Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001872

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65593/2023
LP/04053/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

IH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr A. Joseph, Counsel (NLS Solicitors)

Heard at Field House on 16 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity direction made by the First-tier Tribunal because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (“UK”) under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
2. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“Secretary of State”) against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dated 23 March 2025.
Background
3. The Respondent, IH, is a national of Iraq.
4. He arrived in the UK on 13 April 2022 and claimed asylum two days later. The Secretary of State refused that claim on 29 November 2023. IH appealed against that decision and his appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) sitting in Newport on 07 March 2025. The Secretary of State was not represented at that hearing. In a decision promulgated on 23 March 2025 IH’s appeal was allowed. The present appeal is brought against that decision.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 25 April 2025.
The error of law hearing
6. The hearing was conducted via the Cloud Video Platform (CVP) and attended by representatives for both parties. At the outset, I confirmed that all participants could see and hear one another and the Tribunal.
7. I heard submissions from both parties. Mr Tan, appearing on behalf of the Secretary of State, advanced three grounds of appeal. Under Ground 1, he submitted that the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) erred in law by failing to engage with the credibility concerns and discrepancies identified in both the Reasons for Refusal Letter (“RFRL”) and the subsequent Review. He argued that paragraph 18 of the decision merely summarises and accepts IH’s evidence without addressing the first two points raised in the RFRL. Similarly, at paragraphs 20–21, the Judge’s reasoning is confined to a general assessment of consistency, without engaging with specific issues identified in the RFRL, namely the inconsistency regarding IH’s claim in the Screening Interview that he had never been detained versus what he later claimed, the absence of any corroborative medical evidence from Iraq, Turkey, or the UK, and other material arguments raised in the refusal. Mr Tan submitted that these omissions indicate a failure to properly engage with the Secretary of State’s case, thereby rendering the Judge’s findings materially flawed.
8. In relation to Ground 2, Mr Tan contended that the Judge’s reasoning at paragraphs 22–25 was deficient and, in parts, bordered on the perverse. He argued that the lack of detail surrounding IH’s release and the absence of any clear explanation as to why he would continue to be targeted were illogically treated as factors enhancing, rather than undermining, IH’s credibility. While acknowledging that the Judge was not obliged to draw adverse inferences from the lack of detail, Mr Tan maintained that it was illogical to treat such omissions as supportive of the claim. This, he submitted, undermines the reliability of the Judge’s credibility assessment. Furthermore, the Judge failed to engage with the argument that, if IH had genuinely been released, it must have been because he no longer posed a threat to AH. This raises a further unresolved issue as to why IH’s father would later be threatened to surrender IH to secure the release of his brother, and why the father’s apparent lack of concern regarding the renewed targeting was not addressed.
9. Mr Tan did not make further oral submissions in respect of Ground 3 but relied on the written grounds. These assert that the Judge erred in allowing the appeal on both Asylum and Humanitarian Protection grounds, as IH cannot be entitled to both. The grounds further contend that the Judge conflated the distinct legal criteria applicable to each form of protection, suggesting a lack of anxious scrutiny and casting doubt on the reliability of the determination as a whole.
10. In response, Mr Joseph submitted that the threshold for a finding of perversity is high. It does not mean simply that the judge was wrong, but rather that the decision was irrational. He argued that the Judge found no attempt by IH to embellish his account, and that the reasoning on plausibility was adequate, albeit with some potential shortcomings in the assessment of overall credibility. He submitted that even if I find the Judge had materially erred in law in respect of Ground 2, some findings, particularly those in paragraphs 18–21, could potentially be preserved. He also invited me to note that whilst the Secretary of State had not been represented at the First-tier Tribunal hearing, she had been on notice of the appeal and had not sought an adjournment to enable a Presenting Officer to attend. He invited me to dismiss the Secretary of State’s appeal.
11. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision, which I now give.
Findings and reasons
12. Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions and the decision under challenge, I am satisfied that the Secretary of State’s grounds disclose a material error of law in the Judge’s decision, such that the decision must be set aside.
13. I remind myself of the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, which reaffirm the need for judicial restraint when reviewing the decisions of specialist tribunals. Judges of the First-tier Tribunal are uniquely placed to assess credibility and make factual findings based on the totality of the evidence before them. Appellate courts should not readily find misdirection merely because they might have reached a different conclusion or expressed themselves differently. However, the requirement of judicial restraint does not displace the fundamental principle that a party must be able to understand why they have won or lost. A failure to provide adequate reasoning in this regard constitutes an error of law.
14. It is common ground that the Secretary of State was not represented before the Judge. In such circumstances, the Judge was required to approach the appeal in accordance with the Surendran Guidelines (see MNM [2000] UKIAT 00005). Paragraph 1 of those Guidelines is of particular application in this case:
Where the Home Office is not represented… [t]he Home Office… requests that the special adjudicator deals with the appeal on the basis of the contents of the letter of refusal and any other written submissions which the Home Office makes when indicating that it would not be represented.
15. The Secretary of State’s RFRL raised several specific credibility concerns with IH’s account, including:
(a) The internal inconsistency in IH’s account, particularly his assertion that a member of Hashad Al Shabi was recruiting for ISIS, which conflicts with objective evidence of hostility between those groups;
(b) Discrepancies between IH’s Screening Interview, in which he stated he had never been detained, and his later claim of a one-year imprisonment;
(c) The absence of corroborative medical evidence despite claims of torture and treatment in Turkey, and the lack of any NHS medical records despite being registered with a UK GP; and
(d) Limited and vague information concerning the circumstances of his brother’s death, despite its centrality to the claim.
16. The Judge set out her assessment of IH’s credibility at paragraphs [15]–[33], concluding that he had provided a “broadly consistent account.” While certain parts of the reasoning identify aspects of the claim accepted as plausible, the determination does not address, or even acknowledge, the specific adverse credibility points set out in the RFRL. I have reviewed IH’s witness statement and the Appeal Skeleton Argument filed on his behalf before the First-tier hearing. Neither document meaningfully addresses these key credibility challenges. From the decision as a whole, it does not appear that these concerns were addressed at the hearing, nor do they feature in the Judge’s reasoning.
17. Whilst it is not necessary for a judge to provide reasons on every minor point raised by the parties, it is essential that the decision demonstrates engagement with the principal issues in dispute. In this case, the Judge’s reasoning does not explain why the Secretary of State’s detailed credibility concerns were rejected, nor how the conclusion of overall plausibility was reached. A reader of the decision cannot discern the logical basis for accepting IH’s account in the face of unresolved inconsistencies. I am therefore satisfied that the Judge’s reasoning is inadequate and that Ground 1 is made out.
18. Turning to Ground 2, Mr Tan submitted that the Judge’s reasoning at [22]–[25] was flawed and, in parts, bordered on the perverse. At [23], the Judge concluded that the lack of detail surrounding IH’s release enhanced the plausibility of his account, reasoning that such omissions were consistent with what one might expect:
I note that [IH] has provided limited evidence in relation to his release, for example why he was released, why he was released at that time and the reasons for A H’s decision to release him. In my view, this lack of information demonstrates plausibility in the [IH’s] account as I would not expect [IH] to know such details. In view of this, I find that [IH] has not attempted to bolster his account, instead he has provided sufficient detail relating to his release, such that I find his account plausible.
19. A similar conclusion was drawn at [25], where the Judge treated IH’s inability to explain why he would again be targeted by AH as a factor supporting his credibility:
I note that the [Secretary of State] questions why AH would want [IH] returned having released him and I note that [IH] has not provided a clear explanation relating to this. However, again, I find that such a lack of explanation supports [IH’s] account as I would not expect [IH] to know why A H made such a demand. Overall, I accept that the IH’s brother was detained as claimed.
20. It may be that the Judge intended to convey that IH’s lack of knowledge on these points was understandable and therefore did not undermine his credibility. However, the language used goes further. It suggests that the absence of detail positively enhances the plausibility of the account. This is a problematic inference. While it may be legitimate to treat a lack of knowledge about certain events as neutral, it cannot rationally be said to positively enhance credibility. The Judge’s reasoning reverses that logic. Rather than treating the absence of detail as inconclusive, it is treated as corroborative. Although the threshold for irrationality is a high one, I find that this reasoning crosses that threshold. The Judge’s approach represents a misdirection in the assessment of credibility, thereby undermining the integrity of the findings as a whole. Ground 2 is therefore also established.
21. In relation to Ground 3, the Judge erred in allowing the appeal on both asylum and humanitarian protection grounds. The two forms of protection are mutually exclusive, and the Judge’s conflation of their legal criteria indicates a lack of analytical precision. While this error alone would not have necessitated setting aside the decision had it otherwise been sound, in this instance it reinforces the conclusion that the determination lacks sufficient rigour and anxious scrutiny.
22. Having found material errors which go to the core of the Judge’s credibility assessment, I am satisfied that the decision cannot safely stand. The cumulative effect of these errors permeates the determination, rendering all findings unsafe. The decision must therefore be set aside in its entirety.
23. As to disposal, both representatives agreed that, should a material error of law be found, the appropriate course would be to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal. I agree. The nature and extent of the necessary fact-finding is such that remittal is the only fair and practicable option.
24. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is therefore set aside in its entirety pursuant to section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Having regard to the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo, with no findings preserved.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The decision is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Khan.

S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 October 2025