Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001898
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61950/2023
LP/10095/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEVILLE

Between

IM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Ferrin, counsel, on 26 June 2025
Mr R Toal, counsel, on 9 March 2026
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer, on 26 June 2025
Mr J Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer, on 9 March 2026

Heard at Field House on 26 June 2025 and 9 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND DIRECTIONS

1. The Appellant is a 35 year old national of Somalia. He grew up in the Lower Shebelle Region of the South of Somalia never knowing his biological family, but was raised by adoptive parents who were members of the Ashraf clan. By 2010, the appellant ran a shop with his mother and other family members. They encountered problems because, having a business, they were seen as a target for extortion and as required to pick a side between the two competing Habirgidir and Biyomal majority clans. In 2013, the appellant's mother and one of his brothers were killed in their shop and in 2014, members of one of the majority clans killed the appellant's other brother when he was unable to pay them the money they had demanded. The appellant himself was subjected to attacks and beatings on many different occasions but was unable to access protection against due to his association with a minority clan. After his brother was killed in 2014, the appellant became suspected of involvement in the killing of a Habirgidir clan member and was arrested. He fled Somalia and following a difficult journey through Africa, including being subject to physical abuse in Libya, he travelled through Europe and arrived in the United Kingdom on 26 July 2021. He claimed asylum the following day.
2. The respondent, disbelieving his account, refused the appellant’s claim on 30 October 2023. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT), which dismissed his appeal in a decision of 3 March 2025. While the truth of the appellant’s pre-flight account was accepted, the Judge nonetheless found that he would not be at risk on return. This was because, in brief summary, there was no longer any interest in harming the appellant due to the passage of time and the absence of any threats since his departure, and it was “reasonably likely” that the appellant could settle in Mogadishu with support from the Ashraf clan.
3. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against that decision on three grounds, which I take in turn.
Ground 1 – future risk
4. The Judge found that the appellant had given a credible account of his experiences in Somalia, but went on to hold as follows:
(c) As to whether the Appellant is in fear of Al Shabaab and the Majority Clans, however I find that it is not reasonably likely that he fears persecution for his race or his political opinion or that it is reasonably likely that he will be persecuted for these Convention reasons. This is because since leaving Somalia, he confirmed that he had not received any threats. It was his belief that they would be looking for him, but he had not been told this. I find that it is speculation that the groups are looking for him because he left Somalia 9 years ago and he has no evidence to show he is of adverse interest to these groups. When paying money to these groups, he was not targeted specifically but he was one of many shopkeepers being attacked.
5. It is argued that this was an unsustainable basis upon which to find that the appellant was no longer at risk in his home area, both on its own terms and by reference to the principle in refugee law (codified at para 339K of the Immigration Rules) that past persecution is a serious indicator of future persecution unless there are good reasons to consider that it will not be repeated.
6. There is a well-established requirement for appellate caution before interfering with a finding of fact. In Clin v Walter Lilly & Co. Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 136, Carr LJ (as she then was) surveyed the relevant authorities and set out the following summary:
84. In essence the finding of fact must be plainly wrong if it is to be overturned. A simple distillation of the circumstances in which appellate interference may be justified, so far as material for present purposes, can be set out uncontroversially as follows:
i) Where the trial judge fundamentally misunderstood the issue or the evidence, plainly failed to take evidence in account, or arrived at a conclusion which the evidence could not on any view support;
ii) Where the finding is infected by some identifiable error, such as a material error of law;
iii) Where the finding lies outside the bounds within which reasonable disagreement is possible.
85. An evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which different judges can legitimately differ. Such cases may be closely analogous to the exercise of a discretion and appellate courts should approach them in a similar way. The appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the trial judge's treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion.
86. The degree to which appellate restraint should be exercised in an individual case may be influenced by the nature of the conclusion and the extent to which it depended upon an advantage possessed by the trial judge, whether from a thorough immersion in all angles of the case, or from first-hand experience of the testing of the evidence, or because of particular relevant specialist expertise.
7. I also bear in mind the principles collated and summarised in the Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions, in particular that a realistic and reasonably benevolent approach will be taken such that decisions under appeal will be read fairly and not hypercritically.
8. In this case, I agree with the appellant that the reasons given by the Judge cannot sustain the finding she made. First, it is unclear how such threats would have reached the appellant. At [43(a)] the Judge found his account to be generally credible, and it had always been the appellant’s account that he was no longer in touch with anyone from his home area. Second, while the principle at para 339K is just one evidential consideration, here it reinforces Ms Ferrin’s point that the appellant’s persecutors could be insufficiently motivated to trace him across Europe and send threats to him in the United Kingdom, yet still bear him sufficient ill-will to take action when he returns. The remaining basis upon which to conclude that risk had abated is the passage of time, which in the wider context of clan-based disputes cannot rationally operate by itself to diminish the likelihood of harm below the relevant standard.
9. An error of law is therefore established under this ground.
Grounds 2 and 3 – Relocation to Mogadishu
10. The way in which a decision-maker should approach the issue of internal relocation was recently re-stated by Lewis LJ in ASJ (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 282, as follows:
41. My view is that, as a matter of principle, consideration of internal relocation is an aspect of whether a person can establish that any fear of persecution is well-founded within Article 1A of the Refugee Convention (see the observations of Lord Bingham at paragraph 7 of his judgment in Januzi). If that is correct, then, strictly, the burden is on the appellant to show to a reasonable degree of likelihood that internal relocation would be unduly harsh and so unreasonable. In practice, however, decisions of internal relocation are unlikely to be determined or influenced by considerations of the burden of proof. The appropriate approach is that set out in Januzi, AH (Sudan), and SC (Jamaica). The question the decision-maker has to decide is whether it would be unduly harsh, and so unreasonable, for a person to relocate internally within his country of origin. That will involve the decision-maker considering all the relevant circumstances. In the light of the view that the decision-maker forms of the circumstances, the decision-maker will then decide whether internal relocation is unduly harsh, bearing in mind that that is a high threshold to cross.
11. In relation to Somalia, the relevant country guidance is provided by MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) (CG) [2014] UKUT 442 (IAC): (while the guidance talks of ‘return’ to Mogadishu, it remains relevant to this appellant)
f. A person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to his nuclear family, if he has one living in the city, for assistance in re-establishing himself and securing a livelihood. Although a returnee may also seek assistance from his clan members who are not close relatives, such help is only likely to be forthcoming for majority clan members, as minority clans may have little to offer.
g. The significance of clan membership in Mogadishu has changed. Clans now provide, potentially, social support mechanisms and assistance with access to livelihoods, performing less of a protection function than previously. There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members.
h. If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, there will need to be a careful assessment of all of the circumstances. These considerations will include, but are not limited to:
(i) circumstances in Mogadishu before departure;
(ii) length of absence from Mogadishu;
(iii) family or clan associations to call upon in Mogadishu;
(iv) access to financial resources;
(v) prospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment;
(vi) availability of remittances from abroad;
(vii) means of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom;
(viii) why his ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables an appellant to secure financial support on return.
Put another way, it will be for the person facing return to Mogadishu to explain why he would not be able to access the economic opportunities that have been produced by the "economic boom", especially as there is evidence to the effect that returnees are taking jobs at the expense of those who have never been away.
[…]
408. It will, therefore, only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which is acceptable in humanitarian protection terms.
12. In the later case of OA (Somalia) Somalia CG [2022] UKUT 33 (IAC) the guidance at (h) was supplemented as follows:
5. Somali culture is such that family and social links are, in general, retained between the diaspora and those living in Somalia. Somali family networks are very extensive and the social ties between different branches of the family are very tight. A returnee with family and diaspora links in this country will be unlikely to be more than a small number of degrees of separation away from establishing contact with a member of their clan, or extended family, in Mogadishu through friends of friends, if not through direct contact.
6. In-country assistance from a returnee's clan or network is not necessarily contingent upon the returnee having personally made remittances as a member of the diaspora. Relevant factors include whether a member of the returnee's household made remittances, and the returnee's ability to have sent remittances before their return.
7. A guarantor is not required for hotel rooms. Basic but adequate hotel accommodation is available for a nightly fee of around 25USD. The Secretary of State's Facilitated Returns Scheme will be sufficient to fund a returnee's initial reception in Mogadishu for up to several weeks, while the returnee establishes or reconnects with their network or finds a guarantor. Taxis are available to take returnees from the airport to their hotel.
8. The economic boom continues with the consequence that casual and day labour positions are available. A guarantor may be required to vouch for some employed positions, although a guarantor is not likely to be required for self-employed positions, given the number of recent arrivals who have secured or crafted roles in the informal economy.
9. A guarantor may be required to vouch for prospective tenants in the city. In the accommodation context, the term 'guarantor' is broad, and encompasses vouching for the individual concerned, rather than assuming legal obligations as part of a formal land transaction. Adequate rooms are available to rent in the region of 40USD to 150USD per month in conditions that would not, without more, amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR.
10. There is a spectrum of conditions across the IDP camps; some remain as they were at the time of MOJ, whereas there has been durable positive change in a significant number of others. Many camps now feature material conditions that are adequate by Somali standards. The living conditions in the worst IDP camps will be dire on account of their overcrowding, the prevalence of disease, the destitution of their residents, the unsanitary conditions, the lack of accessible services and the exposure to the risk of crime.
11. The extent to which the Secretary of State may properly be held to be responsible for exposing a returnee to intense suffering which may in time arise as a result of such conditions turns on factors that include whether, upon arrival in Mogadishu, the returnee would be without any prospect of initial accommodation, support or another base from which to begin to establish themselves in the city.
12. There will need to be a careful assessment of all the circumstances of the particular individual in order to ascertain the Article 3, humanitarian protection or internal relocation implications of an individual's return .
13. If there are particular features of an individual returnee's circumstances or characteristics that mean that there are substantial grounds to conclude that there will be a real risk that, notwithstanding the availability of the Facilitated Returns Scheme and the other means available to a returnee of establishing themselves in Mogadishu, residence in an IDP camp or informal settlement will be reasonably likely, a careful consideration of all the circumstances will be required in order to determine whether their return will entail a real risk of Article 3 being breached. Such cases are likely to be rare, in light of the evidence that very few, if any, returning members of the diaspora are forced to resort to IDP camps.
14. It will only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes .
13. In OA, the Upper Tribunal gave specific consideration to support from minority clans and their ability to assist on return:
258. We recall that in Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment , Professor Menkhaus described an "important aspect" of the resilience of Somali society is the " non-negotiable obligation to help one's kinsmen in times of need". That cultural imperative lies behind the flow of remittances into Somalia, but it also provides a culturally compelling reason for those still or already in Somalia to provide assistance to returnees.
259. It follows that even a minority clan would, in principle, be able to provide some assistance to a returnee seeking accommodation, primarily in the form of vouching for the individual concerned. It is likely that the links within the clan necessary to establish assistance of this nature would be identified through an individual's network within Somalia, in light of the role of network in Somali culture. Providing assurance of this sort to a prospective landlord does not require extensive resources, or the ability to engage with the formal guarantor process which lies at the heart of some land transactions: see our discussion concerning accommodation at paragraphs 273 and following, below. If a returnee seeks to establish accommodation for themselves, it is likely that they would do so in an area that features other members of their clan, just as members of the same clans and networks tend to congregate in and around each other. That organic process is not dependent upon new residents to the area having access to a guarantor who would need to rely on majority clan status or otherwise draw on extensive resources of the sort only available to a majority clan in order to provide assistance.
260. Given the extensive links between the diaspora and Somalis in Mogadishu, it will be for the returnee to demonstrate why they will not be able to draw on clan or network assistance upon their return, bearing in mind the well-documented Somali cultural imperative to help others from one's own clan. Ms Harper's evidence was that in-country support for a returning member of the diaspora would be conditional upon that person having made remittances themselves, as an earlier member of the diaspora. We consider there to be no evidence that those receiving remittances in Somalia distinguish between the individual members who may have made remittances to Somalia from overseas. There is no stark proposition of cause and effect whereby a failure to have sent remittances prior to returning will automatically and without more lead to a situation of being shunned by the clan in Somalia, upon their return, especially if a member of the returnee's household has a history of making remittances.
14. The Judge also had regard to the Country policy and information note: security and humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, Somalia, May 2022, which was then the current version. The relevant part of the Judge’s reasoning is:
62. I make the following findings of fact in relation to whether it is reasonably likely that the Appellant could internally relocate to Mogadishu: -
[…]
(c) Based on the Appellant’s confirmation that he has heard that his clan are present in Mogadishu, then applying MOJ and Ors and OA Somalia, it is reasonably likely that he will be able to settle in Mogadishu. OA Somalia held that even a minority clan like the Ashraf clan would, in principle, be able to provide some assistance to a returnee seeking accommodation, primarily in the form of vouching for the individual concerned.
(d) Paragraph 2.4.1 of the May 2022 CPIN states that there are not substantial grounds for believing that the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there is a real risk of harm. I am, however, directed to consider any factors of the Appellant’s personal circumstances which might nevertheless place him at risk. I find that there are no such personal factors. To the contrary, I find that his specific situation of leaving Somalia 9 years ago and not receiving any threats or any contact at all with the three groups makes it reasonably likely that he is well placed to relocate to Mogadishu without being at real risk of harm.
(e) Paragraph 2.5.3 of the May 2022 CPIN states that there has been relative stability in Mogadishu over the last 7 years. There has been the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab there. Even though there are terrorism attacks, as an ordinary citizen, the Appellant is not reasonably likely to face an individual threat. I was not presented with any evidence to show that the Appellant is politically active. I find therefore that he is an ordinary citizen and therefore, it is reasonably likely that he will not face a serious threat. Therefore, I find that Mogadishu is a safe alternative location where the Appellant can relocate to avoid the fear of persecution.
(f) Further, I find that it is reasonably likely that the Appellant will be able to internally relocate because:-
(i) The Appellant heard that his Ashraf clan is based in Mogadishu. It is therefore reasonably likely that he will be able to form cultural and social ties. He will be able to integrate, and his own clan may assist him in accessing resources.
(ii) In relation to the Ashraf clan not being his biological clan, I find that it is reasonably likely that the Ashraf clan will still support him. No evidence was presented to me to show that he will not be supported. This point has not been previously raised by the Appellant (namely, that the Ashraf clan is not his biological family and therefore, he will not be supported. He has maintained that he is from the Ashraf clan).
15. The Judge’s overall conclusion at (f) plainly rests on provision of support by the Ashraf clan. The only sustainable interpretation of (f)(ii) is that the Judge rejected the lack of ‘biological’ clanship as undermining the prospect of clan support, first due to a lack of evidence and second due to the point not having been “previously raised”.
16. I agree with Ms Ferrin that there was such evidence, given by the appellant himself. I also consider that the appellant has consistently stated from the outset of his claim that he is not ‘biologically’ from the Ashraf clan, so is seen as “an outcast”. In his witness statement of 3 March 2022, he stated:
11. …I come from a very small tribe called Ashraf from a family that looked after me that does not have much power. I do not know what my biological tribe is as my parents passed away. I fear that because the community became aware that I was not related to my guardians and I am seen as a person who does not have a tribe and therefore does not belong anywhere. This places me in a much more difficult position as I am an outcast. Being an outcast is seen as taboo, and since my community became aware of my family situation, my life was at extended risk. …
[…]
19. I have no other family elsewhere in Somalia. All I have known is my village area where was born. I had never travelled much in the country and did not know where to go. Without tribal affiliations, I had no one who could support me. I could not relocate to another area because of the difficulties in travelling due to the unsettling tribal conflicts across the country especially coming from my area. I did not have any means to support and protect myself and my family should I have relocated. I did not know where else to go as nowhere was safe for me because I am an outcast.
17. Asked in interview whether he had faced problems in relation to clan membership, his answer is noted as “I have not been opposed by Ashraf but individually by myself I have been discriminated”. He later described having to stop going to school after being bullied for his dark skin. I pause there to note that in NM and Others (Lone women – Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005] UKIAT 76 at [131], the Upper Tribunal accepted evidence that “most Ashraf could be picked out by their appearance, being relatively light-skinned”.
18. Later in his interview, the appellant gave another reason for claiming asylum as “the people are despising me, sometimes they insulted me, I don’t have anyone why do they harm me”. After receiving the recording of the interview the appellant’s solicitors had added a further answer apparently omitted by the interpreter: “the community discriminates me and they insult me and call me a bastard child and that I am illegitimate”.
19. The Judge correctly identified the appellant’s case as being that he would not receive support from the Ashraf clan due to his lack of biological relationship but erred in finding that it had not been previously raised. In any event, the Judge gives no reason why the recency of the argument meant it should be excluded from consideration.
20. The final argument made in relation to internal relocation is, in simple terms, that the Judge applied the wrong standard of proof. The headline to the analysis at [62] is whether it is “reasonably likely” that the appellant could internally relocate to Mogadishu. The component findings are then made according to the same standard: “it is reasonably likely that he will be able to settle”; “it is reasonably likely that he will not face a serious threat”, “it is reasonably likely that he will be able to form cultural and social ties”; “it is reasonably likely that the Ashraf clan will still support him”.
21. In this jurisdiction the phrase “reasonably likely” carries with it a well-established and particular meaning; a degree of likelihood that is ‘real’ or carries ‘substantial grounds for believing’, and that is lower than the balance of probabilities. Something may accordingly be “reasonably likely” while the opposite outcome still remains more likely than not. In the present context, finding it “reasonably likely” that the Ashraf clan will support the appellant leaves open the possibility that the probability of such support is less than 50%. Resting the overall conclusion on a balance of probabilities weighted in that direction would plainly be contrary to the holistic analysis described in ASJ.
22. As with Ground 1, I remind myself of the necessary appellate caution against over-critical analysis. FtT judges produce their written reasons in a variety of ways, but all do so under much pressure and with little clerical support. If the phrase appeared once or twice, and in reasons that could not otherwise be criticised, I would dismiss this as a mere slip rather than symptomatic of flawed reasoning – a similar point is made in ASJ at [37]. Here, however, the frequency and centrality of the phrase, taken together with the other errors I have found, cause sufficient concern as to render the Judge’s findings unsafe. They are accordingly set aside.
Re-making
23. The above reasons were sent to the parties with directions that the appeal would be re-decided in the Upper Tribunal.
24. The Judge’s acceptance of the appellant’s pre-flight account and his genuine subjective fear of his persecutors would be preserved, there being no apparent sustainable basis upon which it could be held that the appellant could return to Marka, and no rule 24 response having been provided.
25. An exception to the above was the account of having suffered discrimination based on skin tone; I had found that the Judge failed to grapple with that aspect of the appeal. Pre-flight discrimination therefore remained at large, although its determination would inevitably take into account that the appellant’s overall credibility is established. The effect of future discrimination on clan support would form one of the relevant circumstances to be considered.
26. The issues on re-making were therefore directed as being:
a. Can the appellant avoid his persecutors by relocating to Mogadishu? If so,
b. Taking into account all relevant circumstances, including those set out in the CG cases and the CPIN, would relocation to Mogadishu be unduly harsh?
The answer to those issues would be determinative of the protection and Article 3 claims, and no discrete Article 8 claim is made.
27. At the resumed hearing, the appellant relied on evidence from a friend I shall call AM, who had grown up in the same village and is now a recognised refugee himself. His witness statement speaks to the bullying and discrimination suffered by the appellant growing up due to the colour of his skin. Mr Pugh confirmed that this issue was now accepted and that AM’s witness statement could be agreed. The appellant gave oral evidence, being cross-examined by Mr Pugh, and also relied on a country expert report from Mr Omer Ahmed.
28. In addressing the issues, I only set out the evidence and the representatives’ submissions where necessary to explain my conclusions. It was not disputed that the appellant would be at risk from his persecutors in his home area or in Mogadishu if they became aware of his presence there.
Can the appellant avoid his persecutors by relocating to Mogadishu?
29. I refer to the relevant principles in MOJ and OA, already set out above, and to the parts of the (now applicable) 2025 CPIN to which I was referred. By way of factual recap, the appellant’s risk is claimed to arise from members of the Habar Gidir clan who threatened to kill the appellant due to believing that he had killed his brother’s murderer. Mr Toal referred to parts of the CPIN as showing that Habar Gidir (in its various English spellings) is a majority clan in Mogadishu:
a. At 7.1.3, “Mogadishu is inhabited largely by Hawiye from the clans Abgaal, Habar Gedir and Murosade”;
b. In the Landinfo report at Annex A, “By virtue of being the strongest clans politically and militarily, the Abgal and Habar Gidir clans dominate Mogadishu’s economy, although other clans also have a presence”; and
c. From the same report, “Since the state collapse in 1991, the Hawiye clans Abgal and Habar Gidir have been the dominant clans in Mogadishu”.
30. That dominance, he argued, combined with the findings in MOJ on the ability and motivation of Somalis to identify newcomers to Mogadishu gives rise to a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would eventually become known via social and network identification to those who wish to kill him.
31. Mr Pugh did not dispute Habar Gidir’s status as a majority clan but did not accept that the appellant would somehow be linked to the incident in Marka and targeted. He referred to Mr Ahmed’s report as stating that the appellant “may not necessarily face immediate or overt targeting upon arrival”, but on reading the report for myself I consider Mr Ahmed to have been referring to general conduct in response the appellant’s ‘outcast’ status rather than deliberate targeting by his former persecutors.
32. There is little information available to assist in determining this discrete issue. The tracing network is not to be underestimated. Finding support, assistance, accommodation and employment through Ashraf clan patronage makes it less likely that the appellant will come to the spontaneous attention of those from the Habar Gidir clan who will then associate his identity with the target of the threats. That ‘passive tracing’ – for want of a better term – is nonetheless made more likely by his appearance making him stand out and be a target of gossip and comment. While I do not repeat the FtT’s mistake on the passage of time, it must be recognised as a factor that makes active tracing less likely. While the appellant would be harmed if he comes to the attention of those who would wish to do so, they are unlikely to still be taking active steps to locate him. While this matter is somewhat finely balanced, I agree with Mr Toal’s submission that it depends in part on consideration of the appellant’s prospects on return. Taking into account my conclusion on the next issue, including the appellant’s difficulties and conspicuousness when attempting to find support, I find that he would remain at risk in Mogadishu.
Taking into account all relevant circumstances, including those set out in the CG cases and the CPIN, would relocation to Mogadishu be unduly harsh?
33. Much of the factual background to this question has already been set out. Those aspects particularly salient to this issue include that:
a. The appellant does not know his own biological clan identity. Mr Pugh suggested a DNA test but there is no basis upon which to consider that clan support can be gained with a genetic passport as opposed to established family and social links.
b. His adoptive parents and all but one of his adoptive siblings are dead.
c. He has no known family or support elsewhere in Somalia.
d. He has no known family or support in Mogadishu.
34. It is now supplemented by the evidence that:
a. The appellant was subjected to discrimination and bullying when growing up with the Ashraf clan. While his adoptive parents’ motivation in adopting him is unknown, his evidence included that they would disavow him as their son when quizzed by neighbours.
b. That treatment continued into adulthood. He gave evidence consistent with that given before the FtT that whenever there were disputes between clans all parties assumed that he was on the side of the other. He has given a few examples over time, such as that when majority clan members forced shop owners to pay them money they would take more from him than others. His use of the word ‘outcast’ carries some justification.
c. He has no recourse to financial support from the UK.
35. Insofar as any of the above was not formally accepted by Mr Pugh, I find it to be established on the evidence. The appellant’s evidence has remained consistent both internally and with the CPIN and country expert report.
36. Mr Pugh referred to the following passage of the expert report:
3. In some instances, an adoptive family may insist on giving the adopted child their own biological name, to shield and protect the child from being discriminated against on the basis of being an orphaned child or progeny of an illicit relationship and hence treated as illegitimate. In the context of Somalia's chronic clan-based conflicts and the prevalence of a large number of children orphaned by the conflict in Somalia, this is by no means an uncommon practice.
4. In social anthropological terms, Somali society is fundamentally organised around patrilineal descent, known as Tol, and clan membership, social identity, and legitimacy are traced through the male line. Somali culture is fundamentally organised around and premised on intimate knowledge of one’s lineage, and critically to be able to recite one’s ancestors often to well over 15-20 generations. […] ordinarily expected to know and articulate their paternal genealogy, often across several generations. This genealogical knowledge is not merely descriptive, but operates as the primary means by which belonging, recognition, and obligation are established within Somali society.
…to submit that the appellant could do likewise to prove his place in the Ashraf clan and obtain the support that it is found in OA at [259] is available from minority clans. I reject this based on the discrimination and other adverse treatment suffered by the appellant when previously in Somalia.
37. The appellant may have initial support through the FRS that will secure short term accommodation in the short term, as described in OA. Addressing the appellant’s prospects of securing a livelihood in Mogadishu thereafter, Mr Ahmed refers to the EUAA report (also cited in the CPIN) that “obtaining a job usually requires some support from relatives or clan members”. His opinion is that someone without such connections will not be able to support themselves. This is consonant with the CPIN and the two CG cases and I accept it, notwithstanding Mr Pugh’s submissions to the contrary.
38. As held in OA:
14. It will only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes.
39. Considering all the evidence, and carefully taking into account the parties’ submissions, I find that the appellant has satisfied that test.
Conclusion
40. The appellant faces a reasonable likelihood of persecution in his home area for reasons that the respondent accepts as engaging the Refugee Convention. It is agreed that there is no effective state protection in relation to the risk he faces. It is reasonably likely that the risk cannot be avoided by relocation to Mogadishu and, even if it could, such relocation would be unduly harsh in any event. Return would be contrary to Article 3 ECHR for the same reasons. Given the subject matter of the appeal, continued anonymity is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Notice of Decision
(i) The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
(ii) The Upper Tribunal remakes the decision by allowing the appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds.

J Neville
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 June 2026