Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001765
UI-2025-001770

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64633/2023
HU/64637/2023
LH/05361/2024
LH/05360/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

VINCENT ADOMAH MARFO
KINGSFORD YAW MARFO
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Youssefian, Council instructed by Malik and Khan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellants are citizens of Ghana. The first appellant was born on 21 February 2006. The second appellant was born on 25 September 2008. An application for entry clearance was made on 1 September 2023, when both appellants were under 18 years old. The applications were made on the basis that they are dependent children of the sponsor, their mother, who is lawfully resident in the UK. Their applications were refused by the respondent on 24 November 2023.
2. The appellants appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT), which determined their appeal in a decision dated 17 January 2025. The FtT refused the appeal.
In the Upper Tribunal
3. The appellants appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT) where in a decision dated 23 June 25 I allowed the appeal and allocated the case to be re-heard in the UT. I retained the finding of the FtT that that the only live issue in the case on the Immigration Rules is whether the sponsor had sole responsibility for the appellants under paragraph 297(i)(e) of the Immigration Rules. If the Rules are not met on that point, proportionality is the issue for an Article 8 claim outside the Rules.
4. On 19 September 2025 I heard evidence from the sponsor, Florence Nketia, and submissions by both parties. The respondent initially indicated that they sought to dispute whether the appellants could be maintained adequately by the sponsor (as required under paragraph 297) in addition to the issues previously identified. I declined to give leave to widen the issues in this case. Given the late notice, and that the appellants would have no time to prepare their case without further adjourning proceedings, I considered that it would not be fair and just to widen the issues. It would not meet the overriding objective to do so. The case proceeded on the issues previously identified.
5. I remind myself that ‘sole responsibility’ was addressed in TD (Paragraph 297(i)(e): “sole responsibility”) Yemen [2006] UKAIT 00049, in particular the guidance in the judicial headnote addresses when a parent can be said to have sole responsibility. The test for sole responsibility is whether the sponsor has continuing control and direction over the child’s upbringing, including making all the important decisions in the child’s life.
Evidence and analysis
6. The appellants provided no statements, but did write letters dated 21 and 19 February 2024. The letters are not addressed to the court but to “whom it may concern”. They do not contain statements of truth. I consider I must attribute less weight to this evidence as a result of its age and format.
7. Their evidence is short and to the point – their mother (the sponsor) is responsible for their maintenance, education and “home support”. They maintain a close relationship with their mother. Their brevity means that there is not much more to them than a bare assertion unless considered alongside the other evidence in this case.
8. A letter from the second appellant dated 2 January 2025 expresses joy at seeing the sponsor and his little sister over Christmas and a fervent desire to relocate to the UK to live with them.
9. I heard evidence from the sponsor. She adopted her four written statements and was cross examined.
10. The sponsor’s evidence in her first witness statement, dated 23 February 2024, is that she had left her children in the care of her brother. He married in October 2023 and wishes to relocate with his wife. He is unable to continue monitoring the appellants. The sponsor’s evidence is that they are reliant on her financial, emotional and parental care. In her second witness statement, dated 8 August 2024, the sponsor primarily dealt with her income in the UK and ability to support her children were they to be allowed entry.
11. In the sponsor’s third statement, dated 10 January 2025, she states that she travelled from the UK to Ghana in December 2024 with her daughter to visit the appellants. Her evidence was that she did this as she missed them and wished to spend quality time with them, and to ensure they were safe. This was the first time they had me their sister. The sponsor tells me that she also took the children for dental care and spoke to the relevant school for the second appellant.
12. In her most recent statement, dated 11 September 2025, the sponsor addressed more fully than in previous statements how she says she has sole parental responsibility for the appellants. She confirms that her brother is no longer willing to look after the appellants as he wishes to build his own life with his wife.
13. She outlines how she had previously not allowed the appellants to have their own mobile phones. However her brother, contrary to her wishes, tried to give them mobile phones and she felt compelled to provide them with a phone. She has done this as she is no longer confident that her brother will adhere to her instructions, and to allow them to communicate with her, her husband, and their sister. The sponsor also gives evidence that her brother does not feed the appellants using the dietary plan that she has provided, a point which is plainly one of the important decisions in the appellants’ lives in the sponsor’s view. She tells me that she has no other relatives who could offer the appellants care in Ghana.
14. With regards to the appellants’ education, the sponsor’s evidence is that she has chosen a university for the first appellant and had carried out research into the university to do this. She calls the university to discuss his results. With regards to the second appellant, she has enrolled him into boarding school and contacts the school directly during term time.
15. The sponsor has visited the appellants three times since she moved to the UK.
16. I take nothing from the fact that the sponsor’s most recent statement is the one that is most relevant to the issues before me. I consider it reasonable for a sponsor to write statements that are relevant to whatever they consider the barrier to the application to be at the time.
17. In cross examination, the sponsor was taken to her visa application in the bundle and agreed (after parts were read to her) that she remembers that she was asked if she had any dependent children and that she had entered that she had 2 children, and named two children who are not the appellants. She would go on to tell me in answer to the respondent’s cross examination that these were her husband’s children
18. She agreed that she didn’t name the appellants in her application as her children where it asks how many dependent children she has, but she stated that her husband had filled that out. I find that assertion to be a contradiction with her other answers about the application, where she accepts that she had answered the questions in the form. At one point the appellant appeared to be avoiding answering the question put to her that her husband had filled out the application. Even approaching this with all the caution that is deserved when taking evidence from someone whose first language is not English, and who is unfamiliar with court proceedings, I found credible the respondent’s suggestion to her that she was avoiding answering questions about who filled in the visa form.
19. The sponsor told me that she named her parents in the visa form despite them not travelling with her, but that she did not name the appellants because the form does not ask for their details. I find this to be untrue. The form (at p425 of the Error of Law bundle) asks whether she has any dependent children, if so how many, and then provides space to enter details of her dependent children. The appellants were not named in that visa application. I find her assertion that she did not name the appellants in the visa form because they were not travelling with her to be lacking in credibility because it is inconsistent with how she has approached giving her parents’ names.
20. The sponsor agrees that, whilst she would wish the appellants to attend a given church on Sundays, her brother does not always honour her wish in this respect. Similarly, although she did not want the appellants to have mobile phones, her brother sought to provide them with mobile phones. The sponsor did not accept that this was her brother making decisions for the appellants, but when asked whether she shares responsibilities with her brother, she asked for the question to be put again and answers that it saddens her, and that she has to rely on her brother. The question was put to her a third time and she answered that she has “no idea with that question”.
21. The sponsor gave evidence that she travelled to Ghana to visit the appellants in January 2025. I do not accept the respondent’s suggestion that there would be more photos of the appellants with the sponsor during this trip if the sponsor had sole responsibility for them – the two are not necessarily linked in my judgment. I accept that it is likely that the sponsor has limited funds and so I should not equate few visits with little control and direction of the appellants.
22. Her evidence continued to the effect that she cannot always communicate with the appellants, seemingly because of their school and university commitments.
23. I found the sponsor to be a witness with mixed credibility. Notably, the closer the respondent seemed to get to points in cross examination that went most directly to the question of the level of control and direction she has over the children, the less ready she seemed to answer questions directly. Judging her live evidence as a whole, I am not drawn to the conclusion that this can be explained by reference to her being in stressful, unfamiliar surroundings. I am not persuaded by the appellants’ submission that this is a question of eloquence and articulation rather than evasiveness and untruthfulness.
24. The sponsor’s husband gave evidence and was cross examined. He stated that he has met the appellants, but he does not know how much care their uncle gives them. His written evidence asserts that he has established a genuine and loving relationship with the appellants.
25. The appellant’s uncle gave a statement which outlines that he wishes to relocate with his wife and so cannot care for the appellants any more. He would previously allow his sister (the sponsor) to contact the appellants via his phone but now feels this is an issue in relation to his privacy and no longer wishes to do this. He does not give further evidence on matters relevant to the question of whether the sponsor has sole responsibility for the appellants, but his statement cannot be said to support the sponsor’s evidence. There is what is apparently a statutory declaration by the appellants’ uncle, declared as part of a custody order application which states that the sponsor is solely responsible for the upkeep of the children. It also states that the appellants’ uncle has been continuously taking care of the appellants as their guardian since the sponsor moved to the UK. I can give this document some little weight in the appellants’ favour because of the lack of detail behind those assertions. There is also a “statements of declarations” from the appellants’ uncle. This does say that he acted upon the instructions and decisions of the sponsor regarding everything concerning the appellants. The weight attributable to this is reduced by the lack of detail that it contains beyond that assertion as to what instructions and decisions are referred to.
26. I accept the appellants’ submission that the starting point in this case (and my analysis) must be that the sponsor had sole responsibility for the appellants at the point she moved to the UK and left them in Ghana.
27. The documentary evidence in this case includes the associated custody order for the appellants in favour of the sponsor. The order makes reference to a social welfare report having been provided, but I am not provided with that report. The custody order is dated August 2023. The respondent had asserted that the date of the document indicated that it was of less value than had it been obtained years earlier. I am not persuaded by that argument. I find the argument that the appellants had no need for such an order before seeking to gain entry clearance to be credible. I do not, however, find that the custody order is of any real probative value in addressing whether the sponsor has sole responsibility for the appellants. At best, I can conclude that it reflects a legal position on responsibility for the appellants, but not evidence of the factual position on who had control and direction over the appellants’ upbringing.
28. A letter from the second appellant’s school asserts that the sponsor has sole responsibility for his upbringing and that she instructs her brother on all matters pertaining to the appellant. I give that evidence no weight because the writer of those assertions gives no indication on how they could know that – they are not matters which are naturally within the knowledge of an assistant headmaster. I do give some weight to the information in that letter that school communications are channelled through the sponsor as the lead contact. The documentary evidence from the first appellant’s hight school stating that “the mother is the one taking care of him and wants to reunite with her” is deserving of little weight for the same reason.
29. The communications records consist of screen shots of call logs. Offered to me as showing calls between the appellants to the sponsor, they are not indicative either of her exercising control and direction (they show little to no content), and they would have limited value in assessing art 8 rights being developed or exercised.
30. There are a number of money transfer receipts showing the sponsor sending hundreds of pounds to her brother. I consider it likely that this money contributed to the appellants’ upkeep. I also accept that the evidence shows the sponsor paying for the first appellant’s university fees. The payment of university fees also weighs in the first appellant’s favour.
31. I find that she does provide money and some meaningful influence over how the appellants are cared for.
32. She has parental input to the second appellant’s schooling. Whilst the sponsor pays university fees for the first appellant, I do not find that phone calls from the sponsor to the university to discuss his progress is indicative of control and direction.
33. The sponsor’s evidence relating to her visa form was at best confused and at worst evasive. Whether she filled out the form herself or adopted the form as filled out by her husband, she has inescapably given an account as to who her dependent children were, and did not at that point claim that the appellants were dependent on her. This is in stark contrast to the appellant’s case in the current appeal that she has held sole responsibility throughout.
34. The fact that the sponsor no longer believes that her brother would adhere to her instructions, and that he does not follow the direction she gives on the appellants’ diets weighs towards the sponsor not having sole responsibility. The sponsor’s evidence that her brother does not routinely take the appellants to the church she desires is indicative of something closer to shared responsibility, rather than sole responsibility and weighs against the appellants.
35. With regards to the account of provision of a mobile phone, I consider that the evidence points most strongly to the sponsor’s brother taking the view that the appellants should have their own phones and, rather than exercising sole responsibility for what appears to be an important decision, the sponsor feeling she does not have the control to give direction that the appellants may not have a mobile phone. This counts against the appellants.
36. Weighing neutrally in my assessment of sole responsibility is the sponsor’s visit to the appellants in January 2025. The evidence on that does not, in my view, assist either party.
37. Bringing all of the above together, I find on the balance of probabilities that the sponsor does not have sole responsibility for the appellants
38. Turning to the question of art 8 rights outside the rules, I keep in mind all of the evidence and analysis above.
39. I am persuaded that the art 8 rights of the appellants’ step-father are engaged, along with those of the appellants, their little sister, and the sponsor. The strength of the relationship with the appellants’ stepfather is not developed beyond the minimum required to engage art 8 given the little engagement between them evidenced.
40. I remind myself that I must keep the best interests of the children in this case as a primary concern in my analysis. I have no evidence specific to this point, and I consider their best interests to be that they reside in a loving home that can provide for their needs. The second appellant is no longer a child. The appellants’ little sister is a child, but there is no suggestion that a decision either way would impact on her continuing to reside with her mother and father in the UK. The best interests of the second appellant appear to me to lean in favour of his case.
41. This is not a case where refusal of leave would break links between family members, but is a case where it would prevent the strengthening of the family life that they do have. This is of particular importance in relation to the second appellant and the appellants’ little sister, both of whom are children.
42. I am content that the decision is in accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim.
43. I keep in mind that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest. That the appellants do not meet the Immigration Rules weighs against them.
44. On balance, I find that the public interest outweighs the circumstances relied on by the appellants and that the decision by the respondent to refuse leave is a proportionate interference with art 8 rights.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside, save that I retain the First-tier Tribunal finding that that the only live issue in the case on the Immigration Rules is whether the sponsor had sole responsibility for the appellants under paragraph 297(i)(e) of the Immigration Rules. If the Rules are not met on that point, proportionality is the issue for an Article 8 claim outside the Rules.
I remake the decision, acting pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 by:
1. Dismissing the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds.

D Cotton

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 November 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001765
UI-2025-001770

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/64633/2023
LH/05361/2024
HU/64637/2023
LH/05360/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

VINCENT ADOMAH MARFO
KINGSFORD YAW MARFO
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Miss R Tariq, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the appellants against the finding of First-tier Tribunal (FtT) Judge Bartlett (the Judge) dated 17 January 2025, in which the Judge refused an appeal against the respondent’s decision not to grant leave to enter under either Rule 297 of the Immigration Rules or on the basis that the respondent’s decision breached Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
2. At the hearing before me the appellants were not represented and the sponsor did not attend. In the days leading up to the hearing and following a Home Office concession on one of the grounds of appeal, to which I will turn to in a moment, the appellant applied for the hearing be vacated and that the matter be remitted to the FtT. Although that application was declined, the Upper Tribunal did indicate to the appellants that they need not attend today’s hearing in light of the Home Office concessions. That lead me to the conclusion that it would be fair for me to proceed in their absence and that this is in line with the overriding objective read more widely.
3. The appellants are citizens of Ghana and the sponsor is their mother, who resides lawfully in the UK. At the time of the application Vincent was aged about 17 years old and Kingsford was 14 years old. The Judge refused the appeal on the basis that the appellants had not proved the sponsor had sole responsibility for the appellants within the meaning of the Immigration Rules. The Judge also refused the appeal on Article 8 grounds outside the Rules on the basis that the respondent’s refusal did not prevent the Article 8 rights the appellant and sponsor had between them from continuing to be exercised. The appellants appealed to the Upper Tribunal and were given leave on two grounds.
4. The first ground is summarised in the permission to appeal as there being a failure to make credibility findings, despite credibility being a central issue in the case. It is also said that the Judge failed to explain why the rarity of visits by the sponsor to the appellants was decisive, ignore the explanation for there being very few visits, and failed to fully engage with a letter from a school attended by an appellant. It was further said that the treatment of the “custody order” document in evidence was incomplete or erroneous, particularly given the ECO’s failure to challenge it.
5. The second ground is that there was procedural unfairness in dealing with the matter by way of it being listed in a float list. It was relevant that the case had previously been adjourned when it had been placed in a float list and there being documentary evidence exceeding 800 pages.
6. The respondent, in a Rule 24 response, dated 30 April 2025 conceded that the judge made a material error by failing to make credibility findings and explicitly state whether the sponsor’s oral and written witness evidence was accepted. The respondent made no concession in relation to ground 2 but Miss Tariq very reasonably pointed out that in light of the concession in ground 1, ground 2 is likely to simply fall away.
7. I remind myself of the need to respect the finding of the First-tier Tribunal, a jurisdiction where the case is heard by a judge with extensive skills and experience in this specialist jurisdiction. My function is to consider any errors of law and not to address any preference of style or approach to a case.
8. I have considered both the grounds of appeal and the concession made by the Home Office and I am persuaded that there is an error of law which is material. I find that the error of law lies in the fact that the judge does not make, in my assessment, a sufficiently clear analysis of the facts that leads them to conclude that the appellants have not proved the sponsor has sole responsibility. It is unclear what conclusions the judge draws about the custody order. I find that the Judge has identified the relevant evidence, but does not sufficiently explain their findings on credibility and therefore the route to their conclusion so that both of the parties can properly understand the reasons for the conclusions.
9. Those same factors are relevant, at least potentially, to the assessment of proportionality outside the Rules. Given the findings that I have just made on ground 1, I do not feel I need to address ground 2. I consider that the error, as outlined in ground 1 is material because it removes the ability for the parties to understand why the case has been decided in the way that it is. I therefore allow the appeal.
10. I set aside the decision on whether the sponsor had sole responsibility and on proportionality outside the Rules.
11. I retain the findings of the judge that the only live issue in the case on the Immigration Rules is whether the sponsor had sole responsibility for the appellants under paragraph 297(i)(e). If the Rules are not met on that point, proportionality is the issue for an Article 8 claim outside the Rules.
12. I give no leave to either party to widen the issues from that and any change to the issues would need to be subject to an application to the Tribunal.
13. The appellant submits that it would be most appropriate for this matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The Home Office position is that the Home Office, whilst relatively neutral on venue, say that it is likely to be a case that is suitable to be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
14. Having considered the relevant Practice Direction and the issues in this case, along with the submissions by both appellants and respondent, I conclude that it would be appropriate to retain this matter in the Upper Tribunal as this is a narrow issue and will not require extensive fact-finding.
Notice of decision
The appeal is allowed to the extent set out below. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside, subject to the preservation of the matters set out below.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law in the way in which credibility was dealt with.
I retain the Judge’s finding that the only live issue in the case on the Immigration Rules is whether the sponsor had sole responsibility. If the Rules are not met, the issue on the Article 8 claim outside the Rules is proportionality.
The appeal will be remade in the Upper Tribunal at Field House on 19 September 2025 at 1000hrs with a time estimate of three hours.
I give the following directions:

1. Within 14 days of being sent this decision, the appellants must confirm whether the sponsor will attend or give evidence at the resumed hearing, address any reasonable adjustments that will be necessary to facilitate her attendance and participation (if so required), and confirm whether an interpreter will be necessary.
2. Within 28 days of being sent this decision, the appellants must file and serve an updated skeleton argument.
3. Within 35 days, the Secretary of State is to file and serve a skeleton argument.

D Cotton
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
23 June 2025