The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001702
UI-2025-001703

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53439/2024
PA/53443/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

25th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

SNM
SSN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Cleghorn, instructed by Legal Justice Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 16 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants’ appeal with permission a determination of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) promulgated following a hearing at Newcastle on 21 January 2025.
2. SNM was born on 15 August 1969 and is male. SSN is the First appellants son, also male, born on 1 November 2002.
3. The Appellants were accompanied by the First appellants wife, their daughter and his youngest son who are dependants on the asylum claim.
4. The claims were rejected by the Secretary of State against which the Appellants appealed.
5. The Judge’s findings are set out from [9] of the decision under challenge.
6. The Judge considered the merits pursuant to section 32 Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022 (NABA).
7. The Judge was satisfied on a balance of probabilities the Appellants had a characteristic which would cause them to feel persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and that the Appellants feared such persecution in Iraq as a result of that characteristic [11].
8. The Judge noted the Appellants were seeking asylum for a Convention reason, membership of a particular social group, as victims or potential victims of an honour crime. The Judge noted their fear was of non-state actors who had shown an adverse interest in them as a result of a perceived slight against them. The Judge was satisfied that the treatment the Appellant’s fear reaches the threshold required by NABA.
9. At [33] the Judge writes:

33. To be found to be members of a particular social group as the victims or possible victims of an honour crime, I would have to find the Appellants to be reliable witnesses of the truth and credible. I do not find them to be either credible or witnesses of the truth for the reasons narrated above and, in my judgement, the Appellants do not face a real risk of serious harm because of an honour killing at the hands of a man or his family, who wants his son to marry the first Appellant’s daughter. They would be able to relocate in another area of the IKR if they found it uncomfortable to remain living in Sulaymaniyah.

10. The Judge finds the Appellants have fabricated the details to support a false claim for protection and that they are in fact economic migrants or persons who planned their journey to the United Kingdom for reasons otherwise known to themselves [34].
11. The Judge does not find the Appellants have established they are entitled to a grant of Humanitarian Protection [36].
12. The Judge goes on to consider the issue of documentation from [40] finding the Appellants had not established that they could not be re-documented.
13. The Judge therefore dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
14. The Appellants sought permission to appeal on grounds dated 14 February 2025 drafted by Ms Cleghorn who states, in summary, that whilst it is a lengthy discursive determination the reasons for dismissing the appeal that can be extracted are lacking in substance and that it is difficult for the reader to readily identify why the appeal has been dismissed.
15. Permission to appeal was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 10 April 2025. There is no Rule 24 response from the Secretary of State.
Discussion and analysis
16. The Court of Appeal have delivered a number of judgments providing guidance to judges below the upshot of which is that they should not interfere with a decision on appeal unless that decision is plainly wrong. It is accepted that different judges might come to different conclusions and/or might express their findings differently, but that may not warrant an appellate court interfering with the findings actually made.
17. It is also settled law that reasons need to be adequate and not perfect and that the appropriate test is whether an informed reader is able to understand not only the findings made by the judge but also the reasons for those findings.
18. Judges of the First- tier Tribunal are being encouraged to write more succinct issue-based decisions than had been the situation in the past.
19. The Judge begins by setting out issues that remain in dispute at [16].
20. As the criticism is that the Judge does not make finding supported by adequate reasons sufficient to enable an informed reader to understand the outcome of the appeal it is necessary to look at the findings the Judge actually made, which are as follows:

i. The burden is upon the Appellant prove an entitlement to a grant of humanitarian protection [12]. That is a legally sustainable finding on the facts of this appeal.
ii. That in relation to his claim to be entitled to be recognised as a refugee as a member of a particular social group as the potential victim of another crime, the Appellants will need to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that they will face persecution because of their memberships of such a group. That is a legally sustainable finding. The Judge notes the Appellants do not claim to fear state persecution but a non-state actor who it is claimed is taking an adverse interest in them because of a perceived slight against him. The Judge is satisfied that the treatment the Appellants’ fear reaches the threshold required by the Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022 (‘NABA’) [13]. That is a legally sustainable finding.
iii. The evidence suggested the Appellants and the remainder of the family are on good terms with the Appellant's wife's family and would visit them and that the relationship with them is such that this is believed to the starting point of the claimed marriage proposal – [18]. That is a finding made by the Judge on the evidence that she heard.
iv. The Judge finds the first Appellant’s father-in-law is a Major General with the PUK although both parents believed he would be agreeable to the marriage as there would be something in it for him, although there was no have reference to a dowry, what the offer was in respect to the marriage taking place, or any indication there were any favours on offer. The Judge finds it relevant that there was said to be a family connection to the General and the PUK as neither Appellant claimed to have been aware of the General before the marriage proposal was made, leading to it being found that whatever power and influence the General had it did not impact on the life of the Appellants or their family [19]. That is a finding made by the Judge on the basis of the evidence she heard.
v. The Judge finds by reference to the patriarchal and tribal nature of society in the IKR the first Appellant must have been given the approval of his father-in-law to marry his wife meaning the families were not estranged from his wife's family. The Judge records that both parents believe their daughter/sister was spotted by the Generals son at their grandfather’s house during one of their visits there. The Judge finds it is more likely than not that the account of interest in the daughter/sister is fabricated and designed to provide an excuse for the family leaving Iraq [20]. That is a finding made by the Judge having considered the evidence and has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to her.
vi. The Judge refers to screenshots from a Facebook page in the name of the General which the Appellant claimed provided sufficient evidence to establish both his existence and his power, but the Judge notes the Facebook pages are dated 2017 and 2019 and did not demonstrate the position of the general in 2022 when the alleged marriage proposal took place. The Judge also refers to changes made in the structure of the security forces in the IKR meaning any power derived from being a ‘Major General’ in Force 70 will be diminished between 2022 and the present day. Leading to the Judge recording that she did not find the Facebook pages established the power and influence the Appellants claimed the general had in 2022, and that the changes in the IKR since the Appellant left would mean the situation cannot now be the same as it had been previously. The Judge specifically finds the Appellants had not established that the General is a man of power and influence who would be able to exert any influence throughout the IKR [21]. That is a finding open to the Judge on the evidence.
vii. In relation to the video evidence, the Judge was not satisfied it had been downloaded straight onto a flash pen as the incident occurred as alleged. The Judge refers to issues with the sequencing which appears to flow from one to another but with the video recording events outside the house being marked with a different time frame to that inside the house. The Judge records not questioning the Appellant on this as she had not noticed that prior to or at the hearing, but records having asked the Appellant as to why he had such a security system and the explanation that it was his father's home and that the security system was there when his father gave him the house in 2014. The Appellant claimed his father lived in another house elsewhere in the district but then that his parents were deceased. The Judge did not find the explanation provided showed why the Appellant would have such an elaborate security system even if many other houses have the same thing [22]. Miss Cleghorn claimed in her submissions that the difference in the timings of the recorded events was because the images were taken from two separate cameras.

Mr McVeety in his submissions stated he had viewed the video evidence and the observations made by the Judge in relation to the difference in the timings of the events was credible. At [23] of the determination the Judge writes:

23. I then asked the first Appellant about the contents as it shows his wife going to the door (19.44) and coming outside on the veranda where the uniformed men are waiting on the pavement outside a gate (19.36). She calmly walks to the gate where the uniformed and armed men are standing, the gate is pushed open before she is then pushed aside and three of the four men run inside, leaving the first Appellant's wife lying on the ground outside. The fourth man waits beside the car and makes no attempt to stop the lady running back inside. Thereafter, the footage cuts to inside, where you see a scuffle, the children, including at the second Appellant, and the lady are escorted through a door by one of the men, while the other two struggle with the first Appellant and take him outside [19.45]. It is only seconds later that the rest of the family emerge from the door and the second Appellant and the lady run outside, arriving just in time to see the car driving off down the road [19.37]. Back inside, the second Appellant picks up a phone and appears to make a telephone call. He told me he was phoning his paternal uncle to tell him what had happened. He had no thought to call the police because he believed they ‘couldn't do anything’. It also shows the second Appellant flinging a black rag on to the floor but not where he obtained that black rag. I place little evidential weight on the video evidence.

The Judge clearly considered the video evidence and makes a clear finding that she felt unable to place the weight upon that evidence that the Appellant’s were inviting her to do in support of the claim. The comment two cameras were involved does not adequately explained the discrepancy between the timing on the video showing the first Appellant’s wife going to the door at 19.44 hours with uniform men waiting on the pavement at 19.36 hours and a subsequent struggle at 19.45 hours. A point raised by Mr McVeety, having viewed the video, is that there is a discrepancy of around five minutes in the recorded times. The Judge concerns are not outside the range of those available to her as the evidence is contrary to the expectation that security cameras will record the date and time of events when they occur simultaneously, even if in adjoining venues in a moving situation, yet the timing shows the car allegedly into which the first Appellant had been taken being driven off down the road at 19.37 hours when the first Appellant's wife had not even gone to the door until 19.44 hours, the starting point for the alleged events. I find the Judge was entitled to express doubts about the credibility of this evidence for which adequate reasons are provided.
viii. The Judge then moved on to consider the first Appellant’s evidence about how the agent took his mobile phone, identity documents of the family and $2,000 and never gave him the items back. The Judge expressed her disbelief that the agent would not have taken the flash drive on which the alleged events discussed above are recorded, especially as it might have contained information detrimental to the agent as noted by the Judge at [24]. That is a finding reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
ix. The Judges finding at [25] that she was not satisfied the evidence on the video was a true reflection of the events from 7 November 2022 and that she was not satisfied they had not been staged in order to substantiate the Appellant’s account of why they left Iraq is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence. The Judge records agreement with the Secretary of State's position in relation to aspects of the evidence in this paragraph and comments upon there being no audio on the video of what he said by anybody, that the car was not identifiable as even registration plates were not visible on the video, and the video was not sufficiently reliable to demonstrate the first Appellant was kidnapped by the a man who was influential in the PUK or who wished his son to marry the first Appellant's daughter. That is a clear finding supported by adequate reasons and one within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
x. At [26] the Judge refers to the first Appellant claiming he returned home around midnight having been released and dropped about 5 minutes from his home. The Judge records having noted from the video that he had no shoes on his feet when he was apparently taken into the car. He claimed he was beaten and had injuries to his face which the second Appellant claimed was the situation in his evidence and that his father had marks on his face as well as blood. The Judge’s observation is that notwithstanding this the Appellant had not produced video footage of the first Appellant’s return to the house which might have been helpful in establishing the injuries he claims to have suffered. On the one hand the Appellant produced video evidence from what appears to be a sophisticated security video recording system but did not provide evidence from the same source of an event that would have corroborated their claim. The Judge’s finding they had not produced such evidence is a factual finding open to the Judge and adequately explained.
xi. At [27] the Judge examines the situation of the family within Iraq and notes the Appellants had good jobs although there was insufficient evidence to support what they were claiming about that and no documents in relation to schooling in the UK. The finding by the Judge that the lack of information about the life they claimed to have had cast doubt upon the veracity of that aspect of the claim is a finding within to range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
xii. At [28] the Judge refers to a letter from the first Appellant’s daughter which makes reference to many problems and hardships the family faced in Iraq after the proposal that was rejected came. The Judge noted, however, that the evidence of the Appellant’s was that apart from a telephone call and the alleged incident at their home there was no interference in their lives until they left Iraq. The Judge refers to the first Appellant’s daughter witnessing the claimed events on 7 November 2022 but finds she was not satisfied that the whole incident was not staged to tie in with the account provided as to why the family had left Iraq. The Judge refers to there being no reference to any hardship whilst the family remained in Iraq with no interest being shown in the daughter by the men in the video, or any attempt to lay hands on her, and her being escorted from the room with her brothers and sisters. The Judge accepts the family may have encountered some discomfort and hardship during the 12 days they travel to the UK but found a lack of consistency between her account in the letter and that of her father and brother in respect of what transpired in the period between mid-October 2022 and 15 November 2022 when she left Iraq. The Judge’s finding that she placed little evidential weight on the letter as it was found to exaggerate events in Iraq has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
xiii. At [30] the Judge refers to the lack of documentary evidence in relation to the father in law’s position with the PUK. The Judge also notes an illegal journey using an agent or people smuggler from Iraq to the UK is not cheap and the first Appellant stating it cost US$40,000. The Judge finds, for the reasons stated, that it is more likely that their journey to the UK was planned for some time. At [31] the Judge notes the journey to the UK took a total of 12 days which indicated there were no long delays while they waited for a space to be found in a lorry, that the journey must therefore have been planned from start to finish before they left Iraq. The Judge’s finding that the facts point to a well-planned illegal migration from Iraq to the UK has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably available to the Judge on the evidence.
xiv. At [33] the Judge makes a finding that she did not find the Appellant’s to be credible witnesses of truth for the reasons set out in the determination, and finds the Appellant’s had not made out that they face a real risk of serious harm because of an honour killing at the hands of a man or his family who wanted to marry the first Appellant’s daughter. The Judge finds they will be able to relocate to another area of the IKR if they found it uncomfortable living in Sulamaniyah. That is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
xv. At [34] the Judge finds the Appellants have fabricated details of their claim in order to substantiate the claim for international protection and that they are, in reality, economic migrants. That has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
xvi. At [36] Judge records finding the Appellants are not refugees which is a finding open to the Judge on the evidence. The Judge also finds it not established that they are in need of a grant of humanitarian protection, and it not established they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in Iraq. It has not been made out those findings not reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
xvii. The Judge at [38] notes that the Appellant’s life was based in Sulamaniyah where his family members still reside and that they could be returned to the IKR without having to travel to Baghdad. The Judge finds the Appellants had not established a breach of Article 15 (c) on the evidence [39]. Those are findings reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
xviii. In relation to documentation, the Judge addresses this issue from [40] finding that it had not been made out the family could not redocument themselves, especially in light of the family they have available to them in Iraq. The Judge’s finding is that the Appellants had not proved they did not have/could not have access to the relevant documents.
xix. The Judge goes on thereafter to dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds on the basis the Appellants had not establish an entitlement to a grant of leave pursuant to Articles 2 or 3 ECHR. That is a sustainable finding on the facts as found.

21. Returning to the grounds on which permission to appeal was sought, I find no merit in the claim it was difficult to disseminate from the document what the credibility findings of the Judge were, as they are clear, as noted above. It is important to read the determination as a whole rather than picking parts of sentences recorded and claiming not to understand the overall thrust of the Judge’s findings based upon limited quotes.
22. Whilst comments such as teachers not being paid their wages do not add to the credibility of the claim, although that observation by the Judge is true as demonstrations in Iraq are recorded as being based upon the failure to pay teachers and other public servants, the grounds are, in effect, disagreement with the Judge’s findings. Those findings are, however, clearly understandable and supported by adequate reasons.
23. The assertion the Judge at [27] erred by referring to a lack of evidence of the first Appellant’s business does not take the matter any further. Proceedings are adversarial it was for the Appellants to prove their case. The Judge is not raising a new issue determinative of the decision which it would have been unfair for the Judge to consider without notice being given to the parties.
24. Whilst the Judge is criticised for referring to matters the author of the grounds considers to be immaterial to the overall decision, they are matters that the Judge refers to as they are connected with the evidential matrix she was asked to consider.
25. In relation to the Judge’s criticism of the contents of the letter and the finding of the Judge that there was no interference with the family’s lives until they left Iraq, the basis of such criticism is the assertion that after witnessing an armed home invasion and the abduction and torture of her father, living in fear before being removed from everything they knew to make a dangerous trip across to Europe, these matters might be viewed as hardship. That ignores the finding made by the Judge that having assessed the evidence as a whole she found that the alleged attack by armed men and abduction in the home was not genuine but was a staged event for the purposes of supporting their protection claim. That has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those clearly open to the Judge on the evidence.
26. The Judge is criticised for making findings said to be inconsistent with a background material but the submissions at [30] of the grounds appear to be giving evidence rather than forming a basis of criticism and does not, in particular, demonstrate that the material relied upon in support of that submission was available to the Judge.
27. Similarly, at [9] comment the authorities in Iraq would not provide protection once the first Appellant’s daughter refused the arranged marriage as it would not intervene in family or tribal matters maybe she true, but the Judge’s finding is that the claim is not credible.
28. In relation to the video evidence, the submission it was extremely compelling evidence does not take into account the Judge’s finding that having examine the evidence it did not show an event that actually occurred for the reasons claimed by the Appellant. The Judge gives adequate explanation for why little weight was attached to the evidence. As highlighted by Mr McVeety in his submissions, there is a material difference between the timing of what are supposed to be contemporaneous events in sections of the video provided.
29. It is correct as recorded in the grounds that this is a lengthy discursive determination as those written by this Judge as a matter of course are, but the claim the findings are lacking in substance making it difficult for a reader to identify why the appeal has been dismissed is not made out. The Appellant’s approach is clearly that all the evidence relied upon is true and that as a result they will face a real risk, but the finding of the Judge is that it is not true and lacks credibility, for which adequate reasons are given. That sustainable finding undermines the basis of the challenge to the determination.
30. A person challenging a decision of Judge the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26] and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30-31]. Those cases are the foundation for the need to establish a decision is ‘plainly wrong’. I find having considered the evidence, submissions, and the matter in the round, that whilst the Appellants disagree with the Judge’s findings and reasoning, it has not been established the dismissal of the appeal is an arguably irrational outcome or the findings made are outside the range of findings reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
Notice of Decision
31. No material legal error has been made out in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
32. The determination shall stand.


C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


19 June 2025