Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001863

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56094/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

LZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmed, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 12 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to China. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of her identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dated 14 February 2025, dismissing her appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights grounds.
3. The appeal concerns the appellant’s claim that she faces a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to China from her ex-husband, who has connections to the police, and that internal relocation would be unreasonable.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal on a single ground, namely, that the judge reached an irrational conclusion on the issue of internal relocation when seen against the conclusions she reached on the overall credibility of the underlying facts and risk on return.
5. In a decision dated 24 April 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Pickering granted permission for the grounds to be argued. She made the following observations in granting permission:
It is arguable that given the past conduct of the appellant’s ex husband, that the Judge has not reconciled this with his future conduct and whether he would likely locate the appellant in the future through the Hukou Registration system.
6. At the outset of the error of law hearing, Mr McVeety, on behalf of the respondent, conceded that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in its assessment of internal relocation. Specifically, the judge’s findings (at [25]) regarding the Hukou registration system and the appellant’s ex-husband inability to trace her through police connections could not be reconciled with uncontroversial country background information that the opposite was, in fact, the reality. This omission was said to be material and, in fact, decisive given the accepted findings that the appellant would be at risk in her home area and could not obtain state protection. The parties agreed that the decision fell to be immediately remade by allowing the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds without the need for a further hearing.
Discussion
7. I am satisfied that the respondent’s concession was properly made. The First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning on internal relocation did not reflect the now-agreed position of the parties that the background information demonstrably reveals that the Chinese police have ready access to the Hukou registration system. When this is coupled with the findings that the appellant’s ex-husband had previously stalked her, worked in the security sector with deep and extensive police connections, the decisive internal relocation assessment is founded on the unsafe premise that the appellant would be beyond the effective reach of the man she fears. As I indicated at the conclusion of the error of law hearing, this amounts to a material error of law and I set aside the decision.
Disposal
8. The parties were agreed that the appropriate course was to simply remake the decision and allow the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds. The human rights ground of appeal becomes academic because there is no longer any prospect of the appellant being returned to China to face the human rights breaches she claims she would face on return.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside as it involves a material error of law. I remake the decision by allowing the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds. The human rights ground of appeal is dismissed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 August 2025