Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001925

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64421/2023
LP/08564/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

MOI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E. Fripp, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms L. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a citizen of Chad, appeals against the decision (“the decision”) dated 8 February 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Aziz (“the judge”), which dismissed his asylum and international protection claim.
2. We do not consider it necessary to set out the procedural background to this claim in detail. Suffice to say that the appellant, who was born in 2000, made his asylum and international protection claim on 18 November 2021, on his arrival in the UK. His claim is founded on a fear of honour-based violence arising from a blood feud between his and another family. The appellant states that if he returns to his village, he will be killed; and that, as the men who control his village are well-connected, he would be tracked down and killed if he were to try to settle elsewhere in Chad. His claim was refused on 22 November 2023; and the appellant appealed. It appears that the judge’s decision in respect of that appeal was promulgated three days after the hearing on 5 February 2025. The decision, however, was only communicated to the appellant on 17 March 2025, for reasons that we will discuss below. On 18 March 2025, he instructed new solicitors, who applied for permission to appeal and an extension of time to do so.
3. A factor that we shall also discuss in further detail below is that the appellant’s journey from Chad to the UK, commencing on 4 December 2019, took almost two years to complete; and in the course of that journey the appellant travelled through Libya, Malta, Italy and France.
4. The appellant’s grounds (“the grounds”) are as set out in the document dated 27 March 2025 and are augmented by the renewed grounds dated 29 April 2025. Mr Fripp today has used the former document as the basis of his oral submissions. We summarise those grounds as follows as taken from that document.
I. Unfairness arising from the failures of the appellant’s previous solicitors (hereafter, “MLC”).
II. The adverse credibility finding made per section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 (“AITCA 2004”) is unsustainable.
III. The other adverse credibility findings are also unsustainable.
IV. The judge failed to give adequate reasons in rejecting the appellant’s sur place claim.
V. The judge failed adequately to consider the trafficking element of the appellant’s claim.
5. Permission to appeal on all grounds was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Grey on 30 June 2025.
6. Mr Fripp’s today only advanced, and Ms Clewley only responded to, the first three grounds in oral submissions today. Accordingly, we shall only consider the first three grounds herein.
7. Turning to the first ground, Mr Fripp argues that the appellant did not have a fair hearing before the judge, relying on R v CICB ex parte A [1999] UKHL 21 for the proposition that it should therefore be set aside.
8. An application dated 22 August 2025 under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedures (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 was made to admit further evidence not before the judge. That evidence included, among other documents, the appellant’s statement dated 26 March 2025; and two witness statements: one from a support worker working with a pro-bono legal help group that had assisted the appellant, whom we shall refer to herein as “LS”, dated 27 March 2025; and the other made by “BMG”, a support worker employed by the appellant’s present solicitors, dated 28 March 2025. That Rule 15(2A) application was not opposed; and we have granted it on the basis that the documents are plainly relevant to the appeal before us.
9. The appellant’s statement dated 26 March 2025 sets out his complaints in respect of MLC. Mr Fripp has particularised them and we summarise as follows.
i. MLC failed to take adequate instructions from the appellant.
ii. MLC failed to address the fact that the record of his screening interview dated 18 October 2021 is largely blank.
iii. The appellant’s witness statement (apparently undated; but stated in the index before us to be dated 15 July 2024) that MLC advanced to the judge had not been approved by him.
iv. Although MLC purported to adopt a “previous asylum statement”, this has still not been seen by the appellant.
v. MLC failed to provide the appellant with an opportunity to give instructions to or receive advice from his counsel at the hearing before the judge.
10. The witness statements of LS and BMG record at least some of the complaints made to them by the appellant in respect of MLC. Both LS and BMG describe difficulties in engaging with MLC. In particular, LS states that the judge’s decision was only communicated to her on 12 March 2025, as the appellant contends.
11. The focus of Mr Fripp’s submissions on this ground has however been a witness statement dated 4 September 2005 made by counsel, whom we shall refer to as “JB”. JB states that she is familiar with MLC and has observed a pattern of concerning practices, which include repeated missed deadlines. Quoting from an email dated 20 May 2025 in respect of a different matter, JB wrote to MLC, raising that the reasons for refusal in that matter were “heavily based on the fact that his case is said to lack detail and specificity”: where the Home Office had asked that claimant to provide additional evidence and MLC had not assisted him to do so. JB adds that, although there appear to be only two fee earners working on immigration cases, MLC have 15 registered offices, and in the year 2024/5 opened 3,274 legal files. She reports that MLC has lost its immigration legal aid contract. Again, there was no objection to JB’s witness statement being put before us; and again we have admitted it into evidence on the basis that it is plainly relevant.
12. Mr Fripp argues that JB’s statement gives credence to the assertions made by the appellant at (i) to (v) above. JB is an independent professional who has given what is nothing more than an honest, professional view. The concerns that JB raises about MLC on a general basis echo in the specific alleged failings the appellant relies on in his own matter. JB’s statement, together with those of JS and BMG, provides the supporting evidence by which the appellant discharges the burden of proof upon him to establish on the balance of probabilities that the appellant’s account of matters (i) to (v) above is true; and that matters (i) to (v), individually and together, constitute procedural unfairness sufficient for us to find a material error of law.
13. In response to points (i) to (v) above, Ms Clewley submits that where the appellant argues that there has been procedural unfairness, it is indeed for him to discharge the burden of proof; and he has not done so. Even if JB is right in what she says about MLC generally, it does not follow that the appellant himself has been poorly served by them. And even if the appellant’s complaints are fair, it does not follow that there would be a material error of law: Ms Clewley draws our attention to [31] of the decision, where it is clear that the judge was relying on the appellant’s oral evidence in making his assessment. Even if the appellant’s statement had not been read back to him, the judge was entitled to make adverse credibility findings: as the oral evidence he heard does not fall away just because the appellant was unfamiliar with his written evidence. The same point is made as to whether there was a “previous asylum statement”, or indeed whether full instructions were taken and advice given: the appellant’s oral evidence still stands available for the judge to make findings upon. And if the appellant’s solicitors – or indeed counsel – did not take the point that the screening interview is indeed largely blank, it is a matter for them to run the case as they deem appropriate. A failure to take a point does not amount to unfairness.
14. Ms Clewley specifically cautions against what, if we were to agree with Mr Fripp’s approach, she says would amount to going behind the regulatory process. In any event, it would be necessary, at a minimum, for there to be evidence before us that MLC had been referred to the Solicitors Regulation Authority, for us to rely on JB’s assertion that MLC has lost its legal aid contract.
15. On this point, we must disagree with Ms Clewley. We consider that we are able to take judicial notice that MLC’s legal aid contract has indeed been withdrawn. That it has been withdraw gives credence to JB’s account. But even if we did not take judicial notice of this fact, reading JB’s statement as a whole, we find it compelling and thorough evidence that recounts serious failings in the services provided by MLC. We consider that JB’s evidence chimes with the statements of LS and BMG, both of which detail specific concerns with MLC in the context of the appellant’s case. These statements constitute third-party evidence which form the basis on which the appellant has, on the balance of probabilities, persuaded us that MLC has failed to provide an adequate service.
16. In making our findings, we are conscious that there is no representative from MLC to address what are, in effect, complaints made by the appellant against MLC. We also agree with Ms Clewley that, taking (ii) in isolation and without further context, the failure to address the screening interview being predominantly blank would not amount to a material error of law. Any of contentions (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) however are not a matter of professional discretion, but of competence. In the absence of representations from MLC and to avoid inappropriate and unnecessary specificity, we make a global finding that there was procedural unfairness to the appellant: in that the service provided by MLC to the appellant was insufficient to provide the appellant with adequate representation at the First-Tier Tribunal hearing on 5 February 2025. This amounts to a material error of law.
17. Having found this error of law, it follows that the decision should be set aside and the appeal remitted for reconsideration de novo.
18. We shall go on to consider the appellant’s credibility per grounds 2 and 3. Taking ground 2 first, it is said that the judge’s section 8 AITCA 2004 finding amounts to an error of law in that the credibility assessment underpinning it is unsustainable. The parts of section 8 of particular relevance to the decision provide:
“Claimant’s credibility
(1) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person who makes an asylum claim or a human rights claim, a deciding authority shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of any behaviour to which this section applies.
[…]

(4) This section also applies to failure by the claimant to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to make an asylum claim or human rights claim while in a safe country.”
19. The question under section 8(4) becomes what a “reasonable opportunity” amounts to, where a claimant has passed through safe countries on route to the UK. Simon Brown LJ and Newman J, sitting in the Divisional Court, addressed this in R v Uxbridge Magistrates Court and Another, ex parte Adimi [2001] QB 667. To do so, they turned firstly to Article 31(1) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”), which provides:
“The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”
20. We quote two points drawn from the Convention in Adimi: the first, per Simon Brown LJ at paragraphs 19 and 20, relates to the length of time a claimant may have taken to travel through safe countries; the second, per Newman LJ, to travel through safe countries per se.
“[19] It is worth quoting in this regard the UNHCR‘s own Guidelines with regard to the Detention of Asylum Seekers:

"The expression ‘coming directly’ in Article 31(1) covers the situation of a person who enters the country in which asylum is sought directly from the country of origin, or from another country where his protection, safety and security could not be assured. It is understood that this term also covers a person who transits an intermediate country for a short period of time without having applied for, or received, asylum there. No strict time limit can be applied to the concept ‘coming directly’ and each case must be judged on its merits."

[20] Having regard to Article 35 of the Convention, it seems to me that such Guidelines should be accorded considerable weight…’

[…]

“[69] I agree with my Lord’s interpretation of the scope of Article 31(1) of the Convention. A strict linguistic interpretation points to the character of the illegality being the fact or presence or entry “without authorisation”. On this interpretation the illegality of the means, whereby entry or presence without authorisation had been achieved, would be outside it. No one contends for such a limited interpretation. The Convention is a living instrument, changing and developing with the times so as to be relevant and to afford meaningful protection to refugees in the conditions in which they currently seek asylum. Apart from the current necessity to use false documents another current reality and advance, occurring since 1951, is the development of a readily accessible and worldwide network of air travel. As a result there is a choice of refuge beyond the first safe territory by land or sea. There have been distinctive and differing state responses to requests for asylum. Thus there exists a rational basis for exercising choice where to seek asylum. I am unable to accept that to recognise it is to legitimise forum shopping.”
21. This approach was approved in R v Asfaw [2008] UKHL 31. It follows from it that the fact a claimant may have passed through safe countries before arriving in the UK does not in itself defeat their claim; nor is there any particular time limit after which the amount of time spent in safe countries will be regarded as to long. As Simon Brown LJ says, each case must be judged on its own merits.
22. Mr Fripp concedes in his skeleton that a failure to make a claim in a safe country may affect credibility. He contends, however, that it does not automatically do so. For the judge to make an adverse finding under section 8 AITCA 2004, he needed to explain why; and the judge’s reasons for making the adverse credibility finding are inadequate.
23. The reasons for the judge making the s.8 AITCA 2004 finding are contained in [18] to [22] of the decision. We quote [22] in full, as it summarises the judge’s reasons.
“It took the appellant two years to travel from Chad to the United Kingdom and this could not have been achieved without a level of ingenuity on his part and assistance and direction from others. I find that there was a greater level of support available than he was letting on and that the appellant was not as isolated or bereft of assistance as he was making out. This was evident in his occasional references to being in groups of other asylum seekers in similar predicaments. Despite being poorly educated, he was not as ignorant of the fact that he could have claimed asylum in other countries as he was sometimes making out. For example, it was telling that at one point in his evidence he spoke of his awareness of asylum seekers who had their asylum claims refused taking painful measures to damage their fingerprints in order to make another asylum claim. He was therefore amongst people who are familiar with the asylum process in these European countries. I find that there was ample opportunity for him to claim asylum in Malta, Italy or France and the decision not to do so was deliberate because he wanted to come to the United Kingdom. There is no good reason why he did not claim asylum in Italy or France. I make a section 8 finding against the appellant. I factor this into account in my global assessment of credibility.”
24. The difficulty here is that there is a circularity in the judge’s reasons. The judge in effect decided that the appellant is not to be believed because he did not claim asylum elsewhere. The correct approach is clearly set out in section 8(4) AITCA 2004: it is to determine whether the appellant had reasonable opportunity to do so; only if it is found that he had reasonable opportunity and did not that an adverse credibility finding should be made. The only specific reason the judge gives in [22] for disbelieving the appellant’s self-confessed ignorance of the options available to him is that, in giving evidence of other asylum seekers who had taken painful measures to escape detection, the appellant had demonstrated awareness of the asylum process more generally. We are not satisfied that that this by itself addresses the appellant’s contention that he both did not know that he could claim asylum in the countries he passed through; and was in any event so frightened of the treatment of other asylum seekers that he would have feared to do so. As the judge found at [21] that the appellant “…may well have witnessed others he was travelling with suffer misfortune and mistreatment”, we consider that the appellant’s professed fear has not been adequately considered by the judge.
25. We are also troubled by the findings in [22] themselves. The judge accepts that the appellant passed through Libya, Malta, Italy and France at [18]. At [22] the judge finds that there was “…ample opportunity for him to claim asylum in Malta, Italy or France…”: not Libya, albeit that, as we shall consider further below, the period the appellant spent in Libya seems to have been counted against him. In the next sentence the judge finds that “There is no good reason why he did not claim in Italy or France.” It is unclear why the appellant is found to have had opportunity to have claimed asylum in Malta but, as distinct from Italy or France, not found to have no good reason not to do so.
26. The judge’s reference to Libya takes us to the judge’s finding at [22] that the appellant’s journey took place over two years. It appears to have been accepted by the judge at [19] that, per the respondent’s decision letter dated 22 November 2023, the appellant was in Libya for a significant amount of time: having been detained there for a combined period of eight months. However, there is no finding as to how much time the appellant spent in Libya beyond this, notwithstanding the reference at [19] to his having worked there. In our view, the time spent in Libya is, on the facts found by the judge, irrelevant; and should not have counted against him. As there is no finding as to how much time was spent in Libya, it is unclear what proportion of the two-year journey took place in Malta, Italy and France combined; which ambiguity undermines any foundation for making an adverse credibility finding. Moreover, we do not accept, as the judge did in [22], that it follows necessarily from the total length of journey that it required “a level of ingenuity and direction from others” to achieve it. To our mind, the only relevance of the time the appellant spent in Libya would have been if that time had demonstrated ingenuity and direction from others. We cannot see how eight months’ detention demonstrates any such thing; nor, in itself, how an unspecified period of work does so.
27. In conclusion, the judge’s adverse credibility finding under section 8 AICTA 2004 is unsafe. It is true that two years is, at least on its face, not a “short period” for the purpose of the UNHCR Guidelines considered by Simon Brown LJ in Adimi. But as the judge has not made a finding as to how much time was spent in total in the safe countries that the appellant visited, the length of the relevant journey period as not been established. Nor, for whatever that period is, has the appellant’s case in respect of it been weighed up: rather, the judge has decided that the length of time in itself speaks against the appellant. We remind ourselves, as set out above, that the UNHCR Guidelines propose no particular time limit; and that each matter must be considered on its own merits. We also remind ourselves, per Newman J at paragraph 69 of Adimi, that “there exists a rational basis for exercising choice where to seek asylum”. The judge’s reasons are inadequate to support a credibility finding under section 8 AICTA 2004; and that finding amounts to a further material error of law.
28. The third ground argues that the adverse credibility findings in [30] to [39] are also unsafe. Having stated without qualification at the end of [22] that “I factor this [section 8] finding into my global assessment of credibility”, we find that the third ground is thereby made out. However, we turn to the matters specifically raised in the third ground and summarise them as follows.
a. The judge failed to consider credibility in the context of the background of the country in question.
b. The appellant’s account of the detention of his father in [36] has a clear rationale and is not prima facie contradictory.
c. In finding at [38] that the men said to be controlling the appellant’s village would not be powerful enough to locate the appellant, the judge demanded evidence that the appellant could not be expected to provide.
d. The finding at [39] that there is an insufficiency of detail in the appellant’s account is unreasonable in the context of the decision failing to address: that the screening interview was blank; the aforementioned “previous appeal statement” was absent; and the eroding effect the five-year period of delay between the appellant’s oral evidence and the events themselves would inevitably have had.
29. In advancing (a), Mr Fripp relies upon Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1123 for the proposition that a judge in the UK should not assess credibility otherwise than by reference to the background information pertaining to that country. We quote from [30] and [31] of the decision.
…The respondent notes that the appellant has been very contradictory about what title/position of authority is held by the agents of persecution he fears, [SA] and [SN].

The appellant accepted during cross-examination that in his interview, statement and oral evidence he has variously referred to these individuals as belonging to militia, belonging to the army, or belonging to the police. It was pointed out to him that these are very distinct groups and the appellant was asked to clarify which group [SA] and [SN] belonged to. This is a fair observation. Broadly speaking, militia are normally civilian soldiers that are aligned ‘with’ or ‘against’ the state. An army contains professional soldiers involved in the defence of the state. Police are involved with maintaining law and order within a state. When pressed on the matter the appellant state that his illiteracy and lack of education meant that he was unable to provide precise information as to their exact title. All he knows is that they controlled his village.
30. We cannot see anything inherently suspect in the appellant’s answer. The judge has made two presumptions: that the categories of army, militia and police are as distinct in Chad as they are in the UK; and that the appellant is able consistently to differentiate consistently between them. On the latter presumption, the judge relies only and inadequately at [32] on the appellant’s brother being in the army as reason to expect the appellant to be sufficiently familiar with army organisation to be able to so differentiate. We cannot see anything in the decision adequately addressing the former presumption at all.
31. As to (b), we again cannot see anything inherently suspect in the appellant’s answer at [36]:
The appellant also explained in his interview and at the hearing that as part of the blood feud the victim’s family must kill a male member of his family. This being the case, the appellant is quite fairly asked at AIR 73-76 why his father was not killed. The appellant says it is because his father is old. He is then fairly asked why his father is then being detained if the real aim is to kill him or his brother. The appellant pleads his ignorance to this question. At the hearing, the appellant continued to maintain that he believed that his father was still being detained and that the last contact he had with his family when he was in Libya confirmed this.
32. The appellant has not been in Chad since November 2019. We cannot see how he can be expected to know what is happening to his father, nor anything beyond a historic understanding of why. We agree with the judge that it is a fair question to ask why the appellant’s father has not been killed. But there is nothing on the face of it to suggest that the appellant failed to provide a fair answer to the best of his knowledge, even if that answer was inevitably lacking in detail.
33. As to point (c). At [38], we disagree that the appellant’s evidence is prima facie inconsistent. The judge finds:
“…the appellant was unable to provide satisfactory evidence establishing that [SA] and [SN] have the power and reach to locate him throughout Chad and have influence and connections with political figures throughout the country. The appellant’s evidence on this was wholly unconvincing. On the one hand, he was keen to maintain that he was an uneducated and illiterate person from a small village in Chad. So much so that he could not even correctly identify which security/defence agency [SA] and [SN] belonged to. That is why he variously referred to them as being in the army, the police or the militia. On the other hand, despite this profound level of ignorance, he was sure that [SA] and [SN] were so powerful and influential that they had the power and reach to locate him throughout Chad. He was aware that they had connections with other Sebes throughout the country and which allowed them to track him down and act with impunity. He knew all this despite not knowing whether they were state or nonstate agents, or whether they were police, army or militia. I do not accept that these two figures from his village hold enough power and authority that they had the resources and connections to locate him in a country which the CPIN report states is the fifth largest country in Africa and 5.2 times bigger than the United Kingdom…”
34. On the reasons provided, is it unclear to us why the appellant’s being “uneducated and illiterate” means that he cannot identify a threat to himself or his family; or why he could not have a general awareness that powerful people wished he and his family harm. We consider that his vagueness about the Sebes and their ability to locate him is consistent rather than not with his assertion that he is uneducated. We agree with Mr Fripp that the judge’s findings in [38] are analogous with those in WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 894, where that judge required a level of evidence beyond what is reasonable to expect the appellant to provide, where the judge failed to provide adequate reasons for deciding that the appellant was untruthful.
35. It is trite to observe that a judge who has heard the oral evidence of a witness is uniquely well-placed to assess it. To question that assessment is not something to be done lightly or routinely; and our role today is not to remake individual findings of fact. The judge is clear that he had concerns as to the lack of detail in the appellant’s evidence, and what he found to be inconsistencies. Inconsistency and lack of detail are sound reasons for finding a witness to be incredible. Our overall concern is that, rather than considering each of the live issues before him in turn as he should have, the judge began by finding that the appellant was not a credible witness; and then based the rest of his decision on that finding. The adverse credibility findings, themselves founded on inadequate reasons, have infected and rendered unsafe the whole decision. To quote the judge at [40]:
“The above adverse findings alongside the ‘section 8’ finding, lead me to an overall conclusion that the appellant has essentially manufactured a protection claim and I do not accept any material aspect of this part of his claim. In respect of the issues of dispute that I have to resolve detailed at paragraph 8 above, I find against the appellant in respect of all of them.”
36. This is not the approach the judge should have taken, and it has led him into material errors of law per ground 3 as summarised at (a), (b) and (c) above.
37. In respect of (d), while it does not appear to us that the judge was alerted to the screening interview being largely blank, we do consider that to make adverse credibility findings as he did, the judge should addressed that evidential gap. This omission is more fundamental regarding the apparent absence of the “previous appeal statement”: the making of adverse credibility findings requires an assessment of all of the evidence, oral and written: even more so where a judge is concerned that there is a lack of detail in that evidence. That the judge did not address the absence of this statement undermines the argument that, as Ms Clewley submits, a careful analysis lies behind the judge’s reasons.
38. Finally, we agree with Mr Fripp that it is to be expected that, with a gap of more than five years between the events described and the oral evidence given, the judge would have provided reasons as to why the passage of time did not account for some vagueness in the appellant’s evidence arising from that gap. Ms Clewley rightly observes that the grounds disclose no issue of vulnerability; but any adverse assessment of credibility must consider the reasons why a witness’s evidence may be unsatisfactory. The period of delay is a factor in why the appellant’s evidence may have lacked detail. If the judge excluded delay as adequate reason for lack of detail, he should have explained why. Accordingly, we find material errors of law as summarised in (d) above.
Notice of Decision
1. The judge’s decision involved the making of errors of law and is set aside.
2. We do not preserve any findings of the decision.
3. We remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Aziz.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 November 2025