Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001677

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66321/2023
LP/11166/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9 January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

AD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Collins, counsel, instructed by Montague Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant (‘AD’) is a citizen of Turkey who appeals against the Respondent’s decision of 7 December 2023 refusing his protection claim made on 20 September 2019. The basis for his protection claim is that he is a Turkish Kurd and claims that he came to the attention of the Turkish authorities as a result of his support for the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) and imputed support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The Appellant’s account is that he was twice arrested, detained, and tortured by the Turkish authorities as a result of his suspected political affiliations.

2. The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s account of his treatment in Turkey is not credible and he is not at risk there.

3. This matter came before me for a de novo hearing, following the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal and a subsequent hearing in the Upper Tribunal in which I found an error of law in that determination and set it aside, with no findings preserved.

4. For the reasons given below, I allow the Appellant’s appeal and find him to be a refugee.

Response to Show Cause Notice

5. For the reasons set out in my earlier judgment, I issued a Show Cause Notice in relation to Montague Solicitors. This was responded to in a timely manner by Mr Sandhu who provided a detailed explanation and apology for the errors in the case’s preparation and presentation. He also attended the hearing to reiterate his apology. I accept that apology and note the assurance that systems are now in place to avoid similar problems in future. I therefore do not consider it appropriate to impose any sanction.

Legal framework

6. The Appellant claimed asylum in the UK prior to the entry into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Thus, the statutory framework for assessing protection claims under that Act does not apply. Instead, the relevant principles arise under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention and reg. 5(1) of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. The Appellant must therefore show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason and I must apply the lower standard of realistic degree of likelihood to the assessment of both past facts and future risk. The burden of proof is on the Appellant.

7. Similar principles arise under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules in relation to humanitarian protection, which arises where a person who does not qualify as a refugee can show substantial grounds for believing that, if returned to their country of origin they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.

8. The relevant ECHR provisions are Articles 2 and 3, which are broadly coextensive with the above. The Appellant has not raised any separate claim under Article 8 ECHR.

9. I am also required to have regard to s. 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (‘AITCA’) and I bear in mind the Court of Appeal’s decision in KG (Turkey) v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1578. This provision states that:
“Claimant’s credibility
(1) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person who makes an asylum claim or a human rights claim, a deciding authority shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of any behaviour to which this section applies.
(2) This section applies to any behaviour by the claimant that the deciding authority thinks—
(a)is designed or likely to conceal information,
(b)is designed or likely to mislead, or
(c)is designed or likely to obstruct or delay the handling or resolution of the claim or the taking of a decision in relation to the claimant.
[…]
(4) This section also applies to failure by the claimant to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to make an asylum claim or human rights claim while in a safe country.”

10. The relevant Country Guidance case is IA and ors (Risk-Guidelines Separatist) [2003] UKIAT 34. While I acknowledge that IA is over 20 years old and note that NM and ors (Lone women – Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005] UKIAT 76 recognises that “the passage of time itself” can be a sufficient reason for the Tribunal to depart from a Country Guidance case, neither party suggested to me that IA was no longer relevant. I note that the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note PKK, Turkey (July 2025, “the CPIN”) states that “Whilst the caselaw is 20 years old, the broad principles it sets out on how to consider risk remain relevant (against the backdrop of the most up-to-date information).” I consider that to be the correct approach and have adopted it in writing this determination.

11. IA identified the following as an inexhaustive list of reasons which could give rise to potential suspicion in the minds of the authorities concerning a particular claimant:
“a) The level if any of the appellant’s known or suspected involvement with a separatist organisation. Together with this must be assessed the basis upon which it is contended that the authorities knew of or might suspect such involvement.
b) Whether the appellant has ever been arrested or detained and if so in what circumstances. In this context it may be relevant to note how long ago such arrests or detentions took place, if it is the case that there appears to be no causal connection between them and the claimant’s departure from Turkey, but otherwise it may be a factor of no particular significance.
c) Whether the circumstances of the appellant’s past arrest(s) and detention(s) (if any) indicate that the authorities did in fact view him or her as a suspected separatist.
d) Whether the appellant was charged or placed on reporting conditions or now faces charges.
e) The degree of ill treatment to which the appellant was subjected in the past.
f) Whether the appellant has family connections with a separatist organisation such as KADEK or HADEP or DEHAP.
g) How long a period elapsed between the appellant’s last arrest and detention and his or her departure from Turkey. In this regard it may of course be relevant to consider the evidence if any concerning what the appellant was in fact doing between the time of the last arrest and detention and departure from Turkey. It is a factor that is only likely to be of any particular relevance if there is a reasonably lengthy period between the two events without any ongoing problems being experienced on the part of the appellant from the authorities.
h) Whether in the period after the appellant’s last arrest there is any evidence that he or she was kept under surveillance or monitored by the authorities.
i) Kurdish ethnicity.
j) Alevi faith.
k) Lack of a current up-to-date Turkish passport.
l) Whether there is any evidence that the authorities have been pursuing or otherwise expressing an interest in the appellant since he or she left Turkey.
m) Whether the appellant became an informer or was asked to become one.
n) Actual perceived political activities abroad in connection with a separatist organisation.
o) If the returnee is a military draft evader there will be some logical impact on his profile to those assessing him on his immediate return.”

12. I bear in mind the Tribunal’s strong emphasis at §47 that these factors are not intended to be a “checklist” and that there is no substitute for a careful and holistic assessment of each applicant’s personal circumstances.

13. There is another relevant, but also somewhat historic, Country Guidance case, namely IK (Returnees, Records, IFA) [2004] UKIAT 312. The Tribunal’s conclusions are set out below.
“1. The evidence of Mr Aydin (paragraph 32) accurately describes the defined and limited ambit of the computerised GBT system. It comprises only outstanding arrest warrants, previous arrests, restrictions on travel abroad, possible draft evasion, refusal to perform military service and tax arrears. "Arrests” as comprised in the GBTS require some court intervention, and must be distinguished from “detentions” by the security forces followed by release without charge. The GBTS is fairly widely accessible and is in particular available to the border police at booths in Istanbul airport, and elsewhere in Turkey to the security forces.
2. In addition, there is border control information collated by the national police (Department for Foreigners, Borders and Asylum) recording past legal arrivals and departures of Turkish citizens, and information about people prohibited from entering Turkey as a result of their activities abroad, collated by MIT.
3. The Judicial Record Directorate keeps judicial records on sentences served by convicted persons, separate from GBTS. The system is known as “Adli Sicil.” It is unlikely that this system would be directly accessible at border control in addition to the information in the GBTS.
4. The Nufus registration system comprises details of age, residence, marriage, death, parents’ and children’s details, and religious status. It may also include arrest warrants and if any of the people listed have been stripped of nationality. There is no evidence that it is directly available at border control.
5. If a person is held for questioning either in the airport police station after arrival or subsequently elsewhere in Turkey and the situation justifies it, then some additional inquiry could be made of the authorities in his local area about him, where more extensive records may be kept either manually or on computer. Also, if the circumstances so justify, an enquiry could be made of the anti terror police or MIT to see if an individual is of material interest to them.
6. If there is a material entry in the GBTS or in the border control information, or if a returnee is travelling on a one-way emergency travel document, then there is a reasonable likelihood that he will be identifiable as a failed asylum seeker and could be sent to the airport police station for further investigation.
7. It will be for an Adjudicator in each case to assess what questions are likely to be asked during such investigation and how a returnee would respond without being required to lie. The ambit of the likely questioning depends upon the circumstances of each case.
8. The escalation of the violence following the ending of the PKK ceasefire reinforces our view that the risk to a Kurdish returnee of ill treatment by the authorities may be greater if his home area is in an area of conflict in Turkey than it would be elsewhere, for the reasons described in paragraphs 90 and 116.
9. The Turkish Government is taking action in legislative and structural terms to address the human rights problems that present a serious obstacle to its membership of the EU. It has made its zero tolerance policy towards torture clear. However the use of torture is long and deep-seated in the security forces and it will take time and continued and determined effort to bring it under control in practice. It is premature to conclude that the long established view of the Tribunal concerning the potential risk of torture in detention as per A (Turkey) requires material revision on the present evidence. However the situation will require review as further evidence becomes available. For the time being as in the past, each case must be assessed on its own merits from the individual's own history and the relevant risk factors as described in paragraph 46 of A (Turkey).
10. Many of the individual risk factors described in A (Turkey) comprise in themselves a broad spectrum of variable potential risk that requires careful evaluation on the specific facts of each appeal as a whole. The factors described in A (Turkey) were not intended as a simplistic checklist and should not be used as such.
11. A young, fit, unmarried person, leaving his home area and seeking unofficial employment in a big city, may not feel the need to register with the local Mukhtar, at least at the outset. Many do not. However, given the range of basic activities for which a certificate of residence is needed, and which depend upon such registration, we conclude that it would in most normal circumstances be unduly harsh to expect a person to live without appropriate registration for any material time, as a requirement for avoiding persecution. This does not necessarily preclude the viability of internal relocation for the reasons described in paragraph 133.13 below.
12. The proper course in assessing the risk for a returnee is normally to decide first whether he has a well founded fear of persecution in his home area based upon a case sensitive assessment of the facts in the context of an analysis of the risk factors described in A (Turkey). If he does not then he is unlikely to be at any real risk anywhere in Turkey.
13. The risk to a specific individual in most circumstances will be at its highest in his home area for a variety of reasons, and particularly if it is located in the areas of conflict in the south and east of Turkey. Conversely the differential nature of the risk outside that area may be sufficient to mean that the individual would not be at real risk of persecution by the state or its agencies elsewhere in Turkey, even if they were made aware of the thrust of the information maintained in his home area by telephone or fax enquiry from the airport police station or elsewhere, or by a transfer of at least some of the information to a new home area on registration with the local Mukhtar there. Internal relocation may well therefore be viable, notwithstanding the need for registration in the new area. The issue is whether any individual’s material history would be reasonably likely to lead to persecution outside his home area.”

14. Both representatives referred to IK and they did not suggest that there was any reason to depart from it in light of the passage of time or updating evidence before me. I again consider that the Country Guidance remains relevant.

Upper Tribunal hearing

15. This matter came before me on 1 October 2025. I was provided with a 260-page bundle incorporating both parties’ evidence and a skeleton argument from Mr Collins. A Turkish interpreter was used; the Appellant confirmed that he could understand her and I was satisfied that there was a good level of comprehension between them. The Appellant adopted his witness statement and his answers given at his screening and asylum interviews. He was cross-examined, following which he was asked further questions in re-examination by Mr Collins and some clarificatory questions by myself. His answers are recorded in the transcript of the hearing, so I do not set them out in full here. There were no other witnesses.

16. I heard submissions from Ms Clewley and Mr Collins. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Appellant’s evidence

17. I draw the following from the Appellant’s account as set out in his interviews, witness statement, and oral evidence. The Appellant is a national of Turkey in his late twenties. It is not in dispute that he is a Turkish Kurd.

18. The Appellant’s account is that he had a limited education and thereafter worked as a shepherd. He later briefly held a job at a water company (there was no suggestion that this was a high-level or technical role). He describes being mistreated by staff and students at school for being Kurdish and accused of being a PKK supporter and terrorist. He describes being insulted and made fun of.

19. The Appellant states that he was a low-level supporter of the HDP. He does not suggest he was a member (which he is recorded as stating at interview). His activism involved attending “many” HDP demonstrations and meetings as well as distributing leaflets “many times” and putting up posters. He said that he would go to people’s homes to get their support for the HDP.

20. The Appellant states that he was first arrested on 15 August 2017 after being arrested by the police, who had approached him whilst in the mountains where he was working as a shepherd. The police asked to see his ‘Nufus’ identity card, which he had left at home. The police took him to his home, which they searched while he was kept in a police car; he was later taken to a police station. He states he was threatened that he would be “very sorry” if he did not confess his involvement with the PKK. He explains that the issue with his card was essentially a pretext to allow the authorities to detain him and to beat him. After he was released, the Appellant states he moved to Bilecik.

21. The Appellant states that he was thereafter again detained on 10 November 2018 in Bilecik. He had twice visited an ‘HDP building’ in the region. Five police officers came to his door and searched his flat; he and his housemate were then arrested and held for two days. He was again beaten. He states that, upon release from detention, he was forced to sign a piece of paper and told to report on a weekly basis to a Commissioner, essentially to act as an informant. He did not do so and instead left Turkey.

22. The Appellant states that he has not undertaken military service.

23. Regarding his family, the Appellant states that his father has passed away and his mother lives in Turkey. He states that he has two brothers and two sisters. He states in his witness statement that he has two brothers in the UK; one with limited leave to remain and the other who has claimed asylum. At the hearing, he explained that this second brother had claimed asylum as a result of the risks which arose as a result of the persecution he himself faced. He states that his sisters remain in Turkey.

24. The Appellant arrived in the UK on 13 April 2019 and claimed asylum on 20 September 2019. His claim was refused on 7 December 2023. As noted above, he initially appealed unsuccessfully to the First-tier Tribunal, whose determination I set aside at the earlier hearing in this matter.

Issues

25. The issues are as follows:
a. Was the Appellant a supporter of the HDP?
b. Was the Appellant detained and mistreated by the Turkish authorities as claimed?
i. In assessing the foregoing, what is the impact of s. 8 AITCA 2004 on the Appellant’s credibility?
c. Would the Appellant be at risk of persecution or other serious harm falling within 339C or amounting to a violation of his rights under the ECHR on return to Turkey?

Parties’ submissions

26. Ms Clewley, in closing, relied on the refusal letter and the Respondent’s review (albeit acknowledging that some of the issues which had arisen as a result of the error by Montague Solicitors have now fallen away).

27. Ms Clewley invited me to find that the Appellant was not credible. In particular, she highlighted the following inconsistencies:
a. The Appellant did not mention torture when he was asked about it in his third asylum interview;
b. During the hearing, he mentioned a scar on his eyebrow, which he attributed to his mistreatment but had not referred to earlier nor obtained a scarring report.
c. He had been inconsistent about whether he was given medical treatment in detention and only at the hearing stated that he was threatened about telling the doctors about his mistreatment.
d. He was inconsistent between his witness statement – in which he referred to being ‘caught’ speaking Turkish and his account at interview of never learning Kurdish.
e. He gave a vague account of the HDP building and hadn’t identified the body of water he described being nearby. He could not identify the name of the street or give any other landmarks.
f. He had been inconsistent regarding whether he started supporting the HDP when he was a child but subsequently said he was 15 years old, which he didn’t consider as ‘childhood.
g. He had not raised participating in demonstrations before his witness statement.
h. He had failed to provide statements from his family when he had had plenty of time to do so.
i. He had not been consistent regarding how long he stayed in the local area after his release from detention; stating two to three months in his second asylum interview but giving a shorter period in oral evidence.
j. He had been inconsistent about his possession of a Turkish passport.

28. Ms Clewley invited me to note that the Appellant had not been politically active in the UK, despite having the opportunity to do so both online and in person. The country evidence showed that mere membership of a political organisation such as the HDP did not put him at risk. She submitted that it was not credible that the Appellant was known to the authorities and could remain politically active at the low level he has to date without being at risk.

29. Regarding military conscription, Ms Clewley submitted that the Appellant had failed to show evidence from the app which would show whether he had been called for military service. At its highest, he is someone who might be eligible for military service. She submitted that the Appellant would not be perceived as a draft evader.

30. In response, Mr Collins started by making the following points:
a. First, he said that the Appellant had mentioned being tortured in an earlier interview (I note the Appellant had three asylum interviews in total in addition to his screening interview, the first substantive asylum interview being interrupted due to ill-health). There was no need for him to reiterate it.
b. Regarding scarring, the Appellant did not claim to suffer serious injury.
c. The Appellant didn’t claim he received medical treatment during his first detention, rather that he asked for water.
d. Regarding his ability to speak Kurish, it was accepted that the Appellant was Kurdish.
e. The background evidence cited in the refusal letter confirmed that there was a requirement to carry photo ID and the fact that he was found by the Gendarme without an ID card would be likely to lead to detention and questioning.
f. The Appellant’s political activism was consistent with his being a low-level supporter and he was not trying to embellish his account.
g. The Appellant had explained that his passport was taken by the Turkish authorities.

31. Mr Collins invited me to find that the Appellant’s account was credible and consistent with the country background. His level of knowledge of the HDP was consistent with his background. The core of this claim was about the Appellant’s detention by the Turkish authorities. He noted that military service is compulsory for men between 20 and 41 in Turkey.

32. Mr Collins addressed me on IK, finding that the Appellant, as a draft evader, will be stopped and sent straight to “phase 2”, at which stage his detentions would be revealed and then would be send to “phase 3”, at which there was a real risk of torture. He emphasised that the Appellant could not be expected to lie in Turkey. He reminded me, by reference to the CPIN, of the ongoing crackdown on pro-Kurdish groups in Turkey.

Findings

33. Appellant’s credibility. In considering the Appellant’s credibility, I have assessed the entirety of the documentary evidence before me as well as the oral evidence given by the Appellant at the hearing. I remind myself that the low standard of proof applies to both past and future facts.

34. I find that the Appellant has given a broadly consistent account of his experiences.
a. At his screening interview, the Appellant clearly stated that he was detained twice (he has always been specific and consistent about the dates of these arrests).
b. The Appellant has always stated that these arrests were related to his involvement with the HDP; while I accept there has been an inconsistency regarding whether he claimed to be a member or supporter, I do not consider this to be a significant inconsistency, especially when giving answers through an interpreter. I also consider that, if the Appellant were minded to exaggerate his political activism, he would have maintained the line that he was a ‘member’, rather than acknowledging that he was merely a supporter.
c. He has always been clear that his mistreatment in Turkey stemmed from pro-Kurdish political activism.
d. From his screening interview he has given an account of being forced to sign a piece of paper at his second arrest.
e. His account at interview of having one brother in Turkey and one in the UK is consistent with his account at the hearing of his other brother having subsequently come to the UK to claim asylum. He also raised his brother’s flight from Turkey in his second asylum interview.

35. I also find the Appellant’s account of facing discrimination as a Kurd to be consistent with the country background evidence. He gave a reasonable, albeit limited, level of detail about his experiences of difficulties growing up as a Kurd in Turkey, which is significant context for his decision to become involved in HDP activism. I accept Mr Collins’ submission that the Appellant is poorly educated and that is likely to limit the amount of detail provided. At interview, he was able to correctly identify the party’s aims, their leader and chairman, and the party’s logo. I was also struck by the fact that the Appellant – unprompted – referred during the hearing to HDP as the “DEM party”, which is its new name (as the parties agreed). I consider this to be an indication that the Appellant is familiar with the HDP/DEM party, at least to the extent that he has remained aware of its changes notwithstanding his departure from Turkey.

36. I consider that the Appellant’s credibility is damaged by his failure to provide any evidence from a third party. There are a number of obvious supporting witnesses in this case (the Appellant’s family members and the family friend with whom he stayed in Turkey), in particular his brother whom he states has claimed asylum in the UK as a result of the same matters the Appellant relies upon. This brother therefore appears to be a key witness and someone who could have provided significant evidence, at least in the form of a written statement and potentially also oral evidence. Both representatives and I sought to clarify this point with the Appellant but his answers were confused and, at their highest, amounted to a statement that he didn’t know where his brother was currently (I note this is consistent with response three in his third asylum interview, when he said he was not seeing this brother). He also stated that his mother was illiterate and could not use phones, but no explanation was given about the lack of a statement from other family members. Most significantly, it is unclear why no statement was obtained earlier when, it appears, the Appellant had contact with his brother. I cannot speculate as to the advice the Appellant may or may not have had or the reasons why this significant evidence has not been provided but I do consider that it was at least reasonably open to the Appellant to obtain some evidence from a family member (I note he attended the Tribunal with his cousin), and I consider that it damages his credibility that he has not done so. I remind myself that there is no requirement on the Appellant to provide corroboration of his case (SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160) but I do consider that this issue falls within the principles set out in TK (Burundi) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 40.

37. While I consider that the failure to obtain this reasonably-available evidence or provide a clearer explanation for its absence is damaging to the Appellant’s credibility, I do not conclude that this issue by itself is sufficient for me to reject the Appellant's account. As I have already noted, there are a variety of reasons which could explain why this evidence has not been obtained, not all of which inevitably mean that the Appellant is being dishonest. I place significant weight on this factor, but it is only one element in the holistic credibility analysis which I must undertake.

38. I accept that the Appellant has not been politically active in the UK. However, I do not consider this to be damaging to his credibility. As noted above, he has clearly remained aware of at least high-level changes in the HDP/DEM Party. He never claimed to be a prolific or high-level activist, so it is less likely that he would choose to pursue activism from abroad. He has not sought to bolster his claim with activism in the UK, which I accept is consistent with a lack of a desire to embellish his account. In any event, the risk on which the Appellant relies on return to Turkey is a desire to continue his activism, but rather the state’s hostility to him as a result of his previous activism and arrests.

39. Regarding the other credibility points raised by Ms Clewley:
a. I find that the Appellant did raise his torture at interview. There was (rightly) no suggestion that he should have raised this at his brief screening interview. In responses 44 and 46 of his first asylum interview he expressed fear of arrest and torture. At response 4 of his second asylum interview he expressed fear of being “tortured again”. He reiterated that he had been tortured in Response 7. In response 11 in his third asylum interview the Appellant referred to the police as being “so vicious”.
b. I do not think it is damaging to the Appellant that he did not raise the scar (which he attributes to mistreatment) prior to the hearing. He never suggested he had suffered very significant injuries and did not suggest it was a large scar. I consider that if the Appellant were minded to exaggerate or seek to bolster his claim, he would have raised this at an earlier stage. I place no weight on the scar as there is no Istanbul Protocol-compliant evidence before me.
c. I do not consider that there was any inconsistency about the Appellant’s access to medical treatment in detention; he provided further details when questioned at the hearing, which is to be expected.
d. Regarding the Appellant’s ability to speak Kurdish, I note that in his first asylum interview at response 66, in response to “Can you speak Kurdish fluently” he stated “No I can’t I understand a little bit”. At the hearing he stated that the witness statement was wrong and he was insulted for being Kurdish. I do not consider there is any significant inconsistency here. The Appellant was clear about experiencing discrimination on the basis of his ethnicity. It is not in dispute that he is Kurdish. I do not accept that the question of whether he was speaking Kurdish is at the heart of his motivation for political activism and I do not accept that this is an inconsistency capable of damaging his credibility.
e. I accept that the Appellant’s account of the HDP building was vague. I accept that he was, perhaps surprisingly, not able to identify significant local landmarks or street signs. He was however able to identify a body of water being nearby and, during discussion of this point at the hearing including my being directed to Google maps by Ms Clewley and Mr Collins, I was able to identify two streams/small rivers and a pond/lake in the area, which did have some buildings near it. While I accept that the Appellant was quite vague on this point, I acknowledge that he only described going to this building twice and accept Mr Collins’ submission that the building was not, for instance, a headquarters or other more prominent building which could be located online. I therefore do not consider that this point damages the Appellant’s credibility because I do not consider that greater detail could reasonably be expected.
f. I accept that the Appellant did not talk about demonstrations at interview, but I consider that is it consistent with a credible account that he would provide some further detail in a witness statement prepared by legal representatives.
g. I accept that the Appellant was vague and somewhat inconsistent about the amount of time he stayed in hiding before travelling to Istanbul and thereafter fleeing the country. However, I do not put any significant weight on this point. The Appellant, who is poorly educated, is recalling matters which occurred more than six years ago. It is not surprising that he would be vague about the exact timeline, which spans only a few months at most.
h. Regarding the issue of the passport, the Appellant explained in response 12 of his second asylum interview that “my passport was confiscated by the Turkish ppt, my Turkish ID card is with the Home Office in this country”. I consider that “ppt” must be a typographical error and conclude this is consistent with the Appellant’s account that his passport is in the hands of the Turkish authorities. There is thus no inconsistency.

40. I do not consider that there is basis under section 8 AITCA 2004 to treat the Appellant’s credibility as damaged. He has always explained that he was under the control of an agent when travelling to the UK. He also had a brother here and has spoken of the faith he had in the UK system. His journey to the UK was relatively short.

41. On balance, I consider that the Appellant to be credible to the lower standard. While, as I note above, his credibility is damaged by the failure to adduce evidence which is reasonably available to him and while there are some inconsistencies in his account, I accept that there may be reasons for this unrelated to dishonesty. I also find that, on the totality of the evidence before me, the Appellant’s account is broadly consistent as well as being consistent with the country background and the situation of Kurds in Turkey. I accept Mr Collins’ submissions that the Appellant has not sought to embellish his account.

42. It therefore follows that I accept that the Appellant was a supporter of the HDP and that he was detained and mistreated by the Turkish authorities as claimed. I accept his account.

43. Risk on return. I did not understand Ms Clewley to be submitting that, if the Appellant’s account were credible and accepted, that he would be safe on return to Turkey. I nevertheless will consider this issue in full, in the interests of clarity.

44. The fact that the Appellant has previously been arrested and tortured by the authorities twice is a significant factor in concluding that he may experience such persecution in future. This is a significant indication that his fear of persecution is well-founded, especially in circumstances where (notwithstanding the lapse of time since the Appellant left Turkey) the situation in the country has not materially changed.

45. Considering the non-exhaustive factors in IA, the Appellant has a profile consistent with a real risk of persecution:
a. He is known to the authorities as someone with involvement in the HDP.
b. He has been arrested and detained twice, for days, and was tortured. I accept that the second detention was due to his involvement with the HDP and therefore suspected affiliation with the PKK (as the country evidence, including the CPIN on the HDP, confirms).
c. He fled from Turkey following his second arrest. He was only, at most, in Turkey for a few months (in hiding) before he left.
d. He is Kurdish.
e. He does not have a current Turkish passport.
f. It is unclear whether the Turkish authorities have expressed an interest in the Appellant since he left; given the lack of evidence from his brother, I make no finding on this issue and treat it as a neutral factor.
g. The Appellant was asked to become an informer but then absconded.
h. He has not undertaken military service; his claim does not amount to being a draft evader, but this is relevant for the purposes of IK, as I will go on to discuss below.

46. While IA is clear this isn’t a ‘checklist’, I note that the Appellant exhibits a significant number of risk factors. I therefore conclude that there is a real risk that the Appellant will be perceived as a supporter of a separatist organisation and faces a real risk of further persecution for that reason.

47. I consider that there is also, and relatedly, a real risk to the Appellant upon return to Istanbul applying the analysis in IK. The Appellant would be removed as a failed asylum seeker who has not undertaken military service on an emergency travel document, leading to a likelihood of being sent to the airport police station for further investigation. At that investigation, as he would not be expected to lie, he would have to disclose his HDP affiliations, arrests, and detentions. It is therefore likely that he would thereafter progress to the third phase of questioning, at which there would be a real risk of mistreatment amounting to a violation of the Refugee Convention, or in the alternative a breach of the ECHR, and / or serious harm giving rise to a well-founded claim for humanitarian protection.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is allowed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 October 2025