Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001949

FTT No.: PA/60332/2024

LP/07871/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

MV
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Gajjar Counsel, instructed by Hawkins Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name
or and address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Raymond (“the Judge”) who by way of a decision dated 14 March 2025 dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Cartin had granted the Appellant permission to appeal by way of a decision dated 1 May 2025 on limited grounds. Namely,
“…However, the Judge’s findings on such matters are also not entirely clear and reasoned. In circumstances where the hearing was arguably unfair, I consider there to be an arguable and material error of law.
4. I am unclear from ground 2 as to what impact this claimed mistake of fact is said to have had on the decision. I am therefore unable to conclude it is a material error of law even if it is arguably an error of law.
5. Ground 3 and 4 relate to the factual findings made and the points made are somewhat overtaken by the arguably procedurally unfair approach to fact-finding in any case.
6. Ground 5 has some merit and the findings on relocation are not easy to discern.”
The Hearing Before Me
3. Mr Gajjar had amplified his grounds of appeal before me. Those grounds having contended in summary that, (1) There was procedural unfairness because the Judge had not given adequate notice of why he was going behind part of the Competent Authority’s positive conclusive decision that the Appellant had been trafficked between July 2017 and February 2019. The Appellant relied on the decision in SA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 357. (2) The Judge made an error of fact and failed to apply anxious scrutiny in respect of various social media exchanges whereby the Judge mixed up the Appellant with her aggressor. Grounds 3 and 4 referred to other findings, including in respect of the screening interview. Ground 5 contends that there as a failure to properly consider the reasonableness of relocation.
4. There was also a witness statement from the Appellant dated 28 April 2025 in which she sets out matters she contends show that the Judge had misquoted parts of her evidence.
5. Ms Kerr submitted in summary in respect of Ground 1 that the Judge had not gone behind the Competent Authority’s decision and so there was no procedural unfairness. She said that in any event the Judge had to explore the trafficking issues because one of the live issues was sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. It was submitted that even if the Respondent had failed to ventilate this as an issue, the Appellant had been cross examined and there was nothing raised at the hearing by the Appellant that there was a procedural error.
6. Ms Kerr submitted that a bald allegation of bias does not suffice and it was not raised that the Judge was acting unfairly.
7. Mr Ker said that in respect of Ground 2 “Roger” was indeed the name of the provider and not the name of the person and whilst the Judge was wrong, nonetheless, this was not material. The Judge was just describing what the social media was showing.
8. Ms Kerr said that Ground 3 was in respect of the screening interview. The Judge’s reference was an observation and it was not a material. It was an opportunity to contact the authorities. The conclusion by the Judge was that there was an opportunity to seek help.
9. Mr Kerr said Ground 4 was not a preserve finding. The evidence was not misquoted by the Judge and there has been no transcript. The findings were open to the Judge.
10. In respect of Ground 5, Mr Kerr said it was open to the Judge to make findings about the reasonableness of relocation within Canada. As the Judge said, there were ample opportunities to turn to the authorities for help. The Appellant grew up in an environment of being in a developed country and all of the advantages that would bring.
Consideration and Analysis
11. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 provides:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
12. In this case, I am clear that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. I come to this view for the following reasons.
13. At paragraph 18 of his decision, the Judge set out the issues which needed to be resolved. That paragraph particularly noted that the Appellant was said in the Respondent’s review to be accepted as a victim of sex trafficking/exploitation. The first issue was therefore whether the appellant “…has a well-founded fear of persecution”. Then at paragraph 72 to 75 the Judge considered the NRM decision. Although the Judge did say he was not going behind this, nonetheless he did so by concluding at paragraph 76 that the Appellant was “…not credible on the extent to which she was sexually exploited and trafficked”. The Judge also said at paragraph 76 that she was not treated as “a slave for nearly three years”.
14. There was procedural unfairness because this issue was not highlighted at the outset as one of the issues which would arise for consideration until it occurred at the cross examination of the Appellant. Whilst Ms Kerr contends that the Appellant (or her advocate) could have said this was procedurally unfair at the hearing, that in this case was to expect too much. The Appellant and her advocate attended the hearing with the issues in mind and would not have prepared for a different case. It was for the Judge to highlight the issues (as he did) but then also to deal with those issues. If further issues arose during the hearing, then those further issues had to be identified so that each party knew the case that they had to meet. The Judge had not highlighted that he would be going behind the issues and thereby going behind those matters which the Respondent had previously accepted.
15. In my judgment, this error by the Judge was material and undermines the whole of the decision, but had it been necessary, I would have additionally concluded that the errors made in respect of the social media screenshots caused some confusion in respect of the Judge’s findings. Had the Judge not made those errors, a different conclusion might have been reached by the Judge.
16. I do observe that the Judge’s findings are lengthy and detailed. I am in no doubt that there were aspects of the case which concerned the Judge. That comes through from the decision quite clearly. I also observe the scepticism of the Judge in respect of some of the Appellant’s evidence. Those findings might ultimately come to be correct, but that is not the issue before me. What I have to decide is whether there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. I conclude that there was because of the procedural unfairness in not alerting the Appellant and her advocate to the new issue which the Judge would also be dealing with in his reserved decision.
17. I have at the forefront of my mind, the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. I have hesitated and have considered whether the errors of law in the Judge’s decision are material, but I conclude that they are.
18. I have considered whether or not this is a matter which ought to remain for consideration here at the Upper Tribunal and I have considered the submissions which have been made. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal with retained findings.
19. Further directions will be provided by the First-tier Tribunal, but the Appellant’s solicitors must ensure that all issues, but especially the issues of adequacy of protection and internal relocation are dealt with fully and specifically in this unusual case in a skeleton argument at least 14 days before the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal. That will ensure that the Respondent is ready to deal with those issues too.

Notice of Decision
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
The First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision is set aside in its entirety. None of the Judge’s findings stand. The rehearing will consider all matters afresh and on all issues at the First-tier Tribunal before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Raymond.
The anonymity direction is continued.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 September 2025