Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No.: UI-2025-001692
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01549/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

MUZZAFAR PASHA
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of state for the home department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Turner, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Stedman promulgated on 20 February 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Stedman dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent to refuse to grant him leave to remain outside the Rules on private life grounds.

Relevant Background
2. The appellant is a national of India who entered the UK on 5 February 2010 as a Tier 4 (Student) migrant. After obtaining a diploma in Business Management in June 2011, the appellant applied for leave to remain so that he could continue to study up to Level 6. The application was eventually refused by the respondent on 25 June 2013. The appellant was given a right of appeal which he exercised. His appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 27 May 2014, and he was refused permission to appeal both by the First-tier Tribunal and by the Upper Tribunal with the consequence that his statutory appeal rights were exhausted by mid-October 2014.
3. The appellant sought an application for a judicial review on 24 February 2015, which eventually concluded on 11 July 2017 without a positive outcome for the appellant. On 6 November 2018 the appellant’s previous representatives submitted a Statelessness application without the appellant’s knowledge. His representatives were later referred to the OISC due to their professional conduct.
4. On 21 January 2020 the Statelessness application was varied by the appellant’s new representatives to an application for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds. This application was promptly refused by the respondent on 31 March 2020.
5. In the reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 31 March 2020, the respondent rehearsed the appellant’s immigration history. The respondent noted that on 4 June 2019 the appellant was encountered by Immigration Officials and was granted immigration bail. The respondent also noted that, in their letter dated 11 March 2020, his representatives stated that the appellant had encountered many problems since his arrival in the UK, and in particular with the Home Office, college institutions, health and loaning money in his home country. However, the appellant had failed to provide any evidence regarding the problems he had had with college institutions or money issues in his home country. Even if he had provided such evidence, these reasons would not warrant a grant of leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules.
6. The appellant’s case on appeal was set out in an Appeal Skeleton Argument (ASA) dated 10 February 2025. The appellant had formed a genuine and subsisting relationship while in the UK. He had married his partner, Ms Begum, who was an Indian national, in the UK on 22 December 2022. They were living together, with his wife working as a Pharmacy Advisor and studying to qualify as a Pharmaceutical Technician. Ms OB was earning a stable income to support them both. They were trying for a baby and were having to undergo fertility tests. They had also been considering IVF which, if returned to India, they would not be able to continue. They had planning to enter the early stages of IVF treatment in the UK. They were hoping that this would finally enable them to have a child together, something they had wanted since they got married. To remove the appellant with or without his wife would unfairly disrupt this process and interfere with their chances of continuing IVF in the UK.
7. Ms Begum was also studying for her final exams. If she was forced to go back with her husband to India, she would not be able to continue and qualify.
8. Another relevant consideration was that the appellant unfortunately had a significant issue with previous representatives submitting wrong applications without his knowledge. He had provided a copy of a UT Hamid decision relating to his previous representatives. The UT in that case made a decision to refer the representatives to the OISC due to their conduct. It was submitted that the appellant had also suffered at their hands. If it was not for their handling of his case, the appellant would not have overstayed.
9. Therefore, considering everything holistically, there were exceptional circumstances in this case that warranted a grant of leave to remain outside the Rules.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
10. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Stedman at Hatton Cross on 12 February 2025. Both parties were legally represented, with Mr Turner of Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. The Judge received oral evidence from the appellant and his partner, who were both cross-examined.
11. In the Decision at para [7] the Judge recorded that Ms Begum’s evidence was that she was on a Post-study Work visa until 2027, and that she wished to undergo fertility treatment due to thyroid issues, and thus she did not want to return to India. She was progressing in her career as a Pharmacist in the UK.
12. The Judge went on to find that there were not very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration. The threshold for this was not met. The appellant was capable of supporting himself and he had not demonstrated that his health condition would prevent him from working. Although he had spent 14 years in the UK, he was born in India and his family, as well as his wife’s, were there to support him in reintegration. His lengthy overstay and lack of employment in the UK did not constitute very significant obstacles. If he returned to India, he could find work, which would improve his well-being and that of his family.
13. Mr Turner had highlighted that the appellant would face a one-year waiting period before applying for entry clearance, due to his overstaying, as per Parts 9.87 and 9.81 of the Immigration Rules. The Judge said that he had considered this. At para [13] the Judge acknowledged the significant delay of nearly 4 years from the date of the refusal to the hearing. The Judge observed that, during this time, the appellant had married, which had strengthened the weight of his family life in the balance.
14. At para [14] the Judge found that the appellant and his wife did not have the right to choose their country of residence. While he understood the appellant’s wife’s reluctance to return to India due to her career progression, she could choose to go with him and wait for him to apply for entry clearance. Both families were in India and they could support her. The appellant could return to India and apply for entry clearance after a year. Although this meant separation, his wife could visit him if needed, although her work commitments might limit this.
15. At para [15] the Judge said that he must assess whether it was proportionate to expect the appellant to leave the UK and apply for entry clearance, considering the public interest in maintaining immigration control, following Younas [2020] UKUT 129:
“By the time the application is made, it is likely that the appellant’s wife will meet the income threshold, and I see no other barriers to a successful application.”
16. The Judge stated his conclusions at paras [17]-[19]. It was suggested that the appellant and his wife would face difficulties in returning to India, but these difficulties were not unjustifiably harsh. Outside of the Rules, the appellant had established a private and family life in the UK, but much of this was built while his status was unlawful and precarious, so he gave it little weight. The relationship and marriage were entered into while the appellant’s status was precarious. The appellant was financially independent and spoke English, but these were neutral factors. The appellant did not succeed on private and family life grounds. Both parties had families in India for support if needed, but he saw no reason why such support would be needed. Both the appellant and his wife were capable and healthy adults who had made their own way in the world. The Judge continued as follows:
“In conclusion, given the appellant’s immigration history and the personal circumstances of both him and his wife, it is proportionate for him to apply for entry clearance from India. This would be the path, should they choose it, that is least disruptive to their long-term plans. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.”
The Grounds of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
17. Mr Turner settled the application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The single ground of appeal was that the Judge had failed properly to consider the appellant’s protected rights under Article 8 ECHR and had thereby erred in Law.
18. The Judge had not considered that the appellant and his wife had taken the first steps towards IVF and had undergone fertility tests. The appellant and his wife had had difficulty in conceiving, and so were planning to complete a round of IVF in order to finally have a child together. To remove the appellant at this stage in the process of the IVF treatment would result in the couple not being able to complete IVF and it would be unjustifiably harsh.
19. The Judge stated at para [15] that he had considered the case of Younas, and he went on to find that by the time the appellant made the application for entry clearance to rejoin his wife, she would be able to satisfy the financial requirement, and he would be successful. The Judge had failed properly to consider the proportionality of this when weighed with other factors in favour of the appellant, including the IVF discussed above, as well as the length of time he had spent in the UK, his wife’s career, their married life in the UK, and the difficulties the appellant had had with previous legal representation.
The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal
20. In a decision dated 4 April 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Athwal granted permission to appeal as it was arguable that the Judge had failed to provide adequate reasons for why the fertility treatment, when considered alongside other factors, did not breach the appellant’s Article 8 rights.
The Rule 24 Response
21. In a Rule 24 response dated 29 April 2025, Mr Tan of the Specialist Appeals Team gave the respondent’s reasons for opposing the appellant’s appeal. In summary, the Judge of the First-tier Tribunal had directed himself appropriately. He had clearly had regard to the evidence of the witnesses, and their desire to undergo fertility treatment. Consideration of the record of proceedings made by the Presenting Officer highlighted only a few questions relating to fertility treatment, which indicated that whilst some tests had been taken, Ms Begum was not actually undergoing any course of fertility treatment and had not paid to do so either. In the circumstances, the appellant’s wish to undertake IVF treatment in the future was a matter of very limited weight, following Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11.
The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
22. At the hearing before me to determine whether an error of law was made out, I raised with Mr Turner the Rule 24 response. Mr Turner responded that if it was just the IVF issue, maybe the Decision was not defective. However, he submitted that the error of law challenge went wider than that. The Judge had failed to engage adequately in his proportionality assessment with: (1) the previous failings of his previous representatives; (2) the delay between the date of the refusal decision and the appeal eventually coming to trial, and (3) that, although the appellant’s partner did not have settled status, having first entered the UK on 13 June 2022, the plan was for her to acquire leave to remain under the Skilled Worker route, under which she could sponsor the appellant as her dependent partner. Ms Begum had since been issued with a Skilled Worker visa on 31 March 2026. At the time of the hearing before Judge Stedman, the appellant could not go back to seek entry clearance, as his wife had not yet got her Skilled Worker visa. On these facts, the Judge needed to explain why the public interest in requiring the appellant to go back to India was not reduced.
23. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Ojo submitted that the Judge had given adequate reasons for holding that requiring the appellant to go back would not be unjustifiably harsh. With regard to the statelessness application made on his behalf by his previous representatives, there was no evidence that the appellant had himself lodged a complaint about their conduct.
24. The Judge had acknowledged that there had been extensive delay between the date of decision and the date of the appeal hearing, and his finding on the ramifications of this delay was entirely in line with what was said at paras [13]-[16] of EB (Kosovo) [2008] UKHL 41.
25. It was also not the case that the appellant was exempt from blame for the delay. On 5 March 2024 the prospective final hearing of the appeal was converted to a CMRH because the appellant had raised as a new matter his marriage to Ms Begum. On 21 May 2024 Judge Rastogi adjourned the hearing again, as the appellant had not complied with directions to provide the evidence upon which he wished to rely in support of the new matter of his relationship with Ms Begum.
26. In reply, Mr Turner insisted that the delay in the final hearing of the appellant’s appeal was entirely the fault of a dysfunctional First-tier Tribunal. As to the conduct of the previous representatives in bringing a plainly unmeritorious statelessness application, he accepted that the appellant had not himself made a complaint about their conduct, but it was obvious that his previous representatives had made an abusive application. The relevant authority was Mansur [2018] UKUT 278.
Discussion and Conclusions
27. Given the nature of the error of law challenge (inadequate reasoning), I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
28. I consider that the error of law challenge is a sophisticated attempt to re-argue the case. It is clear that the Judge took into account the three matters that were relied upon by the appellant as fortifying his case on proportionality. These were (1) the couple’s desire to undergo IVF treatment in the UK, rather than in India; (2) the fact that the appellant’s previous representatives had made an unmerited statelessness application without his knowledge; and (3) the fact that it had taken four years for the appellant’s appeal to come to trial. All these matters were mentioned in the course of the Decision and all of them were encompassed and adequately addressed in the Judge’s proportionality assessment, in which he specifically weighed in the balance the appellant’s personal circumstances and his immigration history.
29. The Judge did not err in law in not undertaking a fuller discussion of any of these matters, as none of them was reasonably capable of reducing the public interest in requiring the appellant to go back to India, and none of them was reasonably capable of fortifying the case that the impact upon the appellant or his partner of the maintenance of the refusal decision would be unjustifiably harsh.
30. On the topic of fertility treatment, the Judge fairly summarised the oral evidence of Ms Begum at para [7] of the Decision. IVF was an aspiration. The couple had not yet embarked upon IVF. As is highlighted in the Rule 24 response, it was put to Ms Begum in cross-examination that she could not get IVF treatment on the NHS, and therefore what was her plan for IVF? She responded as follows: “I thought I do my course, save money and then pay for it.”
31. Thus, not only had the couple not embarked upon IVF treatment, but they currently did not have sufficient funds to do so, and this was going to be something that Ms Begum was going to need to save up for, to do in the future. So, in line with the observations about fertility treatment in Agyarko [2007] UKSC 11, the Judge was right not to treat the couple’s aspiration to undergo fertility treatment in the future as a factor which tipped the balance in the appellant’s favour in the proportionality assessment.
32. As to the second matter, the headnote of Mansur (Immigration advisor’s failings: Article 8) Bangladesh [2018] UKUT 00274 reads as follows:
(1) Poor professional immigration advice or other services given to P cannot give P a stronger form of protected private or family life than P would otherwise have.
(2) The correct way of approaching the matter is to ask whether the poor advice etc that P has received constitutes a reason to qualify the weight to be placed on the public interest in maintaining firm and effective immigration control.
(3) It will be only in a rare case that an adviser’s failings will constitute such a reason. The weight that would otherwise need to be given to that interest is not to be reduced just because there happen to be immigration advisers who offer poor advice and other services. Consequently, a person who takes such advice will normally have to live with the consequences.
(4) A blatant failure by an immigration adviser to follow P’s instructions, as found by the relevant professional regulator, which led directly to P’s application for leave being invalid when it would otherwise have been likely to have been granted, can, however, amount to such a rare case.
33. The Judge did not ask himself whether the inappropriate statelessness application made by the appellant’s previous representatives constituted a reason to qualify the weight to be placed on the public interest in maintaining firm and effective immigration controls. However, the Judge did not err in this regard, as he was not invited to answer this question by the ASA. Furthermore, the actual facts of the appellant’s immigration history did not disclose an arguable case. Contrary to what was stated in the ASA, the appellant did not have extant leave to remain at the time that his previous representatives made a statelessness application. The appellant was already an overstayer, and therefore it could not be said that, but for the inappropriate statelessness application, the appellant would not have been an overstayer. In addition, on the facts the appellant had not been prejudiced, as the application was varied in 2020 to an application on private life grounds, and the preceding two years’ delay while the statelessness application was pending did not detract from the merits of the private life application.
34. As to the delay between the date of the refusal and the final hearing of the appeal, the Judge acknowledged that this delay had meant that the appellant had been able to establish family life with Ms Begum. Logically, therefore, the delay had not prejudiced the appellant, as, but for the delay, the appellant’s appeal would have been decided solely on private life grounds before he had formed a relationship with Ms Begum.
35. It does not appear to have been argued before the First-tier Tribunal that the delay was all the fault of a dysfunctional Tribunal, rather than being contributed to by the appellant. In HB (Kosovo} at [16] Lord Bingham said that delay may be relevant in reducing he weight to be accorded to the requirements of firm and fair immigration control, “if the delay is shown to be the result of a dysfunctional system which yields unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair outcomes”. The appellant did not run a case to this effect before the First-Tier Tribunal and so the Judge did not err in failing to deal with such a case, for which, in any event, there is and was no apparent foundation.
36. For the reasons given above, I find that no error of law is made out.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Anonymity
The First-tier Tribunal did not make made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I do not consider that the appellant requires anonymity for these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
14 August 2026