Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001853
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57659/2023 LP/01812/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

SH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Bazini, Counsel instructed by Spector Contact and Williams
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Chad born in March 1995. He has, however, never lived in Chad. He was born and raised in Saudi Arabia. In 2016 he travelled to Philippines where he was lawfully resident as a student. He married a national of the Philippines in 2018. They divorced in February 2025. The appellant came to the UK in 2019 and claimed asylum.
2. The appellant claims to face a risk of persecution in Chad. He also claims that citizens of Chad threatened him whilst he was in the Philippines.
3. In a decision dated 2 October 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim. It was not accepted that the appellant faces a risk of persecution in Chad. Although the respondent did not accept that the appellant faces a risk of persecution in Chad, the respondent’s decision states “given the complication and potential risk on return to Chad, it is not considered to be a suitable removal destination.” The respondent’s decision then states that Saudi Arabia is also not considered a suitable option for return as it is unlikely he would “be accepted to be returned to Saudi Arabia and gain residency rights”.
4. The respondent’s decision then considers return to the Philippines. The following is stated:
You can return to the Philippines as you have stated you are married to a Filipino citizen. This is through acquiring permanent residency status under the 13(a) Non-quota immigrant visa by marriage This visa is available to foreign nationals who are married and remain married to a Filipino citizen.
Additionally, after having permanent residency for a period of 5 years and residing in the Philippines, you can apply to naturalise and become a citizen of the Philippines.
There are no significant obstacles known that would hinder your return to the Philippines, especially given you had already studied in the Philippines and are able to access the same service afforded to citizens when becoming a permanent resident.
With aid of the voluntary returns service offered by the Home Office, you would be able to obtain support in getting the required documentation and funding necessary to resettle back into the Philippines
5. I pause to make two observations about the respondent’s position in respect of the Philippines. First, the reason the respondent considered that the appellant has a sufficiently strong connection to the Philippines to be returned to that country (despite having lived there for only three years as a student) was that he was married to a Filipino citizen. Second, although when the decision was made the appellant was married to a citizen of the Philippines, this was no longer the case when the appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal.
6. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal where his appeal was determined by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Marenah (“the judge”) in a decision dated 2 March 2025.
7. The judge found that the appellant faces a risk of persecution in Chad for a Refugee Convention reason. This finding is not disputed.
8. The judge then considered whether the appellant could be returned to the Philippines, as proposed by the respondent. The judge stated in paragraph 53 that the respondent’s position was that the appellant could apply for status in the Philippines on the basis of his marriage and his previous lawful residence there.
9. Relying on MA (Ethiopia) [2009] EWCA Civ 289, Abdullah v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 42 and RM (Sierra Leone) [2015] EWCA Civ 541, the judge found that the burden was on the appellant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he would not be admissible to the Philippines.
10. In paragraph 58 the judge accepted that the appellant was divorced from his Filipino wife. However, in paragraph 59 the judge stated:
Nevertheless, once the issue of his admissibility to the Philippines was raised, it remains for the appellant to demonstrate that he is not legally admissible to the Philippines, despite his former habitual residence, by means of sufficiently cogent evidence. The appellant must prove the position under Philippine law to the civil standard; I am not entitled to speculate as to the probable effect of any given set of circumstances. Given the absence of expert evidence on the admissibility of the appellant to the Philippines, I am constrained to find that he has failed to establish that he is not returnable there to the civil standard.
11. The grounds raise various points but the strongest submission – and the focus of Mr Bazini’s oral argument - is that the judge erred in finding that the burden was on the appellant to prove he was not admissible to the Philippines.
12. It is well established that where a person seeking protection claims he cannot return to the country to which return is proposed, the burden will normally be on him to demonstrate that he cannot return to that country by taking all practicable steps to obtain the documentation necessary to enable his return. This was explained recently by the Court of Appeal in AAZA (Yemen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 705, where at paragraph 31 the following is stated:
The general rule is well-established by decisions of this court such as HF (Iraq) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1276 and MA (Ethiopia) [2009] EWCA 289. If an Appellant alleges that he will not be allowed to enter the country to which it is proposed he should return he will be expected to have made an application. As Elias LJ said in MA (Ethiopia) the "tribunal could in the normal case require the applicant to act bona fide and take all reasonably practicable steps to obtain the requisite documents for her to return."
13. When respondent made her decision, the appellant had a clear connection to the Philippines, which is that he was married to a citizen of the country. However, by the time the case came before the First-tier Tribunal, this was no longer the case.
14. The judge was required to decide the appeal on the basis of the facts at the date of the hearing; and at that time, the appellant’s connection to the Philippines was tenuous. He was not a citizen, had never been settled in the country, was not in a relationship with a citizen of the Philippines, had only lived in the Philippines for a short time (3 years) as a student, and had not been in the country for over 5 years (since leaving in 2019).
15. The appellant’s connection to the Philippines is starkly different to that of the appellant in AAZA and in the cases cited in paragraph 31 of AAZA. In AAZA the appellant had lived in the proposed destination country since he was one years old; and in HF (Iraq) and MA (Ethiopian) the appellants were citizens of the country of proposed return. These are cases where the appellants plainly had a very strong connection to the destination country. Caution therefore needs to be exercised in applying principles developed in these cases to this appeal, where the connection to the proposed destination country is so much weaker.
16. The respondent’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was that the appellant was admissible to the Philippines because he was married to a citizen of the country. However, the judge found this was not the case. No alternative theory was advanced by the respondent as to how the appellant could be admitted to the Philippines. In the absence of any plausible theory as to how the appellant could be admitted to the Philippines when he was no longer married to a citizen, there was no basis for the judge to find that the appellant could be removed to the country. I am therefore persuaded that, on the facts of this case, it was an error of law for the judge to find that the burden was on the appellant to prove he could not return to the Philippines.
17. I remake the decision by allowing the appeal because:
a. The judge found, in a finding that has not been disputed, that the appellant is a refugee; i.e. the appellant is outside his country of nationality (Chad) and is unable or unwilling to return to Chad due to a well founded fear of persecution based on a Convention reason; and
b. I am not satisfied that it is more likely than not (indeed, I consider it to be extremely unlikely) that the appellant could be returned to the Philippines, which is the destination proposed by the respondent. This is because, for the reasons set out above in paragraph 14, the appellant (following his divorce) has only a tenuous connection to that country and the respondent has not provided a plausible rationale/theory as to how a person with the appellant’s limited connection to the Philippines could be in a position to be returned to the Philippines.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. I remake the decision and allow the appellant’s appeal.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 March 2026