Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001681

First-tier Tribunal No: DA/00045/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

Pankaj Bangarh
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Mupara instructed by Freemans Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals the Secretary of State’s decision dated 26th April 2024 to make a deportation order against him further to Regulations 23(6)(b) and 27 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (the EEA Regulations).
2. The appellant is a national of Portugal born on 5th January 1994 and he arrived in the United Kingdom in 2010 at the age of 15 years old with his parents. On 4th August 2018 he committed the index offences for which he was convicted on 30th June 2021 as follows:
(1) sexual assault, intentionally touching a female (no penetration); and
(2) potential rape of a female age 16 years or over.
3. On 24th November 2021 the appellant was sentenced at Southampton Crown Court to a total of eight years’ imprisonment and also given a restraining order until further notice, required to register on the sex offenders register indefinitely and served with a forfeiture and destruction of mobiles phones seized order and a victim surcharge of £170.
4. The appellant’s subsequent attempt to appeal against his sentence to the Court of Appeal was refused on 25th November 2022.
5. On 10th June 2022 the appellant was served with a notice of intention to deport him in accordance with Regulations 23(6)(b) and 27 of the EEA Regulations. The appellant made representations via his solicitors in July 2022 and on 26th April 2024 the appellant was served with the decision under challenge.
The Secretary of State’s decision on deportation dated 26th April 2024
6. The Secretary of State set out that the appellant arrived in 2010 with his parents and sister and on 7th December 2010 he applied for an EEA registration certificate as an EEA national, which was granted on 7th March 2011 valid to 7th March 2015. The appellant committed the index offences on 4th August 2018. On 5th September 2020 he applied for indefinite leave to remain under the European Settlement Scheme.
7. Consideration was given to the appellant’s period of residence in the UK in the light of recent case law such as Lassal (C-162/09), Ziolkowski (C-424/10), Tsakouridis (C-145/09), Onuekwere (C-378/12) and MG (C-400/12).
8. The appellant was remanded in custody on 7th July 2021 and sentenced on 24th November 2021. It was accepted in the reasons for refusal letter that the appellant was lawfully resident from 7th December 2010 to 7th March 2015 and then from March 2018 to 7th July 2021. It was, however, not accepted that the appellant had been resident in the UK in accordance with the EEA Regulations for a continuous period of five years and therefore in the reasons for refusal letter it was disputed that he had permanent right of residence.
9. Consideration was given to the principles set out at Regulation 27(5) of the EEA Regulations and notably that a decision to deport should be taken in accordance with the relevant principles, including that the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality.
10. Additionally, Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations was referenced.
11. The decision also set out the Crown Court judge’s sentencing remarks at [34] and which were said to highlight in relation to the appellant:
“how throughout the horrific events, you repeatedly chose to place your own sexual gratification above the wellbeing of the victim and her right to consent. There was additional degradation and humiliation by the way she [the victim] was treated and filmed and laughed at.”
The decision noted the representations dated 28th July 2022 such that the appellant claimed his imprisonment had taught him a lesson and he would not reoffend and he was very aware and very empathetic about the whole situation. The Secretary of State, however, did not accept these submissions and identified the OASys Report (2022) in which the appellant referred to the victim as “sober”, and she was “liking it” and “consenting”. The OASys Report was also referred to as describing the appellant as “entitled”, to have “deficit in thinking skills/attitudes towards women” and that he “not demonstrate a solid understanding of consent”.
12. The appellant was deemed in the OASys Report to be “a high risk of serious harm to the public specifically adult females”.
13. The appellant was also subject to a minimum level of multiagency public protection arrangements (MAPPA level 1), the purpose of which is to protect the public. This indicated that he was considered to pose a continuing risk to the public with a requirement to abide by certain other restrictions and the decision letter stated, “MAPPA arrangements have been introduced to limit the effect on society of those convicted of offences which are of a violent and sexual nature”.
14. Additionally, the appellant was required to register on the sex offenders register indefinitely and he was also the subject of a Prevention from Harassment Order. This indicated that the sentencing judge considered the appellant posed a continuing risk to a vulnerable group, namely women and in particular the victim. The OASys report was referenced.
15. It was concluded that all the available evidence indicated the appellant had a propensity to reoffend and that he represented a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the public and he should be deported on grounds of public policy.
16. In relation to proportionality it was noted the appellant was currently 30 years of age and came to the UK when he was 16 years, in 2010, and had spent the majority of his life outside the UK. He committed serious sexual offences as an adult fully capable of understanding the actions he chose to inflict. The appellant claimed that he was on the “autistic spectrum making him prone to social exclusiveness and reclusive. He suffers from anxiety, low mood and poor sleep”. A medical enquiry was sent to HMP Isle of Wight and they responded on 21st March 2024 stating that the appellant “currently has no underlying medical issues and is not waiting any appointments and has no pending referrals”. It was identified that the appellant had a diagnosis of depression and anxiety and was on sertraline (50mg). The notes identified “No evidence of autism on his medical notes”.
17. The deportation decision noted that sertraline was the medication easily accessible in Portugal as per the prepandemic psychotropic drug status in Portugal: a nationwide pharmacoepidemigological profile – PNC (nih.gov).
18. It was acknowledged his parents and sister resided in the UK but there was no indication they had any level of dependency on the appellant other than normal emotional ties. At that point the Home Office had no evidence of any lawful employment although his records showed that he had exercised treaty rights from March 2018 to July 2021.
19. It was noted he had resided in the UK for approximately thirteen years and three months claiming seven years of those had been lawful. His educational certificates achieved from June 2011 to July 2015 were noted.
20. In relation to social and cultural integration it was acknowledged that this was the appellant’s first offence and that the appellant was previously of good character, but the seriousness of his offences evidenced that he had failed to integrate into UK society.
21. Although he claimed to have no family ties in Portugal, he was an adult capable of living independently in the UK and thus could so in Portugal. A lack of family ties was not considered to be an obstacle on reintegration in Portugal. He was a Portuguese national and would face no legal obstacles upon re-entry.
22. At point 9 of his representations, it was noted that he “learnt to speak Portuguese and took ‘exams’ in the school.”
23. Rehabilitation in accordance with Essa [2012] EWCA Civ 1718 was considered and whether the decision to deport the appellant would prejudice the prospects of rehabilitation from offending in the host country. There was no evidence that the appellant had undertaken any rehabilitative work whilst in custody (although I note various certificates were subsequently produced in the evidence).
24. It was reasoned the family were unable to prevent the appellant from committing the offences, of which he had been convicted, and it was unlikely that they would provide him with the necessary support to aid his rehabilitation and reduce his risk of reoffending upon release from prison. There was no reason why he could not work towards rehabilitation in Portugal and he did not need to remain in the United Kingdom to become rehabilitated, and thus overall, deportation would not prejudice his prosects of rehabilitation.
25. The decision considered there was a real risk that the appellant may offend in the future and the EEA Regulations 2016, as saved, applied to him. He posed a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom. His personal circumstances had been considered but given the threat he posed the decision to deport him was proportionate.
26. Consideration was also given to Article 8 of the ECHR and in particular the Immigration Rules and Sections 117A to 117D of Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 was applied. The appellant had asserted a strong family network in the UK, that he was integrated and had attended various education courses and had also undertaken employment. He had provided an addendum psychiatric report conducted by Dr Ian Cummings dated 21st November 2021, various letters and decisions including a letter of support from Martin Lawther dated 17th November 2021 and various educational certificates.
27. Nevertheless, it was concluded deportation was conducive to the public good and in the public interest because he was convicted of an offence for which he had been sentenced to a period of imprisonment for at least four years.
28. Consideration was given to whether there were very compelling circumstances such that the deportation would breach his rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. He had no qualifying child and no partner in the UK. Further, in relation to his private life, it was not accepted that he had been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life. There was no evidence of his lawful residence between July 2015 and March 2018. It was not accepted he was socially and culturally integrated because he was currently serving a custodial sentence of eight years for sexual assault and attempted rape. This demonstrated a complete lack of respect for UK law, and he remained a clear threat to women and again a clear lack of integration. There was no indication that his relationship with his family showed any level of dependency and it was not accepted that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Portugal; Portugal – The World Factbook (cia.gov) accessed on 5th April 2024 was referenced and considered.
29. Since the appellant’s medical conditions were considered, particularly the psychological report carried out by Dr Ian Cummings, the appellant had failed to submit any current evidence he was suffering with mental health conditions prior to conviction. There was further evidence that he was autistic but nonetheless there was certified autism centres in Portugal that could provide relevant support.
30. The appellant was an adult capable of living independently in the UK and no evidence had been submitted to show why he would be incapable of living as an independent adult if deported to Portugal.
31. It was decided that the appellant should be deported but the appellant given a right of appeal.
The appellant’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
32. The appellant appealed the deportation decision under the EEA Regulations 2016. The First-tier Tribunal allowed his appeal under Regulation 26 of the EEA Regulations (as preserved in relation to offences committed prior to the end of the transitional period).
The Secretary of State’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
33. The Secretary of State appealed the First-tier Tribunal decision promulgated on 29th January 2025 on the basis that:
(1) the First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the appellant’s claim to be entitled to the highest level of protection under the EEA Regulations was flawed;
(2) the First-tier Tribunal’s approach to whether the appellant had shown he was integrated into the community for ten years prior to the deportation decision was flawed and whether the appellant’s offending and imprisonment curtailed any such integration demonstrated; and
(3) if the appellant had shown the highest level of protection applied whether the deportation was proportionate on imperative grounds of public security. In relation to the last ground, it was submitted that there was an epidemic of violence against women and girls which was declared a “national emergency” by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in 2024 and 20% of reported crimes, notwithstanding a chronically high level of underreporting of crimes against women, showed the epidemic of crime against women and a climate of fear which had corrosive effect on security of women and girls of all ages undermining public confidence in the institutions of the state and public order.
34. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis that it was arguable that the judge erred in relation to the appellant’s integration and as to the level of protection afforded.
35. It became common ground between the parties that the appellant, owing to his history, had acquired permanent residence on 25th June 2015 having lived in the UK for five years and this meant that the middle tier protection would apply unless the appellant showed the ten-year test was met.
Amendment to the Secretary of State’s grounds of appeal
36. In the event, there was an amendment to the grounds filed on 25th May 2025 to include in ground 1, that the First-tier Tribunal failed to apply paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations. When considering the level of protection afforded to the appellant, the First-tier Tribunal Judge failed to acknowledge or cite Regulation 27(8) of the EEA Regulations which states as follows:
“(8) A court or tribunal considering whether the requirements of this regulation are met must (in particular) have regard to the considerations contained in Schedule 1 (considerations of public policy, public security and the fundamental interests of society etc.).”
37. Schedule 1(4) sets out as follows:
“(1)(4) Little weight is to be attached to the integration of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national within the United Kingdom if the alleged integrating links were formed at or around the same time as—
(a) the commission of a criminal offence;
(b) an act otherwise affecting the fundamental interests of society;
(c) the EEA national or family member of an EEA national was in custody.”
38. The First-tier Tribunal decision disclosed errors of law because there was simply no reference to Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations. I found the judge failed properly to consider integration by failing to apply Schedule 1(4) of the EEA Regulations and took into account the appellant’s time and attitude whilst he was in prison. The judge appeared to fail to properly apply Secretary of State for the Home Department v AA (Poland) [2024] EWCA Civ 18.
39. The matter was retained by me in the Upper Tribunal and came before me in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
40. The matter was listed for 6th October 2025, prior to which the appellant made two applications to give evidence remotely on the basis he did not wish to be transferred to HMP Pentonville and preferred to remain at HMP Maidstone. The production order was in place for his attendance. Both applications had been refused particularly in order to obtain best evidence from the appellant.
41. On the morning of the hearing in October 2025, HMP Maidstone confirmed to the administrative staff of the Upper Tribunal that the appellant had refused transport to the Royal Courts of Justice direct from HMP Maidstone. On 6th October 2025, in an email in fact sent on 4th October 2025, the appellant’s representative then stated that the appellant was currently unwell and unable to attend the court hearing.
42. The matter was relisted at Field House with an instruction that documentary medical evidence as to the appellant’s state of health should be provided no later than 10th October 2025. None was provided by the deadline but I shall say no more about that.
43. The matter was relisted for 21st November 2025.
Documentation
44. Before me I had the appellant’s bundle, including the appellant’s and respondent’s documentary evidence before the First-tier Tribunal, which included an OASys Report dated 24th June 2022 and an OASys report dated 15th May 2024, witness statements from the appellant’s parents and his sister dated 14th October 2024 and the appellant himself dated 23rd October 2024. I was also provided with the appellant’s representative’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal dated 11th November 2024, the appellant’s skeleton argument dated June 2025 for the error of law decision and a skeleton argument dated 30th September 2025. Also included was an application from the appellant dated 12th September 2025 for an updated OASys Report, a Horizon programme record and notes and certificates from the prison and a positive behaviour quality attitude note date 22nd September 2025, an updated signed witness statement from the appellant dated 19th September 2025 and updated statements from the appellant’s mother, father and sister, all dated 22nd September 2025. The documentation included an HMRC employment history dated 2nd August 2024, a psychiatric report from Dr Ian Cumming dated 28th September 2021 and an addendum report dated 21st November 2021.
45. Additionally, I had the Secretary of State’s bundle and skeleton arguments dated 15th October 2024 and 6th June 2025 and a respondent’s bundle which included the relevant deportation decision.
46. Subsequently a non-attendance document was also filed on behalf of the appellant. The appellant attended the hearing on 21st November 2025 via CVP and remote link from HMP Maidstone and adopted his witness statement. He adopted his statements and was cross-examined by the Home Office Presenting Officer.
47. At the hearing the appellant’s parents, and his sister, gave oral evidence at the hearing and adopted their witness statements. The appellant’s father is named as JK, his mother SK and his sister DB. I shall not set out all the evidence but refer to that evidence as relevant in my conclusions because the evidence is recorded. I have taken the evidence of the family into account.
Submissions
48. Ms Clewley relied on the stage one and stage two decisions for deportation in the respondent’s bundle and the previous submissions and skeleton arguments drafted by Ms Patel and Mr Erdunast.
49. The Court of Appeal attached little weight in AA (Poland) to the appellant’s claim of integration between his arrest and his sentence. The period between the appellant committing the offence and his arrest, when he denied culpability, despite the video footage was the cause of the delay and should not afford any integration. The offending showed a disregard as well as a rejection of core values in the UK.
50. The sentencing judge described the offence as truly appalling and the appellant’s views on women were cited in the OASys Report dated 22nd June 2022. I was referred to the sentencing remarks of the Crown Court Judge and the way the victim was spoken about as if she were an object and on whom severe psychological harm had been inflicted. There was a clear disregard and rejection of core values of the culture in the United Kingdom (UK). The sentencing judge noticed that the appellant did not show remorse during the trial and there were multiple references in the documents to the appellant maintaining his innocence. This included the OASys Reports.
51. The appellant’s views were made clear in his cross-examination today and he repeatedly referred to the fact that the encounter was instigated by the victim, that she bought drink and drank a lot. The appellant now, Ms Clewley submitted, was just trying to mitigate his responsibility. There was however no evidence from professionals to indicate that he took responsibility for the offending, and all documents ran counter to his acceptance of responsibility.
52. The Secretary of State submitted that the integrative links were broken as offending occurred prior to the ten years of his residency. The nature of the offence displayed a rejection of core values.
53. In terms of the degree of integrative links the appellant lacked meaningful ties to the UK. He himself relied on social isolation and cannot now seek to change the narrative. His mother in her statement at [5] stated that he kept to himself and that was the evidence of Dr Ian Cummings who referred to him as shy, timid and socially awkward.
54. The appellant referred in his witness statement to not having any visitors in the Isle of Wight Prison and he was there for three years. Nor did he have any statements from the friend that he claimed visited him in prison to attest to the relationship or support that he was integrated in society at the relevant time. There was nothing from friends and despite the letter from Mustafa he did not attend the hearing and limited weight should be attached to it.
55. The OASys Reports were consistent with the understanding that the appellant had significant difficulty in integrating and his witness statement effectively stated that he spent most of his time at home. The sentencing remarks of the judge also referred to the appellant being timid.
56. In respect of the work records these did not show that he had an effective income and for the tax year 2017 to 2018 the appellant only earned approximately £100. In the year of conviction, he earned less than £15,000.
57. The appellant sought to rely on his employment with Ocado from 2019 to 2021, but that should be disregarded in the light of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations in the light of the timing. Had he been honest, the appellant would have already been in custody. He pleaded not guilty. He had limited links and a lack of meaningful ties.
58. The Secretary of State also submitted that the appellant’s continued presence in the UK posed a significant and sufficiently serious threat.
59. I was referred to the OASys Reports which had assessed him a being a high risk to the public and the community. There had been a lack of accountability on behalf of the appellant. The lack of accountability meant a continued risk to the public. The expert evidence displayed a consistency of the minimising of responsibility by the appellant and an individual desire to resist deportation proceedings. The appellant asserts at various junctures that the acts were consensual. The OASys Report confirmed he did not have a solid understanding of consent and the OASys Report confirmed that he was a continuous threat to lone young women, and he is required to be on licence until 19th June 2029. He presents a continuing risk.
60. In terms of rehabilitation the appellant’s statements and oral evidence from the cross-examination showed that he focused on what he had learned and his skills and staying away from people who party, but he did not appear to have an understanding of how to stay away from negative people. His certificate did not go to the real issue which was understanding of consent. He had referred to a foundation course, in which he stated he covered male dominant behaviours, but the certificate was just that there was no core detail or indication of the content. On the Horizon report the feedback details that he had been an active participant but there was no risk assessment. The OASys Report suggested that none of the objectives were reached and that was in 2024.
61. That the appellant had not offended since he had been in prison was not to the point. The papers showed the appellant did not have the fortitude to control his impulses. He had spent the time trying to minimise his responsibility under cross-examination and asserted the complainant was “out” for a few seconds, but the sentencing remarks of the judge confirmed that she was “out” for more than an hour and a half.
62. Male violence against women is prevalent and insidious.
63. In terms of proportionality, in terms of rehabilitation, it had been almost a year since his last course relevant to the issues.
64. Portugal is an EU state; the appellant had lived there for a year and told Dr Cummings that he learned the language and spent time at school. His father spoke Portuguese and would have familiarity with the culture.
65. The appellant would be able to find work and had even applied for an IT job whilst in prison and he could do the same in Portugal. He previously had a professional YouTube channel which he was able to monetise and had the advantage over many who were moving to a new country would not have. The job he was offered in prison had a salary of £40,000. This showed that he could find employment.
66. Reliance was placed on Ackom [2025] EWCA Civ 537. It was possible for the appellant to integrate in a reasonable time. As noted at [46] ‘it is possible for migrants with no ties to the country of destination, and no contacts there, and who cannot speak the language on arrival, to integrate and develop a private life there within a reasonable time; much will depend on the country and on the nature and character of the individual concerned.’
67. The appellant’s relationship with his family was such that there was now minimal dependency and he had been absent during his period of incarceration since 2021. It was said that his family needed his support to be able to contribute to the mortgage, but the family have been able to maintain itself whilst he was in prison.
68. The family could keep in contact whilst he was overseas, and it was not unusual for family members to spend time in different parts of the world.
69. In terms of Article 8 there were no compelling circumstances as per Section 117C (6) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and I was referred to NA (Pakistan) [2016] EWCA Civ 662.
70. I was invited to dismiss the appeal.
71. Mr Mupara relied on his various skeleton arguments. He submitted that this was an expulsion decision and the burden of proof to show that the appellant posed a risk lay on the respondent and the Secretary of State had made her case on a wrong factual basis.
72. The Secretary of State’s reason for expulsion was that the appellant was involved in serious criminal offending and that the appellant was convicted of rape but that was incorrect. He had not been convicted of rape and even the description by the Secretary of State was not accurate. The appellant was, for example, described as pinning down the complainant but he was acquitted of that offence. The Secretary of State had failed to put an assessment of risk that was fair and reliable. The appellant had been acquitted of a number of offences including rape.
73. The OASys Reports in the respondent bundle did not say that any direct work had been completed between the author of the report and the appellant. There was no evidence when the assessment was made or of who completed the assessment. No reliance could be placed on the reports and indeed on the risk assessment said to be made.
74. The appellant agreed he has previously not taken responsibility and the criminal judge who viewed the CCTV concluded that the individuals met and everyone was friendly and that the complainant left the nightclub voluntarily and she was not alone; she was out on her 18th birthday, and she was not targeted as a lone female.
75. The judge concluded after viewing and concluding that she entered the hotel voluntarily and there had been a pattern of placing charges on the indictment in effect confirming that the appellant was guilty. When making a risk of an assessment and danger it should be based on activities on which he was convicted. Both the OASys Reports in the appellant’s bundle were defective. There was no targeting and it was simply young people who met in a nightclub and went to a hotel where several sexual acts took place and reached the point where some of them were not consensual.
76. The appellant had no previous convictions and there was no planning. The reasons for refusal letter had meshed two paragraphs from the sentencing remarks and I should place no weight on the reasons for refusal. He did not have the qualifications of the people making the psychoanalytical assessment in the OASys reports.
77. The appellant was integrated. The Secretary of State’s position is that the appellant was a loner and there was no integration, but he arrived in the UK in 2010, completed compulsory education at Newham College and his integrative links started in September 2010 and were outside his family. He apparently obtained GCSEs in India. He undertook five years at Uxbridge College and various certificates, including a level 3 BTEC. After college he went to university for a business degree but dropped out after a year owing to poor health. I was invited to review his work history. During 2012 and 2013 he was an online content creator, which was five years before the date of the offence and he was working part-time.
78. The offence was committed in August 2018 and there was evidence of him working in 2017. After the offence the appellant was working for Ocado, and this was evidence of his integration into the UK community and weight should be placed on his working and education outside his family.
79. I have been asked to reject integration from the date of the offence until his imprisonment because all that time he had put in a false not guilty claim but there was no evidence of when he was arrested. The only time he was asked to enter a plea was on 29th January 2021 and that was over two years from the incident and no charges were set until then.
80. The case could be distinguished from AA (Poland) because there the offender was a persistent offender, who had been offending for many years. That was not the case here. In this case the appellant had only committed two offences in a single incident. There was not a sustained period of offending.
81. In this case not all the pleas were false; in fact on eleven out of thirteen were incorrect, and the appellant was not convicted of the most serious offences. The only time which he could be said to have entered and maintained a false guilty plea was at the time he was charged in January 2021. The appellant was not responsible as to why the charges were not brought sooner and integration that took place after the event and the date of the incidence could not be completely disregarded. He was on bail from December 2020 and not from 2018.
82. By the time of the index offence, the appellant was fully integrated outside his family, and it was submitted that weight should be attached to his integration from 2018 to 2020. His evidence was that in the early days he was very angry about the conviction and has since claimed the victim was lying and when he maintained his innocence that was correct in relation to the rape assertion. The Home Office had conflated the offences, and incarceration did not necessarily break integrative links. The only reason he is said not to be integrated is the seriousness of the offence.
83. His continued presence did not pose sufficient and serious threat.
84. There was no evidence that there was an epidemic of violence against women and the assertion made in the original grounds for permission to appeal and by the Secretary of State argued that the offending could be seen as containing an element of sexual exploitation but there was no evidence of sexual exploitation in this case. There needed to be a quid pro quo, that is a threat/payment and there was none here. The appellant did not provide the complainant with drugs, and it was not premeditated. The appellant was integrated by the time of the offence.
85. In terms of proportionality, the appellant was born in India and lived in Portugal for eighteen months and left the country for the UK as he struggled with the language. He had no connection with that country and no relevant language, and he had very strong family connections here and he had lived with his family throughout his time in the UK. He had been here for nearly fifteen years as opposed to eighteen months in Portugal. His expulsion would interfere with his rehabilitation, and he would have no support there, particularly in terms of programs he would need to follow.
86. It was incorrect to assert that the appellant was socially isolated, and he had been active in working and he had attended university and had friends. His tax contributions could be seen from HMRC records and for most of the period between 2010 and 2018 he was studying and exercising treaty rights.
87. He attained permanent residence. In effect as the appellant had shown integration imperative grounds needed to be shown by the Secretary of State. The appellant’s appeal should be allowed.
Conclusions and legal framework
88. It was accepted by both parties that the EEA Regulations applied in this particular matter (the offences were committed prior to the exit of the UK from the European Union), and it was previously agreed that the appellant had achieved permanent residence as family member of his father. The first critical question is the level of protection afforded to the appellant and whether the threshold is ‘imperative grounds’ or ‘serious grounds’ of public policy.
89. I note the appellant’s assertion of depression and anxiety and where required applied The Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance were applied in the light of AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123. The appellant gave not only oral evidence but also written evidence.
90. The deportation is required to be in accordance with the EEA Regulations, and I set out the material parts of regulations 23 and 27 below:
“Exclusion and removal from the United Kingdom
23. …
(5) If the Secretary of State considers that the exclusion of the EEA national or the family member of an EEA national is justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health in accordance with regulation 27 the Secretary of State may make an order prohibiting that person from entering the United Kingdom.
(6) Subject to paragraphs (7) and (8), an EEA national who has entered the United Kingdom or the family member of such a national who has entered the United Kingdom may be removed if—
(a) that person does not have or ceases to have a right to reside under these Regulations;
(b) the Secretary of State has decided that the person’s removal is justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health in accordance with regulation 27; or
(c) the Secretary of State has decided that the person’s removal is justified on grounds of misuse of rights under regulation 26(3).
(7) A person must not be removed under paragraph (6)—
(a) as the automatic consequence of having recourse to the social assistance system of the United Kingdom; or
(b) if that person has leave to remain in the United Kingdom under the 1971 Act unless that person’s removal is justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health in accordance with regulation 27.
(8) A decision under paragraph (6)(b) must state that upon execution of any deportation order arising from that decision, the person against whom the order was made is prohibited from entering the United Kingdom—
(a) until the order is revoked; or
(b) for the period specified in the order.
(9) A decision taken under paragraph (6)(b) or (c) has the effect of terminating any right to reside otherwise enjoyed by the individual concerned.”
“Decisions taken on grounds of public policy, public security and public health
27. (1) In this regulation, a ‘relevant decision’ means an EEA decision taken on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
(2) A relevant decision may not be taken to serve economic ends.
(3) A relevant decision may not be taken in respect of a person with a right of permanent residence under regulation 15 except on serious grounds of public policy and public security.
(4) A relevant decision may not be taken except on imperative grounds of public security in respect of an EEA national who—
(a) has a right of permanent residence under regulation 15 and who] has resided in the United Kingdom for a continuous period of at least ten years prior to the relevant decision; or
(b) is under the age of 18, unless the relevant decision is in the best interests of the person concerned, as provided for in the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20th November 1989(17).
(5) The public policy and public security requirements of the United Kingdom include restricting rights otherwise conferred by these Regulations in order to protect the fundamental interests of society, and where a relevant decision is taken on grounds of public policy or public security it must also be taken in accordance with the following principles—
(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality;
(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned;
(c) the personal conduct of the person must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account past conduct of the person and that the threat does not need to be imminent;
(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to considerations of general prevention do not justify the decision;
(e) a person’s previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision;
(f) the decision may be taken on preventative grounds, even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction, provided the grounds are specific to the person.
(6) Before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy and public security in relation to a person (‘P’) who is resident in the United Kingdom, the decision maker must take account of considerations such as the age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin.”
…
(8) A court or tribunal considering whether the requirements of this regulation are met must (in particular) have regard to the considerations contained in Schedule 1 (considerations of public policy, public security and the fundamental interests of society etc.).
91. In terms of determining the protection afforded to the appellant and for imperative grounds it is the 10 years immediately prior to the expulsion decision that counts: Tsakouridis (European citizenship) [2010] EUECJ. This is not simply a question of residence but also whether the individual has built up integrating links in the UK, social and cultural ties and a commitment to the values of the UK.
92. In particular Schedule 1 of the 2016 Regulations applies and the material parts are below:
“Considerations of public policy and public security
1. The EU Treaties do not impose a uniform scale of public policy or public security values: member States enjoy considerable discretion, acting within the parameters set by the EU Treaties, applied where relevant by the EEA agreement, to define their own standards of public policy and public security, for purposes tailored to their individual contexts, from time to time.
Application of paragraph 1 to the United Kingdom
2. An EEA national or the family member of an EEA national having extensive familial and societal links with persons of the same nationality or language does not amount to integration in the United Kingdom; a significant degree of wider cultural and societal integration must be present before a person may be regarded as integrated in the United Kingdom.
3. Where an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national has received a custodial sentence, or is a persistent offender, the longer the sentence, or the more numerous the convictions, the greater the likelihood that the individual’s continued presence in the United Kingdom represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting of the fundamental interests of society.
4. Little weight is to be attached to the integration of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national within the United Kingdom if the alleged integrating links were formed at or around the same time as—
(a) the commission of a criminal offence;
(b) an act otherwise affecting the fundamental interests of society;
(c) the EEA national or family member of an EEA national was in custody.
5. The removal from the United Kingdom of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national who is able to provide substantive evidence of not demonstrating a threat (for example, through demonstrating that the EEA national or the family member of an EEA national has successfully reformed or rehabilitated) is less likely to be proportionate.
6. It is consistent with public policy and public security requirements in the United Kingdom that EEA decisions may be taken in order to refuse, terminate or withdraw any right otherwise conferred by these Regulations in the case of abuse of rights or fraud, including—
(a) entering, attempting to enter or assisting another person to enter or to attempt to enter, a marriage, civil partnership or durable partnership of convenience; or
(b) fraudulently obtaining or attempting to obtain, or assisting another to obtain or to attempt to obtain, a right to reside under these Regulations. [my underlining]
The fundamental interests of society
7. For the purposes of these Regulations, the fundamental interests of society in the United Kingdom include—
(a) preventing unlawful immigration and abuse of the immigration laws, and maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the immigration control system (including under these Regulations) and of the Common Travel Area;
(b) maintaining public order;
(c) preventing social harm;
(d) preventing the evasion of taxes and duties;
(e) protecting public services;
(f) excluding or removing an EEA national or family member of an EEA national with a conviction (including where the conduct of that person is likely to cause, or has in fact caused, public offence) and maintaining public confidence in the ability of the relevant authorities to take such action;
(g) tackling offences likely to cause harm to society where an immediate or direct victim may be difficult to identify but where there is wider societal harm (such as offences related to the misuse of drugs or crime with a cross-border dimension as mentioned in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union);
(h) combating the effects of persistent offending (particularly in relation to offences, which if taken in isolation, may otherwise be unlikely to meet the requirements of regulation 27);
(i) protecting the rights and freedoms of others, particularly from exploitation and trafficking;
(j) protecting the public;
(k) acting in the best interests of a child (including where doing so entails refusing a child admission to the United Kingdom, or otherwise taking an EEA decision against a child);
(l) countering terrorism and extremism and protecting shared values.”
93. Additionally, AA (Poland) particularly [45]-[49] confirms that regard must be had to the relevant provisions of the EEA Regulations including Schedule 1 as follows:
‘46. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 is in mandatory terms, requiring "little weight … to be attached" to any integrating links formed "at or around the same time as" any offending or imprisonment. Regulation 27(8) of the 2016 Regulations is also in mandatory terms. It is true, as Ms Hirst points out, that what Regulation 27(8) requires the court or tribunal to do is to "have regard to" the matters listed in Schedule 1. But I cannot accept Ms Hirst's submission that these provisions are "not binding" on the FtT which is free to decide how to have regard to the specified matters in any given case. That is too broad a view.’[my emphasis]
…
49 It has not been suggested that this was an exceptional case involving particularly strong features that would allow the tribunal to depart from the general normative guidance laid down by Regulation 27(8) and paragraph 4 of Schedule 1. On that footing, if AA formed any integrating links with UK society in the 68 months immediately preceding the Decision the FtTJ was duty bound to attribute "little weight" to any such links formed during 42 of those months. In fact, the FtTJ attributed significant weight to integration during the period when AA was offending, as is clear from his paragraph [33]. In that paragraph the Judge placed reliance on outward manifestations of integration at a time when the offending was "going on in the background…"
94. MG (Portugal) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] 1 WLR 2441 at [31] and [32] said this:
“31. The Court has also found, when interpreting Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38, that the fact that a national court has imposed a custodial sentence is an indication that the person concerned has not respected the values of the society of the host Member State, as reflected in its criminal law, and that, in consequence, the taking into consideration of periods of imprisonment for the purposes of the acquisition, by members of the family of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State, of the right of permanent residence as referred to in Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38 would clearly be contrary to the aim pursued by that directive in establishing that right of residence (Case C-378/12 Onuekwere [2014] ECR I-0000, paragraph 26).
32. Since the degree of integration of the persons concerned is a vital consideration underpinning both the right of permanent residence and the system of protection against expulsion measures established by Directive 2004/38, the reasons making it justifiable for periods of imprisonment not to be taken into consideration for the purposes of granting a right of permanent residence or for such periods to be regarded as interrupting the continuity of the period of residence needed to acquire that right must also be borne in mind when interpreting Article 28(3)(a) of that directive.”
95. Ali Hafeez v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 406 at [43] recorded:
“As I said in Hussein at paragraph [18] (in a judgment handed down after the FTT and UT decisions in the present case), an individual relying on imperative grounds protection who has served time in custody must prove both that he has ten years’ continuous (or non-continuous) residence ending with the date of the decision on a mathematical basis and that he was sufficiently integrated within the host State during that ten year period.”
96. Bean LJ said this at [18] of Hussein v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 156, and indeed [18]-[22] are relevant:
“18. However, what does emerge clearly from MG (Portugal) is that whether or not a period of imprisonment can count towards the ten years, an individual claiming enhanced protection who has served time in custody must prove both that he had ten years’ continuous residence ending with the date of the decision on a mathematical basis and that he was sufficiently integrated within the host state during that ten year period. After all, if the calculation were simply an arithmetical exercise the phrase ‘overall assessment’ would be inappropriate. As the CJEU had held in Land Baden-Wurttemberg v Tsakouridis (Case C-145/09) [2011] INLR 415, the question is whether the individual's ‘integrative links’ within the host state have been broken by the interruption. The factors to be taken into account in this ‘overall assessment’ were set out at paragraphs [33] to [34] of the court’s judgment in Tsakouridis:
‘33. The national authorities responsible for applying Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 are required to take all the relevant factors into consideration in each individual case, in particular the duration of each period of absence from the host Member State, the cumulative duration and the frequency of those absences, and the reasons why the person concerned left the host Member State. It must be ascertained whether those absences involve the transfer to another State of the centre of the personal, family or occupational interests of the person concerned.
34. The fact that the person in question has been the subject of a forced return to the host Member State in order to serve a term of imprisonment there and the time spent in prison may, together with the factors listed in the preceding paragraph, be taken into account as part of the overall assessment required for determining whether the integrating links previously forged with the host Member State have been broken’.”
97. When considering ‘imperative grounds’, Tsakouridis at [40] explains that exceptional circumstances of “imperative grounds of public security” are required and the focus must be on the individuals present and future risk to the public rather than on the seriousness of the individuals offending per se.
98. Hafeez [2020] EWCA Civ 406 at [47] explained that:
“47. In LG and CC, Carnwath LJ set out the following guidance about the meaning of imperative grounds of public security, emphasising that the focus must be on the individual's present and future risk to the public, rather than on the seriousness of the individual's offending:
‘110. …[We] cannot accept the elevation of offences to ‘imperative grounds’ purely on the basis of a custodial sentence of five years or more being imposed… [T]here is no indication why the severity of the offence in itself is enough to make the removal ‘imperative’ in the interests of public security. Such an offence may be the starting point for consideration, but there must be something more, in scale or kind, to justify the conclusion that the individual poses "a particularly serious risk to the safety of the public or a section of the public’. Terrorism offences or threats to national security are obvious examples, but not exclusive. Serial or targeted criminality of a sufficiently serious kind may also meet the test. However, there needs to be some threat to the public or a definable section of the public sufficiently serious to make expulsion ‘imperative’ and not merely desirable as a matter of policy, in order to ensure the necessary differentiation from the second level’.”
99. The focus therefore is on the present and future risk to the public (not necessarily imminent) and the ‘imperative grounds’ test is not simply invoked by the length of sentence, which is only a starting point and there must be something more to justify the conclusion that the appellant poses a particularly serious risk, and further third there needs to be some sufficiently serious threat to the public or a section of the public may make expulsion imperative.

Conclusions
100. The initial question is the level of protection afforded to the appellant, namely whether there are imperative grounds of public security for considering that the appellant poses a “genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society, or whether there are serious grounds for considering the same”.
101. I note in particular paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Schedule 1 cited above and I have considered all of the evidence and do not repeat but refer to the serious nature of the index offence committed by the appellant. As stated in AA (Poland) at [46] paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations must be considered.
102. The appellant entered the UK in June 2010 from Portugal but committed the offence on 4th August 2018. He was remanded in custody on 7th July 2021, convicted on 30th June 2021 and sentenced on 24th November 2021. On 26th April 2024 the Secretary of State decided to make the final deportation order. Clearly the appellant was in the UK for 10 years prior to the deportation order, and prior to his imprisonment but the question is his integration within the UK following entry. I note he achieved permanent residence by 2015 as a family member of his father.
Integration
103. A custodial sentence is indicative of a rejection of societal values and of severing integrative links and a fact-specific assessment must be made (the Secretary of State for the Home Department v Viscu [2019] EWCA Civ 1052 at [44]). As stated, paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 specifies as follows:
“4. Little weight is to be attached to the integration of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national within the United Kingdom if the alleged integrating links were formed at or around the same time as—
(a) the commission of a criminal offence;
(b) an act otherwise affecting the fundamental interests of society;
(c) the EEA national or family member of an EEA national was in custody.”
104. I am obliged to apply of Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations, as emphasised by AA (Poland) and contrary to Mr Mupara’s submissions whether or not the appellant is a persistent offender. In accordance with paragraph 4(a) of Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations, I attach little weight to the appellant’s claimed integration from August 2018 (offending) to the date of conviction. Further to paragraph [46] of AA (Poland) I attach no weight to the appellant’s integration whilst in prison; I note he was on bail from December 2020.
105. B v Land Baden-Württemberg (Case C-316/16) [2019] QB 126 held that in order to determine whether periods of imprisonment have broken the integrative links previously forged it is necessary to carry out an overall assessment of the situation of that person at the time when the question of deportation arises and part of the assessment should include the nature of the offence that resulted in the period of imprisonment in question and the circumstances in which that offence was committed. Although Mr Mupara emphasised that the appellant was acquitted of many of the offences, it is clear on the face of the record that the appellant was convicted of very serious sexual offences and for which he received over eight years in prison, a sentence indicative of the seriousness of the crime. I have detailed below further details as to the nature of the crimes elsewhere in this decision, but I do consider that the severity of the offences and their circumstances serve to undermine any integrating links.
106. Not only do I consider that the nature of the offence itself undermined any integrating links but even if I am wrong about that I am not persuaded that the applicant evidenced meaningful ties to the UK community outside his immediate family even prior to his incarceration even from 2010 onwards.
107. It was asserted that the appellant has provided ample evidence of his integration into the UK such as his education at Newham Sixth Form College where he started in September 2010 to the years of education at Uxbridge College and his employment. It was advanced that before the offence the appellant worked part-time in 2012 to 2013 as an “online content creator” until 2017 and worked for Mr S J in 2017 to 2018 financial year. He started work as a mechanic in 2018. Since the offence the appellant worked for Ocado from 2019 until his imprisonment and it was asserted that he was not a recluse or socially isolated male.
108. In terms of integration, I consider the various factors.
Education
109. The appellant in his own witness statement stated that he started at Newham Sixth Form in East London, Newham and attended there for only a year but then the family moved house and he started at Uxbridge College. The appellant did not attend for any significant period at school in the United Kingdom and indeed attended school in Portugal for a year. He in fact states he attended Uxbridge College for his GCSEs but his OASys report identified differently; although he completed a BTEC courses and HNC/HND courses and reports that he attended Uxbridge College for five years, there was no indication whether this was full-time or merely part-time. I also note the assertions made that from 2012 to 2017 the appellant worked part time as an “online content creator” from his bedroom. Indeed by 2016 the appellant confirmed in his statement [7] that he was 22 years old when he finished his education there [Uxbridge College] in 2016. Dr Cummings records [11] in his report that the appellant told him the Level 3 course in business (a 2-year course) before leaving was ‘mostly course work’. The appellant then stated that he started at university in 2017 but dropped out after a year and did not return because of his health issues. There was little therefore in terms of confirmation of the appellant’s actual physical attendance at college. He apparently obtained GCSEs in India (according to the information given to the compiler of the OASys report 2024) and the certificates produced from Uxbridge College did not refer to GCSEs.
110. In his witness statement of 23rd October 2024, the appellant states at [12], “I was spending a lot of time on the internet, I was creating content. I was sharing videos of me playing video games. I was registered with google adds (sic) and they were paying me. I stopped in 2017 because of me [sic] health issues.”
111. In sum, there was limited and rather chequered information as to the appellant’s educational career. I note the last certificate for BTEC HNC Diploma Level 4 awarded in July 2016 from Uxbridge College but there are limited educational certificates save there are some certificates completed obtained whilst in prison.

Family and friends
112. The appellant references holidays with his family and one holiday in Amsterdam with friends but there is no confirmation of this from friends. He added at [17] of his statement “I have always lived with my parents and I never lived independently. I am very close with my family”. And at [18], “When in prison I spoke to my sister and also my parents. I also had some contact with friends that I knew from collage [sic]. I did not have any visitors there because I do not have social visit, it was too far. I am not good with emotion.”.
113. Both parents attested to the very close nature of their relationship with their son. His sister in her statement of 14th October 2024 at [11] described the appellant as “quite reserved and introverted” and that her parents “never really asked either of us for any financial help but we both try to contribute”. She added “he has been severely depressed in the past few years. He stopped seeing most of his friends since all his criminal case started” and added that he is “very respectful of women”.
114. All the photographs of the appellant are with his family.
115. In terms of friends, at [23] the appellant references that he committed the offence with his co-defendant whom he knew from college and who was in prison serving the sentence. In the same witness statement, the emphasised the closeness to his family and that “my life has always been around them”.
116. I attach little weight, however, to ties said to centre on his family as per paragraph 2 of Schedule 1
‘An EEA national or the family member of an EEA national having extensive familial and societal links with persons of the same nationality or language does not amount to integration in the United Kingdom; a significant degree of wider cultural and societal integration must be present before a person may be regarded as integrated in the United Kingdom.’
117. His friend MR wrote a statement in support and stated that he spoke regularly on the phone with him although his sister seemed to imply that he had had his phone removed and they had lost contact but nonetheless this person did not attend court, and I attach limited weight to his evidence.
Employment
118. Noting that the appellant reached majority in January 2014 although I appreciate the ‘dependency’ age under the EEA Regulations is 21, the appellant’s employment history and his earnings, as recorded by HMRC, were that in 2013/ 2014 he earned through Payfront Plus Limited approximately £340 and in 2014/2015 approximately £197. There was no record of employment for 2015/2016, a minimal record of employment for 2016/2017, by which time he was 21 years old, a record of earning in 2017/2018 £1,650 for Mr S K D, and for the same person £14,621.54 in the year 2018/2019, which tax year straddled the commission of the offence. It would appear the appellant worked full-time, post offence, for Ocado from 19th August 2019 to 5th July 2021 earning approximately £14,533. It was therefore only from August 2019 and after the offence that he started work with Ocado on a full-time basis.
119. It was not until after the commission of the offence in 2018 that the appellant applied for a job with Ocado and was employed by them until he was convicted.

Psychiatric reports
120. I also factor in the psychiatric court reports prepared on 28th September 2021 and the addendum report from Dr Cummings. These recorded that the appellant first went to ‘Newvic College’ and was told that he could not to school owing to his age. At [13] it is recorded that, “he says he was mainly at home after college” and would pay on the PlayStation and got involved in making YouTube videos and that he, “began making money in 2016 and by the end of 2018 he had made 15k”.
121. At [23] Dr Cummings recorded “he told me likes to be alone most of the time, even in home” and that “He had friends at school, some of whom he remains in contact with.”. At [39] the report states:
“R [the co-defendant] asked him out at a period in his life when he had been at home for quite some time. He explained that he did not like to go out much and said that he felt uncomfortable and had a sense that people were looking at him and generally self conscious. He can recall feeling depressed and also that life was not real. He can recall his appetite was poor and he was sleeping erratically.”
And at [51] it is recorded,
“Behind this, sits an account of a man who is quite shy, timid and socially awkward and with a life centred around the home and his family. I noted that he is very close and perhaps dependant on his family and there is a clear account of a close-knit structure”.
122. His psychiatric report confirmed that the appellant lived in Portugal for just under two years and attended school in Portugal, in Lisbon and learnt Portuguese and took his exams in the school. [9]. He was told he could not go to school due to his age and has been taught English in India. He stayed at Newvic College for a short period and then when his father moved to West London attended Uxbridge College and did level 2 and level 3 in a business course “which was mainly course work”. He then applied for an HNC at Uxbridge College and completed the course in over one year but was suffering and so “remained at home for 6 to 7 and did not return to his studies”. Indeed, the psychiatrist stated at [13]:
“13. He said that he was mainly at home after college and would play on the PlayStation and got involved in making YouTube videos, eventually making money. He began making money in 2016 and by the end of 2018 he had made £15K but lost interest and passion.”
123. From a consideration of the evidence which I have identified above I am not persuaded that the appellant was indeed integrated. He was an Indian national and thereafter a Portuguese national and had spent most of his schooling life in India and spent at least one year of school in Portugal. As identified above his employment to the date of offending was limited and his activity as a ‘content creator’ largely centred on his bedroom. The psychiatric report, as at the date of his sentence, indicated that he was someone who socialised but is predominantly with his family and within his own culture. Nothing in his parents’ witness statements really contradicted that.
124. Overall, the appellant lived at his parents’ home as a stationary isolated adult male who preferred to be alone. The appellant did not evidence significant ties to the UK through employment or education and other than his immediate family and indeed relied on his social isolation at his criminal trial as a mitigating factor.
125. Although the Secretary of State submitted that the offence occurred prior to the appellant residing in the UK for 10 years, stated above, the time calculation should be counted backwards from the date of the deportation order. I have carefully considered those ten years and also the time spent by the appellant following his arrival at the age of 16 years.
126. In view of the test set down by Bean LJ in Hussein in order to satisfy the requirement for imperative grounds, the appellant must not only have been in the UK in accordance with the EEA Regulations for ten years prior to the deportation decision (indeed I have looked at the period since 2010) but also have been integrated. Putting aside the indication by the offence that the appellant was not integrated in the UK, and had thereby rejected the values of the UK, I find his personal circumstances are not indicative that he was integrated.
127. Overall, I consider the appellant had the ‘middle level’ of protection such that there need to be serious grounds of public policy and security for the appellant’s exclusion.
Serious grounds and risk
128. The Secretary of State must discharge the burden of proving that the conduct of the appellant in all the circumstances and for reasons given above has shown there are serious grounds (or where relevant imperative grounds) of public policy and public security which justifies removal of the appellant in accordance with Regulations 23 and 27 and as per Arranz (EEA Regulations – deportation – test) [2017] UKUT 294 IAC.
129. In terms of serious grounds of public policy, the basic protection test must be met, and, the offending behaviour must be of greater seriousness to justify deportation. In SSHD v Straszewski [2015] EWCA Civ 1245 at [25] the Court described the assessment of whether serious grounds of public policy or security exist as:
“an evaluation […] of the likelihood that the person concerned will offend again and what the consequences are likely to be if he does. In addition, the need for the conduct of the person concerned to represent a “sufficiently serious” threat to one of the fundamental interests of society requires the decision-maker to balance the risk of future harm against the need to give effect to the right of free movement.”
130. Although Mr Mupara made considerable criticism of the deportation decision, I have concentrated on the actual appellant’s convictions, the sentencing judge’s remarks and the sentence. The decision letter stated that “This is an extreme case of causing social harm and completely disregarding the safety and wellbeing of the public, specifically women”.
131. Despite Mr Mupara’s observation that the appellant was acquitted of eleven out of the thirteen offences, of which the appellant was charged (including rape) it is clear from the record that the appellant was convicted of sexual assault of a woman over 16 and attempt to rape a woman of age 16 or over, the tenth and eleventh counts. The appellant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment after trial by jury, having pleaded not guilty, and the sentence is itself a reflection of the seriousness of the offence. The appellant is said to be categorised at MAPPA level 1 but see below.
132. The judge’s sentences remarks notwithstanding Mr Mupara’s submission that the appellant was only convicted of two offences recalls that the victim was, “all but unconscious and was being treated by the two Defendants as no more than an object for their own amusement and sexual gratification” and further the judge had:
“no doubt that the events of that night, the process of the investigation of this case, the delay before the trial could start, the trial process itself and now having to wait until the date of sentence, which is the delay for the preparation of psychiatric report and Mr Bangarh, had all had a profound impact upon [the victim].”
133. The judge also referenced “the lewd and unpleasant content of the films that were taken that night” and that the victim “still suffered severe harm as a result of what happened”. The judge referenced the videos taken by the defendant himself in respect of the victim’s actions and her “albeit extremely limited signs of consciousness” and remarked that there
“came a time, however, as reflected on the account upon which they(sic) were convictions when the jury concluded that the Defendants did not reasonably believe she was consenting. I reject the proposition put during the course of the trial that off camera i.e. when one or the other of Defendants did not have the mobile phone out for the purposes of filming things, that [the victim] was actively engaging with the Defendants both socially and sexually. In my judgment she was substantially out or completely out of it for a considerable time “well over one and a half hours” and that the victim was “in reality [treated] as an object”.
134. The judge remarked that there was “no justification for finding that [the victim] consented to any of the filming” and although the judge acknowledged “that there are acquittals in respect of voyeurism” he concluded that what was done to the victim was “highly degrading”. The judge was aware that she left the nightclub voluntarily and did not sentence on the basis that this was a planned enterprise when setting out from London and the defendants were not sentenced for offences with which that had not been committed, but the judge found that he was satisfied that ultimately the jury found the defendants no longer believed the victim was consenting and that she was “there for their sexual amusement and stripped of any sort of dignity”. The judge added “They further degraded her, as I have said by recording her in the most embarrassing fashion”.
135. The judge concluded that there was “severe psychological harm in this case” and it was designated a category two offence. Not only because of the severe psychological harm but the additional degradation and humiliation and the way the victim was treated and filmed and laughed at. Finally the judge recorded that neither pleaded guilty and could not expect any discount and recorded specifically that the psychiatric report recorded “Much of the report of course is based upon what Mr Bangarh had told the psychiatrist after his conviction and the upshot of it is that the psychiatrist had concluded that that from what he was told, Mr Bangarh is a man who is quite shy, timid, socially awkward with a life centred around home and family.”
I do not reference the intimate details of the offence but repeat that the appellant was convicted of eight years in prison. I conclude that the offending behaviour was particularly serious and certainly serious enough to classify as serious offending and thus cross the threshold for ‘serious grounds’.
136. I carefully considered all the evidence with the relevant principles in mind and do not repeat but refer to the very serious nature of the offence committed by the appellant as signified by the very lengthy eight-year sentence and the sentencing remarks. I have made an overall and fact specific assessment of the appellant’s situation at the time of the expulsion decision.
137. Mr Mupara questioned the validity of the OASys reports but these are reports which have been conducted by the Probation Service, were comprehensive and detailed and unusually there were two reports.
138. The first report of June 2022 confirmed that the appellant maintained his innocence of the offences, asserted that the complainant engaged in consensual oral sex and that the appellant did not demonstrate a solid understanding of consent. This report confirmed that the public specifically adult females were at risk who were likely to be perceived as vulnerable (lone intoxicated in need of support). There were various areas of concern including lifestyle and associates and, alcohol misuse and thinking and behaviour. He was noted to have been convicted of serious sexual offence, and the risk of reoffending was low but his OVP in year 2 was described at 13% which is not negligible. At that point his risk of serious recidivism was considered low 1.74% but harm to the public in the community was deemed high.
139. The further OASys Report was undertaken on 15th May 2024 and although there was an application for a further updated report none was placed before me. Mr Mupara submitted that the OASys Report was unreliable, but I note the sources of information were wide-ranging which contributed to the overall report and included the victim’s evidence and evidence given by the appellant himself.
140. It was noted that the victim was a stranger to the offender and it was recorded that the appellant did not recognise the impact and consequence of his offending on the victim, although I appreciate that in his oral evidence, the appellant maintained that he had learned subsequently. The OASys Report also, as at the date of the compilation recorded that the appellant maintained his innocence of the offences and indicated that he performed consensual oral sex, although admitting that his behaviour was exacerbated by alcohol on the night and that he considered he may have been spiked the previous evening; there was an element of males competing with each other, as the offending behaviour was committed with the appellant’s friend. The OASys Report recorded that the offence was not specifically preplanned prior to the arrival at the club, merely opportunistic, but the appellant did present significant issues relating to his thinking, attitude, understanding and behaviour. It was recorded in the second OASys Report that the appellant’s, “thinking and behaviour” was linked to a “risk of serious harm”.
141. It is not clear from the reports presented that these issues have been resolved.
142. I note the OASys Report also identified that the appellant related difficulty in establishing and maintaining friendships and highlighting that he found social situations difficult and during and his teenage young adult years he spent a large amount of time at home with his family because of his difficulties in this area.
143. The appellant was recorded as having committed a serious sexual offence against an adult and having an OVP (OASys Violence Predictor) score in year 1 of 7% and in year 2 of 12% and the overall risk of reoffending as being low. On the risk of serious harm summary, it is identified that the public were at risk, specifically adult females in their late teens or early adulthood, who are perceived to be vulnerable in some way, such as being alone, intoxicated or in need of support. The “direct contact sexual reoffending risk” was considered to be “medium” although serious reoffending over the next two years was considered to be low at 2.28%. The nature of the risk was primarily of sexual harm but the risk to the public, as specified above, was assessed to be “high” in the community because the appellant had offended alongside a peer and targeted the young, lone female and there was an element of an ‘entitlement’ engaged. Immediate risk was considered to be low although overall an assessment of risk does not have to be imminent in terms of the EEA Regulations. Various factors were said to increase the level of risk such as the appellant feeling the inferiority associated with negative peers; by being intoxicated and access to a vulnerable female and should he fail to develop his understanding of consent.
144. It was specifically noted that when in the community the appellant should be supervised in regard to appropriate services to reduce risk of offending behaviour and that there would be additional licence conditions required on release. He was also required to comply with the sex offenders register for life and a barring order. In particular the report noted that his sexual reoffending predictive score for sexual offending was “medium, meaning he will require a moderate intensity programme” and that “rehabilitation activity requirement” should be considered. The 2024 OASys report recorded that the ‘offender objective’ (to reduce the risk of serious harm and reduce offending) related factors in terms of current objectives were described as ‘ongoing’ and ‘completed objectives’ such as “increased awareness of impact of offending behaviour” was not achieved.
145. The appellant’s licence expiry date is not until 29th June 2029. He was recommended in the OASys report to be subject to multiagency public protection arrangements (in fact MAPPA level 2), the purpose of which is to protect the public. The objectives recorded in the OASys 2024 report in relation to the reduction in the level of serious harm and the offending related factors identified as scored highly or marked for attention, were recorded as either being ‘ongoing’ or ‘not achieved’. The appellant is on the sex offenders register indefinitely and is the subject of a Prevention from Harassment Order. This indicates that he is considered to pose a continuing risk to the public. I agree. During his oral evidence he again referred to the complainant/victim as effectively complicit in terms of her instigating the ‘incident’.
146. Having taken an overall view of the OASys Reports particularly that of 2024 which is relatively recent, I consider in line with the sentencing remarks and the details of the offence itself, that the Secretary of State had shown that at very least there are serious grounds of public policy and public security for exclusion.
147. From an overall assessment, as above and when taking into account the fundamental interests of society set out in Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations and which provide a non-exhaustive list of those interests I accept that the Secretary of State has shown that the appellant is a continuing threat to (b) the maintenance of public order (c) the prevention of social harm (f) maintaining public confidence in the ability of the relevant authorities to take such action (exclusion) (i) protecting the rights and freedoms of other particularly from exploitation and (j) protecting the public.
Imperative grounds
148. Even if I were wrong on integration and the appellant can seek the ‘imperative grounds’ protection I conclude that bearing in mind the nature of the offence and the attendant risks this threshold would be met.
149. I was referred to I v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid (Case C-348/09) [2012] QB 799 and the phrasing of Article 83(1) of the TFEU and whether it was open to member states to regard criminal offences such as I’s as particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society “which might pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the population and thus be covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’” [28] and [33].
150. It was posited by the respondent that sexual exploitation of children even without a cross-border element to the specific crime, fell within Article 83(1) of TFEU1 and I accept that sexual exploitation of women does so too because, first, the phrasing of Article 83(1) is “sexual exploitation of women and children”, not just children. Secondly, it is axiomatic that men who attempt to rape women threaten the peace of mind of the population (and calm has been interpreted as ‘peace of mind’ in K v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie; [2019] 1 WLR 1877 at [42]) and third ‘I’, the victim was a former partner’s daughter, but in this case it was a stranger. By contrast here, the victim was a member of the public and sexual predators who target their victims from the population at large are more of a threat to the peace of mind of the population.
151. I wholly reject the assertion that there was no element of exploitation in this case. There was undeniable exploitation of an ultimately unconscious young woman. There need be no exchange of consideration for exploitation as asserted by Mr Mupara.
152. Having found the respondent has discharged the burden of proof in relation to serious grounds I find that the same burden would be therefore discharged in relation to imperative grounds. Even so, there is a requirement either on ‘imperative’ or ‘serious grounds’ to assess whether deportation is proportionate in relation to the EEA Regulations. Even on the higher level of protection I would find it proportionate for the reasons I give below.
Proportionality
153. I consider Regulation 27(6), ‘age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin’.
154. The appellant is now 32 years of age. He has some health issues, but I do not consider that anything significant was presented to me or indeed any updated medical material (save a medical report explaining his absence from the first remaking hearing which referred to anxiety and depression). His GP notes disclosed no significant medical issues; by July 2021 the prison recorded that the appellant had some form of depression, but also recorded he had not pursued any treatment for the psychiatrist outside prison. He was recorded from 6th December 2021 as being discharged from the care of integrated mental health team at HMP Lewes, although he has reported ongoing social anxiety and low mood in relation to his circumstances. He did not report any thoughts or intent to self-harm or commit suicide (dated 6th December 2021) written by the Practice Plus Group.
155. His experiences of anxiety and depression seem to have been exacerbated by his time in prison. Portugal, however, is a European Union country with health facilities of which the appellant could avail himself and sertraline, is a medication easily accessible in Portugal (Prepandemic psychotropic drug status in Portugal: a nationwide pharmacoepidemiological profile - PMC (nih.gov) accessed 5 April 2024). He has no autism diagnosis. No evidence was provided by the appellant to counter the information in the decision letter of the respondent.
156. He entered the UK with his parents in 2010 but has spent between one and two years in Portugal and it is clear from the evidence that he was in school in Portugal and managed to learn some Portuguese there. Indeed, he told Dr Cummings he did exams there.
157. The appellant has now been in prison since 2021 and prior to that for reasons given above, I am not persuaded that he was socially or culturally integrated. No one save his family attended the hearing to give evidence on his behalf and although I have considered any letters provided on his behalf these did not emphasise any form of secure integration and no friend attended to give evidence in person.
158. I take into account the witness statements of the mother, father and sister and that they are a closeknit family and they have to the date of imprisonment had provided accommodation. All three of his family appear to be working and although they stated that they might need to rely on him financially for their mortgage, they have been able to cope with the economic vicissitudes to date. I do not accept any level of dependency either way and not least, although they may be emotionally close, the appellant has been in prison since 2021.
159. The appellant has indicated that he can secure employment (he worked for Ocado after the offending). Even whilst in prison he obtained an offer of employment on a £40,000 salary and in his previous life outside prison was engaged in running and monetising a YouTube channel. The appellant has shown that he can secure work and there is no reason why he could not develop his abilities in the Portuguese language whilst in Portugal.
160. He is single and has no children in the UK and although he would find transplanting to Portugal difficult, and I appreciate he has not lived there since he was a teenager and is now 32 years old, it is an EEA country with similar democratic values, and his parents and sister will be able to visit him there.
161. In terms of rehabilitation, I appreciate that the appellant has undertaken courses in prison but conclude that the appellant will be able to access courses should he so wish and I have no doubt owing to their commitment so far that his family will, so far as they are able to assist him in accessing relevant courses. The family were unable to prevent him from committing offences and in the absence of evidence to the contrary there is no reason why he could not work to rehabilitate himself in Portugal. In the circumstances, any interference in his rehabilitation is proportionate. He also has the opportunity to engage with the Facilitated Return Scheme with a reintegration package.
162. Balancing the risk that the appellant poses, I accept it is sufficiently serious to affect the fundamental interests of society particularly in view of the level of protection he has been afforded. I consider that the decision to exclude the appellant would be proportionate under the EEA Regulations.
Human rights
163. For completeness I have considered the human rights claim under the Immigration Rules and taken account of Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (as set out in the Immigration Rules). The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and significant weight should be given to that consideration.
164. Further to Section 117C (4) (a) the appellant has not lived in the UK for most of his life. He was born on 5th January 1994 and entered the UK on 24th June 2010. He would need to have been in the UK for 16 years and just under month to represent ‘most of his life’. He has not. He has been in the UK for 15 years and nearly 8 months, but even so the relevant exceptions are conjunctive, and (b) I do not accept that he is social and culturally integrated for the reasons given above and (c) I have explained why I consider there would be no very significant obstacles to his integration in Portugal. Further to Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 which requires a ‘broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on’. His father confirmed in oral evidence that he had lived in Portugal for many years prior to coming to the UK (and speaks Portuguese) and I conclude he can advise the appellant in integrating. The appellant came to the UK in 2010 when he was just 16 years old and spent time in school in Portugal and speaks some Portuguese. I accept he has a relationship with his family, but he has no qualifying relationship with a qualifying partner or child, and I am not persuaded on the evidence presented that his has any article 8 family life with his parents or sister (who now lives independently).
165. As set out in NA Pakistan [2016] EWCA Civ 662 at [33] ‘cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient’.
166. Simply, as the appellant was sentenced to four years in prison, I find that there were no very compelling circumstances under S117C (6) presented to counter deportation.
167. I factored in the Section 117B factors and appreciate that he can speak English and that he will not necessarily be a financial burden on society, but these factors are merely neutral.
168. The appellant cannot fulfil the immigration rules and there was no evidence of unjustifiably harsh consequences on removal, Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11. I list my reasoning above to find that there are no very compelling circumstances which outweigh the public interest which is significant and in turn the decision to deport the appellant in relation to human rights is proportionate.
169. I dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9th February 2025