her return to Albania, by telephone or other electronic means. Even taking it at its highest, this factor is not one that could properly have made any difference.
d. The fourth matter said to have been omitted from consideration from the Article 8 analysis was the nature and quality of the appellant’s private life built up in the UK. I was not however taken to any evidence, beyond that set out above, of the nature and/or quality of the private life built up here by the appellant. In those circumstances, it was not an error for the FTT not to have expressly considered it and, in any event, had the FTT done so, it too could not rationally have made any difference. As noted, the evidence of the appellant’s friendships was lacking in any real particularity.

19. In relation to each of the four factors, I would additionally note that they fall foul of the Lata principle (see Lata (FtT: principle controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC)). It is not sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not to make express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon. Having considered the appellant’s Supplementary Appeal Skeleton Argument (which Mr West confirmed replaced the earlier version in the bundle and represented the case he put before the FTT), it is tolerably clear that under Article 8, there was no suggestion that particular heed had to be given to social stigma, the appellant’s fitness to fly, her social networks, or the nature and quality of her private life, the matters it is now complained should have been specifically considered under this head.

20. For these reasons, ground 2 fails.

21. As to the third ground, as already noted, the respondent has conceded that the FTT’s reasoning in relation to Article 8 failed to appropriately set out how it was balancing the various factors outside of the immigration rules. The question is whether a rationally directed tribunal, if it had carried out the requisite balancing exercise could, in light of the findings of primary fact which the FTT reached and which are not challenged (permission to do so having been refused), have allowed the appeal on Article 8 grounds.

22. Dealing first with private life, the first question for the FTT would be whether there are very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in Albania. I am satisfied that no properly directed FTT could rationally answer this question in the appellant’s favour:

a. Assuming in the appellant’s favour that that the quality of the appellant’s private life is relevant to this question, the evidence of this that was before the FTT is, as noted above, vague, and, at best, shows a set of friendships providing moral support. Notably however, no friends gave evidence before the FTT and the appellant’s own evidence for the appeal omitted any reference to such friendships. The appellant’s private life in the UK, as evidenced before the FTT, was on any rational view minimal and there was no evidence before the FTT to suggest that the support her friends provide her could not be continued from the UK on her removal to Albania. In my judgment, no rationally directed FTT could give the appellant’s private life in the UK any significant weight in considering the very significant obstacles question.

b. The obstacles which the appellant would face on return to Albania are substantial and one cannot help but have sympathy for her. She has been treated appallingly and is suffering from mental ill-health and has ended up in a difficult position in her home country as a result (including by virtue of ostracization, societal stigma and discrimination). However, in light of the unchallenged findings made by the FTT as to the availability of appropriate support, including accommodation, food, healthcare, mental health support and childcare, as well as possible assistance with employment (as to which it is not disputed the appellant is a qualified nurse who would appear therefore to have reasonable job prospects on return), I am satisfied that no FTT could properly conclude that the obstacles she faces reach the elevated threshold required for them to be considered “very significant”. In light of the support she will receive, she will, on any view, be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life is carried on, to participate in it and to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted in Albania and to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to her private life.

c. Outside of the Rules, even assuming in the appellant’s favour that she speaks English and would not be financially reliant on the state, any properly directed FTT would be required by s.117B(4)(a) of the 2002 Act to give little weight to the appellant’s private life, given that she has at all times been in the UK unlawfully. Little weight for the purpose of s.117B is not a fixity, but in light of the very limited evidence of the nature of the private life she has developed, it would not be properly open to a properly directed FTT to give substantial weight to it. Further, I do not consider that the appellant’s circumstances can be rationally said to reach the high threshold of unjustifiably harsh consequences in light of the extensive support available to her on return, on the FTT’s unchallenged findings. In my judgment, any properly directed FTT on the basis of those findings would be required to refuse the claim under Article 8 outside of the rules.

23. As to family life, it is not suggested that either of the appellant’s children is a qualifying child for the purposes of s.117B(6) of the 2002 Act. In assessing the children’s best interests it will normally be reasonable for children to be with their parent(s) and that is the common sense starting point (NA (Bangladesh) [2021] EWCA Civ 953 at [30]). There is nothing in this case which would enable a properly directed and rational FTT to come to any other conclusion. While the eldest child is in school and no doubt both will have struck up friendships with other children their age, they are young and healthy and it has not been suggested that there is any reason why they would not be capable of readily adapting to life in Albania. It has not been suggested that they have any family in the UK beyond their mother, with whom they would return as a family unit. In those circumstances, no properly directed Tribunal could rationally conclude that there would be a disproportionate impact on the appellant’s family life.

24. It follows from all of the above that the FTT’s failure to set out the Article 8 balancing exercise more fully than it did is immaterial. The Article 8 claim, assessed on the basis of the undisturbed findings of the FTT, is one which, when considered by a properly directed and rational FTT, was bound to fail.

25. I therefore dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bell dated 30 January 2025 did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Paul Skinner

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 August 2025