Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001816

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51130/2023
LP/00339/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 3rd of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNETT

Between

E.P.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Moriarty, counsel for the appellant.
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 24 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. This is a protection claim and revealing his identity could potentially put him at risk.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (the judge), promulgated on 25 February 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge L Hirst on all grounds, on the basis that it was arguable the First-tier Tribunal’s (FtT) decision was speculative, failed to properly assess the availability of protection, and did not adequately engage with the appellant’s explanation for concealing his identity due to fear.
3. The grounds of appeal raised three principal issues:

(1) That the judge’s findings were speculative;
(2) That the judge failed to properly assess the availability of protection in the context of the appellant’s accepted treatment;
(3) That the judge failed to properly consider the appellant’s explanation for concealing his identity due to fear.
Background
4. The appellant is an Albanian national. He claimed protection on the basis of the abuse he had received, perpetrated by his father. The appellant stated his father had murdered his own brother and had links to the authorities.
5. The appellant was accepted to be a victim of modern slavery at the hands of his father. The respondent accepted that the appellant had been physically abused by his father.
FtT Decision
6. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The judge set out the appellant’s claims [3] to [7] and the accepted facts [8] to [9]. The judge set out the disputed issues [10]. The judge treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness [14], [25] and had regard to his young age [24]. The judge had regard to the bundle of documents submitted [20]. The judge accepted that the appellant’s father had been convicted of murder in February 2011 and had possession of weapons without permission [28], [31]. Between [32] and [39] the judge considered the appellant’s father’s influence. The judge rejected that the appellant’s father had power and influence with the police or local authorities [37], [39].
7. The judge concluded that the appellant’s father would pose a threat to the appellant in his home area. The appellant’s father had encountered him in the local area and the judge concluded this showed a desire to locate the appellant in the local area [41]. At [60] to [64] the judge considered the risk from the appellant’s father. The judge concluded that the state offered an appropriate level of protection. The judge considered internal relocation at [86] to [101]. The judge found that the appellant was an independent young person who would be able to adapt to life in a different town or city and could reasonably look for work and accommodation.
Analysis and Conclusions
8. When considering whether the judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, I have remined myself of the following principles.
9. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached. As held in South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33, reasons must:

36. [...] enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision.
10. I take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal stated:

i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
11. I also remind myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 20
12. I will first turn to consider the alleged failure to consider material matters. At [32] to [39] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision this directly addressed the issues raised in the grounds. The judge set out the appellant’s claim and that he had seen his father with police officers. The judge also considered that the appellant’s father had encountered the appellant just a few days after obtaining his passport. The judge did not state that the evidence of the appellant was rejected. Mr Moriarty pointed to the appellant’s witness statement at paragraph 11 and that the appellant specifically stated his father knew he was leaving Albania. I conclude that it does not follow that just because his father knew or was told that the appellant had obtained a passport and was leaving, means that he had any power or influence over those officials.
13. Mr Moriarty submitted that the judge had not “joined the dots” in what the appellant was asserting. I do not agree. When read as a whole the decision considered all the matters the appellant had put forward and the judge drew inferences and conclusions which were open to him.
14. In relation to the second ground, the judge considered the availability of protection in the context of the appellant’s circumstances and the country evidence. The conclusion that the appellant would be able to access sufficient protection was adequately reasoned. At [61] the judge noted that in general there is a sufficiency of protection in Albania. The question of protection should be read in the context of the decision as a whole. The judge concluded that the appellant’s father presented a threat to the appellant if in the home area [41]. This is essentially a question of whether the appellant would be of interest to his father. Having concluded there is a threat, the next logical question is whether the appellant could seek protection from that threat. If there was no threat, the appellant would not need to seek any protection. The judge concluded that the appellant could seek protection for the reasons he gave. I conclude that there is no material error of law demonstrated in the grounds.
15. The third ground of appeal regarding internal relocation is only material if there is an error of law regarding the question of sufficiency of protection. If the appellant can obtain a sufficiency of protection the appellant’s appeal fails. I have considered the third ground of appeal in any event.
16. As to the third ground, the judge addressed the appellant’s circumstances and concluded that the appellant could internally relocate [101]. This was a finding open to the judge on the evidence before him. The judge rejected that the appellant’s father had power and influence [57] repeated at [63] and [86].
17. At [88] and [89] of the decision, which were not challenged, it contains findings that the appellant’s father would not seek him and would not go to such lengths to find him. These findings are central to the risk assessment and undermine the appellant’s claim of ongoing risk. Even if there was an arguable error in relation to the sufficiency of protection ground in respect of the home area, I conclude it would not be material in light of these unchallenged findings.
18. I should note that submissions were made regarding paragraph 90, as in order to internally relocate it is argued that the appellant should not need to lie about his identity and conceal it. I conclude that the judge made an alternative finding at paragraph 90, stating that “could also take reasonable precautions by not speaking to strangers or colleagues about his family identity..”
19. The primary finding was that his father would not seek him out elsewhere and so there would be no need to hide his identity. The finding at paragraph 90 was central to the challenge to the decision of the FtT. If there is an error which is identified at [90], I conclude it is not material. I conclude that when read as a whole the judge considered the appellant’s claims carefully and adequately.
20. The judge provided a detailed and reasoned analysis of the appellant’s credibility, the plausibility of his account, and the country background evidence. The judge’s findings were open to him on the evidence and were not irrational or perverse.
21. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. The appeal is therefore dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Iain Burnett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal Burnett
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 November 25