Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001915 & UI-2025-001918
First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/02443/2024 & EA/02174/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

(1) JOANITA ASABEA ARKAAH
(2) SHILLA YANKYERA ARKAAH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Sponsor
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester on 2 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellants appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their appeals made under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 against decisions refusing them EU Settlement Scheme Family Permits.
2. The First-tier Tribunal considered the appeals together on the papers and sent its single decision to the appellants on 25 February 2025.
Relevant Facts
3. The appellants are sisters and Ghanian nationals. Joanita is aged 23. Shilla is aged 20. Their sponsor is their father, Mark Arkaah, who is an Italian national residing in the United Kingdom. Their mother, Beatrice Yankyira, resides in Ghana.
4. The appellants applied for EUSS Family Permits on 23 October 2023. Their applications were refused, on different grounds, by decisions dated 4 September 2024.
First appellant
5. In respect of Joanita the decision details, inter alia:
“To enable the Secretary of State to fully consider your application you and the EEA citizen sponsor as stated in your application form were contacted regarding your willingness to attend an eligibility interview to gather further information about your application.
However, after multiple failed attempts to arrange this interview with you via email on 11 July 2024 and 15 August 2024, we were unfortunately unable to complete our enquiries.”
6. The respondent referenced Annex 2.2 to 2.4 of Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules and concluded:
“In light of the above, and on the basis of the information and supporting documentation that you have provided in isolation, I am not satisfied that you are related as stated to your EEA citizen sponsor.
I am therefore not satisfied that you meet the eligibility requirements for an EUSS Family Permit in accordance with Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.”
Second appellant
7. The respondent’s decision in respect of Shilla focused upon two birth certificates provided by her:
“I am satisfied that in relation to your application, whether or not to your knowledge, you provided false or misleading information in support of your application.
You state that you are the child of your EEA citizen sponsor. In order to demonstrate that you are related as stated you have provided a (sic) Ghana birth certificates. The Home Office has sought verification of these documents in order to corroborate the claim that you are related as stated to your EEA sponsor. Checks were conducted on these documents and the results recorded in a Documentation Verification Report held by this department. These enquiries have confirmed that the Ghana birth certificates to confirm your relationship are not genuine documents.”
8. Two documentation verification reports are filed in these proceedings. The first report, dated 4 April 2024, addresses a printed “certified copy of entry in register of births” sealed in Accra on 23 March 2023. A Senior Assistant Registrar assessed the certificate to be fraudulent following internal checks. A copy of the certificate is stamped “not traced”.
9. The second report is dated the same day and is concerned with a partially printed and partially handwritten “birth certificate” dated 30 December 2005. The same Senior Assistant Registrar confirmed that the document has been assessed to be fraudulent following internal checks. A copy of the certificate is stamped “not traced”.
10. The respondent’s decision proceeds:
“I am satisfied that refusal on this basis is proportionate because it is clear from the evidence you have submitted that it is likely you were aware of the deception on the basis of your statement that you are the child of the EEA sponsor. Furthermore, you have signed a declaration on your application form that the information you have provided is true to the best of your knowledge and belief and you have also acknowledged that if false information is given, your application could be refused.”
11. The appellants exercised their statutory right of appeal and requested that it be considered on the papers.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
12. The First-tier Tribunal observed at [9]-[10] of its decision:
“9. The appeal process provides for a disappointed appellant potentially to demonstrate to the Tribunal, by the provision of evidence, both oral and documentary, that the decision made by the respondent was in error. Here it was the choice of the appellant, presumably in reality the choice of their stated sponsor, not to request oral hearings. Had such been arranged the sponsor could have attended and have given evidence in person, potentially responding to any Home Office queries in cross-examination and answering any questions of clarification put by the Tribunal. That did not occur.
10. In essence neither appellant, nor the sponsor, has engaged with the appeal process beyond the submission of a Notice of Appeal. It is clear from the refusal reasons that a response was required by the appellants if they were to attempt to persuade the Tribunal that the Home Office decisions were inappropriate or incorrect. That opportunity has not been taken by either appellant, nor by the sponsor on their behalves.”
13. Its findings are located at [11]-[12]:
“11. Further to the above reasoning neither appellant has countered the assertion as to the provision of false documentation. Accordingly in that specific respect the respondent is found to have discharged her burden as to the appellants deploying false documentation with their applications. The consequences are that the overall burden, which rested with the appellants, has not been discharged in their favour.
14. The refusal decisions are found to have been appropriately reasoned and not in error when considered against the requirements of Appendix EU (Family Permit) to HC 395 as to the use of false documentation by the appellants. Accordingly, neither appellant succeeds under the 2020 Regulations.”
Grounds of Appeal
15. The grounds of appeal are signed by the appellants but appear to have been drafted by someone else. This was confirmed by Mr Arkaah before me.
16. Reliance is placed upon Joanita not having been considered by the respondent to have relied upon false documents.
17. Complaint is also made in respect of the First-tier Tribunal relying upon the appellants not attending an interview:
“3. The judge erred in the sense that no such evidence – interview letters were ever served on the appellants which would have allowed them to respond save the refusal letters which were ably challenged in the grounds of appeal and the subsequent submissions made thereon on the appeal forms.”
18. As to Shilla complaint is made:
“9. Respectfully, it is not clear from the judgment the particular evidence which the judge relied upon in concluding that the appellants relied on a false information. Normally and this is well-known fact by this Tribunal when it comes to birth certificates from Ghana, a DOCUMENT VERIFICATION REPORT – DVR is always supplied by the Respondent but in this case, none was put before the appellants save the mere assertion made in the refusal letter in the case of the SECOND APPELLANT which was duly contested on the appeal form.”
19. By a decision sent to the parties on 28 August 2025 permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor.
Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules
20. Annex 2.2 to 2.4 provides:
“(2) For the purposes of deciding whether the applicant meets the eligibility requirements for entry clearance, the entry clearance officer may:
(a) request that the person (“P”) on whom the applicant relies as being the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, the qualifying British citizen) with whom the applicant is in a family relationship provide information or evidence about their relationship with the applicant, their current or planned residence in the UK or (where P is a qualifying British citizen) their residence in a country listed in sub-paragraph (a)(i) of the entry for ‘EEA citizen’ in the table at Annex 1 to this Appendix; or
(b) invite P to be interviewed by the entry clearance officer in person, by telephone, by video-telecommunications link or over the internet.
(3) If the applicant or (as the case may be) P:
(a) fails within a reasonable timeframe specified in the request to provide the information or evidence requested; or
(b) on at least two occasions, fails to comply with an invitation to attend an interview in person or with other arrangements to be interviewed,
the entry clearance officer may draw any factual inferences about whether the applicant meets the eligibility requirements for entry clearance as appear appropriate in the circumstances.
(4) The entry clearance officer may decide, following the drawing of a factual inference under sub-paragraph (3), that the applicant does not meet the eligibility requirements for entry clearance.”
Hearing
21. Mr Arkaah attended the hearing. He had previously filed a skeleton bundle and a small bundle of documents, including statements from himself, the appellants and their mother that post-date the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
22. He confirmed that he could understand me. With the aid of Mr Tan providing relevant information, it was agreed that requests for interviews were emailed to Mr Arkaah’s personal email address. He explained that when he receives an email, he will check. He confirmed that he did not receive an invite to an interview. Mr Arkaah’s correct mobile phone number is also on the Home Office system.
23. Mr Arkaah was asked about the appellants’ entry clearance application forms. Both had provided the same email address as being their contact email. It begins “esselfelix”. He explained that the appellants do not have email addresses, so gave the address of a friend of his who is in Accra, Ghana. He accepted that he has not asked his friend if an invite to an interview had been sent to the “esselfelix” account.
24. The IAFT-6 forms filed with the grounds of appeal to this Tribunal has the Mr Arkaah’s name and address on the form, but his recorded email address begins “teifrancis”. Mr Arkaah confirmed that this email address belongs to “Tete” who completed the appeal forms.
Discussion
First appellant
25. I address Joanita’s appeal in short terms. The First-tier Tribunal erred in fact and materially erred in law in finding that Joanita had relied upon false documents in her application: R (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982.
26. The material error adversely infected the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of Joanita’s appeal, and the proper course is to set it aside in its entirety.
27. By means of his skeleton argument, Mr Arkaah asked me to reconsider Joanita’s appeal on the papers. However, I consider the proper approach is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to permit Mr Arkaah and Joanita the ability to address the allegation concerning the failure to attend an interview.
28. I am concerned that “Felix” and “Tete” are persons engaged in facilitating immigration appeals in this country for Ghanian nationals. It may be that providing their email address permits them some degree of control over the appeal process. In any event, I am satisfied that the interview requests were sent to Felix as this was the email address provided by Joanita as her contact address. This was sufficient for the purposes of the respondent.
29. However, Mr Tan accepted that requests were also sent to Mr Arkaah’s personal email address. In the circumstances, it is appropriate that Mr Arkaah be provided the opportunity to address why he states he did not receive the requests. This may require him to explain whether he checks his spam email, and to check his old emails.
Second appellant
30. I observe that the biographic page of Shilla’s Ghanian passport was filed with the First-tier Tribunal.
31. Mr Arkaah accepted before me that both he and Shilla were aware of the false documentation allegation when the appeal was filed with the First-tier Tribunal. Save for denial in the grounds of appeal, no additional evidence was produced. In the circumstances, I have some sympathy for the First-tier Tribunal.
32. However, one important fact was not considered by the First-tier Tribunal. The respondent takes no issue with the genuineness of Shilla’s Ghanian passport, which records the same birth date as the challenged birth certificates. The existence of the passport does not by itself establish the birth certificates as genuine. Indeed, it is possible that the latter secured the former. However, this may not be the case. In the circumstances, it was a relevant fact that should properly have been placed into the assessment. The First-tier Tribunal was aware that a litigant in person had requested a paper consideration of her appeal, and fairness required that matters favourable to the appellant be noted and taken into account.
33. I appreciate that Shilla may have an uphill struggle in light of the documentation verification report, but I conclude that the approach adopted to the evidence before it by the First-tier Tribunal was unfair and establishes a material error of law. The decision is properly to be set aside in its entirety.
34. Consequently, Shilla’s appeal should properly be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
35. I consider it appropriate for there to be an in person oral hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. It is a matter for Mr Arkaah if he attends. His closest hearing centre is Manchester.
Notice of Decision
36. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 25 February 2025 is subject to material error of law and is set aside in its entirety.
37. The hearing of the appellants’ appeals is to be heard at the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Manchester.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 December 2025