UI-2025-001720

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 5 Aug 2025
• Promulgation date: 25 Feb 2026
• Publication date: 12 Mar 2026
• Last updated on: 12 Mar 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001720

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59778/2023
LP/06703/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision Issued:
On 25th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE I LEWIS

Between

P. M. K.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms V Easty of Counsel, instructed by Elder Rahimi
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 August 2025
Further Submissions received 5 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Manyarara, dated 9 September 2024, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal on asylum grounds, humanitarian protection grounds, and human rights grounds. The Appellant had appealed against a decision of the Respondent dated 24 October 2023 refusing his application for asylum.
2. The matter came before us on 5 August 2025. Following submissions from the parties the Tribunal decided it was appropriate to adjourn the hearing part-heard in order to seek clarification of matters concerning the presentation of the Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal. This was to be achieved by the representatives listening to the audio recording of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, and thereafter seeking to agree a Note of the relevant passages. The parties were also to be afforded an opportunity of making further consequential submissions in writing. The Tribunal would thereupon consider whether or not it was necessary to reconvene the hearing, or if the issue of ‘error of law’ could be fairly determined on the basis of the submissions heard on 5 August and such additional written submissions.
3. Directions were issued on 6 August 2025 accordingly.
4. In due course a listening appointment took place on 24 October 2025. A joint note of this appointment has been provided. Both representatives have also provided written submissions, both dated 5 November 2025. For completeness, we also note that Ms Easty was able to provide us with a copy of the attendance note/record of proceedings of the Appellant’s advocate before the First-tier Tribunal (Mr K Gayle, a highly experienced freelance solicitor/advocate). The Tribunal is grateful to Ms Easty and Mr Tufan for their endeavours in this regard, and generally in their presentation of the issues in the appeal.
5. The Tribunal has concluded that it is unnecessary to reconvene the hearing in order fairly to dispose of the appeal.

Background
6. The Appellant is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, born in 1970. His personal details are a matter of record on file and are not reproduced here, in keeping with the anonymity direction that has been made in these proceedings and which we continue.
7. For present purposes it is also unnecessary to reproduce the full details of the Appellant’s immigration history and protection claim. We make reference to such details as is necessary or incidental for the purposes of this decision.
8. It suffices to note in the premises:
(i) The First-tier Tribunal Judge found that the Appellant was a member of the Engagement pour la Citoyennete et le Development (‘ECiDe’), having joined a UK branch in 2022, and that he had taken part in demonstrations in the UK: see Decision at paragraph 32.4 and paragraph 54.
(ii) However, whilst the Judge accepted the fact of membership, she observed that the Appellant had failed to provide any detail about the aims and policies of the organisation, and had been inconsistent about the nature of his involvement in the organisation (paragraphs 55-57). In substance the Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim to be a leader, an activist, and a propagandist. The Judge concluded “at best, the appellant can be described as a rank-and-file member of ECiDe” (paragraph 77). In context this is necessarily a reference to his membership of the ECiDe in the UK.
(iii) For reasons set out over the course of paragraphs 59-66, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s claimed narrative of political involvement in the DRC, arrests, and of being the subject of a summons drawn up shortly before coming to the UK.
(iv) With particular reference to the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: opposition to the government’ (v.4.0, November 2023), (see Decision at paragraphs 68-70), and the Country Guidance case of PO (DRC – Post-2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 (IAC), (see Decision at paragraphs 71-75), the Judge concluded that the Appellant was not at risk, and any fears he had were not well-founded (paragraph 76).
(v) In this latter regard, paragraph 76 of the Decision includes the following:
“… the Country Guidance shows that members of ECiDe are no longer at risk of being targeted. Therefore, even if the appellant is a member of ECiDe, the country information and guidance shows that his fears are not objectively well-founded.”
(vi) For the same reasons as rejecting the case under the Refugee Convention, the Judge also rejected the case by reference to Humanitarian Protection (paragraph 80), and Article 3 (paragraph 81). No case was seemingly advanced in respect of Article 8; nonetheless the Tribunal indicated that any such case had no prospect of success (paragraph 82).
9. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
10. Permission was refused in the first instance by First-tier Tribunal Judge Elliott on 31 March 2025.
11. However, on renewal, permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria on 9 June 2025.
12. The Respondent has filed a Rule 24 response dated 8 July 2025 resisting the challenge.

Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission
13. The Appellant’s Grounds of appeal are set out under 3 heads:
(i) Ground 1: ‘Failure to consider the risk on return in line with country guidance caselaw.
(ii) Ground 2: ‘Inadequate consideration of recent country reports’.
(iii) Ground 3: ‘Failure to apply correct standard of proof and erroneous implausibility findings’.
14. In material part the grant of permission to appeal is in the following terms:
“2. Although very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence is required to justify departing from a country guidance case, it is arguable that the Judge erred as asserted in Ground 2, by failing to consider the country background evidence produced by the appellant. The appellant asserts the evidence post-dates the country guidance case PO (DRC – Post 2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 (IAC) and is relevant to the issue of risk to members of ECiDe. The Judge at [67] states the background information has been considered but refers to the Country Policy and Information Note Democratic Republic of Congo: opposition to the government, version 4.0, dated November 2023 and not to any of the other background information. It is arguable that the Judge failed to consider the background evidence produced by the appellant.
3. There is little merit to the remaining grounds. Contrary to what is asserted, the Judge gives adequate reasons based on the appellant’s discrepant evidence for finding the appellant not to be credible and finding the appellant to be a “rank and file” member of ECiDe. The Judge considers the appellant’s sur place activities at [70] to [75] and correctly applies the guidance in PO, that “…as a whole, political opponents of President Tshisekedi, actual or perceived, are not at risk unless they have a profile of significant and active opposition to President Tshisekedi”.
4. The Judge sets out and clearly applies the correct standard of proof.
5. Ground 2 is arguable, although there is little merit to the remaining Grounds, adopting a pragmatic approach, I do not seek to restrict this grant of permission.”
15. Whilst not a preliminary issue, for convenience as we are setting out the substance of the Grounds of Appeal, we pause here to note that although the grant of permission refers to the notion of “departing from a country guidance case”, Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal does not expressly plead that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law by failing to depart from country guidance. Indeed, in the premises, it is to be observed that Ground 1 pleads a failure to decide the appeal in line with country guidance. Moreover, Ground 2 at paragraph 31 contends an error “both in isolation and in line with PO / AB and DM”, (AB and DM being another DRC CG case, AB and DM Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2005] UKAIT 00118).
16. Ground 2 notes a general observation in PO to the effect that risk fluctuates in accordance with the political situation (Grounds at paragraph 26), and asserts that “the FTJ still does not evidence due consideration of the country evidence submitted”, arguing that this was “especially egregious given the country background evidence provided which post-dates PO” (paragraph 27). Paragraphs 28-30 identify, and cite at length with particular passages emphasised, quotations from the country information that was before the First-tier Tribunal “specifically on the ongoing adversity between the Tshisekedi regime and members of ECiDe”. Paragraphs 31-33 then, in substance, plead a material failure to give due consideration to the country information.
17. Having now had the benefit of carefully considering all of the evidence and materials, including the oral and written submissions of Ms Easty and Mr Tufan, we note the following. In our judgement it is manifestly the case that there is nothing in the Grounds of Appeal that amounts to an express challenge based upon departing from country guidance. In particular: it is not pleaded that the Judge failed to depart from country guidance in circumstances where she should have done; it is not pleaded that the Judge failed to engage with a submission inviting departure from country guidance.
18. As such, in our judgement, the reference in the grant of permission to appeal to ‘departing from a country guidance’ case can only be understood in one of two possible ways: a misreading by the permission Judge of the substance of the Grounds; or a unilateral identification by the permission Judge of an arguable ground not actually pleaded (cf. ‘Robinson obvious’ - our comparison here should not be taken as an indication that we consider the point was indeed ‘Robinson obvious’).

Our Directions
19. Be that as it may, it was in the context of the grant of permission to appeal referring to departure from country guidance, and also opining as to the relative merits of Ground 2 in comparison with Grounds 1 and 3, and further to the oral submissions of the representatives before us, that we determined that it was appropriate to seek the clarifications sought by our Directions of 6 August 2025.
20. In particular we invited clarification in these terms:
“(a) The ASA before the First-tier Tribunal presents the Appellant’s case on the basis that he was “a high-profile anti-regime activist with ECIDE” (paragraph 15). It appears to be common ground before the First-tier Tribunal that if the Appellant was to be found credible his case would succeed (Decision of First-tier Tribunal at paragraph 10). The parties are to identify any passages in the audio recording that demonstrate that the Appellant’s case was put in the alternative: i.e. if he were found not to be an activist but only a ‘rank-and-file’ member he would nonetheless be at risk.
(b) Whether it was argued before the First-tier Tribunal that the country information filed with the Tribunal justified departing from the country guidance case of PO (DRC – Post 2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 (IAC), or otherwise qualified the effect of PO.
(c) What, if any, specific passages in the country information were drawn to the attention of the First-tier Tribunal Judge by the Appellant’s advocate.”
21. As noted above, the parties have responded to the Directions: see further below.

Analysis: Grounds 1 and 3
22. We respectfully agree with the substance of Judge Haria's observations in granting permission to appeal in respect of the weakness of Grounds 1 and 3.
23. In our judgement it is manifestly the case that Judge Manyarara had regard to the relevant country guidance caselaw, and considered risk on return in accordance with such guidance.
24. Paragraph 28 of the Decision is in these terms:
“The authoritative status of County Guidance is provided for at s 107(3) of the 2002 Act and the related Practice Direction, at para. 18. I have also considered the case of AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, in relation to the importance of taking due account of Country Information and Guidance. I have, therefore, considered the Country Guidance cases of PO (DRC – Post 2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 (IAC) (‘PO’) and BM & Ors (returnees – criminal and non-criminal) DRC CG [2015] 293 (IAC) (‘BM & Ors’).”
25. This self-direction serves, for both its author and any reader, as a reminder of the ‘authoritative’ nature of Country Guidance cases, and makes express reference to relevant cases including PO.
26. This was no mere exercise in ‘lip-service’. At paragraphs 71-75 – over the course of more than two pages – the Judge rehearses and summarises the issues and findings in PO. No criticism has been made of any of the analysis therein. In our judgement it is both careful and accurate; moreover, it is manifestly the case that the Judge had in mind the facts of the instant appeal, identifying particularly relevant matters in the country guidance, and taking these forward into the determining evaluations at paragraphs 76 and 77.
27. The Judge’s overall conclusion was entirely consistent with PO. We note the following:
(i) The Judge’s reference at paragraph 77 to the Appellant “at best” being describable “as a “rank and file” member of ECiDe”, was a direct reference to the Judge’s summary of PO at para 73.2:
“Rank-and-file members of opposition political parties or opponents of President Tshisekedi and/or the Sacred Union are not likely to be a real risk. However, high-profile opponents may be at risk in some circumstances.”
(ii) This was in turn a reflection of paragraphs 1(ii) and 2e of the headnote in PO, quoted by the Judge at paragraph 72:
1(ii) states: “Generally speaking, rank-and-file members of opposition political parties or political opponents of President Tshisekedi and/or the Sacred Union are not reasonably likely to be at real risk. That must be distinguished from high-profile opponents who may be at risk in some circumstances.”
2e states: “It is unlikely that a rank-and-file member of any opposition party or group will have a sufficient profile such that they will be at real risk upon return without more.”
(iii) The Judge identified at paragraph 72, and re-quoted at paragraph 75, paragraph 5 of the headnote in PO, as being relevant to the Appellant’s sur place activities:
“There is no credible evidence that the current authorities in the DRC are interested in monitoring the diaspora community in the UK; nor is there is [sic.] any credible evidence that the intelligence capability exists, even if there were the appetite.”
28. It seems to us that ultimately this ground of challenge depends upon the contention at paragraph 16 of the Grounds that when the Judge stated at paragraph 76 “the Country Guidance shows that members of ECiDe are no longer at risk of being targeted”, she was suggesting that there was “a blanket lack of risk to members of ECiDe”. We do not accept that suggestion.
29. In context it is adequately clear that the Judge meant that mere membership would not likely give rise to risk in itself. We do not accept that the Judge in substance misunderstood or otherwise overlooked the codicil in paragraph 1(ii) – “That must be distinguished from high profile opponents who may be at risk in some circumstances” - or the other sub-paragraphs of paragraph 2 of the headnote in PO, recited at paragraph 72 of her Decision, that referred to the necessity of analysing an individual’s profile, including involvement in activities likely to have brought them to the adverse attention of the regime, and the extent to which their activities might be known to the authorities. The Judge’s recitation of the Country Guidance expressly includes passages acknowledging that some persons may be at risk in some circumstances: there is nothing here to indicate that the Judge proceeded on an understanding that there was a ‘blanket’ lack of risk to opposition party members.
30. Moreover, it is clear that the Judge evaluated the Appellant’s activities and profile, as well as considering – and rejecting – his claim to have come to the attention of the authorities. In this latter regard the Judge also had express consideration to the likelihood of the sur place activities having come to the attention of the authorities in the DRC: see paragraphs 74 and 75.
31. We reject Ground 1 accordingly.
32. As regards Ground 3, we can identify no proper foundation for the submission that the Judge misapplied the correct standard of proof.
33. In outlining the applicable law at paragraphs 16-21 the Judge directed herself appropriately as to the applicable burden and standard of proof. Further references were made to the standard of proof and authoritative guidance from the higher courts at paragraphs 22-25. Whilst these passages - almost inevitably, and perhaps unavoidably - have some element of rote recitation, we do not accept that the Judge lost sight of the applicable standard in the careful and thorough ‘in the round’ assessment set out in the Decision. The recitation in the Grounds at paragraphs 39-49 of factual contentions where it is suggested this is the case amounts in substance to no more than an attempt to reargue the merits of the case - and specifically the credibility of the Appellant.
34. We do not accept that the Judge’s observation at paragraph 64 in respect of the absence of corroborative evidence of the Appellant’s arrest ran contrary to the guidance at paragraphs 195-204 of the UNHCR Handbook, as referenced in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 (e.g. see Grounds at paragraph 38 and 40). The Judge expressly recognised that there was no absolute requirement for corroborative evidence: “… I accept that there is no requirement to provide corroboration”. However, it was open for the Judge to reach her own evaluation as to the likely availability of such evidence, and to draw an adverse inference from a failure to provide evidence “that it would have been a relatively easy and simple matter for the appellant to provide”. There is no misdirection here.
35. Ground 3 fails accordingly.

Analysis: Ground 2
36. As discussed above, there is some element of tension between the manner in which Ground 2 is drafted, and the terms of the grant of permission to appeal. Further, the attempt through Directions to clarify the way in which the Appellant’s case was presented to the First-tier Tribunal, has not resulted in complete agreement between the parties. These matters are discussed and explored further below. However, in the premises, the Tribunal considers it appropriate and instructive to rehearse two matters of general application that provide a framework for the analysis herein: the ‘issue-based’ approach to appeals; and challenging Country Guidance.

The ‘issues-based’ approach
37. The ‘issues-based’ approach to appeals before the First-tier Tribunal has seen a degree of codification in the ‘Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal’ published on 1 November 2024. This post-dates the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal herein. However, the underlying principles, which are derived in significant part from the 2014 Procedure Rules, and in significant part from the use of standard directions requiring submission of an Appellant’s Skeleton Argument and a Respondent’s Review, pursuant to the President’s Practice Statement No.1 of 2022, were extant at the date of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal: e.g. see TC (PS compliance – “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00012 (IAC), (which is referenced in the Practice Direction of 1 November 2024).
38. The headnote in the case of Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC), (which is also referenced in the Practice Direction of 1 November 2024), offers a summary of the guidance found within the body of the decision:
“1. The parties are under a duty to provide the First-tier Tribunal with relevant information as to the circumstances of the case, and this necessitates constructive engagement with the First-tier Tribunal to permit it to lawfully and properly exercise its role. The parties are therefore required to engage in the process of defining and narrowing the issues in dispute, being mindful of their obligations to the First-tier Tribunal.
2. Upon the parties engaging in filing and serving a focused Appeal Skeleton Argument and review, a judge sitting in the First-tier Tribunal can properly expect clarity as to the remaining issues between the parties by the date of the substantive hearing.
3. The reformed appeal procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues, and they are comprehensively addressed before the First-tier Tribunal, not that proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position.
4. It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon. The reformed appeal procedures that now operate in the First-tier Tribunal have been established to ensure that a judge is not required to trawl though the papers to identify what issues are to be addressed. The task of a judge is to deal with the issues that the parties have identified.
5. Whilst the Devaseelan guidelines establish the starting point in certain appeals, they do not require a judge to consider all issues that previously arose and to decide their relevance to the appeal before them. A duty falls upon the parties to identify their respective cases. Part of that process, in cases where there have been prior decisions, will be, where relevant, for the parties to identify those aspects of earlier decisions which are the starting point for the current appeal and why.
6. The application of anxious scrutiny is not an excuse for the failure of a party to identify those issues which are the principal controversial issues in the case.
7. Unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a judge's decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a judge failed to take account of a point that was never raised for their consideration as an issue in an appeal. Such an approach would undermine the principles clearly laid out in the Procedure Rules.
8. A party that fails to identify an issue before the First-tier Tribunal is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before the Upper Tribunal.”
39. In this latter regard, see further Lata at paragraph 34, which is applicable save where a ‘Robinson obvious’ point is identified:
“A party that fails to identify an issue before the FtT that it subsequently asserts to have been essential for a judge to consider is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before UTIAC. None of this is to say that a FtT judge is to entirely lack curiosity in relation to an aspect of a case that the judge requires further assistance with or which the judge considers should be examined as part of the evaluation of the case. Where, as here, a point has not been identified by the parties, and nor is it one which has independently drawn the attention of the judge, it is not an issue which can be appropriately raised for the first time in the context of an appeal to UTIAC.”
40. We also consider the following paragraphs from Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028 (IAC) to be apposite. They arise in the context of considering procedural rigour before the First-tier Tribunal, having regard to the Procedure Rules and the Practice Statement No. 1 of 2022; the Tribunal cites observations of the Court of Appeal.
“40. In R (Talpada) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 841, Singh LJ stated [67]:
“I turn finally to the question of procedural rigour in public law litigation. In my view, it cannot be emphasised enough that public law litigation must be conducted with an appropriate degree of procedural rigour. I recognise that public law litigation cannot necessarily be regarded in the same way as ordinary civil litigation between private parties. This is because it is not only the private interests of the parties which are involved. There is clearly an important public interest which must not be overlooked or undermined. In particular procedure must not become the master of substance where, for example, an abuse of power needs to be corrected by the court. However, both fairness and the orderly management of litigation require that there must be an appropriate degree of formality and predictability in the conduct of public law litigation as in other forms of civil litigation.”
41. Having deprecated the habit of “evolving” grounds of appeal in proceedings Singh LJ then stated [69]:
“These unfortunate trends must be resisted and should be discouraged by the courts, using whatever powers they have to impose procedural rigour in public law proceedings. Courts should be prepared to take robust decisions and not permit grounds to be advanced if they have not been properly pleaded or where permission has not been granted to raise them. Otherwise there is a risk that there will be unfairness, not only to the other party to the case, but potentially to the wider public interest, which is an important facet of public law litigation.””
41. In our judgement, what emerges from the foregoing that is of particular relevance to the issues that arise before us, is the following:
(i) By the date of the substantive hearing the First-tier Tribunal can properly expect clarity from the parties as to the remaining issues between them.
(ii) The Judge is then tasked with dealing with such issues.
(iii) The Judge, although not precluded, is not required to ‘trawl’ for other issues.
(iv) The Judge is not inevitably required to deal with evolution in the case; a party wishing to ‘evolve’ their case must follow due procedure to ensure fairness.
(v) Failure to identify an issue before the First-tier Tribunal is unlikely to provide a foundation of challenge before the Upper Tribunal based on such an issue.
42. We suggest such matters now find expression in paragraph 11.4 of the Practice Direction of 1 November 2024:
"The outset of the substantive hearing is the final opportunity to refine and further narrow the disputed issues or agree issues or matters that are in dispute. Once settled, the disputed issues define the scope of the appeal hearing and confine the territory to be explored in the evidence, submissions and decision.”
Challenging CG cases
43. The issue of departure from country guidance was the subject of recent discussion in SSHD v PG [2025] EWCA Civ 133, albeit in the context of gay men in Sri Lanka. Amongst other things, the Court reminded itself, at paragraph 54, of established jurisprudence on the significance of, and the approach to, country guidance cases:
“The significance of country guidance cases and the court’s approach to them was considered by this court in R(SG (Iraq)) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 940, (“R(SG)Iraq)”) at [46] and [47], where Lord Justice Stanley Burnton explained that,
“46. The system of country guidance determinations enables appropriate resources, in terms of representations of the parties to the country guidance appeal, expert and factual evidence and the personnel and time of the tribunal, to be applied to the determination of conditions in, and therefore the risks of return for persons such as the appellants in the country guidance appeal to, the country in question. The procedure is aimed at arriving at a reliable (in the sense of accurate) determination.
47. It is for these reasons, as well as the desirability of consistency, that decision-makers and tribunal judges are required to take country guidance determinations into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, are adduced justifying their not doing so.”
44. In PG there was no suggestion other than that previous Country Guidance was being challenged. The Secretary of State had expressly relied upon the country guidance case of LH & IP (gay men: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2015] UKUT 00073 (IAC), which had held that in general the treatment of gay men in Sri Lanka did not reach the standard of persecution or serious harm; PG had succeeded in persuading the First-tier Tribunal that the situation had deteriorated, with particular reference to recent prosecutions. Although the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside for error of law - insufficient reasoning explaining why the new evidence provided cogent evidence of very strong grounds to depart from the country guidance of LH & IP - the issue was successfully re-argued before the Upper Tribunal tasked with remaking the decision in the appeal. However, the Secretary of State in turn succeeded in challenging the decision of the Upper Tribunal.
45. In the course of its analysis the Court of Appeal made observations that essentially amount to guidance as to what is required in challenging a country guidance case. With the caveat that the context is where challenge to country guidance is raised clearly and expressly, we note the following:
(i) The decision-maker is required to take the country guidance case into account, and to follow it unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence are adduced justifying not doing so (paragraph 57).
(ii) Evaluation of whether there be ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ requires both (a) consideration of the further evidence relied upon, and (b) “a careful analysis of the evidence which had been considered by the” Upper Tribunal in the extant country guidance case (paragraph 58).
46. We observe that whilst the Court of Appeal was, necessarily, scrutinising the approach of the Judge, the requisites of the exercise to be undertaken in evaluating whether there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence inevitably informs the approach of the party arguing for departure from the extant country guidance. This is manifest at paragraph 75.
47. In other words, and bearing in mind the observations above in respect of the ‘issues-based’ approach, and the general duty on a party to assist the Tribunal, it is incumbent upon a party seeking to persuade the Tribunal to depart from country guidance – for the benefit of the Tribunal, and, in the interests of fairness, for the benefit of the other party - to make it clear in the written pleadings that such a submission is being pursued. Further, it is incumbent upon such party through a combination of written and oral submissions to identify the new or further evidence being relied upon, and to offer argument as to how this is different from the earlier evidence, including making reference to such earlier evidence considered by the Upper Tribunal that produced the Country Guidance being challenged. It is not unreasonable to expect a represented party to offer exactly the sort of analysis that it is hoped the Tribunal will adopt.
The Appellant’s case below
48. Necessarily the Appellant’s primary case both before the Respondent and in turn before the First-tier Tribunal, was premised on the notion of acceptance of his narrative account of political activism in the DRC, having attracted the adverse attention of the regime prior to departing (including arrest and ill-treatment), and being the subject of summonses issued for his arrest: e.g. see Decision at paragraphs 4-6. Indeed, it was common ground before the First-tier Tribunal that should he be found to be credible, he would be at risk on return: see Decision at paragraph 10.
49. We make the following observations.
(i) The Appellant’s Skeleton Argument (‘ASA’) dated 1 March 2024, places express reliance on the case of PO, (which was promulgated on 18 April 2023): see paragraph 15.
(ii) Insofar as further country information had been filed in the Appellant’s principal Bundle, the ASA stated: “In relation to the country evidence, the recent reports in the Appellant’s Bundle make clear that the human rights situation in the DRC remains dire” (paragraph 16). In our judgement it is plain that this does not amount to an invitation to depart from country guidance. Rather, the submission is to the effect that recent country information supports the continuing applicability PO.
(iii) The Appellant’s case was not pleaded in the alternative in the ASA – i.e. no submission was made as to the appropriate outcome if the Appellant’s narrative account was to be rejected in any material respects.
(iv) The Appellant filed a supplementary bundle, uploaded on 22 August 2024, containing further country information. However, this was not accompanied by any supplementary ASA or other form of written submission as to the relevance of such evidence. In particular there was nothing to indicate any change from the position in the ASA, and there was nothing to indicate that it was being argued that there should be any departure from the country guidance in PO.
(v) Nor was any change from the Appellant’s position as set out in the ASA apparent during preliminary discussions at the hearing held on 30 August 2024 (the Decision gives a hearing date of 30 September 2024, but this is in error). (Cf. the now current Practice Direction of 1 November 2024 - "The outset of the substantive hearing is the final opportunity to refine and further narrow the disputed issues or agree issues or matters that are in dispute. Once settled, the disputed issues define the scope of the appeal hearing and confine the territory to be explored in the evidence, submissions and decision.”).
(vi) In this context, in the first instance we note paragraph 10 of the Decision, which summarises the preliminary discussions.
(vii) We also note that the advocates’ joint Note following the listening appointment comments “In terms of whether the case was put in the alternative, namely whether it was argued that if the appellant was not high-profile would he be at risk, the parties are unable to agree”.
(viii) Ms Easty argues that in closing submissions the Appellant’s representative was arguing that sur place activities were sufficient to put the Appellant at risk. This is founded on a closing submission in which it was stated that the Appellant’s wife had been targeted since he left, and accordingly it was clear he was of interest to the authorities, followed by observation in respect of case law in a Pakistan case on technology for monitoring diaspora activity. With all due respect to Ms Easty, this is not quite to address the issue that we raised in the Directions: we did not invite comment on whether it was argued that sur place activities gave rise to risk, but whether it was argued that being a ‘rank-and-file’ member gave rise to risk. Necessarily, sur place activities might in a particular case go well beyond being a rank-and-file member, and so might amount to behaviours that gave rise to sufficient profile to establish risk within the parameters of the country guidance in PO. The relevance of enquiring as to whether there was a submission in respect of rank-and-file members being at risk was precisely because such a submission would be tantamount to inviting departure from PO. Mr Tufan submits, at paragraph 6 of his written submission, “that the recording does not reveal that there were any submissions made to the effect that members of the ECiDe will be at risk”. We cannot find anything in the agreed Note, or indeed otherwise in Ms Easty’s submission, that contradicts this. Accordingly, we prefer the position of the Respondent.
(ix) Therefore, we conclude that it was not expressly, or in terms, argued before the First-tier Tribunal that rank-and-file members of ECiDe would be at risk.
50. As regards country guidance, the agreed Note states “It is agreed that there was no mention of PO (DRC – Post 2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 IAC at any point in the hearing by any party or the Immigration Judge”.
51. We consider, inevitably, that it follows from this that there was no attempt to articulate a submission to the effect that the Tribunal should depart from the country guidance of PO. Necessarily, such a submission could not be made without mentioning PO.
52. We note that this position is essentially consistent with the presentation of the case by way of the ASA, and the absence of any attempt to modify the ASA either at the time of filing the supplementary bundle, or in the preliminary discussions at the hearing. Contextually, this notion is also reinforced by the fact that the Grounds of Appeal herein do not expressly plead a failure on the part of the First-tier Tribunal to depart from PO, or a failure on the part of the first-tier Tribunal to engage with a submission inviting departure from PO.
53. In all such circumstances we quite simply do not accept that there was any attempt before the First-tier Tribunal to persuade departure from country guidance.
54. In reaching our conclusion we have, of course, taken into account Ms Easty’s written submissions. We note the following:
(i) At paragraph 6 Ms Easty indicates that she proposes to approach our Directions (b) and (c) “together”. With respect, whilst indeed ‘interlinked’, they are nonetheless still separate directions. By addressing them together Mis Easty has in effect failed to address head-on Direction (b) – “Whether it was argued before the First-tier Tribunal that the country information filed with the Tribunal justified departing from the country guidance case of PO (DRC – Post 2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 (IAC), or otherwise qualified the effect of PO”.
(ii) Rather, Ms Easty makes a submission to the effect that the Judge’s approach to country guidance in background evidence was inadequate because of the failure to address aspects of the country information filed by the Appellant. The written submission, as indeed do the Grounds of Appeal, set out extensive recitation from the materials filed before the First-tier Tribunal.
(iii) In this context we acknowledge that the agreed note indicates that the Appellant’s representative drew the Judge’s attention to country information in the course of closing submissions: see between the ‘time-stamps’ 3.24.59 – 3.27.38.. However, we find nothing in these passages that amounts to an attempt to invite departure from PO.
(iv) In particular, there was no apparent attempt to offer to the Judge any comparative analysis between the country information referred to before the First-tier Tribunal, and the country information that informed the decision of the Upper Tribunal in PO. (See our observations above in respect of PG.)
(v) Ultimately, it seems to us that Ms Easty cannot get round the acknowledged fact that there was no mention of PO by the Appellant’s representative in the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal.
55. Drawing these matters together, we conclude that there is no substance to the ground of challenge seemingly identified in the grant of permission to appeal to the effect that the Judge erred in not considering departure from country guidance. No such argument was before the First-tier Tribunal, and necessarily the Judge cannot be faulted for not entertaining such a submission. We do not accept that the Judge should have addressed the matter of her own motion; there is no ‘Robinson obvious’ error in this regard.
56. Nonetheless, we recognise that this is not inevitably dispositive of Ground 2. As we have noted above, the way in which Ground 2 is drafted does not formulate a challenge based on the failure to follow country guidance: it is formulated in more general terms as a challenge arguing a failure to consider country information.
57. Be that as it may, as perhaps was recognised in the grant of permission to appeal, for such a challenge to have any meaningful prospect of success it would ultimately need to demonstrate that departure from country guidance was appropriate.
58. The Grounds of Appeal, and in turn Ms Easty in both her oral and written submission, place emphasis on a short quotation at paragraph 137 of PO from an earlier Country Guidance case, AB and DM Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2005] UKAIT 00118 to the effect that risk “fluctuates in accordance with the political situation” (Grounds at paragraph 26; Ms Easty’s written sub mission at paragraph 11).
59. What appears to be being advocated is a flexible approach to the country guidance case of PO, on the basis that it is nuanced.
60. For context and completeness, we note that the passage relied upon appears in the context of the Upper Tribunal considering evidence and submissions at Part 11 of the Decision under the subheading ‘Are those having or being perceived to have a political profile in opposition to President Tshisekedi at risk on return’. Having rehearsed some of the evidence – and we remind ourselves that in the case before us there was no attempt to make any comparative analysis before the First-tier Tribunal of the more recent country information with that that was before the Upper Tribunal in PO (and indeed, beyond recitation of such more recent evidence there is no comparative analysis offered to us in the Grounds) - the Tribunal engages with some of the submissions of the representatives, before going on to set out relevant guidance at paragraph 139. Paragraph 137 in its entirety is in these terms:
“We find, as Mr Hansen [Counsel for the SSHD] submits, that the risk that an individual is exposed to will continue to depend on the person’s political affiliations, profile, actions and attitude towards the current government taking into account, as the Upper Tribunal has previously observed at [51(iii)] in AB and DM Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2005] UKAIT 00118 that risk ‘fluctuates in accordance with the political situation’.”
61. We do not accept that this endorsement of Counsel’s observation pursuant to an observation in the earlier Country Guidance case is an indication that either the DRC, or country guidance in respect of the DRC, was in some way more particular or nuanced such that a different approach was required compared to country guidance in respect of other countries. The proposition that risk fluctuates in accordance with the political situation is essentially trite, and in no way exclusive to the DRC. In the context of the decision in PO this is no more than a passing reference, and does not form the substance of the actual country guidance offered. This is not evidence of the DRC being in any way a special, or specially nuanced, case. There is nothing in this to suggest departure from basic principles - either in terms of the issue-based jurisdiction or the general approach to departing from CG - is warranted.
62. This is not to deny that country guidance is not to be approached with a degree of flexibility: it provides a starting point rather than an inevitable outcome. But, absent very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence for departing from what is said about the general country situation, any ‘flexibility’ is likely to be in respect of the circumstances of the individual appellant – such as their particular profile, or any specific evidence detailing risk to them as an individual arising from their personal narrative.
63. Where, as here, there was no submission before the First-tier Tribunal inviting departure from country guidance, and where the Judge sustainably found that the Appellant had no profile beyond being a ‘rank-and-file’ member, the more recent country information filed in the appeal could not found an argument that the Appellant should be treated otherwise than in accordance with the guidance in PO applied by the Judge.
64. For all these reasons, we reject the substance of Ground 2 – both as pleaded, and as understood in the grant of permission to appeal.
65. The challenge fails accordingly.

Notice of Decision
66. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained no material error of law and stands.
67. The Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.


I. Lewis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 February 2026