Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001848

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/52644/2024
LH/07028/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

JAVED MUNNABHAI KURESHI
Appellant
And

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. P. Turner, Counsel instructed by Lee Valley Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. N. Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Tuesday 24 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cowx (“the Decision”) promulgated on 11 March 2025 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 6 March 2024 refusing his human rights claim.
2. The Appellant is a national of India. He entered the UK on 16 October 2010 with entry clearance conferring leave to enter as a Tier 4 (General) student migrant valid until 21 January 2013. On 8 April 2021 the Appellant married his wife (“RK”), who is a British citizen. On 18 January 2024 the Appellant made a human rights claim based on his family life with RK. She suffers from multiple health conditions, including a mental health condition, and is a vulnerable adult. There is no dispute the Appellant and RK are in a genuine and subsisting relationship, but the Appellant is unable to succeed in his application to remain with RK pursuant to Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”) due to his immigration status (as an overstayer). The Appellant can only satisfy the Rules if he meets paragraph EX.1(b) of the Rules. This requires him to show that there are insurmountable obstacles to family life with RK continuing in India.
3. Essentially, the Appellant claims that he cannot continue his family life with RK in India because their respective families do not agree to their marriage, and the consequences of doing so will lead to a deterioration of RK’s mental health.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. Both parties were represented before the Judge. The Appellant’s counsel (not Mr Turner) conceded the Appellant could not meet the substantive requirements of the Rules. Accordingly, as the Judge noted at [5], he was required to resolve two issues:
“a. Are there insurmountable obstacles to the appellant and sponsor [RK] continuing family life outside the UK?
b. Whether the removal from the United Kingdom would breach appellant’s rights under Article 8 of ECHR (sic)”.
5. The Judge heard evidence from the Appellant and RK and had before him, amongst other things, RK’s medical records and expert evidence including a medico-legal report from a Consultant Psychiatrist, Dr Sachdeva-Mohan, and a GP letter from Dr Balogun dated 13 June 2024. It was the Appellant’s case that RK would not be able to care for herself without the Appellant and that “…her already fragile state of mental health [would] decline further and increase the risk of suicide” (at [13]).
6. The Judge found the evidence of the Appellant and RK “…in certain respects…to be incredible…and RK’s poor health, to be exaggerated in order to bolster [the Appellant’s] claim” (at [25]). Ultimately the Judge concluded there were no insurmountable obstacles to the Appellant’s family life continuing in India, and that, the removal of the Appellant would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences either for him or RK. We shall return to discuss the Judge’s decision in further detail below.
Grounds of Appeal
7. The grounds of appeal plead expressly two grounds from §§5-13, however, §§2-4 clearly raise an additional ground of appeal. The grounds contend:

i. §§2-4: The Judge’s finding at [15] was against the weight of the evidence;
ii. Ground 1: The Judge erred in failing to have regard to or giving inadequate reasons for rejecting the expert evidence (§§5-10); and
iii. Ground 2: The Judge erred in failing to give any or adequate weight to the GP letter dated 13 June 2024.
8. Permission to appeal was ‘partially’ granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence on 23 April 2025. Whilst Judge Lawrence did not expressly deal with the grounds as delineated, it is appreciably clear that he recognised the grounds went beyond those cited in Ground 1 and Ground 2. Judge Lawrence concluded that it was not arguable the Judge materially erred in law in finding that RK’s medical records contained “quite a limited number of references” to her accepted mental health problems. We are satisfied this is in reference to §§2-4 of the grounds, and that the partial grant of permission therefore, is in respect of Ground 1 and Ground 2. We proceed to consider the grounds on that basis.
The hearing before us
9. We had before us a composite bundle which included the documents relevant to the appeal, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. We also had the Appellant’s skeleton argument and Respondent’s review which were before the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant made an application under rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to adduce an updated assessment from RK’s Clinical Psychologist. We indicated to Mr Turner that this evidence was not relevant to our assessment of whether the Judge erred in law. Mr Wain confirmed the Respondent had not filed a Rule 24 reply, but the appeal was nonetheless opposed.
10. Having heard submissions from Mr Turner and Mr Wain, we indicated that we would reserve our decision and provide that in writing which we now turn to do.
Discussion
11. The matter comes before us to determine whether the Decision contains an error of law. If we conclude that it does, we must then consider whether to set aside the Decision. If we set aside the Decision, we must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
12. We have considered the Decision, the composite bundle, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing before coming to a decision in this appeal.
13. We begin by reminding ourselves of the following principles. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find the tribunal misdirected itself simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. We are again reminded of these principles in many subsequent authorities including Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50-51], and Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46-47].
14. Having applied the above principles and after careful consideration of the representatives’ submissions we find the Decision is vitiated by material errors of law for the following reasons.
15. Mr Turner described the Judge’s consideration of the evidence as a ‘jumble’. We do not go that far, but we acknowledge that the decision is unstructured. The Judge’s consideration of whether there were insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in India and the question of proportionality are elided. Nothing turns on this, but we mention it here to explain why our references to the Judge’s findings are not always sequential.
16. It is appreciably clear that RK’s physical and mental health was central to the Appellant’s case on each of the principal controversial issues before the Judge. Neither the diagnosis of Dr Sachdeva-Mohan that RK had symptoms of “Mixed Anxiety and Depression of Moderate Intensity’, nor the evidence from Dr Balogun that RK had various physical non-life-threatening conditions were in dispute (at [14]-[16]). The Judge addressed this evidence in the following terms:
“13. RK’s health issues form the primary basis of JK’s argument against removal. In essence, it was argued that she will not be able to physically look after herself without JK and her already fragile state of mental health will decline further and increase the risk of suicide. In her witness statement RK state’s that she suffers from post-traumatic stress, anxiety and depression. A letter from her GP, Dr Balogun, dated 13 June 2024 includes reference to RK being physically abused by her former husband during their marriage, and this experience caused her “a lot of psychological harm, with symptoms of posttraumatic stress, and anxiety and depression.” It is not explained on what basis Dr Balogun included his reference to “posttraumatic stress” ie. who carried out such an assessment and whether a formal diagnosis was made. Dr Balogun does not refer to it as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and Dr Sachdeva-Mohan, who I consider to be an expert in such matters, made no reference at all to PTSD.
14. What Dr Sachdeva-Mohan diagnoses is “Mixed Anxiety and Depression of Moderate Intensity”. Dr Sachdeva-Mohan refers to a number of different stressors behind RK’s symptoms. These are JK’s precarious immigration status, the disapproval of JK’s parents to their marriage, and the fact she cannot conceive. At the start of his report Dr Sachdeva-Mohan makes it clear that this history came almost entirely from RK herself.”
17. The operative reasoning that led the Judge to conclude that the Appellant and RK could continue their family life together in India or, alternatively, that they could maintain a long-distance relationship ([39] & [41]) seems to us to be as follows:
“36. … RK has a number of physical health conditions, but based on the evidence presented to me, I am not satisfied that any of those conditions are particularly serious. She controls her diabetes with daily tablets, and I heard nothing about the other conditions having a significant impact on her day-to-day life. I find that JK exaggerated when he spoke of the level of care he provides to RK. His account of helping her to and from the toilet and in and out of the shower is not consistent with a woman holding down a full-time packaging job.
37. If RK was as unwell as she and JK claim, both mentally and physically, then she would have a lengthy sickness-absence record with the company she has been employed by for 12 years. But she does not have such a sickness-absence record and I find she is not as unwell as claimed.
38. I am satisfied that RK can receive the care she needs for all of her health conditions in India. Her trips back to India for a fertility examination and treatment for her arthritis and fibromyalgia are not consistent with her narrative that she has turned her back on her country of origin or the argument that she is fearful of being seen as an outsider who cannot reintegrate. It is also inconsistent with the argument that she cannot receive appropriate health care in India…
…
39. It is argued that RK and JK are estranged from their families who are against their relationship because she is divorced. I have found a willingness by both RK and JK to exaggerate, and in JK’s case to be untruthful. I find it more likely than not that this part of their narrative is an untrue addition designed to create a false obstacle to return. But even if I am wrong and they have no family support in India, that does not amount to an insurmountable obstacle, nor would it result in unjustifiably harsh consequences...
…
41. Alternatively, RK has the option of remaining in the UK and maintaining a long-distance relationship with JK. I accept that he provides her with valuable support in regard to her mental health issues and it would be preferable for them to remain together, in which case they can both return to India. RK herself blames uncertainty over JK’s immigration case as being the major factor in upsetting her mental health, in which case one would expect some improvement once his case is finally determined.”
18. Ground 1 challenges the Judge’s consideration (or lack thereof), of Dr Sachdeva-Mohan’s evidence, that RK’s mental health was likely to deteriorate in the event of either a separation from the Appellant or upon RK’s relocation with the Appellant to India. The grounds cite various references from Dr Sachdeva-Mohan’s report and Mr Wain drew our attention to other references particularly in relation to the Judge’s finding that RK could receive healthcare in India. It is not necessary to recite those references here, we have considered them.
19. We observe that Dr Sachdeva-Mohan opined that in either scenario, RK’s mental health would deteriorate to the extent that she would struggle to manage her physical and mental health, and the impact on separation specifically would be a ‘…high incidence of neglect and death possibly by suicide…’ (paragraph 20.7).
20. We further observe that whilst the Judge rejected the evidence of the families disapproval of the marriage and found the Appellant had been untruthful in his evidence (mostly concerning his evidence of claimed studies in the UK), the Judge nonetheless accepted that RK had problems with her mental health (at[15]), and further accepted the Appellant provided RK with ‘…valuable support in regard to her mental health issues…’ (at [41]).
21. We agree with Mr Turner that these accepted facts together with the accepted expertise of Dr Sachdeva-Mohan and her unchallenged opinions ought to have been intrinsic to the Judge’s overall assessment of the issues either within or outside of the Rules. We accept Mr Wain’s submission that the Judge did factor into his assessment RK’s mental health diagnosis and the support provided to her by the Appellant at [41], however, other than a cursory overview of the medical evidence at [13] and [14] of the Decision, we can discern no proper evaluation being undertaken by the Judge of Dr Sachdeva-Mohan’s opinion about the likely impact on RK’s mental health on either separation or on relocation to India.
22. We take into account Mr Wain’s valiant attempt to persuade us that the Judge had the expert evidence in mind in his reference to RK’s mental health at [37], and at [38], to RK being able to receive care ‘…for all of her health conditions in India’, but we agree with Mr Turner that, first, this is not demonstrative of a proper consideration of the expert evidence and, second, it is plain that when the Judge’s reasoning at [36] to [38] are read holistically, that his focus was upon RK’s physical health conditions and the available healthcare in India in respect of them, rather than a consideration of the expert evidence vis-à-vis RK’s mental health. Further still, we agree as asserted in the grounds, that the Judge’s findings at [37] that RK was not, ‘…mentally and physically… as unwell as claimed’ is not adequately reasoned in light of the accepted facts we referred to earlier and indeed the expert evidence.
23. In reaching these conclusions we have been mindful of the guidance given in MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49 that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account, and in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC) that ‘it is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case…’. However, in our view it was incumbent on the Judge to grapple with relevant expert evidence and give adequate reasons for either accepting or rejecting that evidence. We find the Judge did not discharge that duty.
24. For these reasons, we find Ground 1 is made out.
25. Turning to Ground 2, this ground asserts the Judge erred by failing to consider or give adequate consideration to the full contents of Dr Balogun’s letter. We agree with Mr Wain that the Judge gave some consideration to this evidence, but we do not accept it was adequate. The focus of the Judge’s consideration of Dr Balogun’s letter at [13] is confined to the reference to RK experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress and nothing more. We were taken to Dr Balogun’s letter and note the context in which Dr Balogun referred to RK’s symptoms, namely, her history of physical and verbal domestic abuse which was not in dispute. We note, thereafter, that Dr Balogun refers to RK’s presenting mental health symptoms, a recent psychological referral and the care provided by the Appellant. Dr Balogun then referred to RK’s physical health conditions and said this:
‘She also had generalised aches and pains, and symptoms of Osteoarthritis. Early this year she was diagnosed with Fibromyalgia. This is a chronic debilitating condition associated with aches and pains. She needs to take analgesic every day. She has been working despite her medical condition because her husband is not legally allowed to work by the Home Office. Despite her chronic pain and diabetes, she has not been able to stay off work as she is the bread winner of the family.”
26. Similar to our conclusion in respect of Ground 1, we accept that it is apparent from the Decision that the Judge failed to engage with the full contents of Dr Balogun’s letter. As we have noted the Judge’s consideration of that letter was limited to the comment made by Dr Balogun of RK’s mental health symptoms at [13]. There is no engagement by the Judge, and nor can it be reasonably inferred from the Decision as a whole, that the Judge factored into his assessment the full extent of Dr Balogun’s evidence. The Judge was plainly of the view that RK had exaggerated the extent of her poor health and made an adverse assessment of credibility at [25], [36] to [37]. The passage we have highlighted above was relevant to the Judge’s assessment of RK’s evidence that she continued to work despite her physical ailments. We are satisfied that the Decision fails to demonstrate that the Judge properly engaged with relevant evidence or adequately reason why that evidence fell to be rejected in his assessment of credibility.
27. For these reasons we find Ground 2 is made out.
Conclusion
28. Overall, we conclude that whilst the Judge stated that he had considered all the evidence on both sides, we are satisfied that in reaching his conclusions there is a missing ingredient namely a failure to factor into the assessment relevant medical evidence, and consequentially we find the reasoning is insufficient to support the findings. We have concluded that the errors are material to the Judge’s assessment of credibility and ultimately the proportionality assessment.
29. Whilst the fact that the Appellant may well not have satisfied the requirements of Appendix FM is a matter to which great weight could be attached, it is not necessarily decisive. Proper consideration needs to be given to the weight to be attached to each factor. All the evidence needs to be considered before reaching a conclusion on the issue of proportionality. We are not persuaded that the judge went through this process and accordingly he fell into error and the Decision cannot be allowed to stand.
30. Applying the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), given that we are satisfied the adverse credibility findings cannot stand in light of the established errors, we conclude that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.
Notice of Decision
31. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of errors of law and is set aside.
32. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by another Judge with no findings of fact preserved.

R.Bagral
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24 July 2025