Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001842

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01230/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

YC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent: The Respondent himself, not legally represented.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 1 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent (YC) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Respondent YC, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Respondent YC. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Respondent YC’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his human rights claim. This follows the earlier decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) allowing YC’s appeal on human rights grounds because this contained material errors of law. This earlier decision (‘the error of law decision’) setting aside the FtT’s decision was promulgated on 10th November 2025 and is appended to this decision as a separate annex.
2. Following a transfer order, I heard the remaking appeal on 1st May 2026.
Anonymity Order
3. I have made an Anonymity Order in favour of the Respondent YC. Whilst this was not requested by YC himself, who was in person and not legally represented, I have considered this of my own motion. I consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, there is a real risk of a disproportionate interference with the rights protected under Article 8 ECHR of YC himself, of his mother and the younger siblings (who are both minor children) of YC. Whilst YC is now an adult, I have had to address several aspects of the evidence in these proceedings in detail, which relate to safeguarding concerns and referrals that were raised and made in relation to YC and his mother’s care of him when he was a minor child. These matters would ordinarily be confidential in the Family Courts and the subject(s) of any such safeguarding concerns would not ordinarily be identified.
4. Even though YC is now an adult, I consider that the evidence raises matters of such sensitivity that any publication or reporting of the same through this decision, which identifies YC’s identity, would likely cause harm to YC, who remains vulnerable for the reasons that I have addressed in this decision. This is also the case in relation to his mother, who has experienced ill-health of her own, and to YC’s younger siblings. No safeguarding concerns have been raised before me in relation to the present care of YC’s younger siblings and I do not consider that it would be in their best interests to be privy to the details of the prior concerns held in respect of YC’s and his mother’s care of him. There is a real risk in my view that they would access this information if the Appellant is identified in this decision.
5. I have considered whether it would be sufficient not to provide any identifying details of YC’s mother and younger siblings instead of anonymizing YC himself. Similarly whether it would be sufficient to refer to the evidence more obliquely without anonymizing the Appellant. However, I have determined that the specific facts of this appeal justify the derogation that I have ordered from the principle of open justice. In particular, YC’s siblings are teenagers, and are therefore of an age where they can easily access the internet and there are real and justified concerns that identifying YC in any published decision is likely to cause at the very least emotional harm to them. They are children and remain vulnerable for that reason and for a number of reasons considered as part of this decision. It has also been necessary for me to address the evidence considered in some detail so as to explain the reasons why I have reached the conclusions that I have in the decision below.
6. As I have made the Anonymity Order after the hearing, either party is at liberty to apply, on notice to the other party, to either vary or set this Order aside.
Factual and procedural history, including issues to be determined
7. For ease of reference, I will from now on refer to the parties as they appeared below, namely to the Secretary of State as the Respondent and to YC as the Appellant.
8. As was recorded at paras 42 and 43 of the error of law decision, the focus for the remaking hearing in this Tribunal is to determine whether or not the Appellant can meet Exception 1 and/or 2, pursuant to s.117C(4) and (5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’) in full (or the extent to which he is able to do so) and, if not, whether he can meet the requirements of s.117C(6). The latter stipulates that, in the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. This provision applies to the Appellant in the alternative, namely as someone who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than four years and if he is found not to meet either Exception 1 or 2.
9. The findings of the FtT that the Appellant is a ‘medium’ offender, namely a person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 12 months but less than 4 years, was preserved. As was the finding that the Appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life, pursuant to the first limb of Exception 1 under s.117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act.
10. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s human rights claim, which was made pursuant to the making of a Deportation Order, is dated 28th May 2024.
11. There is otherwise a detailed summary of the relevant factual and procedural background in this matter set out at paras 3-6 of the error of law decision. On this basis I do not summarise this again as a copy of the error of law decision is appended to this decision.
12. It is also the case that the legal framework that applied to this appeal is that contained in s.117A-D of the 2002 Act despite the Appellant being a French national. This is because, as recorded at para 4 of the error of law decision, the relevant offending all took place after 11pm on 31st December 2020, which signifies the end of the Implementation or Transition period of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, and the Appellant no longer being entitled to the enhanced protection against deportation he would formerly have had as an EU citizen residing in the UK. This has also been re-affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Molnar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 311.
13. As part of this appeal hearing, my role is to decide whether or not, on the facts of his individual case, the Appellant meets the statutory requirements for being allowed to remain in the UK in spite of his criminal offending. He is permitted to invoke the statutory exceptions contained in s.117C(4) and (5) and I am to determine whether he has established that he meets those exceptions, which is disputed by the Respondent Secretary of State. In the alternative, the Appellant also invoked s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act.
The evidence
14. I had before me the composite bundle (‘TB’) of evidence of 460 pages, which had been prepared by the Respondent Secretary of State for the error of law hearing, together with a composite bundle from the Appellant YC (‘SB’). The latter comprised 436 pages and was filed and served in compliance with the previous directions issued by the Tribunal for the purposes of this re-making hearing. This bundle incorporates large sections of the Secretary of State’s composite bundle TB. No further documents were otherwise submitted on behalf of the Respondent Secretary of State in preparation for the re-making of this appeal.
15. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in the composite bundles.
The hearing
16. The Appellant attended the hearing and represented himself. As the Appellant was not legally represented, I took time to set out the issues to be determined and checked all of the documentation admitted into these proceedings as summarised above. Ms Simbi was missing a set of pages from the Appellant’s SB and I ensured that copies were provided to her. Ms Simbi confirmed that she did not require any extra time to go through these and both parties confirmed that they were ready and able to proceed with the hearing. The Appellant in particular also confirmed at the outset of the hearing, and throughout, that he felt able to participate in the hearing.
17. The Appellant attended with his mother, his partner and his younger brother. The Appellant confirmed that he intended to call his mother and partner as witnesses, in addition to himself and a discussion ensued concerning the Appellant’s brother, who is under 18 years old. Each of the Appellant’s relatives had prepared their own respective witness statement, which had been duly filed and served within the Appellant’ s bundle SB. After taking some time to consider, the Appellant decided not to call his brother as a witness to give oral evidence and it was agreed that the brother’s evidence would stand in writing. It was also agreed that it would be best for the Appellant’s brother to remain outside of the hearing room while the evidence was taken and oral submissions were made.
18. The Appellant, and each of his witnesses in turn, confirmed the truth and accuracy of their respective witness statements. These appear at SB [356] for the Appellant, SB [85] and [353] for the Appellant’s partner, and SB [81] and [361] for the Appellant’s mother. The Appellant’s brother’s witness statement appears at SB [359] and that of the Appellant’s younger sister is at SB [360]. I also asked the Appellant to confirm the truth and accuracy of the skeleton arguments that he had prepared for the hearing since those were prepared by the Appellant himself.
19. Each of the Appellant, his partner and his mother adopted their respective statements as their evidence-in-chief and each in turn were duly cross-examined by Ms Simbi. I asked four questions of the Appellant by way of clarification and Ms Simbi did not have any questions arising out of those nor did the Appellant seek to add anything or clarify any aspect of his responses given to me and to Ms Simbi’s cross-examination. Similarly, I asked two questions of the Appellant’s partner by way of clarification, which did not elicit any further questions from Ms Simbi. Following Ms Simbi’s cross-examination, the Appellant’s partner provided further clarification as to her previous response when asked what impact the Appellant’s deportation would have on her. Lastly, I asked one question in clarification of the Appellant’s mother, which did not elicit any further questions from Ms Simbi.
20. Following the Appellant’s and his witness’ oral evidence, I heard legal submissions from Ms Simbi and from the Appellant himself, after which I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I do not rehearse the evidence and submissions heard here, but I have taken these into account and I will refer to aspects of the evidence and submissions heard, where relevant, in my discussion below.
Legal framework - General
21. The legal framework of this appeal is that established by Parliament in sections 117A-D of the 2002 Act. Part 13 of the Immigration Rules mirrors the statute in all respects relevant to this appeal.
22. Section 117B sets out “public interest considerations applicable in all cases”, where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and as a result would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 117B provides as follows:
“117BArticle 8: public interest considerations applicable in all cases

(1) The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.
(2) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English—
(a) are less of a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.
(3) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent, because such persons—
(a) are not a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.
(4) Little weight should be given to—
(a) a private life, or
(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,
that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
(6) In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where—
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b) it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom.”
23. Section 117C sets out the “additional consideration in cases involving foreign criminals”, as follows:
“(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.”
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”
24. The above statutory provisions set out a complete code, within which I must make my decision. In doing so, I must be guided by the decisions of the senior courts, wherever relevant. I have provided a summary of these in relation to each legal issue to be determined in this appeal as I address these each in turn below.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
25. As referred to above, it is no longer disputed that, for the purposes of s.117C, the Appellant is a ‘medium offender’. That is to say someone whose sentence was over 12 months (to bring him into the foreign criminal deportation regime applying s.117D(2) of the 2002 Act) but not more than four years. The Appellant was sentenced to a number of sentences running consecutively but the longest of those did not exceed four years.
26. The sentences resulted from criminal convictions handed to the Appellant in 2023, when the Appellant was aged 18 years old, for the following offences:
(a) Robbery;
(b) Possessing a knife blade/sharp pointed article in a public place;
(c) Possessing an offensive weapon in a private place;
(d) Two counts of conspiring/supplying a controlled drug (Class A).
27. At the time of drug offences, the Appellant was aged 17 years old and in respect of the robbery, the Appellant was aged 18 years old. The Appellant pleaded guilty to each of the offences and was 18 years old when convicted of the offences listed above at para 26. At the time of the hearing before me, the Appellant is aged 21 years old.
28. Applying the statutory framework summarised above, I am to consider whether the Appellant is able to satisfy the Exceptions contained within s.117C. If he does, he is able to defeat deportation as the public interest would not require his deportation, pursuant to s.117C(3). If he is unable to do so, he can only avoid deportation if he is able to meet the test in section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act, as summarised at para 8 above.
Exception 1 – s.117C(4)
29. An applicant/appellant is required to meet all three limbs of Exception 1.
First limb – s.117(4)(a) - lawful residence for most of an applicant’s/appellant’s life
30. The FtT found that the Appellant had been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life and this is a finding that has been preserved within the error of law decision. The Appellant is a French national and through either his or his mother’s exercise of Treaty Rights in the UK when the Appellant was a minor, the Appellant’s residence is to be regarded as lawful. The Respondent did not seek to argue otherwise or to revisit this limb of Exception 1 before me.
Second limb – s.117(4)(b) - socially and culturally integrated in the UK
The parties’ submissions – social and cultural integration
31. In relation to the second limb, Ms Simbi submitted that the Appellant had not demonstrated that he was socially and culturally integrated in the UK and this was largely as a result of his offending prior to the deportation order being issued. Ms Simbi acknowledged that the Appellant had established and had maintained a family life with his immediate family and siblings but there was little evidence of positive engagement with wider society. In this respect, Ms Simbi relied on the authority of Secretary of State for the Home Department v Binbuga [2019] EWCA Civ 551, with the Respondent submitting that social and cultural integration requires positive connections with society more broadly and is not established by family relationships alone.
32. Ms Simbi also acknowledged that, since his release from custody and since the FtT hearing, the Appellant had engaged with probation services and other organisations. However, it was submitted that this engagement had taken place within a controlled environment: the Appellant remained the subject of licence conditions and these proceedings were on-going. I was urged therefore to exercise caution in assessing the extent to which that evidence demonstrated genuine integration within the wider community.
33. In response, the Appellant submitted that he accepted the seriousness of his offending and acknowledged the strong public interest that would otherwise warrant his deportation. He stated before me that that he did not seek to minimise or excuse his past behaviour. The Appellant focused on the circumstances that he said had changed materially since his release from custody. Since his release, he had fully complied with all conditions imposed upon him and there had been no police concerns, allegations, or other information or intelligence linking him to further offending or criminal activity. He explained that he had actively engaged in structured rehabilitation programmes designed to address his behaviour and his decision-making. These included programmes focused on goal-setting, developing momentum for change, and step-by-step problem-solving. The Appellant pointed to documentary evidence demonstrating his completion of those programmes and some of the certificates that he had been awarded.
34. In particular, the Appellant referred me to a peer-mentoring certificate dated 22nd April 2026 and another certificate confirming completion of a Stepwise Problem Solving programme on 10 April 2026. Ms Simbi confirmed that she did not seek to dispute these two certificates nor did she take issue with their admission into evidence.
35. The Appellant emphasised that the peer-mentoring programme involved developing communication skills and supporting others, which had helped him to better understand the perspectives and needs of other people. The Appellant submitted that the change he had undergone was not simply a matter of attending courses but through those activities, he had undertaken what he explained to be a genuine process of self-reflection. He stated that he had developed a greater understanding of his past conduct and the factors that had contributed to his offending. This included that he no longer acted impulsively and had learned to pause and consider the consequences of his actions before making decisions or before acting. He described himself as having moved away from the lifestyle that had led to his offending and said that he now followed a structured and disciplined routine.
36. The Appellant further explained that his engagement with rehabilitation programmes reflected opportunities that he had been previously offered but had not been able to participate in previously because of his bail conditions at the time. The Appellant was eager to emphasise therefore that he would have completed many of these courses earlier had he been permitted to and he had actively sought a change in his bail conditions for that same reason. This was not a late change of attitude therefore from the Appellant and the programmes he subsequently completed had built upon positive changes that he had already begun to make and provided further support for his rehabilitation and personal development.
37. Overall, the Appellant relied on his compliance, rehabilitative progress, successful completion of programmes, and evidence of personal reflection as demonstrating a genuine and sustained change in his character and behaviour since his release.
Relevant legal framework - social and cultural integration
38. I have reminded myself of the established authorities on this issue and consider in particular the following guiding principles when assessing whether or not the Appellant has demonstrated that he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK:
(a) Pursuant to CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027, I should not automatically consider that integrative links have been broken because of the offending behaviour irrespective of its nature. Criminal offending can cause integrative links either to be broken or not to have formed and whether this has happened is a fact-sensitive question;
(b) Lord Stephens giving judgment in the Supreme Court appeal of SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15 stated at [51] that “(w)hether a foreign criminal is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom in section 117C(4)(b) and paragraph 399A(b) of the Immigration Rules is to be determined in accordance with common sense.”
He also agreed in the same paragraph “with the formulation of the question at para 77 of CI (Nigeria) that a judge should simply ask whether, having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors, the individual was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the UK”.
(c) In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Binbuga [2019] EWCA Civ 551, the Court of Appeal suggested that alienation from British society is relevant when assessing social and cultural integration. This could include associating with pro-criminal peers, links with organised crime gangs, membership of a gang. However, this must also be assessed in light of all of the Appellant’s individual circumstances, pursuant to the authorities, in order to consider what weight should be attached to the factors both for and against social and cultural integration having occurred.
Findings and conclusion - social and cultural integration – Exception 1
39. Having very carefully considered all relevant circumstances, the parties’ competing evidence and submissions on this issue, I am satisfied that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK. I first consider that the Appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK prior to his offending behaviours. This is because the Appellant has been living in the UK since he was aged three years old. He speaks English fluently as a first language and he has been educated in this country (TB [393]; [409]). The Appellant’s mother and siblings all acquired ‘settled status’ under the EUSS following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and they also reside in the UK. The Appellant has been living back in his mother’s home since he was released from custody and he has maintained throughout very close relationships with his younger siblings.
40. Whilst the Appellant did not complete his secondary education, leaving school before completing any GCSEs, I do not consider that this indicates that the Appellant is not socially and culturally integrated in the UK. This is because I consider that the Appellant’s leaving secondary school is linked with the matters that I have considered below and is likely to have been as a result of the difficult experiences lived by the Appellant as a child. Reinforcing this likelihood is the evidence that the Appellant’s mother and the Appellant’s GP practice worked towards securing a referral to CAMHS (Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services) for the Appellant at various times during his childhood and teenage years (for example TB [121]; [131]; [419]). This is in addition to there being several entries in the Appellant’s medical records documenting safeguarding concerns and several referrals being made to relevant safeguarding agencies. I have addressed these in more detail further below.
41. In addition to the matters considered above, the Appellant has established a very clear network of support through his partner, whom he met while at school when both were aged approximately 14 years old. Their friendship and relationship together has endured and been maintained by the Appellant for the last six years. There are letters of support in the appeal bundles from the mother and sibling of his partner, also confirming this, as well as expressing their own independent support of the Appellant. There is nothing before me to indicate that the Appellant’s partner has a criminal history of her own and as a friend and partner of the Appellant, she stands outside therefore of the persons with whom the Appellant offended and associated with when he was 17 and 18 years old.
42. There is no doubt that the Appellant’s criminal convictions are very serious and are to be regarded as anti-social. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Binbuga stated as follows at [56]-[58]:
“56. Membership of a pro-criminal gang tells against rather than for social integration. In this context, social integration refers to the extent to which a foreign criminal has become incorporated within the lawful social structure of the UK. This includes various incidents of society such as clubs, societies, workplaces or places of study, but not association with pro-criminal peers.
57. Similarly, cultural integration refers to the acceptance and assumption by the foreign criminal of the culture of the UK, its core values, ideas, customs and social behaviour. This includes acceptance of the principle of the rule of law. Membership of a pro-criminal gang shows a lack of such acceptance. It demonstrates disdain for the rule of law and indeed undermines it.
58. Social and cultural integration in the UK connotes integration as a law-abiding citizen. That is why it is recognised that breaking the law may involve discontinuity in integration.”
43. As Leggatt LJ stated at [78] of CI (Nigeria), “(t)he phrase "socially and culturally integrated in the UK" is a composite one, used to denote the totality of human relationships and aspects of social identity which are protected by the right to respect for private life. While criminal offending may be a result or cause of a lack or breakdown of ties to family, friends and the wider community, whether it has led or contributed to a state of affairs where the offender is not socially and culturally integrated in the UK is a question of fact, which is not answered by reflecting on the description of criminal conduct as "anti-social".”
44. Overall, I do not consider that the Appellant’s criminal offending and terms of imprisonment indicate that any integrative links were broken or discontinued by the Appellant. There are two main reasons for my conclusions.
45. First, the sentencing judge remarked repeatedly that the Appellant was young at the time of the offences committed. The sentencing judge cut the starting point for the drugs sentence in half as a result of the Appellant’s youth at the time and they similarly reduced the starting point for the robbery because they stated that “(his) youth is important”.
46. The author of the December 2024 OASys assessment included immaturity as a motivation and trigger for the offences (TB [204]; [213]) and noted that the Appellant had been “identified as being at high risk of CCE (Child Criminal Exploitation) and it is clear that he was indeed manipulated.” The author also assessed that “given his childhood there is likely to be some level of trauma which requires further exploitation” (TB [215]).
47. Second, exacerbating the Appellant’s immaturity is also, as I have referred to above, the difficult childhood experiences that the Appellant has lived. This is evidenced not only in the Appellant’s own testimony as part of these proceedings and that of his mother’s but also through the records of independent agencies that held safeguarding duties towards to the Appellant. These include, as I have recorded above, the Appellant’s GP and local authority. The concerns held, as recorded in the Appellant’s medical notes, range from domestic abuse from the partner(s) of the Appellant’s mother, his mother’s own mental and physical health difficulties, and the Appellant being assessed as being at high risk of Child Criminal Exploitation (‘CCE’).
48. For instance, there is an entry in the Appellant’s GP notes documenting that in 2022 the Safeguarding Service, as part of a Multi-Agency Meeting and a Child Exploitation Daily Risk Management Meeting (‘DRMM’), the Appellant’s case was discussed and he was assessed as “high risk CCE”. Further, that the Appellant had “been groomed and exploited by a Gang (…) (with the gang’s name provided) and (was) drug running/dealing”. It was agreed at the Mult-Agency Meeting of 2022 that the Appellant remained at risk of CCE (TB [140]-[141]).
49. The entries in the Appellant’s medical also document concerns with regards to his mother’s health – both physical and mental – and the domestic abuse suffered by the family. These entries are in turn corroborated by the medical records and capacity to work assessments of the Appellant’s mother, which have been disclosed by the Appellant within these proceedings.
50. The Appellant’s mother was formally assessed approximately three years ago in relation to her capacity to work by a healthcare professional approved by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (‘the DWP assessment’). This assessment records the mother’s diagnosis of stage 3 breast cancer requiring major surgery (TB [370]), when the Appellant would have been approximately 11 years old. The assessment also records that the mother has also been diagnosed with anxiety and depression, first diagnosed at the time of her cancer diagnosis but also recording significant difficulties with her mental health postpartum after the birth of her youngest child. These difficulties required the mother to be admitted into hospital for a period of six weeks (TB [371]), when the Appellant would have been approximately 8 years old.
51. It is clearly evident from all of the information before me that the Appellant experienced many and significant difficulties as a child, within his family home but also outside of it when the Appellant became at high risk of CCE and subsequently offending in a context of organised crime. I do not consider therefore that the Appellant’s offending is an indication that the Appellant was not, or stopped being, socially and culturally integrated in the UK. I consider instead that he was impacted in parallel by major other challenges in his life when he was a young child and teenager.
52. If I am wrong on the above and the Appellant can be said to have discontinued his social and cultural integration in the UK, I am of the firm view that the Appellant’s childhood experiences are likely to have significantly contributed to any such discontinuation for the reasons that I have stated above.
53. I am also to consider whether the Appellant is presently socially and culturally integrated and so even if I am wrong on the above, I am satisfied that he has regained his social and cultural integration. This is demonstrated by the following:
(a) The Appellant has been in a relationship with his partner, a British citizen, since they were both class-mates when 14 years old, as addressed above. Their respective (and undisputed) evidence before me is that they intend to marry each other and they have started living together after the Appellant was released from custody. Their friendship and relationship has withstood the Appellant’s criminal behaviours and the Appellant’s partner, and in turn her own family, have been a source of support for the Appellant as he re-integrates his local community following his release from prison;
(b) The Appellant has maintained close relationships with his mother and siblings. Both the Appellant and his mother described how supportive the Appellant is to his younger siblings, in helping them with homework and other tasks around the home and in their own separate activities. Each of the Appellant and his mother in their respective oral evidence, and each of the Appellant’s siblings in their written evidence (SB [359]-[360]), speak of the Appellant playing a fatherly figure now at home since his release from custody and his attempts to rehabilitate himself at home and in society more widely;
(c) The Appellant has established a close relationship with his fitness and personal well-being instructor at his local leisure centre. They wrote a letter in support of the Appellant, which has been disclosed in these proceedings. The Appellant attends the leisure centre six times a week and the instructor shared information concerning the Appellant’s high level of consistency, reliability, focus, discipline and commitment towards these training sessions (SB [355]). The Appellant also spoke in his oral evidence about how these sessions have benefited the Appellant’s mental health in helping him keep busy and purposeful since his release from prison;
(d) The Appellant’s probation officer wrote on 23rd June 2025 the following relevant information, which also corroborates the above factors:
• The Appellant “demonstrates considerable insight into his former offending behaviour, including the triggers and consequences for the victims, his family and the wider community. He expresses remorse for his actions and a focus upon a more positive future for himself.”
• The probation officer attended a number of home visits at the family home and met with the Appellant’s mother and two younger siblings. She stated that “(h)is mother has offered her consistent emotional and practical support, citing her commitment to him following the breakdown of their relationship when he was a child. (The Appellant) remains in a relationship with his partner, (name deleted for anonymity purposes), with whom he has been in a relationship for a number of years. (The partner) retains regular contact with me so as to support his licence.”
• There has been no indication that the Appellant has breached any of his licence conditions, which include the prohibition of any contact with any co-accused.
• The probation officer confirms that she has not been able to make any referrals for education or employment purposes, not through any lack of willingness on the Appellant’s part but because she is prohibited from doing so as a result of the Appellant’ immigration bail conditions at the time.
(e) As a result of his bail conditions being subsequently varied, the Appellant has participated in a number of courses and programmes. His evidence in this respect and what he says he has gained from these programmes was not disputed by Ms Simbi. This further demonstrated in my view the Appellant’s ability and willingness to participate in activities that ascribe to the shared customs, traditions, practices, beliefs, values, and other local knowledge from UK society and which situate the Appellant in positive social groups also generating a sense of belonging for him and others.
54. The Respondent grounded her submissions on the Appellant’s purported lack of social and cultural integration on the Appellant’s criminal conduct. Contrary to the Respondent’s submissions, I conclude that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK. The Respondent’s position on this issue has centred on the Appellant’s criminality without taking into account the multiple and multi-faceted factors considered above, which she ought to have considered pursuant to the authorities that fell to be applied, as cited and summarised above.
Third and final limb – s.117(4)(c) - ‘very significant obstacles to integration’
The parties’ submissions – ‘very significant obstacles to integration’
55. As to this third and final limb of Exception 1, the Respondent relied on Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537 with reference in particular to [33]-[38] where the Secretary of State’s submissions in that appeal are recorded. Essentially, Ms Simbi submitted that the same, or similar, considerations apply here also. She argued that the Appellant’s integration into France would not face ‘very significant obstacles’. France is a highly developed country with social and cultural norms broadly comparable to those in the UK, and the Appellant for that reason would not be entering an unfamiliar environment.
56. Ms Simbi accepted that the Appellant had left France at a young age but his mother had returned to France during his lifetime and so had the Appellant when he was younger and when his grandmother was alive. The Appellant would therefore have some familiarity with life there and this prior knowledge and connection would assist the Appellant’s reintegration there. Whilst there might be some difficulties, or obstacles, upon return, Ms Simbi maintained that those fell short of the high threshold required to establish ‘very significant obstacles’.
57. Moreover, Ms Simbi also submitted that the rehabilitative work undertaken by the Appellant would in fact assist his reintegration. Through that rehabilitation, Ms Simbi emphasised that the Appellant was no longer in the same position than he had been when he committed the offences. His increased maturity, engagement with support services, and rehabilitative progress would equip him to adapt and establish himself in France. Accordingly, the Respondent maintained that the Appellant had not shown the existence of ‘very significant obstacles’ to integration in France.
58. The Appellant submitted that, if deported to France, he would lose the structure and stability that had supported his rehabilitation since his release. He argued that he would arrive without accommodation, without a support network, and without any experience of living independently in the UK, let alone in France. The Appellant contended that the difficulties he would face would extend beyond simply obtaining employment or supporting himself financially. He submitted that he would face very significant challenges in establishing an independent life and functioning effectively on a day-to-day basis. In those circumstances, there was a real risk that the progress he had made through rehabilitation would not be maintained and that the vulnerabilities and risks that he faced in the not-too-distant past would re-surface.
59. In response to Ms Simbi’s submissions regarding the OASys assessment and the rehabilitative work undertaken, the Appellant explained his understanding of what meaningful engagement with rehabilitation required. This entailed more than merely attending appointments with a probation officer. Whilst routine expectations might involve regular meetings of approximately 20 to 30 minutes with a probation officer, the Appellant emphasised that successful rehabilitation, for him, depended upon an individual's willingness to engage openly and participate in programmes and courses offered to them. The Appellant reiterated that his own progress was attributable to his own commitment and efforts. He had chosen to engage with the available courses and support, and the positive developments identified in his evidence were the result of that sustained engagement. He would have to start all over again if deported to France and essentially, the Appellant effectively implied that his progress was too fragile to permit this successfully.
60. Lastly, the Appellant submitted that his case was not built on how different or similar France generally is as a country compared to the UK but instead, whether he himself would be able to operate as “an insider” there, pursuant to Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at [14]. This was because of his own up-bringing, his vulnerabilities that led or significantly contributed to his offending, and the Appellant only just regaining his feet upon release from custody.
Relevant legal framework - ‘very significant obstacles to integration’
61. Many of the authorities considered above in the context of ‘social and cultural integration’ are also to be applied when assessing whether there are ‘very significant obstacles’ to integration.
62. In particular, pursuant to Kamara, the focus should be on the reasonable period of time, during which it can be said that an appellant can reintegrate. At [14], Sales LJ stated as follows:
“The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-today basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.”
63. On appeal to the Supreme Court in Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 30, the test at [14] of Kamara was approved.
64. The threshold is “self-evidently elevated (…) such that mere hardship, mere difficulty, mere hurdles and mere upheaval or inconvenience, even where multiplied, will generally be insufficient” - Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 at [9] (citing Treebhawon v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKUT 13 (IAC) at [37]).
65. There must be specific factors that “would prevent or seriously inhibit” integration - Ackom (aka Bonsu) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537 at [49] (emphasis original).
66. The analysis must be fact-sensitive. There is no exhaustive checklist of relevant factors, but Andrews LJ (with whom Nugee and Newey LJs agreed) set out helpful guidance in Ackom. Generic factors that could be significant and form part of the broad evaluative judgment of whether or not someone would encounter very significant obstacles to integration include an appellant’s “good health, the ability to work, intelligence, academic abilities, ability to adapt to the local culture, and robustness of character” (Ackom, [22]).
67. In some cases, the cumulative effect of “a lack of ties with the country of destination, no familiarity with that country, no friends or family there to help with integration, and an inability to speak the language - might well suffice in an appropriate case to demonstrate "very serious" obstacles to integration in that country, as they did on the facts of Kamara” (ibid., [45]). Such factors “are not unusual in cases of this nature. They are not inevitably determinative” and “much will depend on the country and on the nature and character of the individual concerned” – [46].
68. It had been accepted in Ackom that “each case requires careful fact-specific analysis and this must be done within the context of the particular receiving state. It is incumbent on the tribunal to make a realistic assessment of the "on the ground" practical realities. Regard must be had to the likely consequences of the obstacles to integration which have been identified. However, there is nothing to stop the tribunal from looking at the identified obstacles cumulatively. The test is an objective one and requires consideration of any reasonable step that could be taken to avoid or mitigate the obstacles identified”.
69. This was also identified in NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1379 at [25] and [26].
Findings and conclusion – ‘very significant obstacles to integration’
70. The Appellant does not have strong cultural and social ties to France. He has been living in the UK since he was three years old. His father is not French and he does not live there (nor in the UK). His mother is a French national and was born there and with his mother, the Appellant has previously visited France to spend time with his maternal grandmother. The only relative the Appellant had in France was his maternal grandmother, who passed away in 2021. The Appellant’s mother was an only child and so the Appellant does not have any aunts or uncles, nor cousins in France.
71. It is difficult to assess the Appellant’s knowledge and abilities in the French language but the Appellant himself has previously stated that he has a moderate level of French (SB [357]).
72. I therefore accept that the Appellant’s existing cultural and social links to France are limited to him speaking a moderate level of French and having familiarity with its culture and society, through his mother and through his visits there on holiday as a child. I accept, nor was it disputed, that the Appellant does not have friends or other family members who live there presently and that he has no memory of living in France. Nevertheless, limited links are not “inevitably determinative” of there being ‘very significant obstacles’ to integration and I accept that some familiarity with life in France would generally assist the Appellant to integrate. France is, in addition, a country where it can be presumed that life is “not so different” from in the UK, as considered in Ackom in the context of Germany. The same considerations in this respect apply here.
73. The Appellant, together with his mother, maintained that he would not likely have access to welfare benefits in France, despite being a French citizen. This was because he had never worked in France, or another Member State of the European Union, which would be a requirement to access unemployment benefits. The other welfare benefits available for those who have never worked are limited to those who are over the age of 25 years old, which the Appellant is not.
74. Neither party sought to adduce any background or documentary evidence to either support or contest the Appellant’s position on whether or not he would be able to access financial assistance from the French state authorities upon arriving in France. I am not therefore able to reach any conclusive findings with regards to the likelihood of the Appellant receiving state assistance in France in either the immediate or short to medium term.
75. I also consider the Appellant will need assistance in order to access basic utilities, accommodation and other basic services, which in turn would assist him to integrate in France. This is because the Appellant is a 20-year old, who has not yet supported himself, or lived, independently. The Appellant left secondary education without any GSCEs. When living alone, or without parental supervision, it has been assessed by others that he was likely groomed into criminal activity and subsequently engaged in serious criminal conduct in a context of organised crime.
76. Whilst there is force in Ms Simbi’s submission that the Appellant’s positive and renewed engagement with support organisations here in the UK, since his release from custody and detention, is a protective factor in favour of the Appellant’s abilities to integrate society in France, the question is whether the Appellant can do so within a reasonable period of time.
77. Having considered what is likely “on the ground”, I do not consider that it is likely that the Appellant will secure gainful employment in France within a period of six to 12 months. This is because of the following:
(a) the Appellant has no formal educational qualifications;
(b) he only speaks a moderate level of French;
(c) he was not educated in France nor has he ever worked there, does not have any formal work experience acquired in the UK and the Appellant does not have any contacts in France, whether personal or otherwise, to assist him to enter the labour market there;
(d) It is generally known that youth unemployment rates are high presently in the UK and this is also the case in France, where these may even be higher than in the UK.
78. I accept that the Appellant is not able to look to his mother for financial support – whilst she has been working, she is a single mother and has two younger children to support for a long time to come still. I accept her evidence that she would not be able to support what would amount to a second household in France for the Appellant, whether in the immediate or short to medium term until the Appellant is able to support himself independently.
79. I also accept that the Appellant would not be able to look to his partner either. She owns a modest income of her own and she has not been living independently either – she is currently living in the Appellant’s mother’s home and prior to that, she was living in her parents’ home. Even if both the Appellant’s mother and partner can spare some of their respective incomes to provide some financial assistance to the Appellant, this would not be sufficient to finance accommodation and subsistence for the Appellant.
80. An additional consideration that I have taken into account is the evidence before me, which indicates that the Appellant is not equipped to look after himself in a new, and largely, unfamiliar environment, where he would have no established support network.
81. I do not rehearse here the evidence that I have accepted and weighed into my assessment on the issue of UK cultural and social integration but briefly recount that the Appellant did not complete his secondary education. He thereafter displayed a number of vulnerabilities, arguably through no fault of his own as he was a child at the time, which led, or very significantly contributed to, him being groomed for criminal exploitation and which led other professionals to raise safeguarding concerns and referrals, including to the local authority’s children services and to CAMHS.
82. Whilst the Appellant has demonstrated before me, and to his probation officer as summarised at para 53(d) above, self-reflection and a great deal of insight, into both his criminal conduct and his childhood experiences and vulnerabilities, the Appellant has not yet been tested with living independently and looking after himself. As his probation officer has observed, he remains very much supported by his mother and his partner, who are both deemed to be important protective factors.
83. The OASys assessment also concluded that the Appellant had been impacted “greatly” at the time of his offending from a lack of familial support (TB [205] & [213]), which included a lack of financial support (TB [211]). The OASys December 2024 assessment records that the factors, which are likely to increase the risk of serious harm to the public are the following:
“- Not engaging with agencies there to support and monitor him including Probation/Children's Services.
- Continued association with pro criminal peers or OCG.
- Unstable mental health.
- Unstable housing/employment.
- Lack of finances.
- Loss of support network.
- Lack of motivation to address triggers for offending behaviour.
- Failure to engage with sentence plan.
- Breach of any licence conditions.”
84. On the proposed deportation to France, I also consider that the Appellant is not likely to have available to him any assistance from the type of agencies, who have supported the Appellant thus far. This is because these agencies are involved here in the UK as a result of the Appellant’s offending and current licence conditions, the time spent by the Appellant in prison and his subsequent attempts to rehabilitate on release from custody and detention. The Appellant is no longer a child, nor was he ever taken into the care of the local authority and so children’s services do not hold any safeguarding duties towards him either.
85. It is highly relevant in this case that unstable mental health, unstable housing/employment, lack of finances and loss of support network have all been deemed by the OASys assessor to be relevant in the Appellant’s case as potentially increasing the risk of serious harm posed by the Appellant to the public now and in the future (TB [244]).
86. The ‘very significant obstacles’ do not lie with the Appellant’s in/ability to make friends, or to partake in social activities or otherwise understand how life in society is conducted in France in principle. If the relevant factors were limited to these factors, I would not conclude that there were ‘very significant obstacles’ for the Appellant on any deportation to France. In any event, as the Court of Appeal considered in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Olarewaju [2018] EWCA Civ 557 at [26], ““(v)ery real culture shock” is not the same as “very significant obstacles””.
87. I am satisfied instead that the ‘very significant obstacles’ that the Appellant is likely to face on any deportation to France are in his likely inability to live independently without having had the upbringing and the tools to enable him to do this on his own presently. By living independently, I mean being able to secure employment and suitable accommodation within a reasonable period of time in light of his young age and the relevant history. By young age, I also refer to his lack of maturity and lack of education as opposed to his chronological age.
88. For this particular Appellant, I consider that the seriousness of the Appellant’s vulnerabilities and child-hood experiences are the ‘very serious obstacles’ to the Appellant’s integration in France. The Appellant was living with these vulnerabilities and experiences right up to his criminal convictions and his sentences of imprisonment. It is only through the time spent in custody and through the support that he has been able to access while in custody and since, that the Appellant has taken steps to address the traumas that he has been exposed to and has lived through.
89. As a result of his traumatic child-hood and past experiences, I am satisfied that the Appellant will not be able to operate on a day-to-day basis if deported to Fance, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private or family life. This is because he would only be able to do so by deriving the considerable amount of support that he has been receiving in the UK since his release from custody. This includes the support from his family, his partner and the outside agencies that the Appellant has been working and engaging with. He would not have access to this support network to the extent that he currently does and any less support is likely to entail re-offending and placing others, including himself, at risk of harm, as assessed by the OASys assessor.
90. Deporting the Appellant to France would entail the withdrawal of his current support network, for the reasons that I have set out above. On my findings above, there are no likely prospects of the Appellant accessing similar in France in the immediate and short-to-medium term. I am satisfied that this amounts to ‘very significant obstacles’ to his integration in France.
91. The next issue to consider is whether there are any reasonable steps that could be taken to avoid or mitigate these obstacles. I have already found that the Appellant would have no support from existing family and friends in France as there are none. No doubt he could continue to speak to his mother and siblings, as well as to his partner, by telephone/video-calls, but frequent visits would not be realistic as a result of the family’s and his partner’s modest financial circumstances. Ongoing remote contact would therefore only provide some mitigation, but this would be limited.
92. I have already found that the Appellant is not likely to be able to access support in France from the type of supporting organisations, or similar, that he has been able to work with as a result of his licence conditions and his efforts to rehabilitate. Without this and the support network that his existing relationships provide him here in the UK, as reported upon by the OASys assessor, the Appellant is likely to relapse into his previous detrimental lifestyle, associations and offending behaviours. There is therefore not likely to be any real mitigation that the Appellant would be able to access or invoke and which would be capable of diminishing, or otherwise, extinguishing the seriousness and severity of the obstacles that I have found the Appellant to likely face on any deportation to France.
93. For the reasons above, I find that there would be ‘very significant obstacles’ to the Appellant’s integration in France such that he meets the statutory exception to deportation, pursuant to s.117C(4) of the 2002 Act.
Exception 2 - s117C(5)
94. The fact that I have found the Appellant to meet the provisions contained in Exception 1 is sufficient to mean that this appeal stands to be allowed against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim. The Appellant has also raised Exception 2. As this is a ground of appeal before me and is capable of standing in the alternative, I turn to consider this next.
95. The Appellant does not have any children and so it is only the limb of Exception 2 in so far as this applies to the Appellant’s partner that the Appellant seeks to invoke.
The parties’ respective submissions – ‘unduly harsh’ on the Appellant’s partner
96. At the time of the Respondent’s decision, the Appellant’s relationship with his partner was not accepted but this was not the case before me within these proceedings. It was disputed however that the Appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on the partner.
97. Ms Simbi, on behalf of the Respondent, maintained that the Appellant could not satisfy Exception 2, whether the case was considered on a “go” scenario (where the partner relocates to France with the Appellant) or a “stay” scenario (where the partner remains in the United Kingdom). Ms Simbi accepted that the weight to be attached to the evidence of the Appellant’s partner was ultimately a matter for the Tribunal. No credibility-type challenge was advanced by the Respondent in relation to her evidence. However, Ms Simbi submitted that, even taking her evidence at its highest, the consequences of deportation would not reach the elevated threshold of being ‘unduly harsh’.
98. In relation to the “stay” scenario, in which the Appellant and his parter would live separately, Ms Simbi noted that the Appellant and his partner had already experienced periods of separation during his imprisonment and had been able to maintain their relationship notwithstanding those circumstances. It was submitted that this demonstrated a degree of resilience within the relationship and an ability to cope with separation.
99. The Respondent further argued that the country of proposed deportation was France, a neighbouring country which is readily accessible from the United Kingdom. It was submitted that there would be no significant practical barriers to the Appellant’s partner travelling to France to visit him on a regular basis and maintain their relationship through personal contact that way.
100. As regards the “go” scenario, Ms Simbi argued that it would not be unduly harsh for the Appellant’s partner to relocate to France with him. For the reasons already advanced in relation to Exception 1, France presented no exceptional circumstances which would hinder the continuation of their family life together there. Ms Simbi maintained that there was no reason why the couple could not continue their relationship in France if they chose to do so. Any relocation would take place against the background of support being available from both families and there was no evidence that family support would be not be available to them.
101. Accordingly, whether the Tribunal considered the case on the basis of separation or relocation, the Respondent submitted that the consequences for the Appellant’s partner would be difficult but would not meet the high statutory threshold of undue harshness.
102. In response, the Appellant submitted that his relationship with his partner demonstrated the depth and importance of their family life together. He explained, as his partner had also done within her own oral evidence, that earlier in the year, his partner had suffered a bereavement, having lost her grandmother. During that difficult period, the Appellant had played an active and significant role in supporting her emotionally and practically. He had been present to assist her through her grief and to provide the support that she required following her loss.
103. The Appellant argued that the impact of deportation on their relationship would go beyond the ordinary consequences of separation experienced by couples facing removal or deportation. He submitted that his partner relied upon his support, particularly during periods of emotional difficulty, and that the loss of that support would have a significant effect upon her wellbeing, so as to render this ‘unduly harsh’.
Relevant legal framework – ‘unduly harsh’ on partner
104. The need under Exception 2 for an elevated standard to be met is made clear in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22:
“41. (…) I consider that the best approach is to follow the guidance which was stated to be “authoritative” in KO (Nigeria), namely the MK self-direction:
“… ‘unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
42. This direction has been cited and applied in many tribunal decisions. It recognises that the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable” in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals involves an “elevated” threshold or standard. It further recognises that “unduly” raises that elevated standard “still higher” - ie it involves a highly elevated threshold or standard. As Underhill LJ observed at para 52, it is nevertheless not as high as that set by the “very compelling circumstances” test in section 117C(6).
43. Whilst it may be said that the self-direction involves the use of synonyms rather than the statutory language, it is apparent that the statutory language has caused real difficulties for courts and tribunals, as borne out by the fact that this is the second case before this court relating to that language within four years. In these circumstances I consider that it is appropriate for the MK self-direction to be adopted and applied, in accordance with the approval given to it in KO (Nigeria) itself.
44. Having given that self-direction, and recognised that it involves an appropriately elevated standard, it is for the tribunal to make an informed assessment of the effect of deportation on the qualifying child or partner and to make an evaluative judgment as to whether that elevated standard has been met on the facts and circumstances of the case before it.”
Findings and conclusion – ‘unduly harsh’ on partner
105. The evidence of the Appellant’s partner was not contested by the Respondent. I need to determine whether or not the circumstances that she and the Appellant relied upon, and the effect that they said the Appellant’s deportation would have on her, amount to being ‘unduly harsh’, crossing that elevated threshold. I have summarised below the circumstances referred to by the Appellant and his partner.
106. The Appellant’s partner does not speak French and is a British citizen. She does not have any French heritage and her only connection, so-to-speak, to France is through the Appellant’s mother and the Appellant’s nationality and ancestry. The partner explained that having spent all of her life in the UK, completing her education here and maintaining close relationship with her immediate and wider family members means that she would not, in her terms, realistically be able to relocate to France with the Appellant.
107. She had obtained her first job at the age of 16 years old and had steadily worked her way up since. She enjoyed her employment and this was a very important part of her life. She does not know French and would not be able to hold a basic conversation in French, which would make finding employment and supporting herself very difficult.
108. In relation to the prospect of separation, the partner described the consequences in highly emotional terms. She explained that she and the Appellant had been together for approximately seven years and had plans to marry. She stated that they were approaching a point in their lives where they hoped to build a future together, particularly as the Appellant was nearing the end of his licence conditions. She said that those plans would be disrupted if he were deported from the United Kingdom and financial constraints would prevent her from relocating independently or travelling regularly to France. Although she has secure employment, she has other financial responsibilities and could not sustain a long-distance relationship through frequent travel. She said that communicating solely by telephone would not be sufficient for them and would place significant strain on their relationship.
109. The partner also gave evidence about the impact that separation would have on her mental health. She explained that the possibility of losing the Appellant had caused her considerable distress and anxiety. Following the death of her grandmother, she had relied heavily on the Appellant's emotional support. She said that she did not know how she would cope if he were deported from the United Kingdom. She described experiencing obsessive thoughts and stated that she had begun struggling with her mental health since becoming aware of the possibility of losing him.
110. The partner further explained that, before meeting the Appellant, she had experienced depression, suicidal thoughts and an eating disorder. She described suffering bullying during her younger years and said that the Appellant was the first person who made her feel loved and valued. According to the partner, the Appellant played a central role in helping her recover from her eating disorder and to establish a healthy relationship with food. She stated that she no longer suffers the same difficulties and attributed this in large part to the Appellant’s support and their relationship together. She expressed concern that separation could lead to a deterioration in her mental health and the return of previous harmful thoughts and conduct.
111. I found the Appellant’s partner to be an impressive witness. She gave her evidence in a considered manner, not seeking to exaggerate it and it was clear to me that the witness had given considerable thought to the questions that she was asked and in turn to the answers that she gave. Whilst the partner has been working for some time and has not suffered the same child-hood experiences as those lived by the Appellant, it was also clear to me that the partner is young and is still in the process of establishing her own independent life. She has not yet lived on her own - she previously lived with her own parents and she now lives with the Appellant in her the Appellant’s mother’s home.
112. I have very carefully considered the partner’s evidence and I am satisfied that it would be unduly harsh to expect her to relocate to France with the Appellant and unduly harsh to expect her to remain in the UK without him.
113. First in relation to any relocation, I apply the same considerations to this assessment as I have done in the context of the ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ assessment for the Appellant addressed above. In that, France is a country where life is “not so different” from in the UK, and this is also a relevant premise when assessing the impact of any relocation on the Appellant’s partner.
114. Neither party addressed me on whether in fact the Appellant’s partner would be able to relocate to France, considering she is not a French national, is not yet married to the Appellant and they have not been living together for a lengthy period of time. Presuming however that she would be entitled to some form of resident status in France, the partner has no real knowledge of French, unlike the Appellant, and she has never lived there. Her only connection to France is through the Appellant.
115. A relocation to France for the Appellant’s partner would mean the loss of her employment, her established work history and her efforts thus far to establish herself independently from her own parents and the Appellant’s mother. I accept that she has treasured every aspect of these factors and she would effectively have to start ‘from scratch’. The partner is a young woman, who is eager to live independently and who has been working at least on a part-time basis since she was 16 years old. She is currently working full-time and progressing in her career is very important to her.
116. The findings that I have reached in relation to the Appellant facing very significant obstacles upon being deported to France are also relevant here. This is because, for the same reasons, the partner would not be able to look to the Appellant for support while she adapts to life in France since the Appellant would be in equal, if not more, need of support than her.
117. In the context of the partner’s evidence concerning her earlier struggles with her mental health and an eating disorder, which I accept and which the Respondent did not seek to challenge, I am satisfied that expecting the partner to relocate to France and to sever the ties that she has established through her employment, her family and her social life would be unduly harsh. On a relocation, the Appellant’s partner will not likely secure employment for a significant period of time as a result of her not speaking French. She would not be financially supported by the Appellant in the interim for the reasons that I have addressed when assessing Exception 1. Whilst the partner is likely to still be able to benefit from some support from her own parents, I do not consider that this would be sufficient to ensure that the partner is able to access suitable accommodation and other such basic services with the Appellant, also for the reasons that I have given when assessing Exception 1.
118. Similarly, I am satisfied that expecting the Appellant and his partner to live separately would also be unduly harsh. As a result of the very limited financial means available to both the Appellant and his partner, such a separation would in the medium to longer time likely result in their relationship ending. Considering how much of a protective factor this relationship has been and continued to be for each of the Appellant and his partner, I am satisfied that this crosses the elevated threshold.
119. I am satisfied, for the reasons above, that it would not be merely uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult for the Appellant’s partner to either relocate to France or to live in the UK separately from the Appellant. I have taken all of the circumstances into account and I am satisfied that the Appellant’s deportation would have the elevated effect of unduly harshness on his partner.
120. For the reasons above, I find that the Appellant’s deportation from the UK would be unduly harsh for his partner such that the Appellant also meets the statutory exception to deportation, pursuant to s.117C(5) of the 2002 Act.
Section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act
121. The fact that I have found the Appellant to meet both sets of provisions contained in Exceptions 1 and 2 is sufficient to mean that this appeal stands to be allowed against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim. However, the Appellant has also raised s.117C(6) in the alternative. Thus, if I am wrong in relation to my assessments under either, or both of the, exceptions, I now turn to consider the threshold of ‘very compelling circumstances over and above’ these exceptions.
122. As part of the assessment to be undertaken under this high threshold, the extent to which the Appellants meets Exception 1 and 2 is also a necessary step in the analysis of whether there are very compelling circumstances “over and above” those exceptions - Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987 at [42]. For this reason, I carry forward to this assessment the findings that I have reached above at paras 70-93 and 105-120.
The parties’ respective submissions - ‘very compelling circumstances over and above’
123. The Appellant argued that these factors must be viewed cumulatively. Taken together, the loss of his current support structures, the lack of a support network in France, and the challenges of independent living amounted to ‘very compelling circumstances’. It was submitted that those circumstances outweighed the substantial public interest in deportation.
124. The Respondent’s position was the opposite, namely that taking all matters cumulatively, the Appellant’s circumstances fell well short of the high threshold required to establish ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above the statutory exceptions. The public interest in deportation therefore remained decisive, and the Appellant had failed to demonstrate circumstances capable of outweighing it.
Relevant legal framework – ‘very compelling circumstances over and above’
125. Before turning to consider in detail the various competing factors in this case, I set out and remind myself of the overarching principles applicable to the ‘very compelling circumstances over and above’ assessment under s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act.
126. The threshold is undoubtedly very high. In NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662; [2017] Imm AR 1, Jackson LJ said at [33] that:
“33. Although there is no “exceptionality” requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare.”
127. When considering the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22; [2022] 1 WLR 3784, Lord Hamblen referred at [48]-[49] to other authorities with similar effect:
“48. In Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR 4203 at para 50 Sales LJ emphasised that the public interest “requires” deportation unless very compelling circumstances are established and stated that the test “provides a safety valve, with an appropriately high threshold of application, for those exceptional cases involving foreign criminals in which the private and family life considerations are so strong that it would be disproportionate and in violation of article 8 to remove them.”
49. As explained by Lord Reed in his judgment in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60; [2016] 1 WLR 4799 at para 38:
“… great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of [qualifying] offenders, but … it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words, by a very strong claim indeed, as Laws LJ put it in the SS (Nigeria) case [2014] 1 WLR 998. The countervailing considerations must be very compelling in order to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders, as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State.”
128. In cases where the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test applies, rehabilitation is in general likely to be of little or no material weight, but if there is evidence of positive rehabilitation, such evidence may have a bearing on whether deportation is necessary to protect the public.
129. I have had regard to the relevant considerations set out at [51] of the judgment of the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) and to the case of OH (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1763 at [63] where Irwin J stated that “[a]s a matter of language and logic” the very compelling circumstances test sets “a very high bar indeed”.
130. As I have referred to above, the authorities also make it clear that the considerations under Exceptions 1 and 2 in ss.117C(4) and 117C(5) of the 2002 Act can be relevant to the very compelling circumstances test. At [37] of NA (Pakistan), Jackson LJ concluded that:
“37. In relation to a serious offender, it will often be sensible first to see whether his case involves circumstances of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, both because the circumstances so described set out particularly significant factors bearing upon respect for private life (Exception 1) and respect for family life (Exception 2) and because that may provide a helpful basis on which an assessment can be made whether there are “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2” as is required under section 117C(6).”
Findings and conclusion – ‘very compelling circumstances over and above’
131. For the avoidance of any doubt, it is not in dispute that the Appellant has established a private life in the United Kingdom and that he enjoys a family life with his partner. The interference with those ties and relationships, which would be caused by the Appellant’s deportation, is plainly sufficiently serious to engage Article 8. There is no dispute as to the legitimate aim pursued and that the decision under appeal is in accordance with the law.
132. I emphasise that my approach to the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test has been cumulative in nature: I have addressed the various competing factors relied on by both parties separately simply as a matter of structure and it should not be taken as any indication that I have viewed any of these factors in isolation.
133. I have already summarised and set out above the relevant legal framework that applies to an assessment under s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act and which is compliant with that statutory framework, reflecting in turn UK’s obligations under s.6 HRA 1998.
134. I confirm again that I have considered very carefully the relevant authorities and the evidence relied upon by each party within these proceedings, when conducting my assessment and reaching my conclusions below. I have set out my assessment using the balance sheet approach, being careful not to ‘double-count’ relevant factors.
The factors relied on by the Respondent in favour of her decision and the interference with the Appellant’s rights
The public interest
135. The Appellant’s deportation is in the public interest and the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal. That interest has the weight of primary legislation behind it through s.117C(1) and (2) of the 2002 Act.
136. Although the constituent elements of the public interest are not spelt out in s.117C, they remain as described in the authorities pre- and post-dating the introduction of Part 5A of the 2002 Act. These are: protection of the public; deterrence; and society’s concern as to the ability of the authorities to deport foreign criminals: see, for example, OH (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 694; [2009] INLR 109 and, in a more recent judgment reviewing the relevant authorities, Zulfiqar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 492; [2022] 1 WLR 3339, Underhill LJ at [38]-[44]. All three elements are relevant here.
The seriousness of the offence
137. The seriousness of the offence is a matter which I am required to take into account by virtue of s.117C(2) of the 2002 Act. In so doing, I have borne in mind the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq), at [60]-[71].
138. The Appellant has several criminal convictions, all handed down as part of the same trial and which concerned drugs offences and a robbery. The sentencing judge reiterated the Appellant’s young age and what could be described as a more subordinate or low-ranking role held by the Appellant as a ‘runner’ when committing the drugs offences. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge noted that the role played was “still within category 3, significant role (…) but lower down on the range because of that”. The sentencing judge also noted that the Appellant had been “pretty busy”.
139. In relation to the robbery, the sentencing judge stated that it was “a bad robbery”, that involved the offensive weapon for which the Appellant was also convicted and “a terrifying experience for the victim”. The sentencing judge also reiterated in relation to this offence when addressing the Appellant that “you are still only 18. You are young”.
140. The seriousness of the offences in the present case clearly underpins the three elements of the public interest in deporting the Appellant, which I have referred to above. In particular, Ms Simbi submitted that significant weight must be attached to the public interest in deportation. The public interest was particularly strong in this case, both to maintain public confidence in the immigration and deportation system and to serve the objective of deterrence. I attach, as I must, great weight to the public interest.
141. The public interest does also have to be assessed in the context of the Appellant having been assessed at “high risk” of CEE, of having been groomed and manipulated, all when a child, and which either led to or contributed to his criminal offending.
The factors relied on by the Appellant in favour of there being very compelling circumstances over and above
142. I now turn to address the factors relied on by the Appellant. The factors that I have taken into account include the findings that I have reached in the Appellant’s favour under Exceptions 1 and 2.
The Appellant’s family life established in the UK
143. Pursuant to my findings in relation to Exception 2, the Appellant has an established family life with his partner. The support that she is able to provide to the Appellant, and which is said to directly support him in his rehabilitation, is a protective factor and one that I attached significant weight to. In particular, I consider the Appellant’s relationship with his partner to be co-dependent and the likely pernicious impact on both the Appellant and the partner of the Appellant’s deportation is a particularly significant and strong factor in favour of the Appellant.
144. Since the Appellant has been living in the UK lawfully, there is no question of needing to apply ‘little weight’ to the family life established by the Appellant, pursuant to s.117B(4) of the 2002 Act.
The Appellant’s private life established in the UK
145. There are two main aspects to the Appellant’s private life that bear relevance to the assessment of whether or not there are ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above the two other statutory exceptions. The first relates to the Appellant’s own experiences as a child and how this has impacted him during his childhood until now. It is a relevant consideration that I have addressed elsewhere in this decision but consider this in a bit more detail here.
146. The safeguarding concerns and referrals recorded in the Appellant’s medical notes are also replicated to an extent in the Appellant’s OASys assessments. The author of the Appellant’s OASys assessment in December 2024 noted that in 2021 there were two periods during which the Appellant was subject to a Child in Need Plan “due to an absent parent”. The author states at TB [213] that “(a)t the time of the offences he was vulnerable and that it is highly likely he was groomed into such activity as a youth.” Further in relation to pre-sentencing report matters, the author opined as follows (italics added):
“From speaking with (the Appellant) and reading the information held by partner agencies, it seems that he experienced some neglect during his younger years. He was left for periods of time with no parental figure or guardian and as a young, immature teen, took the wrong path which has ultimately led him to where he is. Whilst I do not assess that this is the sole reason for his offending, it is likely to have contributed greatly as he would have not needed to “fend for himself” (a term used by the Appellant himself).
Police also identified that he was at a high risk of Child Criminal Exploitation (CCE).”
147. The OASys assessor similarly observed at TB [215] that the Appellant “had been identified as being at high risk of CCE and it is clear that he was indeed manipulated. Police identify him as a runner within the context of organised crime. It should be noted that he is currently 18 and therefore vulnerable to other more prolific peers and given his childhood there is likely to be some level of trauma which requires further exploration.” The author concluded at TB [220] that “lack of parents’ guidance and support growing [sic] and possible poor attachments in relationship linked to abandonment are significant during development.”
148. From the above and the other relevant entries in the Appellant’s medical records that I have considered in more detail elsewhere in my decision, it is clear that a significant contributor to the Appellant’s offending lies in his childhood experiences. These range from his up-bringing as a result of being exposed to domestic violence at a young age, his mother’s ill-health also when he was a young age, and her - at times - absent parenting. The Appellant has been assessed multiple times as being at high risk of Child Criminal Exploitation and of having been manipulated and groomed for exploitation purposes.
149. It has been established in the best interest of children jurisprudence that “a child is not to be held responsible for the moral failures of either of his parents” – ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 at [35] citing EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 64, [2009] 1 AC 1198, para 49; and at [44]. Clearly, the Appellant has been held responsible for his actions through his criminal convictions. There lies evidence before me however that what led to his offending is complex and nuanced. To use the terms used by the OASys author, whilst the author does not assess these as the “sole reason”, the Appellant’s childhood experiences and being “at a high risk of Child Criminal Exploitation (CCE)” are “likely to have contributed greatly” to his offending. The sentencing judge remarked that the Appellant was 17 years old at the time of the drugs offences and then 18 at the time of the robbery.
150. The second element of the Appellant’s private life is that relating to the Appellant’s life with his other family members. As I have considered further below, this is also informed by the Appellant’s own private life and development addressed above. I have little evidence before to demonstrate the extent, if any, of any dependence held by the Appellant’s younger siblings on the Appellant, which leads me to assess these relationships as part of the Appellant’s private life.
151. I have no doubt that the Appellant, his mother and his younger siblings maintain very close relationships with each other. The Appellant’s siblings are very much still in their minority and all of the witnesses giving oral evidence before me, including the Appellant, speak of the support that the Appellant has been able to provide them with, since his release from custody. This evidence was not disputed and Ms Simbi merely asked me to find that the levels of support provided did amount to significant dependence sufficient to amount to ‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.
152. I agree with Ms Simbi on this point and so I prefer to categorise the relationships that the Appellant has with his siblings, and which appear to have become stronger since his release from custody, as part of the Appellant’s ‘private life’ under Article 8 ECHR. It is also the case that the Appellant’s siblings continue to live with their mother in the UK and there is no evidence before me to suggest that her care of them is lacking.
153. Having considered all of the information that is available to me concerning the Appellant’s upbringing and his relationships with his siblings, I am satisfied that deporting the Appellant from the UK would have a very detrimental effect on his younger siblings. It is clear from the Appellant’s medical records that he and his siblings have experienced much upheaval in their young lives. I also accept that the Appellant has started to provide a more stable and guiding role to his younger siblings, not dissimilar to that of a father-figure. It also appears to be the case that the Appellant’s mother’s life, and parenting of her children, has stabilised.
154. The view that I have reached above is all the more reinforced by the information that is available to me concerning the Appellant’s mother. In the context of the DWP assessment for the mother’s capacity to work, the medical professional concluded that the mother’s “condition history” indicated that there would be substantial mental or physical risk if the Appellant's mother were found capable of work. The professional further recorded that the mother had ongoing non-specific suicidal thoughts three to four times a week and that her GP was unaware of this (TB [384]). As a result of this, the professional also concluded that the mother was likely to be at risk of deterioration to her mental health if found fit for work (TB [386]).
155. Whilst I have no updated medical evidence as to the mother’s health at the time of the hearing, the totality of the evidence before me indicates significant difficulties experienced by the mother over a significant period of time. The first diagnosis of depression and anxiety was in 2016 around the time of her stage 3 cancer diagnosis. She was also admitted into hospital for a period of six weeks as a result of poor mental health postpartum after the birth of her youngest child. Together with the safeguarding concerns and referrals recorded in the Appellant’s own records, the support that the Appellant is able to provide his mother and his younger siblings now that he is older and has started to rehabilitate himself carries in my view significant weight in favour of the Appellant and his family members.
156. Similarly, whilst I consider that the mother’s health and her abilities to parent her children have stabilised in recent times, in light of the considerable history of difficulties having been experienced in the past, I consider that any such stability would be short-lived should the Appellant’s family experience the very significant upheaval that his deportation would entail. This too is a weighty consideration in favour of the Appellant and his family members.
Other matters
157. For the sake of completeness and the avoidance of any doubt, I briefly address other matters which are relevant to my task of deciding whether, in the alternative, there are “very compelling circumstances over and above” the statutory exceptions in the Appellant’s case.
158. I have had regard to the fact that the Appellant speaks English and there was no suggestion that the Appellant presently has recourse to public funds. I also accept that the Appellant intends to work and support himself once/if he is permitted to do so. Both of these factors under s.117B(2) and (3) are of neutral effect pursuant to well-established precedent authority.
159. Section 117B(4) and (5) do not apply with the Appellant being a French national and the Directive 2004/38/EC and the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016 (as amended) applying to the Appellant’s residence in the UK prior to 31st December 2020. This means that I do not consider that the Appellant’s leave was ‘precarious’ within the meaning of those sections and accompanying guidance.

Conclusion
160. The assessment of whether ‘very compelling circumstances exist’ is a highly fact-specific, cumulative exercise, involving an evaluative judgment within the applicable legal framework.
161. In my view, the Appellant’s above-referred to experiences when a minor, are in themselves capable of amounting to “very compelling circumstances” over and above the other statutory exceptions. In my view, they certainly amount to such when considered cumulatively with the other factors that I have considered above relating to the Appellant’s relationship with his partner and with his younger siblings in particular.
162. This is also particularly the case when the Appellant has been assessed positively by his probation officer, as noted above at para 53. I am acutely aware that not much time has passed since the Appellant’s convictions and him re-entering society, following his release from custody and immigration detention. However, as noted by his probation officer, all of the indicators as to the Appellant’s insight, remorse and self-reflection are positive and demonstrative of the Appellant starting to rehabilitate himself and to take responsibility. These indicators have also, so far, been translated into positive and consistent engagement with supporting agencies, which is likely to ensure that the Appellant’s improvements thus far are sustained and further strengthened.
163. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not factor in as a significant or determinative factor any rehabilitative work undertaken by the Appellant thus far. I consider instead that the work he has done thus far and the progress that the Appellant has thus far demonstrated indicates that a great deal of learning and maturity has been acquired by the Appellant in a relatively short period of time. This has also been possible thanks to the Appellant being able to access the support and guidance that he should have been able to benefit from as a child but which was not available to him for the reasons considered in this decision.
164. The ‘very compelling circumstances’ threshold is undoubtedly stringent and I have at the forefront of my mind the public interest considerations which apply. Taking cumulatively the above-considered factors in favour of the Appellant remaining in the UK, together with my findings reached in respect of the Appellant meeting the two statutory exceptions, I am satisfied that the particular circumstances of this Appellant and his family members, together with the particular aspects of the Appellant’s upbringing and his vulnerabilities, demonstrate that this threshold is also met.
165. With all of the above in mind, I reach the overall conclusion that the Appellant is able to demonstrate that there are very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory exceptions in his case and which outweigh the public interest in his deportation. This is in the alternative to my findings that he otherwise meets the provisions contained in s.117C(3)-(5), each amounting to an exception to his deportation.
166. It follows from this that the Appellant’s deportation from the United Kingdom pursuant to the Respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim is a disproportionate and, in turn, unlawful interference under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
167. Lastly, as has been considered within this decision, I have noted the evidence that the Appellant has been previously assessed as being at high risk of child criminal exploitation. It is not clear to me whether a referral to the National Referral Mechanism has been made previously and, if none have been made to date, this may be something that both, or either party, wishes to consider further.
Notice of Decision
168. The decision of the FtT dated 5th March 2025 did involve the making of material errors of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the earlier decision of Judge Rastogi dated 10th November 2025.
169. I remake the decision by allowing YC’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 28th May 2024 on Article 8 human rights grounds.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

03.08.2026