Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001851
PA/65761/2023
LP/04815/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29th of September 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
DS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr A Malik, Counsel, instructed by Longfellow Solicitors
For the respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

ERROR OF LAW DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of India, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bonavero (the judge), dated 19 March 2025. By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. Those claims were based on the following: whilst in India the appellant had been a supporter of the Khalistan movement; he had been arrested and detained for a couple of hours in 2014 and released without charge; he had undertaken some activities in United Kingdom; and as a result of the foregoing would be at risk on return. The respondent accepted that the appellant had been arrested and detained briefly, but did not accept any other aspect of the claim.

The judge’s decision
2. The judge confirmed that he had considered the evidence in the round: [7]. At [8], he recorded that the appellant had left India when he was only 16 years old, that he had never been a member of any political party, had attended a small number of demonstrations, had been briefly detained at one and then released without charge, and that in all the circumstances there was no reason why the Indian authorities would now hold an adverse interest in him.

3. The judge acknowledged country evidence indicating that some Sikh leaders had been ill-treated by the authorities, but the evidence did not suggest that someone with the appellant profile faced a risk on return: [9]. The appellant’s interest in Sikh separatist politics in the United Kingdom was very limited and, on his own evidence, the appellant had only attended a single demonstration in his 10-year residence in this country: [10].

4. The judge found that even if the appellant were to revive any interest in Sikh nationalism on return to India, there was no risk in light of the country information: [11].

The grounds of appeal
5. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Malik confirmed that the grounds of appeal at page 17 of the error of law bundle with the only grounds put forward with the application for permission to appeal. These grounds are, put bluntly, in the barest form imaginable. They consist of three short paragraphs only. In summary, they contend that: the judge may have erred in concluding that only “high-ranking members” of the Khalistan movement are at risk; the judge may not have adequately considered country information in relation to who would be at risk; the judge may have acted irrationally in concluding that the appellant would not be at risk, in light of his particular circumstances.

6. Permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal.

Rule 24
7. The respondent did not provide a rule 24 response.

The hearing
8. Mr Malik relied on the grounds and recognised that they were narrowly drawn. He accepted that the HJ (Iran) point raised in the error of law skeleton argument (not drafted by Mr Malik) did not appear on the grounds or the skeleton argument before the judge. There was no application to amend those grounds. Mr Malik referred me to a limited number of passages in the country information which had been provided by the appellant at first-instance. He accepted that there had been no evidence in relation to the Indian authorities’ record-keeping of arrests/tensions and released without charge.

9. Mr Sheikh submitted that whilst the judge’s decision was concise, it was legally adequate in all respects. He relied in particular on [8]-[12] of the judge’s decision.

10. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Conclusions
11. I exercise appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Conciseness is not of itself indicative of any errors. I note the judge’s reference to having taken all of the evidence into account.

12. Having read the judge’s decision sensibly and holistically, I have little hesitation in concluding that he has not committed any material errors of law.

13. It is clear from a sensible reading of [8]-[12] that the judge took proper account of the entirety of the appellant’s circumstances. At [8], the judge recorded the fact that the appellant was only a teenager when he was arrested and very briefly detained in 2014, and was then released without charge. He had faced no difficulties between that event and leaving India in 2015. The judge accurately recorded that the appellant had never been a member of any proscribed organisation. It was undoubtedly the case that the United Kingdom-based activities were extremely limited: a single demonstration during a decade of residence. There was never a suggestion that the Indian authorities had expressed any interest whatsoever in the appellant since 2014. On any view, the appellant’s profile could not have been much lower.

14. There was no evidence before the judge that any record of the arrest and brief detention in 2014 would have been maintained by the Indian authorities to date and that he would be identified on return for that reason. The brevity of the detention, the absence of any charge, and the passage of time, were all plainly relevant to the judge’s assessment of risk. The judge was clearly entitled to conclude that some political activists might be at risk. The reference to “some Sikh political leaders” at [9] was not, on a fair reading, a conclusion that only such high-profile people could be at risk. Rather, it was simply a reference to what the country evidence said. The DFAT report referred to at [11] was consistent with a view that someone in the appellant’s position was not reasonably likely to be at risk. The additional references to that report made by Mr Malik in submissions (which were not included in the grounds) do nothing to assist the appellant’s challenge. Paragraph 3.95 says nothing about any risk to low-level supporters and indeed makes reference to the arrest of a Khalistani separatist “leader” in 2023. Paragraph 3.102 states that participants in Punjabi politics face a “low risk” of official or societal discrimination violence, but it is possible that there might be violence “among supporters and opponents of separatism”. The first part of that passage is referred to by the judge at [11] and the second part says nothing about a risk from the Indian authorities to someone such as the appellant. Mr Malik’s reliance on the USCIRF report adds nothing: that evidence does not properly support a contention that anyone with the appellant’s profile would be at risk.

15. In light of the foregoing, the judge’s assessment of risk and the conclusions drawn are eminently sustainable.

16. I return to the HJ (Iran) point. In the first instance, I conclude that it is not in play in this appeal. The Upper Tribunal can expect representatives to clearly articulate alleged errors of law in the grounds of appeal. A distinct argument based on HJ (Iran) could have been included in the grounds if that were thought appropriate.

17. In any event, there would be no merit to any assertion that the judge materially erred in failing to address the HJ (Iran) point. As far as I can see, the only evidence from the appellant as to any political beliefs and a desire to express them on return to India is contained in a single sentence within paragraph 19 of his witness statement. In the absence of any submissions put to the judge based on that sparse evidence, and in light of the appellant’s almost non-existent political activity since being in this country, it is inconceivable that the judge would have concluded that the appellant would wish to have engaged openly in expressing pro-Khalistan views to the extent that there was any reasonable likelihood of him being persecuted as a consequence.

Anonymity
18. I maintain the anonymity direction made by the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 25 September 2026