Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001935
IA/01835/2021
PA/50658/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

MP (ANGOLA)
Appellant
AND

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Katani, Katani & Co
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Melville St, Edinburgh on the 3 February 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him, any of his witnesses or any member of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Angola born in 1969. He seeks leave to remain in the United Kingdom on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The substance of the Appellant’s claim for protection was that whilst living in Angola he, along with a small group of others, had founded a political party opposed to the ruling MPLA. It was called the Movimento Revolucionario Da Primera Regiao (MRPR), which translates as the ‘Revolutionary Movement of the First Region’. They had produced a video critical of the government; they had demonstrated in the streets on a number of occasions and been violently dispersed; they had been threatened and some of their number, including the Appellant’s nephew, had been arrested. The Appellant decided to leave Angola in early 2020 after the police attended his property looking for him. He claimed asylum on the 26 February 2020, the day he arrived in the UK. The Appellant avers that today he suffers from significant mental health issues as a result of his experiences.
3. Protection was refused on the 28 January 2021, primarily on the grounds that the Appellant had not been able, in his 8 hours of asylum interview, to provide what the Secretary of State regarded as a coherent narrative, particularly in respect of the dates of the various protests he claimed involvement in. The account was therefore rejected.
4. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. That decision was subsequently set aside by the Upper Tribunal and the matter remitted to be heard de novo.
5. A second First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal in a decision dated 6 February 2025. That Tribunal accepted the evidence of two consultant psychiatrists that the Appellant was suffering from cognitive disfunction and Moderate Depressive Disorder which had been untreated at the time of his asylum interview. It expressly accepted the expert opinion of a Dr Hanna that it is likely that at the time of his interview in August 2020 the Appellant “could not have meaningfully engaged” in the process. Having made that finding, the Tribunal did not, as the Respondent had done, focus on the Appellant’s apparent confusion about dates. Instead it evaluated the overall plausibility of the account, and found it wanting, noting inter alia that there was no corroborative evidence that the MRPR even exists.
6. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on several grounds. On 13 November 2025 (decision 9 December 2025) the second decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside by consent, the Secretary of State accepting that the Tribunal had erred in a manner which infected its entire assessment: it was an error of fact to say that there was no corroborative evidence of the MRPR existing, because there was. The bundle before the First-tier Tribunal contained a newspaper article dated which referred in terms to the Movimento Revolucionario Da Primera Regiao, and names an individual identified by the Appellant as being his nephew. In light of the Respondent’s concession Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Howarth set the decision of the First-tier Tribunal aside, albeit preserving its conclusions about the Appellant’s mental health, which had not been subject to challenge.
7. The matter came before me on the 3rd February 2026. Mr Katani explained that the Appellant did not feel well enough to give evidence. I spoke briefly to the Appellant with the assistance of a Portuguese language interpreter. He told me that he is taking medication “because of the sickness I have” and that he was finding it difficult to concentrate and remember things. I indicated that in light of the medical evidence accepted by the First-tier Tribunal I would be treating the Appellant as a vulnerable witness. I heard submissions from Mr Mullen and Mr Katani, and I reserved my decision, which I now give, with my sincere apologies for the delay in its production.
8. In respect of the protection claim the parties were in agreement about the following matters:
i) The First-tier Tribunal’s conclusions about the medical evidence were preserved;
ii) The Appellant’s evidence, and including his responses at his asylum interview in 2020, had to be viewed in the context of that evidence, in particular the opinion of Dr Hanna that the Appellant was not at that time well enough to “meaningfully engage”;
iii) I must consider all of the evidence in the round. The relevant standard of proof is one of “reasonable likelihood” and the burden lies on the Appellant;
iv) If I find it to be reasonably likely that the Appellant is telling the truth, his appeal must be allowed because, as the Secretary of State has accepted since the outset, there would in those circumstances be a real risk of harm to the Appellant from the Angolan government.
9. Mr Katani’s alternative position was that the Appellant qualifies for leave to remain under the provision relating to the protection of Article 8 private life, which was, at the date of his application, set out in paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules. This would require the Appellant to demonstrate that there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Angola today.

The Protection Claim: Discussion and Findings
10. It is the established position in international refugee law that the question of risk is one to be assessed ‘in the round’, with the credibility of the claim assessed against the background of specialist country evidence. Tribunals of fact are in addition required to be cautious before drawing adverse inference from inconsistencies and omissions in the account, which can arise for many reasons. As long ago as 1994 the Tribunal recognised that it would be unwise to focus on peripheral discrepancies, stating in Chiver (10758) that:
“It is perfectly possible for an adjudicator to believe that a witness is not telling the truth about some matters, has exaggerated the story to make his case better, or is simply uncertain about matters, but still to be persuaded that the centrepiece of the story stands”
11. Since that time science, and so law, has come to better understand the inherent fallibility of human memory. People who are telling the truth can be confused, or forget certain details. Events can be mixed up in our minds, particularly where they happened some years ago. Trauma, depression and other matters effecting our mental health can present further challenges. Medication, lack of sleep or stress can all impact on our ability to give clear evidence.
12. In evaluating a narrative that occurred abroad I am also mindful of the restraint urged upon me by Lord Justice Keene in Y [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, to the effect that a tribunal of fact should be cautious before finding an account to be inherently incredible, because there is a considerable risk that it will be overly influenced by its own views of what is or is not plausible, and those views will have inevitably been influenced by its own background in this country and by the customs and ways of our own society. That is not to say that I am required to take at face value an account of facts that is contrary to common sense and my experience of human behaviour, but it is important that I evaluate the Appellant’s account in the context of the evidence on Angola generally.
13. Against that background I am required to evaluate the evidence before me, attaching to it what weight I find to be appropriate, and ultimately reaching a rounded assessment of risk. In Karanakaran [2000] 2 All ER 449 Brooke LJ described that task as follows:
“… When assessing future risk decision-makers may have to take into account the whole bundle of disparate pieces of evidence: (1) evidence they are certain about; (2) evidence they think is probably true; (3) evidence to which they are willing to attach some credence, even if they could not go so far as to say it is probably true; (4) evidence to which they are not prepared to grant any credence at all.”
14. What then, is the evidence in this case?
15. I start with the evidence of the Appellant himself. The first contact he had with the Home Office is recorded in his ‘screening interview’ on the 20 February 2020. He stated that he fears the government of Angola because he is the President of an organisation called Movimento Revolucionario Da Primera Regiao. For reasons that will become clear, it is also relevant to note that in that initial interview, and the subsequent letter from his solicitor, the Appellant lists his family members as including adoptive children whose names include ‘Viriato da Cruz’.
16. Presumably because of Covid-19 lockdowns, the next thing that happened is that the Appellant was asked to complete a ‘preliminary information questionnaire’, which he did with the assistance of his solicitor. In respect of the ‘adopted’ children mentioned in his screening interview, the Appellant explained that some relatives had passed away, and so he had become responsible for these ‘nieces and nephews’ . The Appellant supported these young people, his wife and their four biological children from his work as an engineer for a construction company.
17. The Appellant states that he was motivated to start protesting against the government in Angola during 2018 after discussions with his nephew and other young people. His nephew, Viriato Da Cruz (aka Escoval Franca) and his friends had been unemployed for three years and it did not look as though that situation would improve. The Appellant suggested that they start a protest group. They built this up partly through word of mouth. The Appellant explains that in his work supplying goods throughout Angola he would speak to clients and people he met along the way and if they supported their ideas he encouraged them to start branches of the group in their area. They also used Whatsapp. They held meetings and disseminated their messages via this network.
18. After months of patient organisation their first protest was organised for 24 August 2019. It was near the Presidential Palace. When the police attacked the Appellant saw them arrest his nephew and two friends. The Appellant managed to run away and get home safely. He told his wife what had happened and she was very afraid. Before their arrest the Appellant’s nephew and his friends had made a video highlighting protests planned for October. The first of these went ahead, but then the Appellant was warned that the government were after him and he had to stay at friends’ houses so that he was not detained. In January 2020 the Appellant decided to go to check on his house – no one had been there since October. In the night he heard a gunshot and when he looked out he saw that it was the police who were there to get him. He saw five individuals. Two of them were wearing what Angolans call “something that shines” – special black jackets with ‘SIC’ written on them. These are from the criminal investigation service. The group had a large weapon with them. The Appellant fled out the back and ran to a friend who lived nearby.
19. The Appellant was interviewed in connection with his claim on the 18 August 2020. He was asked a total of 206 questions, many of which have no direct relevance to his claim. He confirmed that his organisation was not a formal party; it was more of a social movement. It had no headquarters. It was organised mainly by telephone and word of mouth. They did not use social media because that would have been dangerous. The Appellant stated that he organised three protests: on 15 October 2019, 19 October 2019 and on 23 January 2020, the latter in conjunction with a grouping called Cazenda who had asked him to join in. The police had attacked these protests and beaten participants. In October 2019 a man who was friendly towards the Appellant because he used to fix his car warned the Appellant that the authorities were interested in him. This man knew this because he worked for the President. The Appellant went into hiding. He went to stay at friends’ houses, whilst his wife and all the children went and sought sanctuary in a church. On the 17 January 2020 the Appellant returned to the house he and his wife had rented. At 2.00am the following morning he realised that the police were outside trying to enter his property. They were taunting him and calling his name saying that they wanted to speak with him. He saw that they were armed and he became afraid. He grabbed what he could and fled out the back, running away with no shoes on. He fled to a neighbours house and asked him to drive him out of the area. The neighbour reassured him, persuaded him to stay in the house until 5am, and then drove him away. The Appellant sought the assistance of the man who had warned him back in October; this man is well-off and helped him get out of the country.
20. I next consider the evidence relating to Angola. The Appellant’s bundle contains a number of human rights reports and media articles outlining how the Angolan government have faced multiple economic challenges in recent years, and have responded to dissent about that by suppressing protest, arresting opposition leaders and threatening journalists and activists. None of that is in issue, so I need not set it out in any further detail here. As I say, the only matter in issue before me is whether the Appellant’s account is true: if it is, the Respondent accepts that he will face a real risk of persecution.
21. More directly relevant to the Appellant’s claim is the expert report by Ms Ticky Monekesso, a journalist and researcher with over 27 years of experience working in and on Angola. The Secretary of State accepts that Ms Monekesso is a suitably qualified expert, and did not in this case take any issue with her impartiality. Ms Monekesso observes that there have been, in the past decade, many social movements or spontaneous protests in Angola of the type described by the Appellant. These are not formal political parties as such, but loosely aligned groups of individuals who have a common issue or issues that they want to bring to the attention of the authorities, for instance food prices. She likens these movements to that of the ‘Yellowjackets’ in France. Such grassroots movements may be popularised by word-of-mouth or social media, and rarely have formal hierarchies or organisational structures. She describes Cazenda, the other group mentioned by the Appellant in his asylum interview, as an umbrella organisation encompassing a number of grassroots activist groups. She confirms that during 2019-20 there were a series of protests organised or supported by such groups, around issues such as unemployment, the cost of living, and corruption. Many of these protests were, as the Appellant describes, violently repressed by the Angolan security services, using live ammunition, teargas, intimidation and arrests.
22. The Appellant’s representatives have identified two articles which they submit support his claims about the Movimento Revolucionario Da Primera Regiao. The download date given at the bottom of each page is the 12 July 2021. The first article is dated 25 September 2019. An accompanying screenshot of the ‘google’ search that found it indicates that it appeared on the website of the Voice of America Portuguese language service. It reads:
“Four out of the six young Angolan activists of the self-designated Revolutionary Movement of the ‘First Region’, who signed the letter which notified the provincial government of Luanda of a protest which would take place on 19th October, against the rise of the price of the [essentials] box [cesta basica], will answer this Thursday 26th at about 11 o’clock, at the Crime Investigation Department in Viana, for having supposedly recorded a video which threatens the security of the state.
In his statements to VOA one of the individuals who signed the petition, Escoval Franca, better known as Viriato da Cruz, assured that the group would not retreat and that the protest will happen, starting at Fermat de Cazenga and up to 100 metres away from the presidential palace.
‘The warnings will not make us retreat’, the activist highlighted, denying the accusation of a coup because ‘we only advertised for a demonstration’”.
23. The second article, from the same source, is dated 15 October 2019. The headline reads ‘Angolan Police Disperse Protestors Against Unemployment’. The article notes that on the day there were more officers than civilians on the street. It explains that about 20 activists, including members of the ‘Revolutionary Movement’, had gathered approximately 100 metres away from the National Assembly, where the Prime Minister was due to make a speech, before being dispersed by the police with “acts of force”.
24. I must consider all of that evidence in the round, having regard to the submissions made by the Secretary of State.
25. The ‘reasons for refusal’ letter is quite right to say that the Appellant has not been consistent about dates. In his witness statement he describes a protest in August 2019 at which his nephew and others were arrested, never to be seen again. In his substantive interview the Appellant describes what seem to be the same events as occurring in October of that year. One explanation for that discrepancy is that this account is a fiction and the Appellant has forgotten his lines. Another possibility, and one more likely in my view, is that the Appellant was narrating real events; he just got hopelessly confused about the dates upon which they occurred. I say that for three reasons. The first, is that as Dr Hanna indicates, and the First-tier Tribunal accepted, the Appellant was not, at the relevant time, cognitively capable of “meaningfully engaging” with the process. That medical assessment is borne out by the written evidence itself, which shows the Appellant to be confused about matters entirely irrelevant to the substance of his claim: he has to correct his statement where he gave the wrong date of birth for one of his children; asked at interview to name some Angolan holidays he gives independence day but then says “it has slipped my mind, I can’t think of any others”. Finally, and most significantly, the core of the account – dates aside - has remained entirely consistent. The Appellant founded this social protest group, along with his nephew; a video was produced, protests organised and attended; the police attacked, and the nephew was detained.
26. That core account finds considerable support in the articles that appeared on the Voice of America Portuguese language website. Not only do these articles name the group, and reflect what the Appellant has said about the protests, but one of them specifically names the Appellant’s nephew. These articles were downloaded for translation in this appeal on the 12 July 2021. I note that the Appellant gave the name ‘Viriato da Cruz’ in respect of his nephew some 16 months before that date, listing him as part of his family in his screening interview. It is of course possible that the Appellant read an article about an opposition group before he ever left Angola, and attempted to memorise details in order to found this claim, hoping that his solicitor would in due course find the same article to provide ‘corroboration’ for his claims. That is possible. It is also possible, or reasonably likely, that the article reflects what the Appellant told his solicitor and various immigration officers during 2020 because it is true. This, taken with what Ms Monekesso says about the somewhat nebulous nature of these groups – effectively dealing with the Secretary of State’s query of why there is no flag, HQ, membership cards etc - leads me to find that the Appellant has discharged the burden of proof.
27. It follows that I must allow the appeal, since the Respondent expressly accepts that a positive credibility finding should also lead to a finding that there will be a real risk of persecution should the Appellant return to Angola. I need not, in these circumstances, deal with Mr Katani’s alternative argument concerning Article 8.

Decisions
28. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal has been set aside to the limited extent identified above.
29. The decision in the appeal is remade as follows: the appeal is allowed on protection grounds.
30. There is an order for anonymity because the Appellant is a vulnerable witness.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 March 2026