Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001826

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63770/2023
LP/00880/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILSON

Between

J I
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hyder (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe (Senior Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 6 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Davison (the “judge”), promulgated on 7 March 2025, dismissing the appellant’s protection appeal.
2. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 18 February 2021 with valid leave to enter as a student and claimed asylum on 6 June 2021. His protection claim was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 1 December 2023. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
3. The basis of the appellant’s claim was that he had been politically active in Bangladesh as a member of the student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). He claimed to have held positions within the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal and to have drawn the adverse attention of members of the Awami League because of his political activities. The appellant relied upon a criminal case which he claimed had been brought against him for political reasons.
4. The appellant also relied upon his sur place activities in the United Kingdom. He claimed to have continued his involvement with the BNP, including through attendance at demonstrations, and relied upon his social media activity, including Facebook activity where he posted political material critical of the Awami League. He also claimed to have received threats through Facebook.
5. Following the removal of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024, the appellant maintained that he remained at risk. He claimed that individuals associated with the Awami League remained influential within the state apparatus.
6. The appeal was heard remotely in the First-tier Tribunal on 6 March 2025. In a decision promulgated on 7 March 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
Grounds of Appeal
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal on two grounds. However, each ground contains a number of overlapping themes. In summary, they assert that the judge erred in the following respects:
a. Failing to properly consider and material evidence relevant to the appellant's political profile and risk on return, including the claimed politically motivated criminal case, his social media and sur place activities, the expert evidence, and the objective evidence concerning the ability and willingness of the Bangladeshi authorities to monitor social media activity; and
b. Failing to properly consider material evidence regarding the country circumstances following the change of government in August 2024. This included evidence of the continuing influence of the Awami League within the apparatus of the state to include police, armed forces and judiciary; evidence of continuing attacks upon BNP members, and threats said to have been received by the appellant after the change of government.
Permission to Appeal
8. Permission to appeal was granted in part in a decision dated 23 April 2025. The permission to appeal provides:
2. It is not arguable that the judge materially erred in their assessment of the credibility of documents provided by the applicant. The judge had regard to the expert assessment and the reasons given for reaching a different view are not arguably irrational nor unreasonable. It is not submitted that the authenticity of the documents could have been resolved conclusively by a simple process of inquiry and therefore there was no requirement on the Secretary of State to authenticate the documents: PJ (Sri Lanka) [2014] EWCA Civ 1011; MA (Bangladesh) [2016] EWCA Civ 175.
3. I do however consider that the judge arguably materially erred in law by failing to adequately explain why the applicant’s use of social media “to try and establish a risk when in fact none exists” has failed. There is no apparent challenge to the judge’s explanation that no country information was brought to their attention that the present interim government or authorities in Bangladesh are monitoring the social media activities of those in the United Kingdom and that this monitoring would place the applicant at risk. However, the judge does acknowledge that it is possible that that if there were previously a department to monitor social media activities then it is likely this department still exists. The reasons the judge refers to at para. 31 for finding incredible the claim that monitoring of the appellant’s activities are likely to bring him to the adverse attention of those currently in power in Bangladesh are arguably inadequate or inadequately clear.
Rule 24 Response
9. The Respondent opposed the Appellant’s appeal in a Rule 24 response dated 1 May 2025. I do not rehearse the submissions contained in the Rule 24 response but refer to them where relevant to my reasoning.
The Hearing and Submissions
10. I heard oral submissions in support of the grounds from Mr Hyder and submissions from Ms Lecointe. I do not rehearse those submissions but refer to them where relevant to my reasoning.
11. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated that I would reserve my decision which I now give together with my reasons.
Discussion and Reasons for Decision
12. In oral submissions, Mr Hyder particularised the instances where the judge’s reasoning was inadequate. In summary, Mr Hyder submitted that the Judge had not properly engaged with and had given inadequate reasons for rejecting evidence. In particular, evidence of the continued involvement of the Awami league in the apparatus of the state together with evidence of the monitoring of social media. This included the country expert report and objective evidence. The Judge had not properly engaged with and had given inadequate reasons for rejecting the evidence of threats. The Judge had not properly assessed the extent of the appellant’s Facebook activity and had given inadequate reasons why the activity would not bring the appellant to the adverse attention of the authorities. The Judge's assessment of the risk arising from the appellant's sur place activity took account of the Judge's credibility findings and the appellant's motive, which were irrelevant matters for the purposes of assessing risk upon return on account of the appellant’s sur place activities. MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812, was not a country guidance case and it could be distinguished as it was a deportation case in which asylum had been claimed in response. I consider each of these elements of the appeal below.
Country Expert Report and Objective Evidence
13. In submissions, Mr Hyder contended that there was an up-to-date supplementary expert report dated 25 February 2025, and therefore produced following the change of government. Mr Hyder submitted that this represented the most up-to-date country evidence of the political situation in Bangladesh. Mr Hyder directed the Tribunal to the relevant provisions of the report, including pages 72 - 77, 79, 80, 82 of the Upper Tribunal bundle and the conclusions section at page 82.
14. Mr Hyder submitted that, broadly, these paragraphs indicated that the Awami League had appointed supporters and members to various positions within the apparatus of the state, such as the police, judiciary and government authorities. These individuals were operating to actively destabilise the BNP and were targeting members or supporters of the BNP when exercising their functions. Mr Hyder contended that the 2024 CPIN also supported that position.
15. In particular, he relied upon the conclusions at page 82 of the report, which provide as follows:
"… despite the government's fall, the Awami League's control over significant parts of the state's machinery remains intact, sustaining its influence over the wider system."
16. The grounds contend that the Bangladeshi authorities have the ability to monitor online activity. The grounds cite paragraph 10.5.5 of the Country Policy Information Note Bangladesh: Political parties and affiliation which in turn cites the USSD Report 2019. This states that preceding the election, ‘the government became increasingly active in monitoring social media sites and other electronic communications. The government formed a monitoring cell to “detect rumours” on social media’. At 10.2.26 the same CPIN notes that even ordinary citizens have been sued under the DSA for simply posting, liking or sharing a post against the government.
17. The grounds also cite evidence of attacks, threats and arrests of BNP men following the change of government. In this regard I note the content of the expert report that provides evidence of attacks from Awami league members with little to no intervention from law enforcement [11.6].
18. Taken together, the submission was that there was evidence pointing to the state conducting social media monitoring; Awami league members and supporters holding positions in the apparatus of the state and, notwithstanding the change in government, violence from Awami league supporters towards BNP members. The judge had in some instances referred to this evidence but has not given adequate reasons for rejecting it.
19. In my judgment it is clear that the judge considered the evidence, including the supplemental expert report and the country evidence that supported the appellant’s claim. At [14], the Judge accurately summarised the appellant's view of the expert report and objective country information that notwithstanding the removal of the Awami League from power, individuals within the establishment continued to pose a risk to the appellant. At [22], the Judge expressly considered the supplementary expert report and quoted its conclusion that the risk to BNP activists and members, whilst lower than during the Awami League regime, remained significant. At [26], the Judge considered extracts of the December 2024 CPIN that indicated that given the length of time the Awami League had been in power it was simply impractical to imagine that every possible connection to the party had been removed from public office.
20. However, I note that the judge also considered countervailing evidence including that contained in the December 2024 CPIN, in particular the extracts below:
‘3.1 Risk from the state
3.1.1 Leaders, members, and supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party and their auxiliary (student and youth) organisations are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state.’
[...]
‘3.2.1 Leaders, members, and supporters of political groups are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from non-state and/or rogue state actors. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.’"
21. At [26], the Judge then concludes:
"Even student leaders are unlikely to face persecution. This is not to say that there is no risk for any person going back to Bangladesh presently. The appellant’s representative went through, in some detail, those presently in power and their connections to the Awami League. The statistics regarding the police force and judiciary were also highlighted to show that there has not been a complete change of personnel. Other extracts of the CPIN were highlighted to show that given the length of time the Awami League had been in power it was simply impractical to imagine that every possible connection to the party had been removed from any form of public office. Whilst this may be correct the, albeit low burden, is on the appellant to show that he is a person who would be at risk. Again in submissions and in the skeleton argument the representative has set out in great detail recent events and how some individuals have been targeted and that there is still some political instability and issues in Bangladesh. Whilst noting all of these points it is again an appellant focused exercise. I must be satisfied to the lower standard that the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution upon return. Not that others with different factual backgrounds may have experienced some difficulties. For the reasons given I do not accept the appellant has a well-founded fear."
22. It is clear that, when the decision is considered as a whole, the Judge considered all material evidence, to include the supplementary expert report and the 2024 CPIN. Having done so, the Judge did not reject the country expert report but rather found that its evidential weight, when considered with other evidence to include the CPIN (which indicated that there was not a risk to leaders, members, and supporters of the BNP), was insufficient for the appellant to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution upon return. The judge's rationale is clear, and it cannot be said that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for his treatment of the country expert evidence and his finding that the appellant had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
Facebook Activity and Monitoring
23. Turning to monitoring of the appellant’s Facebook activity. The grant of permission provides:
“There is no apparent challenge to the judge’s explanation that no country information was brought to their attention that the present interim government or authorities in Bangladesh are monitoring the social media activities of those in the United Kingdom and that this monitoring would place the applicant at risk.”
24. I was not directed to any significant country expert evidence or objective evidence which indicates that the interim government currently monitors social media accounts of BNP members supporters or activists in the UK. Albeit, Mr Hyder relied upon the Country Policy Information Note Bangladesh: Political parties and affiliation [10.5.5 & 10.2.26] referred to above and in the grounds, which predates the change of government.
25. Mr Hyder submitted that the judge had failed to properly apply the principles in KS Burma [2013] EWCA 67 and YB Eritrea [2008] EWCA Civ 360. In particular, no positive evidence is necessarily required to demonstrate the likelihood of persecution eventuating where the regime is a repressive one that does not tolerate political dissent. In addition, WAS (Pakistan) [2023] EWCA Civ 894 provides that it would be very improbable that there would be any direct evidence of covert activity by foreign security forces in the UK.
26. However, I note that the judge did not reject the possibility of monitoring. At [31] the judge acknowledged that if there had previously been a department responsible for monitoring social media, it was likely that the department continued to exist. The judge then directed himself to the correct question which was whether such monitoring would bring the appellant to the adverse attention of those currently in power in Bangladesh.
27. In my judgment, the judge gave adequate reasons why it would not. As submitted by Ms Le Cointe, the appellant had failed to establish that his activities in Bangladesh had previously brought him to the adverse attention of the authorities. At [27], the Judge found that his profile was, at its highest, that of a person who had expressed an interest in BNP politics whilst a student. The inference being that the appellant had no existing profile which had brought him to the adverse attention of the Bangladeshi authorities by virtue of his activities in Bangladesh. The judge then considered the Facebook activity. The Judge did not reject the possibility that monitoring might continue. The judge accepted that a monitoring department may still exist. The judge accepted that Awami league members and supporters held positions in the apparatus of the state. The judge then asked the correct question, whether this appellant's Facebook activity would bring him to the adverse attention of those presently in power. It is clear that the judge’s consideration of “those currently in power” included a consideration of Awami league members and supporters in positions of power in the state apparatus. The judge concluded that the sur place activity would not bring the Appellant to the adverse attention of those presently in power due to the appellant's limited political profile and the changed political landscape. Accordingly, in my judgement, the judge gave adequate reasons for that conclusion.
28. Mr Hyder also submitted that the Judge failed to meaningfully engage with the social media evidence. In particular, its extent and reach. However, detection does not of itself establish risk. The judge asked the material question which was whether, if discovered, the material would draw the adverse attention of the authorities. As set out above the judge gave adequate reasons why it would not.
Threats
29. In the grounds of appeal and in submissions Mr Hyder contended that the judge had failed to properly engage with the threats that the Appellant had received and explain why this material evidence had been rejected. I do not agree. The judge acknowledges that the appellant claims to have faced threats since arriving in the UK [16]. The judge considers the threats made after the change in government via Facebook. The Judge found the threats to be incredible because of the appellant’s lack of political profile and propensity to use fraudulent documents. In my judgement, the judge properly engaged with the evidence and gave adequate reasons for rejecting the evidence of threats.
Credibility and Motive
30. In submissions, Mr Hyder submitted that, in assessing the risk to the appellant arising out of his sur place activities, the Judge improperly took account of adverse credibility findings and the appellant's motive for undertaking those activities. Mr Hyder relied upon BA (demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT and Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000 and submitted that motive and credibility are irrelevant to the assessment of risk and that the true test is how the appellant will be perceived upon return.
31. I accept that the objective risk arising from sur place activity cannot be rejected due to the appellant's motivation for undertaking that activity and that the true test is how the appellant will be perceived upon return.
32. However, in my judgment it is a mischaracterisation of the judge’s approach to state that the judge considered credibility and motive when assessing the risk arising out of the appellant’s sur place activities.
33. At [29] the judge states “I find this is a part of a pattern of the appellant trying to establish a risk on return when in fact none exists.” However, it is clear the judge was considering the reliability of the evidence of the threats claimed to have been received by the appellant. The judge was not assessing the objective risk to the appellant arising out of the Bangladeshi authorities’ perception of his Facebook activities. The Judge was entitled to assess the threats as a whole, in the round with other evidence, and there is no error of law in him doing so.
34. At [31], the Judge states:
“For the reasons given above, I have not found the claim to be credible and I do not find that the appellant faces a risk upon return.”
35. However, in my judgement it is clear that when the paragraph is read as a whole, the reference to credibility is in relation to the appellant’s account of events in Bangladesh. It does not infect the judge’s conclusions about the Bangladeshi authorities’ perception and treatment of the appellant’s Facebook activity. This is dealt with separately in the next sentence where the judge states “As the political landscape has changed in Bangladesh I find the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom will not have brought him to the adverse attention of those presently in power.” Further, when the judge considers the credibility of the Appellant’s account, within the context of the Appellant’s sur place activities, he does so appropriately. He assesses the credibility of the appellant’s account of events within Bangladesh as the basis for establishing the appellant’s political profile which is a relevant factor when considering whether the appellant would have come to the adverse attention of the authorities [26, 27 & 32].
MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812
36. At the hearing I asked the parties to address me on the Court of Appeal case of MU. Mr Hyder submitted that MU was not a country guidance case. The Upper Tribunal was putting forward country guidance and the appeal should be remitted so that both parties had an opportunity to consider the appeal within the context of the country guidance as and when promulgated. He also noted that MU was a deportation case in which asylum had been claimed in response.
37. I accept Mr Hyder's submission that MU is not a country guidance decision and that the assessment of risk remains fact sensitive. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal's observations concerning the effect of the change of government upon the risk faced by those who support the BNP are consistent with the approach adopted by the judge in relation to the changed political landscape. Accordingly, albeit not determinative of this appeal, MU provides support for the importance that the judge placed on the change in the political landscape.
38. It follows from all that I have said above, that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law. The appeal is dismissed.
Anonymity
39. The Anonymity Order made by the First-tier Tribunal is maintained.

Notice of Decision
40. The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of a material error of law.
41. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

G Wilson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 September 2026