Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001904

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00970/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRIMES

Between

LARRY JAMES KOFI MORRISON
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Lewis of Counsel, instructed by Kidd Rapinet Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarke promulgated on 21 January 2025, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his human rights claim in the context of deportation dated 7 February 2023 was dismissed.
2. There was previously a dispute as to the Appellant’s nationality, however the First-tier Tribunal found him to be a national of Ghana, a finding which has not been challenged. The Appellant was born in the United Kingdom on 24 May 1985 and has never left. The Appellant made human rights applications on 20 August 2017, 16 March 2018, 19 February 2019 and 28 March 2019 and also had an outstanding application for indefinite leave to remain on long residence grounds dated 20 October 2004.
3. On 30 January 2007, the Appellant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to supply and sentenced to two years and five months imprisonment.
4. On 2 July 2008, the Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twelve years.
5. On 13 July 2018, the Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to blackmail and sentenced to five years imprisonment, to be served consecutively following the expiry of his minimum term for murder.
6. The Respondent made a decision to deport the Appellant based on his criminal convictions on 26 September 2022, albeit that was withdrawn as it contained the wrong nationality for the Appellant. The decision under appeal is that of 7 February 2023 in which the Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claim essentially on the basis that the Appellant would be able to reintegrate in Ghana and maintain contact with family there; had no established family life in the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 8 and in all the circumstances there was nothing to outweigh the very high public interest in his deportation.
7. Judge Clarke dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 21 January 2025 for the following reasons. It was not in dispute that given the Appellant’s length of sentence, he could only succeed if there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in his deportation. However, the First-tier Tribunal first considered whether the family or private life exceptions were met before considering whether there were circumstances over and above these. In relation to the private life exception, the first question was whether the Appellant had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life, which is dealt with as follows in the decision:
“38. The ASA contends that the Appellant has been here lawfully for most of his life and, as he has been born here and lived here all his life, it would be incorrect to say that his residence was unlawful, as per Akinyemi v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 236.
39. I accept that the Appellant was born here, as is evidenced by his birth certificate. However, from his immigration history I cannot see that he has enjoyed lawful residence for most of his life. I acknowledge that he made various applications to regularise his status, but I cannot see that he has had legal status for most of his life.
40. The Appellant therefore fails the first limb of the test and thus he cannot succeed under the private life exception.”
8. As to the second question, the First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom having spent all of his life here with family and friends. As to the final question, the First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant would face obstacles if deported to Ghana where he has never been, although he has been brought up with knowledge of his Ghanaian heritage and has some family there whom his parents have visited in recent years and whom would be able to accommodate the Appellant until he establishes himself in Ghana. He would also benefit from continued emotional support and contact with family in the United Kingdom. It was further found that although studies showed it is difficult for ex-convicts to gain employment in Ghana, self-employment would be available to the Appellant and there were organisations to assist a person with integration. The Appellant has a degree in Social Sciences and other education from his time in prison, which he was able to navigate and succeed in; showing him to be resourceful and resilient. Overall, it was found that there would not be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration in Ghana to meet the final part of the private life exception.
9. In relation to the family life exception, the Appellant relied on a relationship with a British citizen and her daughter; but it was not found that there was a genuine and subsisting relationship with the latter. As to his partner, the First-tier Tribunal found that it would be unduly harsh for her to relocate to Ghana with the Appellant, but that it would not be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom without him. The findings in relation to the family life exception are not challenged.
10. The final part of the decision is whether there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation. The First-tier Tribunal noted that the Appellant had been convicted of one of the most serious crimes that anyone can commit, namely murder and that whilst in prison he committed a further serious offence of conspiracy to blackmail in the sum of £100,000, instigated by the Appellant and involved threatening a mature man and his family. The offence committed whilst in prison showed that the Appellant has not been rehabilitated. The First-tier Tribunal took into account that the Appellant had lived all of his life in the United Kingdom, was socially and culturally integrated here and had not been to Ghana. Further, he had a British citizen partner here; whose daughter’s best interests were considered; and wider family members in the United Kingdom as well. Overall, the public interest in deportation was found to be extremely strong and far outweighed the Appellant’s private and family life.
The appeal
11. The Appellant appeals on fives grounds, which in summary, are as follows:
(i) The First-tier Tribunal materially misdirected itself in law as to the meaning of lawful residence in section 117C(4)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, applying a meaning contrary to the decision in Akinyemi No. 1 [2017] 1 WLR 3118;
(ii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to properly take into account the Appellant’s immigration history as a positive factor in the balancing exercise which reduced the public interest in his deportation, as per Akinyemi No. 2 [2020] 1 WLR 1843. Further, it failed to properly take into account that the Appellant could have been registered as a British citizen or make an earlier application for leave to remain here and it was not his fault that this had not been done on his behalf when he was a child;
(iii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider evidence that the Appellant would not be able to establish himself in self-employment in Ghana because he is an ex-convict;
(iv) The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider the difficulties the Appellant would face on return to Ghana due to the stigma associated with being an ex-convict; which is relevant to the assessment of whether there were very significant obstacles to reintegration; and
(v) The third and fourth grounds also undermined the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that the Appellant would be supported and accommodated in Ghana by family members; from whom he would also face the same stigma, as he would due to their relationship with the Appellant.
12. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Lewis relied on his skeleton argument and expanded upon the same in oral submissions.
13. In relation to the first ground of appeal, Mr Lewis’ submission in essence was that where a person, such as the Appellant, is not a British citizen, was born in the United Kingdom, has never left and not been granted leave to remain, that person’s residence here is lawful. The requirement in exception 1 in section 117C(4)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”) that a person has been ‘lawfully resident’ in the United Kingdom for most of his or her life should be interpreted accordingly. In support of this, Mr Lewis relies first on the decision in Chief Adjudication Officer v Wolke [1997] 1 WLR 1640 and the key concept of immigration control in the United Kingdom being on a requirement for leave to enter and the Immigration Act of 1971 not prohibiting a foreign national being present in the United Kingdom, only prohibiting entry without leave and overstaying a grant of leave. This leaves a lacuna of those present, either because they were born in the United Kingdom or entered when there was not a requirement for them to have leave to enter; who have not entered without leave nor overstayed a grant of leave.
14. Mr Lewis further relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Akinyemi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 3118 (“Akinyemi No.1”) where the Mr Akinyemi, who was subject to deportation proceedings, was not in the United Kingdom ‘unlawfully’ because having been born here and never left, he was in the United Kingdom without being in breach of any legal obligation for entry or leave to remain. As such, a person like the Appellant was lawfully present for the purposes of section 117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act even though they are subject to immigration control, because there is no sanction on their presence.
15. Further to questions from the panel, Mr Lewis submitted that the lacunae identified in Wolke did not identify a third possible category of those who are present in the United Kingdom neither lawfully nor unlawfully and that instead a person has to be either lawfully here or unlawfully here. If presence is not unlawful, it must be lawful, particularly in this case given the absence of any prohibitions on the Appellant’s presence in the United Kingdom and for whom there is no criminal sanction for his presence. Mr Lewis relied on the principle that what is not forbidden is not unlawful and therefore must be lawful.
16. In relation to the second ground of appeal, Mr Lewis submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in failing to take into account the Appellant’s immigration history as a positive factor in the final balancing exercise as to whether there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation. The Appellant had lived in the United Kingdom all of his life and having been born here, could have been registered as a British citizen (after the age of 10 and prior to his first offending) but his parents failed to make the necessary application and an application for indefinite leave to remain was only made in 2004 (and then not decided until after deportation proceedings were commenced). As a child, the Appellant can not be blamed for the failure to regularise his status earlier and should not be prejudiced by the failures of others. At its highest, the First-tier Tribunal only refers to the Appellant never having lived in Ghana. For this ground, reliance is placed in particular on the decisions in Akinyemi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 1 WLR 1843 (“Akinyemi No.2”); CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 and Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47.
17. In relation to the third ground of appeal, Mr Lewis submitted that the First-tier Tribunal failed to have regard to relevant evidence as to the prospect (or lack thereof) of the Appellant establishing himself in self-employment in Ghana as an ex-convict; with material before the First-tier Tribunal and reference in the Appellant’s skeleton argument as to the stigma and hostility faced by ex-convicts in Ghana with one example of an ex-convict who could not re-establish his shoemaking business and of word spreading about convictions amongst the community leading to individuals being shunned and no likelihood of or need for specific research on a person.
18. In relation to the fourth ground of appeal, Mr Lewis submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to have regard to background country evidence as to the likely difficulty the Appellant would face re-establishing social relationships in Ghana due to the hostility and stigma he would face as an ex-convict, with people not wanting to be identified by association with an ex-convict either. Mr Lewis submitted that this is a paradigm example of very significant obstacles to reintegration as the Appellant would not have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted in Ghana and build up a variety of human relationships, also hindered because of his lack of familiarity with society in Ghana.
19. In relation to the final ground of appeal, Mr Lewis submitted that the First-tier Tribunal also failed to have regard to the impact of stigma including by association on the likelihood or otherwise of family members supporting the Appellant in Ghana and instead speculating that the Appellant would benefit from family support there, including providing accommodation and/or assistance.
20. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Ahmed relied on the amended rule 24 response and further oral submissions. The amended rule 24 response relied upon an additional matter, that although ostensibly the winner in the appeal, the Respondent would submit that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law for failing to give adequate reasons for finding that the Appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. There was no objection on behalf of the Appellant to this matter being raised, but for the reasons set out further below, it was not necessary to consider further and we do not need to set out the submissions made by either party in any greater detail.
21. Ms Ahmed opposed the first ground of appeal on the basis that there is a material difference between someone’s presence not being unlawful and a positive finding that is lawful; there being a distinction in the statutory scheme between section 117B(4) which refers to “unlawful” and section 117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act, which refers to “lawful” implying a difference in approach. Ms Ahmed did not accept that the ratio of either Akinyemi case was that a person born in the United Kingdom, even with an absolute right to citizenship after a certain age, was lawfully resident in the United Kingdom; with Akinyemi No.1 focusing only on the interpretation of section 117B(4) of the 2002 Act as to whether a person’s presence was unlawful. Ms Ahmed agreed with our proposition that there could be a third status which is that a person’s presence who was born here was neither lawful nor unlawful.
22. In addition in relation to the first ground of appeal, Ms Ahmed submitted that even if there was an error as to the lawfulness of the Appellant’s residence, it would not be material as in any event not all three limbs of the exception were met; nor were there in any event very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to outweigh the very significant public interest in deportation.
23. In relation to the second ground of appeal, Ms Ahmed submitted that this was no more than a complaint as to the conclusion reached by the First-tier Tribunal without any identification of an error of law. In particular she drew attention to the thorough and well reasoned nature of the First-tier Tribunal decision which expressly reference the Appellant having lived all of his life in the United kingdom, that he had never lived in Ghana and was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom; all of which were considered as relevant factors but not sufficient, in accordance with the appropriate self-direction to HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 to outweigh the public interest in deportation in this case.
24. The final three grounds of appeal, were in Ms Ahmed’s submission, all related to whether the First-tier Tribunal sufficiently engaged with the Baffour study relied upon and she submitted that overall, it had. In particular, there was express reference to the background country evidence but a reasoned finding that there was a difference between employment and self-employment when considering the Appellant’s ability to navigate life in Ghana further to his experiences in the United Kingdom, including adapting to prison and the resourceful and resilient nature he had applied here. Further, it was not necessary for the First-tier Tribunal to list each and every aspect of the background evidence and it was a matter for the Judge to attach appropriate weight to this evidence. Clear and cogent reasons were given as to why it was found that there would be a level of family support both within Ghana for accommodation and in any event from family in the United Kingdom who could provide financial support; which included adverse credibility findings about the Appellant’s knowledge of life in Ghana through family in the United Kingdom and through family who were in Ghana. Ms Ahmed further noted that the Appellant had not specifically relied on his family not offering support for any reasons of stigma due to his convictions. Overall, the First-tier Tribunal acknowledged that the Appellant would face difficulties on arrival in Ghana, but these did not, even cumulatively amount to very significant obstacles to reintegration.
Findings and reasons
25. The first issue for us to determine is whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in finding that the Appellant was not “lawfully resident” in the United Kingdom for most of his life. Although the First-tier Tribunal’s reasons on this point are relatively brief (as set out above in paragraphs 38 to 40 of its decision) we find that they contain no error of law for the following reasons.
26. First, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Akinyemi No.1 is not authority for the meaning of “lawfully resident” in section 117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act given that it deals solely with the meaning of “unlawful” in section 117B(4) of the same. We note the following paragraphs in particular:
“40. … The way in which the Supreme Court in ST’s case [2012] 2 AC 135 distinguished Szoma’s case illustrates – what would in truth be evident anyway – that the meaning of the language of section 117B(4) of the 2002 Act is not to be found by following decisions on the effect of cognate, though not identical, language in other statutes. The question is whether the reference in this particular context to a person being in the UK “unlawfully” is to their presence being in breach of UK law or is merely to their not having a positive vested right of residence. In my view the former construction is correct, for essentially two reasons.
41. First, as a matter of the ordinary use of language it seems to me unnatural to describe a person’s present in the UK as “unlawful” (which is not necessarily the same as not being “lawful”) when there is no specific legal obligation of which they are in breach by being here and no legal right to remove them – and all the more so where they have, as A did from the ages of four to 23, an absolute right at any time to acquire British nationality simply by making the necessary application.
42. Secondly, it seems to me that a construction which focuses on removability rather than a positive right to remain is more in keeping with the statutory context. Section 117B(4) is concerned with the establishment of a “private life” over a period of presence in the UK. The reason why it is reasonable to put little weight on private life established while a person’s presence in the country has been “unlawful” is surely that he or she has no legitimate expectation of their continuing presence in the country and may be removed at any time. It is similar, but a fortiori, to that underlying section 117B(5), relating to private life developed while a person’s immigration status is “precarious”. It is hard to see how that policy can apply to the situation of a person born in the United Kingdom to parents who were lawfully present and who in due course became settled, who is legally irremovable and who is entitled to acquire British nationality: such a person’s expectation that they will continue to live indefinitely in the UK is entirely legitimate.”
27. Secondly, as above, the Court of Appeal expressly acknowledged in paragraph 41 that “unlawful” is not necessarily the same as not being “lawful”. We do not accept that in the context of the immigration system, even with a key focus on entry requirements, that “lawful” and “unlawful” are the only two outcomes and that if a person is not here “unlawfully” it must always follow that they are here “lawfully”. The system, as recognised as well in Wolke is also dependent on grants of leave to remain (not just control of entry) with statutory provision for those with a right of abode in the United Kingdom or those who do not require leave to enter or remain, for example, but not limited to British citizens; but importantly does not include those born in the United Kingdom who remain present here thereafter. We find that “lawful” in the context of section 117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act denotes a specific permission granted to someone to live in the United Kingdom and not just that their presence here is tolerated to the extent that they are not here “unlawfully” or in breach of any obligations, such as for entry clearance or leave to enter.
28. Thirdly, as a matter of comparison, if “unlawful” and “lawful” were to be the complete opposite of each other with nothing inbetween, there is no reason for different words to be used in section 117B(4) and section 117C(4)(a) which of itself suggests they carry a different meaning. Otherwise, for consistency, one would expect both to use the same expression, with section 117C(4)(a) referring to being in the United Kingdom “not unlawfully” for most of their life.
29. Fourthly, the Court of Appeal in Akinyemi No. 2 appear to have proceeded on the basis that there was a finding that Mr Akinyemi was in the UK lawfully for the whole of his life [42] which follows what appears to have been Mr Akinyemi’s position, undisputed by the respondent [36]. However, there was no finding in Akinyemi No.1 nor in the Upper Tribunal’s decision which followed that the appellant’s status in that case was “lawful” only that his presence “has not been unlawful”. The point that arises in the present appeal as to the meaning of “lawfully resident” in section 117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act was not in issue nor is there any record of any submissions or decision upon it in any of Mr Akinyemi’s appeals. In these circumstances, we do not consider that there is any binding ratio or factual similarly to find that the Appellant before us was “lawfully resident” in the United Kingdom.
30. For these reasons, albeit not expressed by the First-tier Tribunal itself, we find that the Appellant was not “lawfully resident” in the United Kingdom for the purposes of meeting the first limb of exception 1 in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act and there was therefore no error of law on the first ground of appeal.
31. Although Mr Lewis submitted that the second ground of appeal was freestanding and not dependent on an error of law being found in the first ground, the two are closely linked and absent a finding that the Appellant was lawfully in the United Kingdom, it is difficult to identify a material error of law on the remaining basis in relation to the Appellant’s parents’ failure to make any application for British citizenship or leave to remain sooner; absent a positive immigration history of lawful residence and in circumstances where the factual context that the Appellant has lived all of his life in the United Kingdom and never been to Ghana has expressly been taken into account. Whilst we acknowledge that the earlier entitlement to British citizenship can be a relevant factor, we do not find in this case that reading the decision as a whole, there was any failure to properly take this into account that could have been material to the outcome in the final balancing exercise as to whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to outweigh the public interest in deportation.
32. We deal with the final three grounds of appeal together as they all raise distinct points about a single piece of evidence before the First-tier Tribunal; an article in the Criminal Justice Review from Georgia State University, ‘Perpetrators at First, Victims at Last: Exploring the Consequences of Sigmatization of Ex-Convicts’ Mental Well-Being’ by Baffour & others. The article details experiences from 20 male inmates in Ghana who after residing for a time in the community, were reincarcerated, of their own perception of stigmatization and degrading treatment as ex-convicts in areas of employment, relationships and family ties and in particular the impact on their mental well-being.
33. As a general point, we would emphasise that it is not necessary for a decision to refer to each and every aspect of a particular piece of evidence (or even every piece of evidence as a whole) and that the decision must be read as a whole; with the weight attached to evidence being primarily a matter for the Judge hearing the case. In relation to the findings generally as to whether the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to reintegration in Ghana, we note there were a number of adverse credibility findings and a number of positive findings as to the Appellant’s personal qualities and family support, both within Ghana and from relatives in the United Kingdom who could provide him with emotional support, guidance and financial support. We also note the acceptance by the First-tier Tribunal of obstacles that will be faced by the Appellant in Ghana, some of which, such as in relation to employment, would be significant; but that even cumulatively, these would not reach the elevated threshold of “very significant obstacles”.
34. In particular, the Appellant relies on three specific points. First, in relation to self-employment, the report includes:
“Other participants who tried to set up their own businesses postprison were also not successful. Dramani lamented how: “Before I was imprisoned, I was a shoemaker, but when I went back and wanted to practice, people were not patronizing my service and I had to stop.”
35. The First-tier Tribunal distinguished the opportunities for self-employment from the difficulties of employment on the basis essentially that the Appellant would not be likely to be identified as an ex-convict when running his own business (from which we infer, as opposed to any questions he may be asked for employment and need to disclose the same). The First-tier Tribunal acknowledged that there are articles online about the Appellant’s convictions but potential customers to a business would not come across the same without specifically searching the Appellant’s name online in advance. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Lewis essentially relies on an inference from the background material that everyone would know about the Appellant’s background and gossip within the community such that internet searches would not be necessary. However, on return from the United Kingdom, it is far from established that that would be the case without the background searching relied upon in the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning. Overall, we find that the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that the Appellant would have the option of self-employment in Ghana to be open to it on the evidence and for the reasons given and as such, there is no error of law on the third ground of appeal.
36. Secondly, in relation to stigma and difficulties establishing social relationships, the article includes:
“In addition to being denied access to see family members, ex-convicts struggled to make new friends and establish intimate relationships. For example, Nene pointed out that “In the community, nobody wants to be identified as an ex-convict’s friend or girlfriend; even if the person is willing to, her family and friends will not allow that to happen.” Participants lamented difficulties in having and maintaining friendships or any kind of relationship with nonincarcerated people in the community. …”
37. The article refers to ‘struggles’ and ‘difficulties’ in relationships, but does not in our view provide sufficient evidence of very significant obstacles to participate in social relationships in Ghana and we find the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of the Appellant’s education, personal resilience and navigating challenges, as well as family support is relevant to balance against these potential difficulties, even if not expressly referred to. As above, we take into account the reasoning as a whole without the need for the First-tier Tribunal to refer to each and every aspect of a particular article. On this particular point, an express reference was not required and even if it not been considered in the mix (and there is nothing to suggest it was not given the number of references to the article), it would have remained open to the First-tier Tribunal to reach the conclusion it did on all of the evidence that there were not very significant obstacles to reintegration. We find no error of law on the fourth ground of appeal for these reasons.
38. Thirdly, in relation to stigma from family members and on family members by association with an ex-convict, the article includes:
“… The participants struggled to comprehend why they were treated harshly and different by their own families and friends. …”
39. This is a point that was not specifically relied upon by the Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal as to why his own family members would not be willing to provide support or accommodation to him in Ghana. There were a number of reasons given in evidence as to why family support would not be available, including the lack of financial means and lack of contact with particular individuals; all of which was considered and rejected by the First-tier Tribunal who found that the Appellant could stay with his father’s uncle or that there was otherwise no space in any of the family properties to accommodate the Appellant until he establishes himself. If individual family members would also stigmatize the Appellant as an ex-convict or be concerned about stigmatization by association, it would be reasonably expected that this would be expressly relied upon by the Appellant’s mother or father. At its highest, the Appellant’s mother confirmed that her relative does not know of the Appellant’s convictions and if they knew, they would be less likely to support him, not that they would not do so for that reason. There were no similar comments in relation to paternal relatives, one of whom was more expressly relied upon as being able to provide accommodation. In the absence of express reliance on this point and knowledge of the Appellant’s relatives actual attitudes, it is not an error of law for the First-tier Tribunal not to expressly consider whether this applies to the Appellant’s particular family members. It is further not an error of law for the First-tier Tribunal to find that support would be available from family, particularly given the adverse credibility findings on the evidence presented on this. In any event, it was found that the Appellant would have financial support available from family in the United Kingdom. For these reasons, there is no error of law on the final ground of appeal.
40. We make one final overarching point on the facts in this appeal, in that even had we found that there was a material error of law on any, or even all of the grounds relied upon by the Appellant in this appeal; we would not have found that even cumulatively these could have been material to the outcome of the appeal in all of the circumstances of this case. The Appellant could only succeed in his appeal if he could establish very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions in section 117C of the 2002 Act to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
41. In this particular case, the public interest in deportation is at the highest possible level given the nature of the Appellant’s offending, having received a life sentence with a minimum tariff of 12 years for murder and a further sentence of five years’ imprisonment for a further offence of conspiracy to blackmail committed whilst he was in prison. In accordance with section 117C(2) of the 2002 Act, the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation of the criminal and murder is one of the most, if not the most serious offence. It is difficult to envisage circumstances which could outweigh that very significant public interest, but in our view, even if the Appellant could meet all three limbs of the first exception on private life grounds (which he does not) the only additional factor of substance over and above that is his length of residence in the United Kingdom from birth with the potential for at least part of that period for him to have been registered as a British citizen. In our view, that would still fall very far short of establishing very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deporting a person who has been convicted of murder and has gone on to commit a further offence whilst in prison.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is not necessary to set aside the decision.
The decision to dismiss the appeal is therefore confirmed.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15th January 2025