Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001721

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52167/2022
IA/05754/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

SK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Asanovic, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 26 February 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
Background
3. Before the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant’s international protection and human rights appeal centred on his claimed risk of persecution in Iraq due to two interlinked reasons: first, his involvement in a clandestine relationship with a woman whose family, he claimed, held significant influence and had threatened and attacked him once they learned of his intention to marry her, thereby engaging the Refugee Convention as a member of a particular social group (victims of honour-based violence); and second, his mental health vulnerabilities—learning difficulties, depression, anxiety, and symptoms of PTSD—which were said to expose him to exploitation and serious harm on return, particularly in light of the limited availability of treatment and pervasive stigma in Iraq. He further relied on humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR grounds due to the lack of identity documentation and the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, and on Article 8 ECHR, arguing that removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences given his fragile mental state and social ties.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The judge dismissed the appellant’s protection and human rights claims in their entirety, concluding that the core account was not credible. The judge found that the appellant’s narrative—particularly regarding the claimed threats and attacks by the family of his partner—was implausible in several respects and tainted by inconsistencies across his various accounts. These included discrepancies in the appellant’s description of the attacks, the identity and motivations of the persecutory actors, and the behaviour of the girlfriend’s extended family. The judge determined that the appellant’s account was fabricated, and that his claimed fear of persecution was false.
5. In assessing credibility, the judge found that the appellant’s vulnerabilities—namely his learning difficulties and mental health symptoms—did not sufficiently explain the inconsistencies in his account. The judge noted that the appellant was able to provide coherent and consistent detail in other respects, such as his journey to the UK, and concluded that the inconsistencies in the core narrative were not attributable to cognitive or psychological impairment. The judge also rejected much of the opinion evidence of two clinical mental health experts. Dr Halari attended the hearing and gave oral evidence. It was not disputed that she was not questioned either by the respondent’s presenting officer or by the judge. It was found that parts of her report appeared to relate to a different appellant from a different country and that there was nothing to indicate that the appellant’s medical records were considered. Dr Maggs did not attend the hearing. The judge found his report to contain methodological flaws of reasoning.
6. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the appellant did not face a real risk of persecution on any of the grounds advanced, nor did he suffer from a serious mental illness that would engage Article 3 of the ECHR. The appellant was found to be capable of reintegration into Iraqi society with the support of his family, and the evidence did not establish that he would be at risk of exploitation or unable to access documentation or healthcare. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal relying on the following grounds:
• Ground 1: the judge erred in rejecting the expert evidence of Dr Maggs without putting the perceived deficiencies to the expert, contrary to the principles in Griffiths v TUI [2025] A.C. 374. The criticisms were based on immaterial considerations and misunderstandings of psychological testing methodology.
• Ground 2: the judge unlawfully assessed the appellant’s credibility in the following ways:
• The judge failed to assess the appellant’s credibility in the round, improperly separating the appellant’s account from the expert evidence.
• Numerous adverse findings were made on matters not raised by the respondent, amounting to procedural unfairness, especially given the appellant’s vulnerability.
• The judge relied heavily on inherent probability and speculative reasoning, particularly in relation to the behaviour of third parties in Iraq, without sufficient regard to the country context or the lower standard of proof applicable in protection claims.
• The judge failed to properly consider the impact of the appellant’s learning difficulties and mental health conditions on his ability to give a coherent and consistent account.
• Ground 3: The judge’s treatment of Dr Halari’s evidence was procedurally unfair. Serious criticisms were made without these challenges being ventilated during the hearing.
8. In a decision dated 15 April 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner granted permission for all grounds to be argued.
9. At the error of law hearing, Mr Terrell conceded that the decision ought to be set aside on the strength of ground two and, in particular, that many of the points taken against the appellant’s credibility were not taken by the respondent and were not canvassed during the hearing. This was said to have undermined the fairness of the hearing such that the overall decision fell to be set aside.
Discussion
10. While it is not for the respondent to decide whether a decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error of law, in adversarial appellate proceedings, it functions as a telling signal if the parties are agreed that the decision ought not to stand as a lawful determination of a protection claim. I am satisfied that the concession was properly made and that the judge’s decision fell into material legal error.
11. From paragraph [41] of the decision, the judge embarked on a detailed and cogent analysis of why she was unable to accept the appellant’s account as a credible narrative of what unfolded after the family of his girlfriend learned of their relationship. In many respects, the findings carried considerable force, and it is not difficult to see why Mr Terrell indicated that the respondent may well seek to adopt, for the purposes of any future hearing, some of the points which were taken by the judge. This only serves to underscore the procedural problem which the judicial analysis discloses. As conceded by Mr Terrell, the respondent had simply never taken many of the points which were held against an acknowledged vulnerable appellant who answered a series of written questions in writing and who was assisted by an intermediary during the hearing. Simply put, the appellant did not have a fair opportunity to respond to the points which ultimately proved decisive in the judge’s analysis that he had not told the truth about important parts of his narrative account. I am satisfied that the decision is founded on elemental procedural unfairness such that it cannot safely stand. For this reason, the decision involved a material error of law. As the appeal succeeds on the strength of ground 2, I need not address the remaining grounds of appeal.
Disposal
12. There was no dispute between the parties that the appeal must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided de novo because the appeal has been allowed based on procedural unfairness.
13. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides:  
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:   
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or   
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.  
14. I am satisfied that the appellant did not have a fair hearing before his appeal was dismissed because he never had an opportunity to address the points which ultimately proved to be decisive in rejecting his all-important narrative account of what happened before, and soon after, he departed Iraq.

Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision involved a material error of law. I set aside the decision in its entirety and preserve no findings of fact. The matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to hear the appeal de novo.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025