Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001777

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60475/2023
IA/00783/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

KI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Lennon, of Counsel, instructed by, Maguire Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Edinburgh on 13 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iran and is of Kurdish ethnicity. He came to the UK in February 2021 and claimed asylum on 10 February 2021. The application was refused on 16 October 2023.
2. The appellant appealed to the First Tier Tribunal (“FtT”). The appellant alleged that he had lived with his uncle in Iran. That whilst in Iran he had helped his uncle distribute leaflets supporting the KDPI. His uncle then learnt that someone in the village had informed on them. His uncle arranged for him to leave through an agent and he travelled across Europe before arriving in the United Kingdom. He further alleged that whilst in the United Kingdom he had attended demonstrations and posted material on Facebook. He claimed that he was at risk on return due to both his activities in Iran and his sur-place activities in the UK.
3. In a decision dated 27 February 2025 the FtT dismissed the appellants appeal on protection grounds (“the FtT Decision”). The FtT did not accept the appellants account of his activities in Iran and in relation to his sur-place activities the FtT determined that the Iranian authorities would not have an adverse interest in the appellant. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) was granted.
4. In a decision dated 17 November 2025 (and issued to the parties on 3 December 2025) (“The UT Decision”) the UT (Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hills) allowed the appeal, following a concession by the respondent. The appeal was allowed on the ground that there was an error in law in that the FtT had failed to make an explicit finding as to whether the appellant’s sur-place activities were genuine.
5. Following the making of a Transfer Order, we now remake the decision. In the UT error of law Decision, the UT preserved the findings at paragraphs 20 to 31 of the FtT Decision (see Annex A at [13]). Those preserved findings form the basis of our analysis.
6. At the commencement of the hearing both Mr Lennon and Mr Mullen explained that they had thought the purpose of this hearing was to consider the appeal on an error of law. They appeared to be unaware of the UT Decision and that the purpose of this hearing was to remake the appeal on the asylum issue. This was surprising given that the hearing notice issued to parties was unequivocal as to the purpose of the hearing. We agreed a short recess to allow parties to consider their position and obtain instructions. Following that recess both parties confirmed that they were ready and willing to proceed.
7. There was no new material placed before us for the remaking appeal. The appellant gave evidence based upon the witness statements contained in the Appellants Bundle used for the original hearing before the FtT. He was cross examined by Mr Mullen. The parties relied upon the original documents that were before the FtT. Both Mr Mullen and Mr Lennon made submissions.
Anonymity Direction
8. We have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice because this was originally a protection claim.
Issues
9. There was one issue to be determined in this hearing – was the appellant at risk on return due to his sur-place activities?
Legal Framework
10. This case pre-dates the coming into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The burden of proof is upon the Appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. We must determine whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted on return to Iran for his sur-place activities.
Submissions
11. It is argued for the appellant that even generalised low level sur-place activity was enough to put the appellant at risk. He left Iran illegally and will be questioned upon return. He is not expected to lie about his activities in the UK. He has demonstrated genuine political belief. The Iranian authorities are also likely to search for the appellant’s Facebook account when he requires to apply for an emergency travel document or he is likely to be asked about his Facebook page/ password on return at the airport (XX (PJAK-sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) at paras 121-124). The appellant is at real risk upon return and the appeal should be granted.
12. For the respondent it is argued that the appellant has not demonstrated any genuine political belief. There is no evidence to suggest that he has become known to the Iranian authorities and there is no reason to suppose that he could not delete the Facebook account. The respondent submitted that the appeal should be dismissed.
Findings of Fact
13. The relevant findings in fact, based upon both the evidence provided by the appellant, the documentary evidence and the preserved findings of the FtT Decision are as set out below.
14. That the appellant is a national of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity.
15. The appellant lived with his uncle and his uncle’s family in a village outside Sardasht in Iran. He assisted his uncle by working as a shepherd and had minimal education.
16. The appellant cannot read or write.
17. The appellant was not involved in any activities whilst in Iran likely to bring him to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities.
18. The appellant arrived in the UK in February 2021.
19. Whilst in the UK the appellant has not joined any groups or organisations who are opposed to the Iranian regime and he has no knowledge of these groups.
20. The appellant has a Facebook account in his own name. From time to time articles are posted on this Facebook account. These articles and materials are generalised accounts that are critical of the Iranian regime. The articles and materials that are posted are created by persons other than the appellant.
21. Since arriving in the UK in 2021 the appellant has attended some demonstrations in London to protest against the Iranian regime.
22. The appellant is not genuinely engaged in his sur-place activities.
23. The appellant would delete his Facebook account more than 30 days prior to return to Iran.
Application of Law to the Facts
24. The only issue for consideration in this case is whether or not the appellants sur-place activities placed him at risk on return to Iran. The appellant relied upon two witness statements. The witness statement dated 21 June 2021 makes no reference to sur-place activities. The second witness statement dated 16 February 2024 does make some reference to sur-place activities. Specifically, the appellant alleges that he attended two protests in the UK and posted online. He alleged that he was a political activist.
25. In the appellants Asylum Interview held on 23 July 2023 (“AIR”) the appellant acknowledged that his Facebook account was set up for him by his friend and that his friend posts for him (AIR answer 37 and 126). He also accepted that he did not know the password (AIR answer 127). Under cross examination the appellant accepted that most of his posts came from a friend who helped to post the material. The appellant has produced excerpts from the Facebook account showing the type of posts made.
26. In relation to attendance at demonstrations the appellant in the AIR stated that he had attended a demonstration in London but he could not recall when that was – he thought it was a year or two years before. He had attended with a friend and he did not know who organised the demonstration. In the witness statement from 16 February 2024 the appellant stated that he had attended protests but did not provide much further in the way of explanation. Under cross examination the appellant stated that he last attended a demonstration on 28 July 2024. When asked if any of his friends were linked to any organised groups who opposed the regime the appellant stated that he did not know of any such groups and he only took part as an Iranian citizen. From the excerpts from the Facebook account there are some pictures purporting to be the appellant attending a demonstration in London on 22 March 2022 and then again on 10 August 2022 and on 21 January 2024. There was no photographic evidence for a demonstration on 28 July 2024.
27. When considering the evidence and taking into account the lower standard we are not satisfied that there is any evidence that supports the appellant being genuinely politically active or engaged. He has not joined any group or organisation in the UK despite being here for nearly 5 years. He has no knowledge or awareness of such groups. Although attending a number of demonstrations he was not involved in organising these and he had limited knowledge or awareness regarding the demonstrations. His role was to accompany a friend and to be present at the demonstrations. We also take into consideration that the appellant was not found to be politically active whilst in Iran and the credibility of his account from that time was not accepted – which comes from the preserved findings made by the FtT. It is clear to us that the Facebook account was set up for the appellant and as he is illiterate he has no or very limited control over what is being posted. It appears that the material is supplied by third parties and posted for him. We also take into consideration the preserved finding at paragraph 23 of the FtT Decision. When looking at the posts on the Facebook account it is clear these are of a generalised nature and do not contain any material content provided by the appellant.
28. Based on the evidence we are satisfied that the appellant is not genuine in his sur-place activities. Accordingly, we must turn to consider the position based upon evidence that establishes a Facebook account in the name of the appellant that does contain generalised material critical of the regime and some photographs of the appellant attending demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London.
29. Status as a failed asylum seeker, with no adverse interest, will not of its own result in a risk to a returnee to Iran – SSH and HR (illegal exit; failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 (IAC).
30. We take into consideration the country guidance case of HB (Kurds) Iran CG[2018] UKUT 00430 and the risk factors for Iranians of Kurdish ethnicity returning to Iran even where political activity might be described as “low level”. In accordance with XX (PJAK – sur place activities- Facebook) Iran CG [2022] 00023 we have considered whether the appellant is someone who is likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities because they are of significant interest and thus might be subject to targeted Facebook surveillance. In considering this we have taken into account the factors listed in BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 00036. Given that the appellant has at no point come to the attention of the Iranian authorities to date and has attended only a small number of demonstrations as an attendee only, we do not consider that there is any reasonable risk that he would be someone of significant interest to the Iranian regime. There is no reasonable likelihood that the Facebook account will have been subject to targeted surveillance.
31. We accept that there will be a “pinch point” when the appellant applies for an emergency travel document to return to Iran. There is a reasonable risk that the Iranian authorities will at the point carry out searches in relation to Facebook and or request access to the appellant’s social media accounts. However, given our finding that the appellant is not genuine in his sur-place activities we find as a fact that the appellant will delete his Facebook account sufficiently far in advance of any such application being made to ensure that his account can no longer be accessed. On that basis there would be no risk to the appellant from the contents of his Facebook account.
32. We consider that there is no reasonable risk to the appellant on return to Iran arising from his sur-place activities.

NOTICE OF DECISION
We have remade the decision. The appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 16 October 2023 is dismissed on asylum and human rights grounds.

FEE AWARD
We have dismissed the appeal and there can be no Fee Award.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Neilson
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
14.01.26

Annex A: Error of law Decision

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity who claims asylum on the basis that he distributed leaflets with his uncle in Iran which supported the KDPI and left the country when someone from his village informed on them. In addition, while in the United Kingdom he has attended demonstrations and posted material on Facebook which is critical of the Iranian government. The respondent refused the claim and the appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT).

2. The FtT appeal was dismissed in a decision dated 27 February 2025. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge who heard the matter in the FtT (the Judge) did not accept the appellant’s account of his activities in Iran or while on route to the United Kingdom. In relation to his sur place activities, the Judge concluded that the Iranian authorities would not have an interest in the appellant. The Judge found that the Facebook activity was at a low level and generalised in the subjects it covers, such that it would not bring the appellant to the adverse attention of the authorities.

3. That decision is appealed to the Upper Tribunal.

Grounds of appeal

4. The appellant argues that the Judge erred in finding that he was not at real risk of harm on return, based on the treatment of his sur place activities. I will not repeat the grounds in full, but in summary the appellant argues that the Judge’s assessment of his social media activity was flawed, that even minimal and generalised social media activity is enough to generate real risk, that his Facebook activity was public and could be identified by the authorities, and that his activity is sufficient to trigger adverse interest on return. He argues that he will be questioned about his activities in the United Kingdom and he is not expected to lie about those activities.

Discussion and Analysis

5. At the outset of the Upper Tribunal hearing Ms Simbi, on behalf the respondent, conceded there had been an error of law in relation to how the Judge approached the appellant’s sur place activities. In particular, that the Judge should have considered whether the appellant’s sur place political activity represented a genuinely held political belief. Ms Simbi’s view was that given the nature of the error, the case could be remade following a further hearing in the Upper Tribunal on a narrow basis.

6. Mr Winter submitted that in the context of an Iranian asylum seeker it does not matter if the political activity represents a genuinely held belief or not. He argued that someone who had left Iran illegally would be questioned about their activities upon return and they were not expected to lie. He submitted that the appeal should be allowed and the appellant granted asylum.

7. Ms Simbi submitted that genuineness of the political activity was something that did need to be considered and referred to the decision in S v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 1482. At [54] of that decision, the Court of Appeal held:

“[…] it is apparent that the judge accepted that as the appellant was of Kurdish ethnicity, he would be likely to be questioned on entry into Iran; hence the question which she posed, namely what the appellant would or could reasonably be expected to say when questioned by the Iranian authorities. In my judgment, bearing in mind the retained finding that the appellant's activities whilst in the UK were opportunistic and not genuine, the judge was entitled to find that the appellant would not be required to volunteer information about those activities. Furthermore, that as the appellant had no involvement in PJAK or politics before he left Iran, there would be no other reason for the Iranian authorities to have any suspicion about the appellant, such that on his return to Iran, there would be no risk to the appellant either of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment either by reason of second-stage questioning or otherwise.”

8. I agree with Ms Simbi. The genuineness of the appellant’s sur place activities is plainly relevant to the assessment of risk of harm, as it goes to whether he would be required to volunteer information about those activities upon return to Iran. That is consistent with the authorities.

9. If the sur place activity was found to reflect genuine beliefs, it would be necessary to assess if the appellant’s Facebook activity would become known to the authorities at a pinch point and if this would result in the hair-trigger response referred to in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430. Critically, if a Judge found those points in the appellant’s favour, they would need to decide whether the appellant could be required to delete his Facebook account or lie about his activities in the United Kingdom to avoid harm upon return.

10. The Judge has not sufficiently resolved these important issues and so has erred.

11. In light of the above, I allow the appeal.

Preserved Findings

12. I discussed with the parties which findings of fact should be preserved if I allowed the appeal. The parties agreed that, given the issue which remains to be determined is the risk to the appellant on return given his sur place activities, much of the Judge’s findings can be preserved.

13. Paragraphs [20] to [31] of the FtT decision dated 27 February 2025 are findings which do not go to the sur place activities and therefore they are preserved.

Disposal

14. Given that the factual matrix is for the most part settled the decision can be remade in the Upper Tribunal following a remaking hearing. No findings are preserved other than those set out at [13] above.

Notice of Decision

15. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. The decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal following a resumed hearing on a date to be fixed at Field House.

Directions to the Parties

1. The parties may adduce additional evidence addressing the outstanding issues.
2. Any documentary evidence (including witness statements) upon which the appellant wishes to rely to be filed at the Upper Tribunal and served on the respondent no less than 14 days prior to the resumed hearing.
3. The appellant to inform the Upper Tribunal no less than 14 days prior to the resumed hearing if he requires an interpreter.
4. Any documentary evidence (including witness statements) upon which the respondent wishes to rely to be filed at the Upper Tribunal and served on the appellant no less than 7 days prior to the resumed hearing.

N Hills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 17 November 2025