Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001727

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53991/2023
LP/02366/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 September 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
GM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr Q Ahmed, Counsel, instructed by Lexmark Legal Associates
For the respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Khan (“the judge”), promulgated on 17 November 2024. By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims.

2. The appellant is an Albanian national, born in 1996. He came to United Kingdom in November 2015, but did not claim asylum until May 2020. The appellant claimed to be the nephew of a prominent Albanian politician, MD. MD held a leading role in the Albanian Workers Party (“PPRSH”). The appellant claimed to have been an active supporter of the party and assisted his uncle on the campaign trail, including attendance at a number of meetings. As result of this, the appellant claimed to have been targeted by political opponents, both by violent attacks (in 2011 and 2013) and verbal threats from 2013 onwards. The appellant claimed that he would be at risk on return to Albania as result of his own activities and his association with MD.

3. In refusing the claims, the respondent accepted that the appellant had supported the PPRSH, but did not accept that he had experienced the specific problems put forward in the claim. Respondent concluded that there was no risk on return, but in any event there would be sufficient to state protection and/or the availability of internal relocation. Article 8 was considered, but found not to assist the appellant.

The judge’s decision
4. The judge took account of the fact that the appellant had been a teenager at the time the claimed events in Albania took place: [33]. He acknowledged and summarised an expert report from Erion Fejzulla. The report confirmed the position of MD within the party and the plausibility of attacks having been carried out by political opponents, particularly during election campaigns: [34]. The judge accepted that the author was an expert: [35]. At [36] and [37], the judge found that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by his failure to have claimed asylum in Italy and the significant delay in claiming asylum in the United Kingdom. Minor inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence were disregarded: [38].

5. The following matters are all contained within [39]. The judge accepted that MD had a “significant political profile” in Albania and that he had been attacked in 2011 and 2013. The judge accepted that the appellant had been involved in the political activities of his uncle, but that he had too young to be a member of the PPRSH (he was only 15 in 2011 and 17 in 2013). The judge did not accept that the appellant had played “a significant political role” within the party. He had attended only four meetings. The appellant had been a supporter of the party. The judge found that the appellant had not been politically active in the United Kingdom, which in turn demonstrated a “limited political commitment.” Ultimately, the judge did not accept that the appellant had been the target of the attacks in 2011 and 2013 and did not accept that he would have been personally threatened. The judge found that it was the uncle who had been the target of the attacks.

6. The judge noted that claimed verbal threats between 2013 and 2015 had not been taken seriously by the appellant. The judge did not accept the appellant’s claim to have still been receiving threats up until four months before the hearing. The judge found it not to be credible that such threats would have been directed to the appellant when the uncle was no longer receiving any and in light of the appellant’s limited political role: [40].

7. Overall, the judge found that the appellant was not at risk of persecution on return and therefore did not address the issues of state protection or internal relocation: [41].

8. Article 8 was then addressed and the judge found that removal would not be disproportionate. This aspect of the judge’s decision has not been challenged and I need say no more about it.

The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
9. Two grounds of appeal have been put forward. The first of these is effectively divided into two. It is said that the judge’s finding that the appellant was not himself a target of the 2011 and 2013 attacks is flawed due to a failure to properly evaluate the appellant’s political activities in Albania. It is also asserted that the judge failed to make any or any adequate findings on the expert report. If the report had been properly considered it is said that the “only reasonable conclusion” would be that the appellant faced a risk on return from the same political opponents who had previously targeted the family.

10. The second ground is in a sense linked to the first. It is also divided into two parts. It is said that the judge failed to properly assess the particular role played by the appellant on behalf of the PPRSH, with specific reference to evidence provided in the asylum interview. Further, it is said that the judge failed to address an argument made at the hearing relating to the well-known principle set out in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 (namely that the appellant would wish to continue political activities on return to Albania, but was afraid to do so because of the dangerous consequences).

11. Permission was granted on both grounds, although it was observed that the first appeared to have more merit than the second.

Rule 24
12. The respondent has provided a brief rule 24 response, opposing all aspects of the appellant’s challenge.

The appellant skeleton argument
13. The appellant’s solicitors drafted a skeleton argument, which was provided to the Tribunal but not apparently to the respondent.

14. As I observed at the outset of the hearing, there was an obvious problem with the skeleton argument. It made reference to the two grounds of appeal, but then sought to add in a further two grounds of appeal which had never been raised previously. Mr Ahmed appreciated the difficulty and, acting professionally and sensibly, confirmed that he was not relying on the skeleton argument.

15. Skeleton arguments can be useful in appeals to this Tribunal. However, they must accurately reflect the grounds of appeal on which permission has been granted. In this case, the document clearly went beyond what was permitted. I would expect that this will be explained to the privately-paying appellant and that any cost to him as a result of drafting the skeleton argument is refunded in whole or at least part.

The hearing
16. Mr Ahmed relied on the two grounds of appeal and expanded on these with concise and helpful oral submissions. In addition to these being recorded, I took a full note and have considered everything said by him on the appellant’s behalf. The same applies to the points made by Ms Isherwood on behalf of the respondent.

17. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Conclusions
18. I remind myself of the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The judge read and heard a good deal of evidence from a variety of sources. It was for the judge to evaluate that evidence and place it within the appropriate legal framework. It is not for me to set aside the judge’s decision simply because I disagree with it or believe that it could have included more detail or fuller reasons.

19. I have read the judge’s decision sensibly and holistically.

20. For the reasons set out below, I conclude that the judge did not materially err in law.

Ground 1
21. As put by Mr Ahmed, the essence of the first aspect of this ground is that the judge erred in finding that the appellant was not a target of the attacks in 2011 and 2013, with particular reference to what was said at [34] and [39] of the decision. Indeed, he went so far as to submit that it had been “irrational” for the judge to have found that the uncle had been the target.

22. Whilst the point was clearly argued by Mr Ahmed, it does not disclose a material error by the judge.

23. I am satisfied that the judge was aware of the nature of the appellant’s case: there was no requirement for him to set it out in any detail within the decision itself and there is nothing to clearly indicate that the witness statement, interview record, and oral evidence had been overlooked.

24. The appellant’s own evidence was that he had become involved as a supporter of the party as result of his uncle, and that he had been only 15 years old at the time of the first violent attack and 17 years old at the time of the second. The judge was rationally entitled to take the appellant’s young age into account when assessing (a) the appellant’s political profile at the time and (b) whether the appellant would plausibly have been a specific target of political opponents when launching a violent attack involving explosives in 2011 and weapons in 2013.

25. When assessing the appellant’s political profile, the judge was also entitled to take account of the fact that the appellant had only attended four meetings and had undertaken no political activity whilst in the United Kingdom for nine years.

26. Similarly, the judge was entitled to take account of the fact that the uncle was the pre-eminent political figure in the party, which in turn was a rational consideration when the judge was assessing who was in fact the target of the attacks. The same applies to the evidence that it was the uncle’s car which was blown up in 2011 and the uncle’s house which was shot at in 2013.

27. It would not have been entirely fanciful to have concluded that everyone at the meetings might have been targeted, but that is beside point. On the evidence before him, it was plainly open to the judge to conclude that it was the uncle who had been targeted.

28. That conclusion was in no way inconsistent with the appellant having been an active supporter of the party and the judge’s findings reveal no error in that regard. At no stage did the judge state that the appellant had merely been a passive bystander.

29. The suggestion by Mr Ahmed that the judge had implicitly found that the attacks on the uncle were of a “personal” nature only is without merit. It is quite obvious from the context of the case as a whole that the judge found the attacks to have been politically motivated.

30. Before moving on, I make an observation on the underlying evidence. At [2] of his witness statement, the appellant set out his uncle’s position within the PPRSH and went on to say that because of that involvement “his political opponents put explosives in his car”. I am satisfied that the judge would have had that evidence in mind when undertaking his overall assessment. Whether he did or not, it represents a clear indication that the appellant himself believed that at least one of the violent attacks had specifically targeted the uncle.

31. For the sake of completeness, I address the judge’s finding on the verbal threats. In respect of those claimed to have occurred between 2013 and 2015, the appellant himself confirmed that he had not taken them seriously. Further, the judge would have been aware that the appellant had remained in Albania during that time without any harm coming to him. It is clear to me that the judge regarded such threats (even if they had in fact taken place) as holding very little, if any, weight. Importantly, the judge expressly rejected the appellant’s claim that he had received threats over the course of years from 2013 and running up until only a short time before the hearing. The reasons set out by the judge for that conclusion are sound: the uncle, who had a significantly greater political profile, had not received any such threats; and the appellant’s own profile had been “limited”.

32. I turn to the expert report. I am satisfied that the judge took proper account of the report. He summarised it in some detail at [34] and concluded that the author was indeed an expert. As acknowledged by Mr Ahmed, the report said nothing on the issue of whether a 15 or 17-year-old was likely to have been specifically targeted by political opponents. The passages relating to attacks against the PPRSH focused on electoral campaigns. In any event, even adopting a wider approach, there is nothing in the report which materially undermines the judge’s conclusion that it was the uncle who was targeted in 2011 and 2013.

33. It is right that the report verified the police documents. However, those documents were all addressed to DM’s circumstances, not the appellant’s. They provided no evidential support for the assertion that the appellant had been targeted.

34. There is no error in relation to the expert report.

35. Ground 1 fails.

Ground 2
36. The first element of the second ground relates to the judge’s assessment of the role played by the appellant on behalf of the PPRSH. I have already addressed aspects of the argument when setting out my conclusions on the first ground and need not repeat myself. Beyond that, there is nothing in the asylum interview answers set out in the grounds of appeal which discloses any material error of law on the judge’s part. The judge was aware of the appellant’s claimed activities ([9]) and he was not required to set out every aspect of the evidence considered and/or every step in his reasoning. Contrary to Mr Ahmed’s submission, the passages from the witness statement to which I was referred do not contain a great deal of detail as to the activities undertaken. Certainly, there was no detail as to activities undertaken prior to the 2011 attack and it is frankly fanciful to suggest that the judge should have inferred that a young teenager would have established a significant political profile for himself prior to 2011. I reject Mr Ahmed’s submission that the judge wrongly required the appellant to have played a “significant role” in the party in order to demonstrate risk. That is not the case: in truth, the question of significance related to the question of whether the uncle had been the target of the attacks, not whether the appellant himself had been either singled out or an intended victim. As I have already said, the judge was fully entitled to conclude that the uncle’s profile was consistent with him having been targeted.

37. In all the circumstances, the judge was entitled to conclude that the activities set out in the asylum interview and the witness statement did not amount to a “significant role”, particularly when combined with the appellant’s young age at the time (he was too young to have even become a member of the party).

38. The second aspect of ground 2 relates to HJ (Iran). I am prepared to accept Mr Ahmed’s word that he did raise the issue in his oral submissions before the judge. Having said that, it certainly did not appear in writing and it is entirely possible that the Presenting Officer was not given the opportunity to address the issue.

39. Mr Ahmed criticises the judge for not having made a specific finding on whether the principle in HJ (Iran) applied to the appellant. The single asylum interview answer relied on in the grounds to support this is that provided in response to question 178:

“Have you been politically active in the UK
No since I left Albania I am not even interested in that part I am scared and don’t want to go that way.”

40. On a fair reading, that was not clear evidence from the appellant that he would wish to resume political activities in Albania, but was afraid of doing so because of the risk of harm.

41. Ms Isherwood quite properly referred me to the next two questions and answers in the interview:

“179. If you were to return to Albania would you still be part of PPRSH
I don’t even want to go back never the less the part of politics, I can no longer think of my life there.”

180. I know you don’t want to think about it but if you were able to return are you saying you wouldn’t campaign any more
You better kill me then send me back there, I don’t want to live my life as if it was a black night stressed and scared all the time, every day I pray I will be able to do the documents here and live a normal life like everyone here I don’t think of going back there.”

42. Again, the answers do not represent clear evidence as to the appellant’s intentions on return, despite the questions being focused. Rather, the answers express a fear of return which appears to be linked to past problems (the attacks and verbal threats) which the judge had already rejected as constituting risk factors. At most, the answers expressed a disinterest in politics and a current fear whilst the appellant was in the United Kingdom, not a fear of what would happen to him in Albania if he were to resume political activities.

43. The appellant’s witness statement said nothing at all about the HJ (Iran) issue. There is no record of proceedings before me to indicate what, if any, oral evidence had been given on the point.

44. The evidence that was before the judge undeniably demonstrated that the appellant had undertaken no political activity in United Kingdom whatsoever over the course of nine years since his arrival. The judge was plainly entitled to take this into account as demonstrating a lack of political commitment. That went to the question of whether the appellant ever intended to resume political activities if returned to Albania.

45. I acknowledge that the judge did not specifically refer to the HJ (Iran) submission in his decision. However, beyond the fact that he need not have addressed each and every point made on the appellant’s behalf, there was no clear evidence before the judge to establish the basic fact of an intention to undertake activities on return to Albania.

46. Further, and in any event, the expert report does not contain clear evidence to indicate that a person undertaking political activities such as the appellant had in the past would thereby be at risk from political opponents.

47. Reading the judge’s decision sensibly and holistically and having regard to the underlying evidence (or indeed the absence thereof), there is no material error in respect of the HJ (Iran) issue.

48. Ground 2 fails.

Anonymity
49. The judge declined to make an anonymity direction on the basis that no application had been made and there was “no reason” to make one. I find that somewhat odd, given that the case clearly involves a claim for international protection and that the usual practice is to make such a direction. In any event, a direction is justified at this stage and is to be maintained until further order of the Tribunal or a Court.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 2 September 2025