Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001813
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54504/2023
LP/12934/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

S.S.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Mohzam of Counsel instructed by CB Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers given to it by an Act of Parliament. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role in considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’). When the Upper Tribunal allows an appeal and sets aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on the basis of an error of law, the Upper Tribunal may remit the case to be reconsidered before a differently constituted First-tier Tribunal or it may re-make the decision itself.
2. This decision involves the Upper Tribunal re-making the decision itself. It should be read in conjunction with the earlier decision issued on 10 November 2025 in which the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law. The First-tier Tribunal decision was set aside with preserved findings and the appellant’s appeal was adjourned to be re-heard by the Upper Tribunal.
3. This case involves an asylum claim. The sole issue for the Upper Tribunal’s determination is whether the appellant faces a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Egypt due to his political activities.
Anonymity
4. An anonymity direction was made previously in connection with this case and is continued.
The Relevant Law
5. The applicable law is not in dispute. It is to be found in the decision in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 and in particular the opinion of Lord Rogers at [82]. The Supreme Court recognised that the Refugee Convention 1951 protects against persecution for all Convention reasons, including political opinion, so that it is no answer to a refugee claim that the appellant could avoid being persecuted whilst remaining in their country by concealing that protected characteristic.
6. Lord Rodgers at [82] laid down the test to be followed by Tribunals regarding the risks flowing from engagement in voluntary conduct such as political activity. The test modified to the context of this case requires the Tribunal to first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that the appellant is a political activist or would be treated as a political activist by his potential persecutors in his country of nationality;
If so, the Tribunal must then ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that political activists who lived openly would be liable to prosecution in the appellant’s country of nationality;
If so, the Tribunal must go on to consider what the individual appellant would do if he were returned to that country; If the appellant would in fact live openly and thereby be exposed to a real risk of persecution, then he has a well founded fear of persecution, even if he could avoid the risk by living discreetly;
If on the other hand, the Tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go back and ask itself why he would do so. If the Tribunal concludes that the appellant would live discreetly simply because that is how he would wish to live or because of social pressures e.g, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends then his application must be rejected. Social pressures of that kind do not amount to persecution because for reasons that have nothing to do with any fear of persecution, he himself chooses to adopt a way of life which means that he is not in fact liable to be persecuted because of his political opinion.
If on the other hand the Tribunal concludes that a material reason for the applicant living discreetly on his return would be a fear of the persecution which would follow if he were to live openly as a political activist, then other things being equal, his application should be accepted.
Background
7. The following summary sets out the factual background to the appeal. The appellant is a national of Egypt who arrived in the United Kingdom by small boat on 28 March 2022. He claimed asylum the next day. On 7 July 2023, the respondent refused the asylum application. An appeal was dismissed on protection and human rights grounds following a hearing, by FtTJ Rothwell (‘the Judge’). The First-tier Tribunal determined that the appellant was not a refugee, was not entitled to humanitarian protection and was not at risk on return to Egypt.
8. Following an appeal hearing held on 15 October 2025, the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law in respect of the narrow issue of whether the appellant faces any risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Egypt on account of his political activities. The appeal was allowed, and the First-tier Tribunal decision was set aside with a direction that it be retained and re-made by the Upper Tribunal on a later date. Preserved facts were retained at paragraphs [12]-[25] of the decision. A chronology of this appeal and the detailed outcomes of the previous hearing are set out in the statutory appeal (error of law) decision issued on 10 November 2025 and need no repetition here.
The Re-making Hearing
9. The matter now comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the appellant is at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Egypt on account of his political activities.
10. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary. The appellant gave oral evidence using an Arabic translator and they confirmed that they understood each other.
11. The appellant did not provide any new evidence before the Upper Tribunal but relied on the core documents in the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant stated several times in the presence of his counsel, Mr Mohzam, that he had provided his legal representatives with videos and Facebook posts supporting his political activities which he had wanted placed before the First-tier Tribunal, but were not.
12. I gave Mr Mohzam the opportunity to discuss with the appellant if he wished to make a late application to admit new evidence pursuant to Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Following their private consultation, Mr Mohzam confirmed that no application would be forthcoming, and that he wished to proceed on the basis of only the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal.
13. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Findings and Reasons
14. The appellant’s case can be explained quite simply. He says that his political activity in Egypt and sur place activities in the UK place him at risk of persecution or serious harm because the Egyptian regime will arrest anyone who shares anything against them on the internet and that he has published his political activity on Facebook.
15. The appellant adopted his previous witness statement dated 5 July 2024 that was before the First-tier Tribunal as his examination in chief and gave oral evidence in response to questions asked by me for clarification, and Ms Khan in cross-examination. Mr Mohzam did not ask any supplementary questions or conduct any re-examination.
16. The appellant says that he attended a demonstration in Egypt on 20 September 2019 against the government’s corruption and restriction of freedom and shared his political opinion on Facebook. However, he stopped posting two months after the demonstration because the mayor of the village warned his father that the authorities would arrest him if he continued. The appellant said by this time, two of his friends had already been arrested so he stopped posting.
17. The appellant also relies on sur place activities in the UK. He says that he attended two demonstrations against the Egyptian regime on 26 May 2023 and 11 November 2022. The demonstrations were against the Rabaa massacre in Egypt where he says innocent people were killed. He claims that he only attended a few demonstrations in the UK because not many were held in Birmingham City.
18. During cross-examination, it was put to the appellant that the Rabaa massacre remembrance event that he attended was not a political demonstration but a remembrance gathering. The appellant refuted that assertion and said that ‘Rabaa for him was a guilt’ and that a friend had told him that he would be arrested for participating in the protest.
19. The appellant was asked by Ms Khan where was the evidence of his sur place activities in the UK beyond the four photographs of himself standing before a poster of a Rabaa remembrance event held in Birmingham that had already been considered by the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant said that he had given 74 photographs from his Facebook account to his legal representatives to produce before the First-tier Tribunal hearing. It was pointed out to him that the First-tier Tribunal decision at [28] clearly stated that although he had referred to Facebook posts, none had been produced at the hearing.
20. The appellant told the Upper Tribunal that he had personally posted pictures of the Rabaa remembrance protest on TikTok and had taken screenshots which he then posted on Facebook. He said that his sisters living in Egypt had seen the posts on TikTok and had requested him to take them down because they were worried for their own safety. He agreed to take them down but before he could do so, they were taken down by a third party, either by TikTok or the regime, although he could not be sure which one.
21. Under cross-examination, the appellant appeared to change his earlier evidence and told Ms Khan that although it was his intention to post the TikTok screenshots to his Facebook account, his brother had advised him against it, and therefore nothing was posted on Facebook about the Rabaa massacre remembrance protest.
22. I have carefully assessed the evidence provided by the appellant. In relation to his sur place activities the only evidence before the Upper Tribunal are the four photographs provided by the appellant of himself, with three or four others standing before a poster of the Rabaa massacre remembrance, which was already before the First-tier Tribunal.
23. I note that although the appellant mentioned posting photographs on TikTok, his witness statement makes no mention of TikTok, and he has produced no evidence of any posts on social media. He also mentioned that he was advised by his sisters to take down the photographs on TikTok, and by his brother not to post anything on Facebook, which advice he followed. However, none of this evidence can be found in his witness statement.
24. No application has been made to admit new evidence under rule 15 (2A), comprising for example, the 74 photographs from Facebook that he says he gave his legal representatives, nor copies of political videos that he claims were uploaded. I find that his oral evidence before the Upper Tribunal constitutes nothing more than embellishments to his previous witness statement. I accordingly attach no weight to it.
25. Turning to the appellant’s political activity in Egypt, his credibility has not been challenged by the respondent in her refusal decision dated 7 July 2023. However, based on the appellant’s own evidence (AIR Q125-126) he participated in only one demonstration held on 20 September 2019, and that demonstration was dispersed very quickly (AIR Q162). He also accepted (AIR Q172) that he never faced adverse attention as a result of his political opinion in Egypt.
26. The appellant also claims that he posted on Facebook for about two months after the 20 September 2019 demonstration but stopped after he was warned by his father’s friend, the local mayor (AIR Q 128). However, as noted in the First-tier Tribunal decision at [28] no Facebook posts were produced at the hearing , and no application has been made to admit them at this re-making.
Country Information
27. Both parties took the Upper Tribunal to the relevant Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN: Egypt, Opposition to the State (Version 4) December 2023).
28. CPIN Paragraph 3.1.1. specifically refers to the factors that need to be taken into account when assessing whether a person is at real risk of persecution or serious harm. The factors listed are: (i) their profile; (ii) the group they belong to (if any); (iii) their role (if any) in the group and the nature of their activities/comments; (iv) whether or not they have come to the adverse attention of the authorities previously; and (v) the profile and activities of family members who are perceived to be critical to the government.
29. CPIN Paragraph 3.1.2. also states that each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the appellant to demonstrate that they face such a risk.
30. CPIN Paragraph 3.1.8. states that human rights defenders, journalists, activists, and others have faced criminal prosecution for what observers considered were expressing political views or criticism.
31. Mr Mohzam also took the Upper Tribunal to CPIN Paragraphs 9.3.5, 10.1.2 & 10.1.6. These paragraphs are noted but are not especially helpful in determining the core question at this hearing, which is primarily focussed on establishing whether the appellant would face any risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Egypt on account of his political activity. The key related issues being, what are his political activities and whether they have attracted the attention of the Egyptian authorities.
32. Mr Mohzam also took me to the first paragraph of the Amnesty International Report 2023. However, given this report focuses from the outset on the presidential elections and the repressive actions taken by the government, I consider it to be less relevant to my assessment of the risk posed to the appellant on return.
33. CPIN Paragraph 17 refers to ‘Sur place activities’ which I have also taken into account.
34. Overall, it is clear that the most relevant part of the CPIN 2023 is to be found at paragraph 3.1.1. which is unarguably directly relevant to assessing whether the appellant would be at risk on return.
35. Looking at the factors listed in paragraph 3.1.1. and assessing the evidence in context, I find that the appellant was not a member of any political group or party (AIR Q 168-170). His admitted political activity in Egypt was limited to participating in one demonstration held in September 2019 and he has never come to the adverse attention of the authorities in Egypt, nor are his family politically active. I also find that there is no evidence of any social media posts or videos on Facebook while in Egypt.
36. In relation to his sur place activities, the appellant has provided only four photographs of his participation in a Rabaa massacre remembrance event which he says was a protest held in Birmingham City. I find it is at least arguable, that it was not a political protest at all, but a remembrance gathering to mark the death of innocent people. I have reached this view based on the objective evidence, namely, the specific text on the banner before the appellant and others which states ‘Rabaa Massacre Remembrance – We light candles to preserve the memory of the deceased remains in our heart’ and the fact that candles were lit. There is no evidence of him being politically active in the UK or of any participation in a second demonstration in the UK. There is also no evidence of any social media posts on Facebook or Tiktok.
37. In light of these factual findings, I now turn to consider the application of the legal test in HJ (Iran) which follows a holistic approach. The first question is whether the on the available evidence the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant is a political activist or would be treated as such by his potential persecutors in his country of nationality.
38. Based on the factual findings, I am not satisfied that the appellant is a political activist or would be treated as such. A single attendance at a demonstration in Egypt which was quickly dispersed and one attendance in the UK is simply insufficient for him to be considered a political activist. In this context, he has not proven that he attended two demonstrations in the UK or engaged in any political posts on social media. Accordingly, I find the appellant has not satisfied the first stage of the test.
39. However, even if I am wrong about the appellant not being a political activist, it is clear that he cannot satisfy the remaining stages of the HJ (Iran) test to establish that he has a well-founded fear of persecution and would be at risk on return. This is because he cannot demonstrate that he would live openly as a political activist in Egypt and be exposed to a real risk of persecution contrary to his response at interview (AIR Q140).
40. In this regard, taking his evidence at its highest, the appellant said that he intended to take down the Tiktok posts after his sisters asked him to do so, and that he did not post anything on Facebook after his brother advised himself against such action.
41. Likewise, he said that he stopped posting political views when he lived in Egypt after he was warned by his father’s friend, the mayor. Taken together, his own evidence shows that he would not engage in any political activity due to social pressures such as not wanting to distress his family and would himself choose to adopt a way of life which means that he will not become liable to prosecution because of his political opinion.
42. It follows from the foregoing reasons that the appellant’s profile is not such that he is at risk of persecution or serious harm on return. His appeal is therefore refused.
NOTICE OF THE DECISION
43. The appeal is refused.

K.A.Khan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 March 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email