Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001734

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/64537/2023
LP/11339/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE I LEWIS
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

K K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Saifolahi of Counsel, instructed by Barnes, Harrild & Dyer
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ahmed, dated 13 February 2025, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Respondent dated 5 December 2023 refusing a protection claim made on 2 September 2020.
2. We are grateful for the helpful submissions both from Counsel and the Home Office Presenting Officer, and in particular we are grateful for the helpful and realistic manner in which Mr Tufan has presented the case on behalf of the Secretary of State. In the circumstances we do not propose to rehearse the background facts to this case in any detail, but to focus on the key issue that is said to constitute an error of law in these proceedings.
3. The Appellant’s first ground of challenge focuses on paragraph 17 of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal - which is in these terms:
“The Appellant’s account of what happened in Iran is the only evidence presented of any interest the authorities may have in him, and this evidence is hearsay, not backed up by any account from his uncle or any third party, or any external evidence. The burden of proof lies on the Appellant to make out his case to the relevant standard and I find that the Appellant has not been able to prove his claim that he came to the attention of the authorities in Iran while he was still in Iran to the lower standard of proof.”
4. Further to the first ground of challenge, permission to appeal was granted on 15 April 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Elliott in these terms:
“3. A reading of the Judge’s decision at paragraph 17 does suggest that the Judge considered that the appellant had to provide some direct or corroborative evidence to support his claim, without which he would be unable to succeed. That is arguably an application of a higher standard than is required, (see MAH (Egypt) v SSHD (2023) EWCA Civ 216 and WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD (2023) EWCA Civ 894 regarding corroborative and direct evidence in protection claims).”
5. It is well-established that there is no absolute requirement for an applicant for protection to provide corroborative evidence. That does not mean to say that the absence of corroborative evidence may not be a relevant consideration in evaluating credibility, particularly in circumstances where such evidence might be expected to be reasonably obtainable. Nor, of course, does it mean that it is inevitable that a decision maker must accept an uncorroborated account. The case of MAH reinforces these principles, in particular at paragraph 86:
“It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department (13190, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 1 April 1996). On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the Tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) at para. 46(iv).”
6. We accept that paragraph 17 lacks the requisite analysis that would allow the reader to understand on what permissible basis the Judge has rejected the Appellant’s account.
7. Mr Tufan has emphasised that to a large extent paragraph 17 is a recitation of accurate fact. It was indeed the case that a significant part of the Appellant’s evidence was based on hearsay; he did not provide any supporting evidence, whether from his uncle, any third party or any other source. But what is missing from that paragraph is any specific analysis as to why those circumstances led the Judge to conclude that the Appellant had not established his case.
8. We note for completeness that the only other area in which the Decision essays any analysis of credibility is in respect of the Secretary of State’s invocation of Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. The Secretary of State had raised the point in the decision letter. It is addressed by the Judge at paragraph 15. The Judge concluded in favour of the Appellant - “Taking all of this into account, I will not draw adverse inferences on the Appellant’s credibility from his failure to claim asylum between Sweden and the UK.”
9. There being nothing else in the Decision that approaches any analysis of credibility, we find that the Judge has failed to explain adequately the basis of the credibility finding beyond the clear inference that the Judge considered the absence of corroborative material as sufficient to condemn the Appellant in this regard.
10. Mr Tufan has very helpfully acknowledged that if we do find that the analysis is missing, then that is an error of law. Moreover, he accepts that it is material.
11. Clearly the Appellant’s credibility was a core issue in the appeal. More particularly we can see when the Judge goes on to consider other aspects of the case, she takes forward the assessment at paragraph 17. In particular at paragraph 21 we find this in respect of the possibility that the Appellant may be of interest on return to Iran:
“I therefore find, in relation to the Appellant’s sur place social media activities that it is not reasonably likely that his account will have been monitored. His activity is not prolific and, as I have found above, he has not previously come to the attention of the authorities.”
As we say, in our judgment this underscores the materiality of the error.
12. The Grounds of Appeal raise two further matters, but in the circumstances it is not necessary for us to give any further consideration to those matters.
13. It is common ground between the parties that the error described above necessitates that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal be set aside in all aspects, and that the remaking of the decision will require to be done before the First-tier Tribunal by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Ahmed. We endorse that position having regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statement of 25 September 2012.
Notice of Decision
14. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside.
15. Pursuant to sub-sections 12(2)(b)(i) and 12(3)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the decision in the appeal is to be remade before the First-tier Tribunal by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Ahmed, with all issues at large.

The above represents a corrected transcript of ex tempore reasons given at the conclusion of the hearing.

I.Lewis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber