Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001815

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/63799/2024
LP/12354/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

PK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Malik, instructed by Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Mr P. Lawson, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 3 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. By way of a decision sealed on 8 October 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) dated 27 February 2025 and set the decision aside with various preserved findings. The remaking of the appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal and it was that which came before me. I had the benefit of a 320 page bundle and I heard the appellant’s oral evidence. After hearing submissions on behalf of both parties, I reserved my decision which I now give together with my reasons for the same.

Background

2. The appellant is an Iranian citizen of Kurdish ethnicity who claimed asylum on the basis that he was politically active in Iran as a supporter of the KDPI there and where his activities became known to the police following which he fled Iran. He also claimed to have been politically active since his arrival into the United kingdom (“UK”) by way of attending pro-Kurdish demonstrations and posting political material on Facebook. The respondent had rejected his claim to be at risk from either and the FTT dismissed his appeal against that decision.

3. In her error of law decision, Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick rejected the appellant’s challenge to the FTT decision as contained within Grounds 1 to 3 of the Grounds of Appeal (which mainly related to what the appellant claimed to have happened in Iran) but allowed it in relation to three of the eight limbs of Ground 4 as summarised at [36] of the error of law decision:

“36. However, I consider that the FTT did err in its approach the appellant’s sur place activities, in three ways that are identified in the grounds:

(i) There is no consideration of the evidence before it of the surveillance of anti-regime demonstrations in the UK. This evidence consisted not only of the news article and CPIN mentioned directly above, but also what was said in the country guidance case of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) at [30]-[32];

(ii) It failed to apply the guidance in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) in that it only asked the question of whether the appellant had been more than an attendee at the demonstrations he had attended in the UK. BA requires a multi-factoral assessment, taking into account, for example, how often a person has attended demonstrations, what the theme of the demonstrations is and how that is viewed by the regime, whether the person has carried a banner, etc. The FTT did not do this. There is nothing to suggest it considered how many demonstrations the appellant had attended in the UK, what the content was of the “pictures” the appellant was noted to have been carrying, what the theme of the demonstrations was, or how that would be viewed by the regime. The approach of the FTT was that the question of whether the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations in the UK would have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities was resolved by the finding that he had been no more than an attendee. That approach is not in line with BA.

(iii) This error then undermined the FTT’s application of HB (Kurds) to the facts of this case. Although the FTT properly took into account the guidance that the Iranian regime perceives “even the lowest level of involvement [in Kurdish political activities] as a threat”, when it applied that guidance here, it only considered the appellant’s Facebook activities. There is no mention anywhere at [32]-[37] of the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations in the UK. This would only have been a permissible approach if the FTT had given sustainable reasons for finding that that attendance had not come to the attention of the authorities, but it had not.

37. For these reasons, the FTT’s finding that the appellant would not be at risk on return to Iran for reasons of his sur place political activities was based on material errors of law and must be set aside. However, it was open to the FTT to reject the appellant’s account of his political activities in Iran and to find that his Facebook activity was not genuinely motivated for the reasons that it did. Those findings are preserved.

38. I consider that there has been no clear finding as to the whether the appellant holds any genuine political beliefs at all. This is because the FTT found at [26] that the appellant’s failure to attend any demonstrations in the UK until after his claim was refused was “not consistent with a genuine political conviction” but it also accepted at [28] that the appellant “may be sympathetic to the Kurdish cause” and had attended two demonstrations in Iran. A clear finding about the genuineness of the appellant’s beliefs still needs to be made.”

4. This sets out the scope of the remaking of the appeal and at the hearing, Mr Lawson noted that a finding was also required in relation to whether the appellant’s activity in Iran was genuine political activity. I return to that below.

Legal Framework

5. The appellant claimed asylum on 20 November 2022 which means that it is to be considered within the framework contained within sections 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”). Section 32 applies here. That was considered in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 and a 2-stage approach was commended. The first stage is to determine the following on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason?
(b) Does the appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?

6. If these apply, it is then necessary to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The appellant could not internally relocate.

7. The relevant country guidance which applies to this appeal is found in HB (Kurds) Iran (CG) [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC).

8. Paragraph [98] of HB (Kurds) contains the Country Guidance as follows:

“(1) SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC) remains valid country guidance in terms of the country guidance offered in the headnote. For the avoidance of doubt, that decision is not authority for any proposition in relation to the risk on return for refused Kurdish asylum-seekers on account of their Kurdish ethnicity alone.

(2) Kurds in Iran face discrimination. However, the evidence does not support a contention that such discrimination is, in general, at such a level as to amount to persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.

(3) Since 2016 the Iranian authorities have become increasingly suspicious of, and sensitive to, Kurdish political activity. Those of Kurdish ethnicity are thus regarded with even greater suspicion than hitherto and are reasonably likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny on return to Iran.

(4) However, the mere fact of being a returnee of Kurdish ethnicity with or without a valid passport, and even if combined with illegal exit, does not create a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.

(5) Kurdish ethnicity is nevertheless a risk factor which, when combined with other factors, may create a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Being a risk factor it means that Kurdish ethnicity is a factor of particular significance when assessing risk. Those “other factors” will include the matters identified in paragraphs (6)-(9) below. (6) A period of residence in the KRI by a Kurdish returnee is reasonably likely to result in additional questioning by the authorities on return. However, this is a factor that will be highly fact-specific and the degree of interest that such residence will excite will depend, non-exhaustively, on matters such as the length of residence in the KRI, what the person concerned was doing there and why they left.

(7) Kurds involved in Kurdish political groups or activity are at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse by the Iranian authorities. Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.

(8) Activities that can be perceived to be political by the Iranian authorities include social welfare and charitable activities on behalf of Kurds. Indeed, involvement with any organised activity on behalf of or in support of Kurds can be perceived as political and thus involve a risk of adverse attention by the Iranian authorities with the consequent risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.

(9) Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political, such as, by way of example only, mere possession of leaflets espousing or supporting Kurdish rights, if discovered, involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Each case however, depends on its own facts and an assessment will need to be made as to the nature of the material possessed and how it would be likely to be viewed by the Iranian authorities in the context of the foregoing guidance.

(10) The Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.”

9. In light of the primary way in which Judge Ruddick found the FTT to have erred, I remind myself particularly of the extent of evaluation I am required to undertake in relation to the appellant’s sur place activities as summarised by the Upper Tribunal’s headnote in BA, further confirmed and extended to the extent of social media activity by virtue of headnote (1) in XX. I do not set out the headnotes here in the interests of brevity.

The evidence and the submissions

10. In his updating witness statement and his oral evidence, the appellant confirmed that his sur place activities continued. In the former, which he adopted, he said that by the time of the remaking hearing, he would have attended a total of 10 demonstrations in the UK in which his presence is high-profile. He wears high-visibility jackets, carries banners and chants. He maintained that much of that is recorded and then uploaded onto social media. He believes he has been spotted by the Iranian Embassy in London. He also maintained that his pro-Kurdish beliefs are genuine and he has always said as much.

11. In cross-examination, the appellant said that he attended multiple demonstrations in Iran, as many as 4-7 days a week. When it was put to him that in his asylum interview he said he only attended two demonstrations, he said he is certain he attended more than that. He elaborated on that and said that at times he went for a whole 4-5 days and also that he would attend weekly. He said the interview must be a mistake. He does not claim to have been identified at those demonstrations in Iran.

12. In response to clarification questions I asked him, the appellant said he correctly told the FTT that he has attended 4-5 demonstration in Iran and that he did not stay in Iran long enough to attend that many. He said he was otherwise referring to the number of protests taking place, not those he attended. When he was talking about attending more regularly, he was muddled up and thought Mr Lawson was asking him about how often he delivered political leaflets which he had done multiple times. Mr Lawson pointed out to the appellant in further cross-examination that he said he had only delivered leaflets five times. In submissions Mr Lawson invited me to find the appellant inconsistent about this.

13. As for his activities in the UK, the appellant said the leaders of the demonstrations handed out the high-visibility jackets and he would photograph himself there and post the photos in order to raise awareness of Kurdish treatment in Iran. As to why he only appeared to start attending demonstrations after he received his refusal letter, he said that was not correct, he attended from 2023, but he did not post his attendance as he thought he needed to avoid the authorities here. It was only later he realised he did not need to do so as his life is safe here. Mr Lawson asked the appellant why he said in his witness statement that he only started attending demonstrations in 2024 and the appellant said he must have been mistaken and he has proof of his attendance in 2023. He also set up his Facebook account in 2023 (after he claimed asylum).

14. Due to his limited education and his inability to fluently read or write in English or Kurdish Sorani, the appellant says he has help from a number of trusted friends to run his Facebook account. He did not realise it would be helpful for them to come to give evidence.

15. The appellant said he would not be able to close his Facebook account in order to avoid persecution in Iran because by now his posts have already been re-posted and shared so they are forever available online, thereby rendering deletion of his Facebook account pointless. His voice would not be persuasive enough to explain, on return, that he only posted such pictures and posts to bolster a weak asylum claim even were that true (which he denies). The authorities would not believe him in light of his profile.

16. Mr Lawson’s overarching submission was that the appellant has continued to provide inconsistent evidence about his attendance at demonstrations in Iran and in the UK and there is no good reason for that other than he is making it up. He further submitted that he has created a Facebook account to bolster a weak asylum claim so he could delete that and evade risk by explaining that to the authorities on return, if required. Mr Lawson also submitted that it is unlikely the appellant has already come to the attention of the authorities as he said in his asylum interview that he has never held a passport so there is no picture against which he could be compared.

17. Mr Malik addressed me on the factors which Judge Ruddick identified had been overlooked by the FTT. He submitted that there is evidence in the bundle of someone taking photos from inside the Iranian Embassy when the appellant was outside the Embassy and there is evidence of the appellant attending 10 demonstrations in the UK including ones in August and September 2023 showing that the appellant is right about starting to attend then as opposed to what he mistakenly said at [6] of his witness statement.

18. Mr Malik drew to my attention paragraph 3.2.6 of the Country Policy and Information Note; social media, surveillance and sur place activities, Iran, April 2025 (“the April 2025 CPIN”) as to the targeting of Iranian dissidents abroad. He reminded me that, in this context, even if the appellant was not found to have genuine political beliefs, his sur place activities are enough to put him at risk on return particularly in light of the anti-regime content which is likely to have come to the authorities’ attention and his particular role in calling for people to attend the demonstrations in the UK. However, his primary submission was that in light of the unchallenged finding that the appellant attended at least two demonstrations in Iran and then continued to do so in the UK, he has genuine political views.

19. As to the possibility of deleting his Facebook account, Mr Malik referred me to the evidence in the bundle of the appellant’s posts being viewed, shared and documented across different profiles. He submitted that, applying WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894 an appellant does not need to provide direct evidence of monitoring and the absence of such material is not fatal to an asylum claim. He drew to my attention the evidence about Iran’s ability to surveil demonstrations and its use of facial recognition technology. As to Mr Lawson’s point about the appellant’s passport, Mr Malik submitted this was never put to the appellant and we do not know if there was any other form of identification against which the appellant’s face could be matched.

Discussion and Findings of Fact

20. It is relevant to note that in rejecting Grounds 1-3 and by preserving the findings she did at [37] Judge Ruddick upheld many of the FTT’s adverse credibility findings against the appellant.

21. I found the appellant to be inconsistent about the number of demonstrations he attended in Iran and I find it difficult to accept he was muddled by Mr Lawson’s questions which were simply put and clearly referencing protests. There was nothing about the appellant’s answers, some of which contained more detail, which suggested he may have understood Mr Lawson to be talking about leafleting.

22. However, I am not persuaded that the appellant’s credibility is undermined by the appellant’s inconsistency in his evidence as to when he started to attend demonstrations in the UK. I am satisfied there was an error at [6] of the appellant’s witness statement of 20 October 2025 when he talked about doing so in 2024 when there is clear dated photographic and Facebook evidence in the bundle about him attending demonstrations from August 2023 onwards and in fact he listed those protests at [8] of his witness statement and the first of those was 3 September 2023.

23. I have regard to the fact that one of the FTT’s findings which Judge Ruddick did not find to be infected by legal error was that the appellant had attended two demonstrations in Iran. I am satisfied that the appellant has attempted to bolster his claim by exaggerating his evidence as to how many demonstrations he attended in Iran. But that exaggeration does not mean he is lying about having attended any demonstrations. In light of the previous findings, I am satisfied that the appellant attended two demonstrations in Iran but that he did not come to the attention of the authorities as a result.

24. The evidence from the appellant’s Facebook account is sufficient to satisfy me that the appellant has attended a total of eight demonstrations in the UK from the beginning of September 2023 to the end of June 2025 His attendance on those occasions is documented by photographs which have then been uploaded onto the appellant’s Facebook account. There are references to two protests in the appellant’s witness statement which are not corroborated by photographic or other evidence. One of those is 3 September 2024 and the other is on 2 November 2025 which was the day before the hearing and which the appellant advertised in a post on 16 October 2025. The appellant was not asked whether he, in fact, attended that protest. Even without it, the appellant attended at least 8 protests which I find to be a relatively significant number of demonstrations over a fairly protracted period which indicates a commitment to the cause at hand.

25. As to the role the appellant played, there was reference at the hearing to the appellant wearing high-visibility jackets. However, there are barely any (if any) photos of him doing so. The photos are generally of the appellant holding posters, banners or flags, or content which I accept as being pro-Kurdish or likely otherwise to be inflammatory to the Iranian regime. There is some material of a nature likely to be extremely provocative to the Iranian regime bearing in mind the country guidance contained within paragraph [98(7)-(10)] of HB (Kurds). The appellant has positioned himself very openly holding such material whilst outside the Iranian Embassy and then posting comments of an equally provocative nature on his Facebook account. The appellant does not claim to have been accompanied at the demonstrations by high-profile individuals from Kurdish parties.

26. There is no suggestion from those photos that the appellant occupied a leadership role. He is one of many in a crowd outside a building which I accept to be the Iranian Embassy in London. I find as fact that it is in this type of role that the appellant attended the demonstrations. His consistent carrying of inflammatory material indicates that he is more than a mere passive participant, but he has not satisfied me that he participated in a leadership or organising role

27. Although there are also photos of what appears to be people inside a building filming or taking photos, there is no reference to when those photos were taken and the appellant is not visible in the photos. The photos were posted on 21 August 2024 and 11 November 2024 although they are the same set of photos. In his witness statement, the appellant says in general terms that he has often seen such people when he has attended demonstrations although he does not refer to specific examples or cross-reference particular photographs. In the absence of that, I am not satisfied the photos on which the appellant relies relate specifically to occasions he has attended demonstrations as opposed to evidence on the more general phenomenon of this occurring.

28. As to the ability of the Iranian regime to surveil demonstrations in the UK, I remind myself of what was said at headnote (1) and (4)(ii) of BA. Mr Malik directed me to some of the background country material on this issue.

29. In between the Facebook posts which show the appellant’s participation at demonstrations, the appellant has regularly posted about forthcoming protests many of which he did not then attend (in his witness statement he attributes this to the distance of his home address in Birmingham to London). Those posts are frequently accompanied by comments about the purpose of the demonstrations and the importance of attending. Furthermore, the appellant very regularly posts or shares material highlighting atrocities carried out by the Iranian regime against members of the Kurdish population or regarding other anti-Iranian regime content and in his witness statement he said this was to try to raise awareness of the plight of Kurds and also of women in Iran.

30. I have not been directed to any particular evidence of the appellant’s presence at the demonstrations being reported elsewhere, for example on any news outlets. However, the appellant has just shy of 5000 friends of Facebook. His account is public. His posts attract in the region of 10-300 comments each with posts being liked between 25-320 times (although most between 50-250 times). The activity logs show the appellant to be a regular commentator/liker of other’s posts and to be mentioned in comments of others. I have not been able to find any evidence as to the actual sending of the appellant’s photos to third parties as opposed to the posts publishing the photos being liked or commented upon.

31. The evidence from the appellant’s Facebook download is sufficient to satisfy me that the appellant’s posts and views are more likely than not to have been published wider than his account but the level of interaction is modest as opposed to very high, although the potential for higher activity is there given the number of friends.

32. In support of his submission that the appellant’s activities were opportunistic, designed to bolster his asylum claim, Mr Lawson relied on the fact the appellant’s sur place activity did not start until after he claimed asylum. The appellant claimed asylum very soon after arriving in the UK in 2022 so that is hardly surprising. However, his first post was not until August 2023 and that was a reason the FTT found for doubting that his political activity was genuine [24].

33. One of Mr Lawson’s other submissions related to the appellant’s reliance on friends to post his material as being a reason to undermine his evidence that he is a genuine political activist or user of Facebook. Mr Lawson’s point was that the appellant is only barely able to read and write in his first language so the fact that he has posted long diatribes is more likely to be sign that such posts are opportunistic. In my judgement, it does not follow automatically that one’s illiteracy and reliance on a friend means a person is not a genuine political activist. Read another way, it may show a level of commitment to the cause to repeatedly seek out willing friends to help publish one’s views. The number and length of posts point away from them being opportunistic. The respondent did not point to any particular posts which might cast doubt on whether or not the political content was genuinely held.

34. Looking at the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that the fact the appellant attended demonstrations in Iran in relation to the Kurdish cause, the fact he has continued to do so here, together with the regularity and content of his posts and the commitment he has shown to attending demonstrations since 2023, means that there is a genuineness to his political views. I am satisfied, not only that the appellant is sympathetic to the Kurdish cause, but that his views are sufficiently strongly held so as to motivate him to participate in anti-regime activities in both Iran and the UK. Of course, in Iran the extent of his activities were far more modest, but that is not surprising given the far more dangerous environment which exists there for Kurds (or anyone potentially espousing anti-regime rhetoric). Here, once he was somewhat settled, had met people who could assist him to express his views and once reassured as to his safety, he was emboldened to participate.

Application of the law to the facts

35. In light of what is said at [98] of HB (Kurds), I am in no doubt that if the Iranian authorities had sight of the appellant’s Facebook account and the postings made thereon it would trigger their suspicion of him as a person engaging in Kurdish and anti-regime political activity as a result of which the appellant would face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 mistreatment pursuant to sub-paragraph (7) of [98] of HB (Kurds).

36. The next question is to decide upon whether the appellant’s activities have already come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. To that extent, I remind myself of what was said in BA. I return to the findings I made above as to nature and scope of the appellant’s sur place activity. This is set against the appellant’s profile as a Kurd but (applying the preserved findings) not one who had already come to the authorities’ attention prior to leaving Iran illegally. He said in his interview that he has never had a passport but, as Mr Malik pointed out, the appellant was not asked about whether or not the authorities in Iran may have his photo for some other reason. Accordingly, I exercise caution about making a finding that they have no ability to recognise him.

37. There are two potential ways the appellant may have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities: at the protests and as a result of his Facebook account and the photos and posts thereon. When considering the risk here of prior identification, I take into account what I have found about where he sits on the “social graph” (see [25]-[31] above).

38. I accept Iran has some ability to identify faces in a crowd and that it carries out some surveillance (that is not really in dispute). The country guidance in BA makes it plain that this is only likely to take place if the regime has a particular interest doing so in respect of a particular individual.

39. There is clearly a high number of demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy. That much is clear from the number of times the appellant advertised the fact of them taking place and encouraging people to attend. There will also be others at protests who present in a similar way to the appellant in terms of their conduct at the protests. That can be seen from the photos the appellant has exhibited which show others in a similar position to him. However, I take into account that the cause the appellant was advocating is one which is likely to be considered hostile to the Iranian regime and the appellant can be seen with inflammatory material. I am satisfied this presentation would have attracted the attention of the Iranian authorities if the particular protests were the subject of surveillance on the days on which he was there, and in which case there is a real risk that there are photos of his attendance.

40. In addition to his attendance at the protests, the appellant has been operating a Facebook account in the way described above.

41. I have reminded myself of what was said at [83] of XX:

“In relation to the second aspect of publicity, namely how a person might generate interest in their Facebook material, this is reflected by the number of meaningful interactions they have with people on Facebook and their interactions in the real world. At one extreme, a person who posts regularly on Facebook, but with few "friends" or followers on Facebook; or even if they have garnered many "friends", but with few "likes" in relation to their comments, and few other interactions, may have attracted little or no publicity at all. At the other extreme, a person with many friends or followers on Facebook, who has attracted many comments and much discussion, and whose activities reflect their prominence and activities in the real world, may attract great publicity. A person's publicity may also be relevant to whether there is a real risk of them being monitored by a state.”

42. At [87] of XX, the Upper Tribunal said:

“the evidence fails to show it is reasonably likely that the Iranian authorities are able to monitor, on a large scale, Facebook accounts, in the sense described by Dr Clayton, of the automated extraction of data. More focussed, ad hoc searches will necessarily be more labour-intensive and are therefore confined to individuals who are of significant adverse interest. We accept Mr Thomann's submission that the risk that an individual is targeted will be a nuanced one. Whose Facebook accounts will be targeted, before they are deleted, will depend on a person's existing profile and where they fit onto a "social graph;" and the extent to which they or their social network may have their Facebook material accessed.”

43. I have found the appellant’s Facebook posts are more likely than not to have been published wider than his account. Whilst the level of interaction with his account is modest, rather than high, it is not minimal. Comments and likes often still number into the hundreds. There is no suggestion the appellant has received any threats or encountered any problems as a result of his Facebook usage or attendance at protests thus far.

44. Taking these findings together, given the inflammatory nature of the appellant’s posts and the material he is seen to be holding at the protests, together with the traffic on his Facebook page, I am satisfied there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant’s on-line profile would have already come to the attention of the Iranian authorities and/or there is material in the possession of third parties. Accordingly, applying headnote [6] of XX, closure of his Facebook account does not assist to negate any risk there may be to him on return to Iran.

45. As to the “pinch points” referred to in AB and Others, I note headnote (4) of XX in which the Upper Tribunal said:

“A returnee from the UK to Iran who requires a laissez-passer or an emergency travel document (ETD) needs to complete an application form and submit it to the Iranian embassy in London. They are required to provide their address and telephone number, but not an email address or details of a social media account. While social media details are not asked for, the point of applying for an ETD is likely to be the first potential "pinch point, " referred to in AB and Others (internet activity - state of evidence) Iran [2015] UKUT 257 (IAC). It is not realistic to assume that internet searches will not be carried out until a person's arrival in Iran. Those applicants for ETDs provide an obvious pool of people, in respect of whom basic searches (such as open internet searches) are likely to be carried out.”

46. The appellant does not have a passport so could only be returned on a Laissez Passer or an ETD. Consequently, he is likely to be the subject on an internet search at that point. Applying what was said at [79] of XX, if the appellant’s Facebook account is still live at that point and as it is public, it is likely it will crop up on a Google search as a result of which the person searching the account would be able to view the appellant’s posts ([80] XX).

47. I have found that it is no answer for the appellant to delete his Facebook account. In any event, given that I have found the appellant to be a genuine political activist, even if I am wrong about the risk of him already coming to the attention of the Iranian authorities, I still need to consider whether he could be expected to (and whether he would in fact) delete his Facebook account.

48. Applying my findings, the way in which the appellant has expressed his political views thus far is by attending pro-Kurdish demonstrations in Iran on two occasions, in the UK on eight/nine occasions and through his posts and commentary on his Facebook account.

49. If he returns to Iran and attends such demonstrations, he is at real risk of persecution or Article 3 mistreatment. That is unlikely to be a controversial finding given the country guidance summarised at headnote [7] of HB (Kurds) and given what the respondent says at paragraph 3.2.1 and 3.2.4 of the Country Policy and Information Note: Kurds and Kurdish political groups, Iran, October 2025 (“the Kurdish CPIN”).

“3.2.1 Kurds found to be engaged in activities in Iran that are, or are perceived to be, political and against the state of Iran, which may include promoting Kurdish rights, are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm.
……..
3.2.4 Intelligence agencies and security forces operating in Kurdish regions monitor people who partake in activities deemed to oppose the Iranian government. Kurds who are members or sympathisers of Kurdish political parties, or who are engaged in, or associated with, civil and cultural activities asserting their ethnic and religious identity, may be surveilled, arrested and detained. Some are charged with broadly defined security offences which may lead to social restrictions, floggings, lengthy prison sentences, and in some cases the death penalty. “

50. At paragraph 3.1.1 of 2025 CPIN the respondent says of the general situation in Iran:

“3.1.1. Social media users whose posts are deemed critical of the state or against its high moral standards, or who comment on sensitive issues, may be subject to treatment, including harassment, arrest, ill-treatment, torture and criminal charges, that is sufficiently serious, by its nature or repetition, to amount to persecution.”

51. That guidance does not refer solely to Kurds and the guidance continues to say that a fact-specific assessment is required including reference to a person’s ethnicity and profile, the nature of their on-line activity and the size of their audience (3.1.2).

52. Accordingly, in order to mitigate the risk of persecution, it would be necessary for the appellant to close his Facebook account and refrain from expressing his political views as he has done in the past and continues to do (including by protesting). His right to express his political opinion is of course a fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention and if the only reason he supressed it was to avoid persecution, that of itself would be considered persecutory mistreatment and he would be considered a refugee (HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31 applies).

53. Whilst extensive reference was made in XX to the possibility of a person deleting their Facebook account, such a course of action was contemplated in the context of a person whose political activity was opportunistic rather than as a result of genuinely held political beliefs (see [100], [102]).

54. Accordingly, I do not find that the answer to the risk the appellant would otherwise face upon return to Iran as a result of his political activity is the closure of his Facebook account. Even if he did, I am satisfied he would only be doing so for fear of persecution because there is no reason to consider that he would want to act other than how he acted both before and after he left Iran which includes by way of protests as well as Facebook activity.

55. On this basis, whether it is because he has already come to the attention of the Iranian authorities, or on the basis that he is a genuine political activist in relation to the Kurdish cause which (in this alternative scenario) would be discovered by the Iranian authorities at the first “pinch-point” of an application for a Laissez Passer or an ETD, in accordance with the country guidance, I find the appellant to be at real risk of persecutory mistreatment on return to Iran.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 January 2026