The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001804

First-tier Tribunal No:  PA/67928/2023

LP/11290/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th of October 2025

Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between
KR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, of counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Young, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 1 August 2025


DECISION AND REASONS

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo born in 1980. He appeals with permission the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 24 February 2025 to dismiss his appeal for asylum.

The appellant’s case
3. In summary, the appellant fears return to DRC. He fled the DRC in approximately 1997 due to the unrest in Goma and the political connections of his father. The appellant claimed asylum in South Africa in 2003 for these reasons and he was granted Refugee Status. The appellant was a victim of crimes and racist attacks whilst in South Africa. He left in 2019 and came to the UK where he claimed asylum.

The respondent’s case
4. In summary, the respondent did not accept that the appellant had provided a credible account of the attention he received in the DRC.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’) did not find the appellant to be a credible witness. The Judge found that the inconsistencies in the account were damaging. The Judge made reference to the Country Policy Information Guidance Note (CPIN) and country guidance case law and concluded that the appellant would not be at risk.

The grounds
6. The grounds seeking permission were two fold. Permission was granted on both.
7. Ground one avers that the Judge failed to make findings on material matters. The material maters were broadly that the appellant made a successful asylum claim in South Africa. It was also highlighted that the Judge had not grappled with other historic background information.
8. Ground two submitted that the Judge failed to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt especially in respect of the appellant’s personal circumstances about his recollection of events in 1997.

The hearing
9. The parties had very helpfully discussed the appeal in advance and had, subject to the Tribunal’s approval, reached consensus about disposal. It was agreed that the decision contained material errors of law which meant that the decision should be set aside.
10. Both advocates accepted that whilst there was reference within the determination to the fact of the appellant having been granted asylum in South Africa [§15] there was no finding as to what impact if any that had upon the appellant’s appeal. It was agreed that the respondent had not challenged the Refugee Status point. The parties quite properly referred me to KK (Recognition elsewhere as refugee) Democratic Republic of Congo [2005] UKIAT 00054 and that whilst the Judge was not bound by the earlier grant of Refugee Status it was an important piece of evidence upon which findings should have been made and they had not been. In relation to ground two it was acknowledged very fairly that the points advanced in ground one materially impacted upon ground two.
11. I accept the helpful submissions of the parties. I agree that the fact of the Refugee Status had not been challenged was important. I agreed that the earlier grant of asylum was not binding upon the Judge. However I accept the submission that in light of KK it was a significant matter and represented at least an appropriate starting point for the Judge in their consideration of the claim. I agree that clear factual findings should have been made by the Judge and the lack of such findings is a material error on ground one and materially impacts ground two. I therefore find an error on both grounds of appeal.

Disposal
12. The parties agree that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing. Their position was based upon the need for the fact finding exercise that must take place.

Notice of Decision
The decision involved material errors of law.
I set aside the decision and remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided by a Judge other than the Judge who dismissed the appellant’s appeal. I do not preserve any findings of fact.

RA Pickering
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
13 October 2025