Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001746
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61596/2023
LP/06215/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Khan of Counsel instructed by Liberty Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Newton, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at the Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 27 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I am dealing with the remaking of the decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal. I do so pursuant to section 12 (2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to reject his international protection and human rights claim.
Background and the Procedural History
2. The Appellant is a national of Iraq. He was born in 1999.
3. The matter had originally been considered by First-tier Tribunal Judge C.J. Williams (“the Judge”) who in a decision dated 2 February 2025 had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
4. The Appellant had sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision. Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman had granted the Appellant permission to appeal on 10 June 2025.
5. An Error of Law hearing then took place before Deputy Chamber President Plimmer on 7 November 2025. By way of a decision dated 20 November 2025. she explained as follows:
“2. The appellant’s asylum claim can be summarised as follows: he was in a relationship with a woman, named H, which was disapproved of by her family; for this reason they assaulted and threatened him, and; he felt compelled to leave Iraq because her father, an arms trader had connections with powerful people.
3. The FTT accepted the appellant’s evidence that he was in a relationship with H. This had been roundly disputed by the respondent but the FTT concluded at [3] that notwithstanding robust and entirely focused cross examination of the appellant, his oral evidence was credible and clear with explanations given Page 9 for what at first appeared to be inconsistencies. The respondent has not sought to cross appeal against that clear finding of fact.
4. The appellant’s grounds of appeal focus upon the FTT’s separate findings of fact rejecting the appellant’s claim that (1) H’s family are powerful, (2) they tracked him down and ill-treated him, and (3) he was not safe in other European countries, which is why he did not claim asylum there en route to the UK.
5. I heard helpful submissions from Ms Khan and Mr Tan, which I address when providing my reasons for concluding that grounds 1 and 2 are made out below. I have not addressed ground 3 because both representatives accepted that if grounds 1 and 3 are made out it is unnecessary to deal with ground 3.
Ground 1
6. Mr Tan accepted that the FTT was wrong to record at [17] that the appellant did not state how he knew about the profile of H’s family within his witness statement, when the witness statement clearly says this at [23]: “The HO claim that they do not accept that I am at risk from H’s family... as I have failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to how I was aware that H’s father traded weapons and had strong links to the KDP and PUK. I wish to respond that I know that H’s father is an influential arms dealer. This is because H told me about her father's work as an arms dealer and showed me her father's photographs with prominent KDP and PUK leaders...She told me that her father hangs photos of himself with KDP and PUK leaders in her house.”
7. The FTT clearly failed to take important evidence in the appellant’s witness statement into account. This explanation must be seen in the context of the FTT having accepted the credibility of the close relationship between H and the appellant. This is a clear error of law.
8. Mr Tan submitted that this error is not material because the FTT appeared to treat the claimed role of H’s father at its highest at [18] when rejecting the appellant’s claim that he was able to travel and stay in Erbil without detection. As Mr Khan pointed out there was an alternative explanation available for this in the evidence – H’s father, as a resident of Sulaymaniya, had closer links to the leadership in that city as opposed to Erbil.
9. In my judgment, the FTT made a material error of law which infected his reasoning for disbelieving the appellant’s claim that H’s family had the ability to and did track him down within Sulaymaniya.
Ground 2
10. As the UT noted when granting permission to appeal, it is difficult to see how the appellant could know how H’s brothers were able to track him down within Sulaymaniya. Indeed, the appellant’s witness statement emphasises at [26] that the appellant simply did not know how they found him on that occasion. This must be seen in combination with [19] of the witness statement when he said that H’s father is a weapons trader and has the influence and connections to find him. Grounds 1 and 2 are therefore interconnected. Disposal
11. Both representatives agreed that whilst there will be some further fact findings, it is unlikely to be extensive. The FTT’s positive finding regarding the appellant’s claimed relationship is preserved. Given the limited nature of the fact finding required, the appropriate action in these circumstances applying Begum (remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the FTT and UT, is to retain the appeal in the UT, where the decision will be remade at an adjourned hearing.”
6. It is that remaking hearing that has taken place before me. In readiness for the hearing, I had been provided with a 382 paged bundle. There was also a Rule (152A) application by the Appellant for the admission of evidence. It was served late (just the day before the hearing), but Ms Newton on behalf of the Respondent said that she did not oppose the admission of the Appellant’s late evidence and I ruled accordingly.
7. That Rule 15(2) is referred to as follows in the Appellant’s application dated 26 January 2026:
“2. The evidence consists of three publicly available articles relating to senior political figures within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, namely:
(i) Article from PUK Media President Bafe honours Mahmoud Sangawis lifelong service to Kurdistan and PUK
(ii) Kurdistan Region Presidency – Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa
(iii) Article published by the Kurdistan Democratic Party
3. The evidence is relied upon as background material only. It is not tendered to introduce new factual claims by the Appellant.
4. The documents are relevant to the Appellant’s account concerning the influence and political connections attributed to individuals linked to his former partner’s family, which is a central issue in the remaking of this appeal.”
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge
8. There have been retained findings of the Judge. It is therefore necessary to consider what the Judge had said in his decision. I refer to the following paragraphs in particular:
“4. The appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return due to his membership of a particular social group as a potential victim of honour-based violence and his political opinion, or alternatively that he is entitled to humanitarian protection because he is without the documentation he requires to live in Iraq…
11. The appellant’s claim to be at risk upon return to Iraq is advanced on the basis of a relationship he engaged in with a woman, H. The appellant claims that he began a relationship with H when they were attending different schools which were opposite each other. The appellant approached her in 2016, and a relationship ensued which included physical contact. In around 2017/2018, H’s brother found photographs of the appellant and H together and attacked and threatened the appellant. The relationship ended until 2020 when by chance, the appellant met H whilst she was working as a nurse.
12. The appellant and H revived their relationship, going on dates and becoming intimate. In February or March of 2021, the appellant’s father and maternal uncle approached H’s family with a view to marriage, and the proposal was rejected by H’s father. H’s brothers realised the appellant was the same person who they had attacked previously and physically attacked him again. H and the appellant fled Iraq and travelled through Europe and became separated in Germany on en route to the United Kingdom.
13. The respondent, whilst accepting the appellant’s Iraqi nationality, his identity and Kurdish ethnicity, does not accept the credibility of the account pertaining to the appellant’s relationship with H, and any risk emanating from the discovery of the relationship for a number of reasons outlined in the refusal decision.
14. The reasons outlined in the refusal decision are, in essence, points challenging the plausibility of the appellant’s claim. Having considered the appellant’s oral evidence, I do find he was in a relationship with H has claimed. The respondent relies on the putative inconsistency between H being from a strict family, and yet being able to travel to school alone, and have access to social media. After her relationship with the appellant was discovered, it is said to be inconsistent that she would be able to gain employment and have access to a mobile phone.
15. I am aware that it is possible for relatively traditional and conservative families to make concessions such as permitting daughters to travel to school alone, or to have access to social media. The appellant claims the ‘strictness’ only started after their relationship was discovered, which I find is a credible explanation and almost to be expected in a situation where H has taken advantage of her limited freedom to spend time with the appellant. When I consider the chronology provided by the appellant, his relationship with H had been over for around two years before he met her again at her workplace. I see no inconsistency in H being able to work, especially after the passage of a number of years since her relationship with the appellant ended.
16. Despite Mr Payne’s robust and entirely focused cross-examination of the appellant, I found his oral evidence to be credible and clear, with explanations given for what at first appeared to be inconsistencies. The appellant was asked about his ability to go to a restaurant with H whilst they were still attending school, and the appellant’s response that there were times when school would finish early where teachers were absent, and that they would go to a takeaway near his school seemed to me to be entirely credible and not unusual.
17. Whilst I accept the credibility of the appellant’s relationship with H, I did not find his evidence on the profile of H’s family and their ability to locate him within Iraq to carry the same ring of truth. The appellant was asked how he knew (AIR 58) that H’s father traded weapons, and he did not respond with how he knew. The appellant does not state how he knew within his witness statement (p.222, SB). Within the ACQ (p.418, SB) the appellant states H’s father ‘has connections with the authorities and the government’. Within his screening interview (p.408, SB) the appellant says, ‘I was in a relationship from 2016-2018 with the daughter of one of the men in the government’. The appellant seeks to amend this answer (p.420, SB) however it is unclear whether this supersedes the answer given or is an addition to it.
18. The appellant does not provide an explanation as to how he was located by H’s brothers on the second occasion they beat him after the proposal. I note the proposal took place in February or March 2021, and that after this, neither the appellant nor H were located in Erbil, which is where they are said to have stayed pending their exit from Iraq. This undermines the appellant’s claim that H’s father could locate him anywhere, as does his claim to have left Iraq on his own passport. I do not accept that the daughter of a politically connected man from a strict family would simply be able to travel around Iraq with the appellant unhindered or undiscovered were H’s family as connected as the appellant would have me believe.
19. In assessing the credibility of the claim, I have taken into account, as I am required to, the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in Poland and France. There is no explanation as to the appellant’s failure to claim in these countries except that they were not safe. I reject this explanation and find the appellant’s failure to claim in these countries is a factor telling against his credibility.
20. Drawing these factors together and assessing the appellant’s evidence in the round, I do not find he has shown to the lower standard that he would be at risk upon return to Iraq. Whilst I accept he was in a relationship with H, I do not accept there were any adverse consequences of that relationship to him whilst he lived in Iraq, nor do I find he would be located or traced by H’s family were he to return there now…
29. There are elements of the appellant’s claim which I have found not to be credible, and in my view his claim to be unable to be reunited with his CSID is simply a confection deployed to strengthen his position on appeal.”
The Hearing before Me
9. The Appellant’s solicitors had provided a skeleton argument dated 17 December 2025 for the remaking hearing which appears at page 85 of the bundle. I will return to this, especially since Ms Khan helpfully refined what was set out within that document.
10. The Appellant gave evidence before me. He did so via an interpreter in the Kurdish Sorani language. Appropriate breaks and time was offered to the Appellant and to the interpreter through the hearing. I remind myself that the use of an interpreter can make providing evidence more difficult for witnesses because the evidence is broken and not given directly to the Tribunal in the witness’s own words.
11. The Appellant adopted his two witness statements as his Evidence in Chief. The Appellant’s witness statement dated 4 December 2025 appears at pages 12 to 15 of the bundle. The Appellant states at paragraph 10 that if he returns to Iraq, he fears H’s father and her brothers. He states, “They have strong motivation because they believe I am responsible for damaging their honour and causing [H] to run away. If they find me, they will kill me.” The Appellant sates that his own family will not protect him because they will be pressured to disown him. He states he has had no contact with his family since he left Iraq. I shall return to the Appellant’s evidence that in fact he states he has been in touch with an uncle. At paragraph 8 the Appellant said that H’s family were forcing her to marry her cousin in Germany.
12. The Appellant’s earlier witness statement dated 7 February 2024 appears at page 96 onwards of the bundle. The Appellant explained how he had become separated from H in Germany. He also explains that H’s father is an influential arms dealer. He had seen photographs shown to him by H with prominent KDP and PUK leaders.
13. In cross examination, the Appellant said in summary that he had left Iraq using his own passport. The Appellant was pressed why he had said at question 49 of his asylum interview that H’s father was ‘the government’. The Appellant had also said there that “I don’t have problems with anyone else”. The Appellant said now that H’s father was powerful amongst the government because he has lots of connections with the government and he was influential.
14. Pressed again if H’s father was a member of the government, the Appellant said he was not.
15. The Appellant was pressed how he and H were able to flee Iraq using their own passports. The Appellant said his maternal uncle had assisted him.
16. The Appellant initially said that he had had contact with his maternal uncle since arriving in the UK but then changed this to say that he was not “100% sure but the last time had contact with his uncle was in January 2022 just before coming to the UK.
17. The Appellant was asked about his screening interview at section 6.3 on page 297 of the bundle where he had said he would possibly provide additional documents from his country at a later stage. He was asked who he would get such documents from. The Appellant said he did not have anybody and had said he would provide documents if he could.
18. The Appellant was asked about his Facebook account. He was asked why he was not now on it and he said his family had an issue. Asked about his uncles, the Appellant was referred to page 326 of the bundle and was asked to look at question 99 of the asylum, interview. The Appellant was pressed why he had said there that, “I contacted my paternal uncle several times through my journey but this communication has stopped now”. The Appellant said that Ms Newton was trying to confuse him because he had only ever referred to his maternal uncle.
19. The Appellant said that if he returned to Iraq then Asayish would only allow him to stay with a permit or with permission from the Mukthar and that therefore he would be ‘in front of the government officials’. The Appellant said he did not know where his CSID card was. He did not have it. It was ‘back in Kurdistan’.
20. Pressed on why he could not get in touch with his friends again on Facebook who and who could vouch for him on arrival, the Appellant said that he did not have friends now and it was in the past. He said ‘maybe’ some are still his friends but there was no regular relationship with them.
21. In Re-examination, the Appellant said that he did have a Facebook account when he was in Iraq. He said he now has access to a different Facebook account now. He said the Iraq account no longer exists “because I do not have it anymore”. He said he did not use that account because he was afraid and because “they find me and locate me”. The Appellant was asked what happened to that Facebook account. He said, “I do not know. Maybe deactivated. I cannot remember”.
22. There were no other witnesses. I therefore heard closing submission from each of the advocates. I shall refer to those submissions within my consideration and analysis as and where necessary to do so.
Consideration and Analysis
23. This is a pre-June 28 June 2022 appeal because the Appellant had made his protection claim on 22 March 2022. Therefore section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 does not apply. Consequently, I remind myself that when assessing the evidence of this Appellant that the lower standard of proof applies. Although no specific matters were raised by either party about vulnerability, I take into account that those who give evidence particularly through an interpreter invariably find it unusual, difficult or even uncomfortable to provide details about what occurred to them. I make every allowance for the Appellant in respect of those matters.
24. I remind myself too that the Appellant was found to be credible in respect of his relationship with H at the First-tier Tribunal. That was despite the Respondent challenging the Appellant’s version of events. Since then, albeit the day before the hearing, the Appellant has provided evidence to show that Mahmoud Sangawis and Jaffar Shekik Mustafa exist. They are senior members of the KDP and PUK. The Appellant claims that H’s father knew them.
25. Whilst no specific parts of the background material was referred to during the Appellant’s closing submissions, I note the Appellant’s solicitor’s skeleton argument. So called ‘honour’ based violence and honour crimes are a real thing in Iraq. Although honour crimes against men are less common, they are common against women. I therefore assess the Appellant’s claim against that background evidence. Similarly, corruption and the influence of powerful actors is a reality in Iraq.
26. Despite all of those matters and despite making every allowance for the Appellant and when applying the lower standard of proof, I conclude that the Appellant’s credibility has been seriously undermined by his own evidence.
27. In coming to this view, I take the following particular matters into consideration. Firstly, I consider the Appellant’s evidence in relation to his uncle(s). The Appellant did indeed refer in his interview to his paternal uncle, whereas in other evidence, he has said that he was referring to his maternal uncle. It is possible that there was an error in translation, but this has caused me to hesitate. I am aware that there are different terms in Kurdish Sorani for maternal uncle compared with paternal uncle. Indeed, that is the case in many languages. On its own the references by the Appellant to a paternal uncle and to a maternal uncle is not of such gravity to mean I cannot accept the Appellant’s evidence as being true. However, Ms Newton is correct that despite the number of hearings and the number of witness statements and documents from the Appellant, this has never been corrected by the Appellant. Indeed, I note too that the Appellant has been legally represented throughout.
28. Secondly, what has caused me significant concern is that the Appellant was ‘in touch’ with his uncle until January 2022, yet the Appellant claims that he had fled Iraq in around September 2021. The Appellant had been to Lebanon, Belarus, and France. He had remained in Germany for some 6 months according to his first witness statement. It is clear therefore that the Appellant remained in touch with his uncle (whether maternal or paternal) for a very lengthy period of time across many thousands of miles and across many countries. In my judgment, it is fanciful for the Appellant to now contend that somehow, he then lost touch with that uncle in January 2022 when the Appellant had arrived in Europe (if not the UK because the Appellant was not entirely sure if he had contacted his uncle once in the UK). Whilst I note that at earlier time, such as in his screening interview, the Appellant had said that he had spoken to his uncle when he was in Baghdad, he did not state that contact in Baghdad was the last time that he had spoken to his uncle.
29. Thirdly, in my judgment, the Appellant has clearly been in extensive touch with his uncle since leaving Iraq. Cleary the Appellant has had the contact details for his uncle and has had the ability to contact his uncle. I therefore conclude that the Appellant has been and is able to contact his uncle. The Appellant’s pretence of not being able to do so does not make sense if the Appellant had remained in touch with his uncle until at least January 2022 across so much of the world. This is so even if the Appellant’s claim is that he lost his mobile phone or that it was taken off him or the like. I do not accept that the Appellant would not have contact details for his uncle, or no means to contact his uncle, especially since the Appellant was travelling through so many countries. These would be unfamiliar places for the Appellant. He would clearly have contact details stored for his uncle and not just in his mobile phone.
30. Fourthly, in any event and even if I am wrong about the Appellant’s contact with his uncle(s), in my judgment the Appellant has not provided a credible account in respect of his Facebook account. The Appellant accepted he had a Facebook account in Iraq. He accepted he had friends in Iraq. The Appellant said he did not know what had happened to that Facebook account. The Appellant said he did not know. He said he could not remember if the account had been deactivated. In my judgment, had the Appellant genuinely been in fear for himself, for H or indeed for his parents and family then he would know if his Facebook account had been deactivated or if it was inaccessible. It is the first thing the Appellant would check. The Appellant’s non-committal answers such as that he ‘did not know’ or ‘could not remember’ were examples of the Appellant’s whole case collapsing in terms of its credibility. This speaks volumes about the Appellant’s inability to provide a credible account. Even if the Appellant had a good reason to lie about his Facebook account, I have not been able to discern it.
31. Further, or alternatively the Appellant said he did not use that Facebook account because he was afraid because “they find me and locate me”. This is wholly inconsistent with the Appellant’s other claim in which he has appeared in numerous self-publicising pictures and videos at various locations which he claims will be seen by the authorities in Iraq. It cannot be that the Appellant fears being located, yet he has sought to present himself on social media so extensively.
32. In my judgment, the Appellant is not at risk from H’s family because the Appellant has not provided a credible account.
33. In my judgment the Appellant’s whole claim unravels with these findings. I do not accept that he is at risk from H’s father or from H’s brothers. Nor do I accept that H’s father is so influential as an arms dealer that the Appellant is thereby at risk from the government, whether because of corruption or otherwise.
34. In my judgment, the Appellant will easily be able to get the assistance he needs in Iraq. He will also be able to get assistance from his friends and/or family. Whether in terms of getting them to send him his documents which still exist. Even if the documents do not exist, the Appellant will be able to get assistance to enter the IKR without any issue. The Appellant has failed to be truthful with the Respondent and with me.
35. The Country Guidance of SMO makes clear that the Appellant, as a fit young man will be able to access housing and employment, but even if he cannot, the Returns Package of at least £1500 will be a very large sum which will ensure that he is able to return and settle for several months which will enable him to seek work and accommodation, even if really does not have family and friends there.
36. In any event, I do not accept that the H’s father or brothers have the means or influence to find the Appellant. Even if they did find the Appellant, the authorities, albeit not as well organised as in the UK, will be able to provide a sufficiency of protection. The honour based matters are severe against women, but not so much against males.
37. Further or alternatively, the Appellant as a young fit man will be able to reasonably internally relocate, had it been necessary to consider the same.
Conclusion
38. In my judgment despite making every allowance for the Appellant and that the lower standard of proof is to be met, this is a claim in which I dismiss the Appellant’s account as fanciful and exaggerated. He had a relationship with H (commencing when he was a teenager and revived in 2020) but beyond that, the Appellant is well able to contact his family and friends now to get the documents he needs and the home he needs to return safely to Iraq. The fear is that of non state actors in any event.
39. In any event internal relocation for this Appellant involving non-state actors is a reasonable and viable option. He will be able to relocate safely and easily in my judgment. I am well aware of the decisions of the House of Lords in respect of internal relocation, including AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 AC 678.
40. I have had in mind the case law in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 which provides that it is necessary for an individual to have a CSID or an INID in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR, for example at the checkpoints.
41. The Appellant is a fit, young man. I see no basis upon which it can be said he would not be able to secure a home, employment and safe passage on return. In any event, as is made clear in SMO (2), there is a returns package open to the Appellant. I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence, which are mere assertions in light of the background material and case law in any event. All he seeks to raise are matters that have been extensively dealt with in the Country Guidance which Country Guidance remains binding on me. I am aware that the Appellant may have limited education, but that is not unusual and of itself means little in terms of being able to live in Iraq or in the IKR.
42. Ms Khan said that Refugee sur place findings were not challenged, but in any event, I conclude such a claim is not made out, even with the photographs and the like. The Appellant merely needs to delete any such social media accounts and the like, even if this was being pursued before me, which it is not. The Appellant is clearly not seen as genuine in his claims in any event either.
43. There was no Article 8 claim and no challenge is therefore before me, but for the avoidance of doubt it is dismissed in any event.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and was set aside.
I remake the decision.
I dismiss the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
The anonymity direction continues because the matter raises international protection issues.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 March 2026