Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001952

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66005/2023
LP/02482/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

MT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, instructed by Barclay Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He made a claim for protection on 16 February 2022 which was refused on 27 November 2023. He appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 and his appeal was heard on 3 March 2025 by First tier Tribunal Judge Balroop (“the Judge”) sitting at Hatton Cross. The appeal was dismissed by way of a decision dated 10 March 2025.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge G McMahon on 30 April 2025.
3. The parties confirmed that all relevant documents were contained in the composite hearing bundle.
4. The Appellant’s claim is that he was an activist for the BNP and JCD and that he faced problems in Bangladesh from the Awami League, Chhatra League and the police on account of this. He claims to have sustained injuries when attacked for political reasons in 2018 and 2020. The Appellant’s claim is that, following a political event which resulted in damage to cars and college property, the police attended but took the side of the Chhatra league. As a result, the police filed a case against the Appellant and the members of the JCD and he went into hiding.
5. The Appellant produced a First Information Report (FIR) dated 26 January 2020, a charge sheet dated 15 July 2020 and an arrest warrant dated 23 February 2021. The Judge found the court documents to be genuine [47] and recorded the Appellant’s case as being that the criminal case was fabricated and politically motivated against him and the other members of the JCD because they were against the Awami League [48].
6. The decision records evidence from the Appellant’s lawyer from 2024 giving an opinion that a trial in absentia would take place and from 2025 giving an opinion that the arrest warrant remains open and valid and that “… in light of the current circumstances you will be convicted”.
7. The Judge found that the Appellant would “likely face prosecution not persecution” [55] noting that, “The political aspect and motivation of the charges are no longer applicable because the Awami League are no longer in power”. The December 2024 CPIN is referred to, among other sources, as showing changes to state institutions in Bangladesh and in particular as showing changes being made to the judiciary and the police with politically motivated charges being withdrawn or dropped [13.3.5].
8. The grounds of appeal are that:
(i) The Judge identified genuine documents relating to criminal proceedings which the Appellant claimed were politically motivated but erred in failing to identify this as persecution, rather than prosecution;
(ii) The Judge stated the Appellant’s position to be that there had been sustainable change in the political landscape in Bangladesh [32] whereas the overall thrust of the Appellant’s submissions was that there had not been sustainable change, and the Appellant adduced materials supporting that position recorded at [38] and [40];
(iii) Ground 3 is directed at the Judge’s alleged failure to make findings regarding the alleged attacks upon the Appellant in 2018 and 2020;
(iv) Ground 4 asserts that, in considering paragraph 276 ADE (vi) of the Immigration Rules, the Judge erred in his assessment of whether there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Bangladesh, in particular because the (accepted) prosecution was not taken into account in the Judge’s analysis;
(v) Ground 5 asserts that the Judge’s consideration of Article 8 ECHR outside the Immigration Rules was similarly flawed as the proportionality assessment and balance sheet approach required consideration of the criminal proceedings against the Appellant.
Analysis
9. Persecution is to be distinguished from prosecution. The nature of criminal allegations and procedural safeguards to ensure a fair trial require analysis in making that distinction: see Iqbal (Muzafar) [2002] UKIAT 02239 in which the Tribunal summarised how asylum claims, based on a fear of prosecution amounting to persecution, should be dealt with, giving the following guidance:
(i) although it is not the purpose of the asylum determination process to judge guilt or innocence, nonetheless a factual evaluation as to whether there is a real risk that the claimant faces injustice rather than justice must be made;
(ii) whether prosecution amounts to persecution is a question of fact, and all relevant circumstances must be considered on a case-by-case basis;
(iii) the criminal justice process in the country of origin must be looked at as a whole, with possible harms considered cumulatively and not separately;
(iv) whether prosecution amounts to persecution must be analysed by reference to international human rights norms;
(v) prosecution does not amount to persecution unless likely failures in the fair trial process go beyond shortcomings and pose a threat to the very existence of the right to a fair trial;
(vi) when considering whether there is a general risk of persecution to any person subjected to the criminal law process in a given country, it is important to establish the scale of relevant human rights violations, particularly in relation to mistreatment in detention and the right to a fair trial, and, using Article 3 ECHR as a benchmark, it is useful to ask whether the level of human rights abuse rises to the level of a 'consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights' (however, the Supreme Court has since held that there is no actual requirement that human rights violations be systemic for a real risk of persecution to be established: R (on the application of EM (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 12).
10. As examples of 'acts of persecution' the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 at s.31(3) (c) and (d) and the Qualification Directive at article 9(2)(c) and (d) (no longer in force in the UK) refer to prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate or discriminatory, and denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discriminatory punishment.
11. I do not consider that a prosecution, even if initiated with political motivation, necessarily is (or continues to be) persecution.
12. The Judge accepted that the Appellant was made subject to criminal proceedings prior to the change in regime. The evidence from the Appellant’s lawyer was to the effect that the proceedings remained pending. The Judge was required to assess, in line with Iqbal (Muzafar) (above) whether the Appellant was now facing injustice by reference to all relevant circumstances i.e. whether there was a threat to a fair trial, taking into account relevant human rights violations.
13. Considering the judgment as a whole, I find that there is no error of law in the Judge’s approach to the issue of whether the pending criminal proceedings amounted to persecution for political reasons. The Judge was required to look at the totality of the state and criminal justice apparatus and in doing so, was entitled to take into account changes since the new government came to power.
14. To conduct that assessment, the Judge was required to evaluate the objective evidence regarding changes to the regime in Bangladesh. In doing so, the Judge took into account materials relied upon by both the Appellant and Respondent: this is apparent from [26- 42]. The Judge took into account the Appellant’s submissions, and objective evidence in support, to the effect that there had not been sustainable change to the institutions of authority, and concluded that the materials (including those relied upon by the Appellant) supported the conclusion that there had been such change, so that prosecution would not, now, amount to persecutory treatment (as defined).
15. This includes express consideration of changes to policing and the judiciary: see paragraphs 41-43.
16. It is unfortunate that para. 32 appears to record the Appellant as submitting that there has been sustainable change, as that does not appear to have been the overarching thrust of the Appellant’s position. However, I do not consider this to be a material error of law. Looked at in the overall context of the decision it can be seen that the Judge took account of the competing positions as to the sustainability of change, and reached a view on the basis of the objective materials: the Judge’s conclusion on this issue was not based (solely or at all) on any perceived “concession” by the Appellant, and was the subject of scrutiny and consideration.
17. Ground 3 relates to the alleged lack of findings as to whether the Appellant was attacked in 2018 and / or 2020 and if so, whether this was persecution on account of his political beliefs. No adverse finding on that issue appears in the determination, and it appears to have been accepted at [69] that the Appellant suffered harm at the hands of the Awami League. If and to the extent that the Appellant is right in saying that there was no express finding on this issue, I do not consider it to be a material error of law, because the Judge concluded at [43] that: “Taking in account all of the above the Awami government that threatened the Appellant is no longer in power, the army supports the interim government, there has been reform of the police and judiciary, the BNP leader has been released. There is no longer a risk of persecution of the Appellant from the Awami government due to his political activity/belief”.
18. Ground 4 alleges that the Judge erred in failing to taking into account the pending criminal proceedings in his analysis of whether the Appellant faces very significant obstacles to reintegration. The Judge’s analysis under the heading of Article 8 private life ‘Very Significant Obstacles” does not expressly refer to prosecution or criminal proceedings, although the acceptance of this is set out elsewhere in the decision. It is, however, recorded under this heading that, “I have found no risk of harm from the Awami League which is the cause of his PTSD”. This imports into the Judge’s consideration under this heading, his earlier consideration of risk on return (including in relation to criminal proceedings). I find there to be no material error of law in the Judge’s analysis of very significant obstacles, as it is clear that the Judge took into account the Appellant’s history of political activity, and harm as a result, but considered there to no longer be risk because of the change of regime.
19. Ground 5 alleges that the Judge erred in failing to take into account, in assessing whether return to Bangladesh would breach the Appellant’s article 8 ECHR rights, the impact upon him of prosecution. For the same reasons, I find no material error of law.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The anonymity direction previously made shall continue because the matter relates to a protection claim.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 October 2025