Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001966

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63110/2023
LP/00097/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

AM
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Dingley, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 20 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Hillis) promulgated on 16 February 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 17 November 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The background:
3. The appellant is a national of Iraq who left Erbil, Iraq on 13 September 2021 travelling through Turkey and France and arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 October 2021 by boat and claimed asylum.
4. The basis of his claim was that the appellant and woman “A” were both students at the time they met and became attracted to one another. The appellant gave his number to A and gradually a secret liaison started. Their friendship blossomed and led to a sexual relationship and love between the two. A’s family arranged for her marriage to her cousin who was a high ranking KDP official within the regime. On hearing this, the appellant convinced his parents to go to A’s parent’s home and seek her hand in marriage for her. The appellant’s parent’s marriage proposal was refused, and A’s parents humiliated the appellant’s parents stating that there was a big class difference in the respective families and their respective tribes and that they would not even contemplate considering the marriage proposal. The appellant and A were fearful that if A was to marry her cousin that her cousin would realise that she was not a virgin and ultimately the relationship between the appellant and A would be realised, resulting in the pursuit and killing of A and the appellant, in the name of honour. The appellant and A eloped, meeting secretly at the appellant’s sister’s house. Whilst in hiding the appellant sought the assistance of his uncle, confiding in him as to what was happening. The uncle informed the appellant that A’s family had found out about their relationship and their eloping together. The uncle, realising the danger to the appellant and A’s life agreed to help them but he placed them in hiding in separate places until arrangements for their escape were secured. Whilst in hiding A was captured by her family, her whereabouts continue to be unknown to the appellant. He therefore left Iraq.
5. In the United Kingdom he claimed to have been engaged in political activities against the Iraqi authorities by attending demonstrations and placing posts on social media.
6. The appellant’s claim for asylum was refused by the respondent in her decision letter dated 17 November 2023. Beyond accepting the appellant’s nationality and ethnicity as a Kurd, the respondent set out credibility issues in respect of the factual account of what had occurred in Iraq and in the UK . Thus his claim was refused.
7. The appeal came before the FtTJ and in a decision promulgated on 16 February 2025 the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iraq on the core of the factual basis as claimed or that he would be at risk due to his sur place activities and that he would be able to have his document, including his CSID or INID sent to him by his family prior to leaving or to be met at the airport. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal.
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal the decision. Permission to appeal refused by FtTJ Murray but on renewal was granted by UTJ Hoffman on 13 June 2025 who stated:
“(2) I am satisfied that Ground 1 is arguable. At [15] and [16], the judge found the appellant’s account to fear his own family as a result of his relationship with a woman to be inconsistent with passages from the respondent’s CPIN Iraq: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribunal violence. The judge’s reliance on the CPIN informed his finding at [17] that the appellant was not therefore credible and reliable with regards to this aspect of his account. The appellant argues that the judge failed to take into account para 3.2.5 of the same CPIN which says that “males involved in premarital or extramarital relationships with a female may be targeted by the female’s family in acts of revenge”. Although that passage relates to men being targeted by the family of the female and not their own family, and while it goes on to say that “there is limited data and evidence relating to the prevalence of such incidents”, I am satisfied that it is at least arguable that the judge may have erred by failing to take para 3.2.5 into account.
(3) Ground 3 will stand or fall with the other grounds and I therefore grant permission in relation to that ground as well.
(4) Ground 2 is less convincing and it may be said that it amounts to little more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings. However, I do not restrict the grant of permission”.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
9. The hearing took place on 20 August 2025. The appellant was represented by Mr Dingley, of Counsel and the respondent by Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer. Mr Dingley submitted indicated that he relied upon the grounds of challenge, both the original ground and those dated 11 April 2025. Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer, confirmed there had been no reply provided to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 but that the appeal was opposed. I am grateful to the advocates for the helpful submissions made by each of them and how they have advanced their respective cases. The submissions are contained in the record of proceedings, and I will not rehearse them here. I will refer to them as relevant in the analysis of the issues raised.
Discussion and analysis:
10. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, it is necessary to set out the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
11. The grounds advanced challenge the decision on the basis of inadequacy of reasoning. As regards the provision of reasons, I take into account that there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions of the central issue on which an appeal is determined and what is said in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons; set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) that “reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the FtTJ.” I further observe that the parties are aware of the evidence that has been presented before the FtTJ, both orally and in documentary form.
12. As the issues in this appeal relate to challenges brought against findings of fact on credibility made by the FtTJ, I also remind myself of the decision in Volpi v Volpi ( supra) when reviewing a first instance judge's findings of fact as per Lewison LJ as follows:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i)An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
13. Mr Dingley began with ground 1 where it is submitted that there is a failure to give reasons and material error of fact based on a selective reliance on the respondent’s CPIN. He referred to the decision at paragraphs 16 -17 and that the FtTJ cited the conclusions in the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note ‘Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal Violence, July 2024’ paragraphs 2.2.3, and 3.2.3 – 3.2.4 as determinative of the issue of the objective plausibility when considering if the appellant would be at risk as a male victim of honour crimes .
14. He submits that this was not a point taken by the respondent in their refusal letter, review or in submissions and that the FtTJ was asked to accept on behalf of the appellant to find that his account was objectively plausible, with reliance on that same guidance at paragraph 3.2.5 which states:
“Available evidence indicates that males involved in premarital or extramarital relationships with a female may be targeted by the female’s family in acts of revenge. There have been cases where a male has been killed. However, there is limited data and evidence regarding the prevalence of such incidents. As such, it does not amount to a generalised risk. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.”
15. Mr Dingley submitted that the FtTJ did not consider paragraph 3.2.5, nor reasoned why the appellant could not fit into that paragraph. Instead, the FtTJ proceeds on the basis that the only category of male that could fall victim of honour crimes is that set out at paragraph 16 which is incorrect, as shown by a full reading of the guidance document.
16. It is submitted that had the Tribunal considered the full document, the objective plausibility of the account would not be in dispute and no inconsistency found.
17. Mr Tan submitted that paragraph 3.2.5 referred to the female’ s family and not to the appellant’s family. But in any event there was a limit to that paragraph in light of the limited data and as recognised within the contents of that paragraph. Section 11 as relied upon by Mr Dingley so set out the limitations of the evidence and by reference to the appellant’s own account and therefore it did not take matters any further than that set out in 3.2.5. The objective evidence is very limited in terms of the appellant’s account. In any event the FtTJ went on to consider the core aspects of the appellant’s claim.
Conclusion on ground 1:
18. When addressing ground 1, it is of relevance to set out the basis of the appellant’s account as to those he was at risk from in Iraq has confirmed in his witness statement (paragraph 1) and also the appellant’s skeleton argument (“ASA”) at paragraph 2. He claimed to be in fear of the family of his girlfriend, her tribe, his own family, fellow Kurds for having relations outside marriage and bringing shame and dishonour to their families, and dishonour to the tribe, ethnicity and religion. There were a number of potential people/categories he feared on return to Iraq.
19. At paragraphs 15 -16 of his decision the FtTJ set out references to the material set out in the CPIN ( paragraphs 2.2.3. and 3.2.3-3.2.4) and that the appellant’s account of being at risk from his own immediate family was not consistent with those paragraphs. Whilst the grounds assert that the FtTJ failed to consider paragraph 3.2.5, that paragraph does not relate to those being targeted by a man’s immediate family but identifies risk from the female family.
20. At paragraphs 15 and 16 the FtTJ is not addressing risk from the female family but from his immediate family as one of the categories of people he claims to fear as set out in his factual claim. Furthermore paragraph 3.2.5 set this out in the context of there being “limited data”
21. It is further clear from reading paragraphs 3.2.3 – 3.2.5 that this is a précis or summary of the section entitled “honour crimes against men” set out in section 11 of the CPIN. That is shown by the reference to the “available evidence“ and the reference to “limited data“ (see section 3.2.5). At section 11.7.1 it is recorded that CPIT could not find any specific incidents of men who were specifically killed or threatened by their own family due to perceived loss of honour. Whilst Mr Dingley referred to section 11.7.2 as support for the appellant’s claim, that paragraph is based on article from 2013 that men and women may face murder if deemed to have damaged their family or the community honour. However that paragraph has to be read with paragraph 11.7.3 where it is expressly recorded that the authors of the article described at 11.7.2, “did not provide examples of time where men have faced murder for damaging family or the communities honour.” At paragraph 11.7.4 it is recorded that men who engage in extramarital relationships are not perceived as staining of the family honour. Reference is made to the source of conflict as revenge or blood feuds, but as Mr Tan submitted that was not what the appellant had claimed. Furthermore whilst reference was made to women and girls as being the most frequent victims of honour killing but that men may be affected on “a smaller scale“ the sources did not provide any detail or any qualification as to what was meant by “a smaller scale” thus there was no source material providing examples of any such events in support.
22. I do not consider that the FtTJ was saying that this objective evidence was determinative of the objective plausibility of the appellant’s account. The FtTJ was plainly referring to the risk from his own family and paragraph 3.2.5 does not impact on that.
23. In any event, I accept the submission made by Mr Tan that any error, even if it were made, would be immaterial. This is because the FtTJ assessed the appellant’s account of having had an extramarital relationship with a woman called “A” which is the issue set out at paragraph 7 (a) which would lead to issue (b) whether he was at risk of being a victim of an honour crime. Thus whether or not the appellant faced a risk from his family or her family, the credibility of the core of the account was assessed by the FtTJ between paragraphs 18 – 25. The FtTJ did not conclude his assessment at paragraph 17 but properly went on to assess the core of his claim and his consideration of the factual events.
Ground2 :
24. Turning to ground 2 this ground challenges the findings of fact made by me FtTJ. The ground is based on what is described as reliance on inherent implausibility. It is submitted that whilst plausibility might form part of the Tribunal’s assessment of the reliability of a claimant’s account, inferences may only be reasonably drawn from background evidence. The Tribunal Judge’s own subjective view as to the inherent probability of an account is an irrelevant consideration (see, for example, HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037’
25. Mr Dingley submitted that the FtTJ’s conclusions on credibility are grounded in inherent plausibility.
26. By way of example, he refers to paragraph 18, that the appellant would being a relationship or ask for marriage despite risks stemming from tribal differences is “not, in my judgement, a credible explanation” without further reasoning as to why it is not deemed credible. At paragraphs 19 - 21 the FtTJ sets out what they would expect to have happened, or what is viewed the appellant ought to have known, but none of these factors are an answer to the question of whether or not the appellant could reasonably have proceeded with a relationship regardless of the risks.
27. He also relies on paragraph 22, where he submits the same approach is taken . The FtTJ finds the appellant has “failed to give a credible reason why” and that “it is simply not credible that he and A would risk being killed by eloping”. No reasons are given for why it is simply not credible, other than what it is believed someone ought to have done in those circumstances.
28. Paragraph 23 is challenged on the basis that there is no evidential basis for this finding. Whilst the FtTJ relies on the interview record at AIR38, AIR40 and AIR54, it is submitted that none of those questions comment on whether or not the partner was required to have an escort at all times.
29. Paragraph 24 is challenged on the basis that this is again an imposition of what the Tribunal thinks the appellant ought to have done, and not an assessment of what he reasonably could have done. Thus it is submitted that in the absence of other reasons, the FtTJ’s view of what ought to have happened is insufficient to reject the reliability of the Appellant’s account.
30. Mr Tan submitted that the grant of no more than a disagreement with the findings of fact which were open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence. The FtTJ did not make the findings based on general plausibility but assessed the account by reference to the appellant’s factual claim based on the general background evidence relating to the position of women in Iraq, and tribal conflicts. The factual findings made later in the decision between paragraphs 33 and 34 also were supportive of the other factual findings made in the earlier part of the decision.
Conclusions on ground 2:
31. Having considered the submissions, ground 2 is not established for the reasons set out below.
32. The FtTJ’s assessment of issue 7 (a) is set out between paragraphs 14 – 26. At paragraph 26 and having considered the evidence the FtTJ concluded that the appellant was neither credible nor reliable in the core aspects of claim being at risk of harm due to having had an extramarital relationship. The grounds challenge the findings of fact made on the basis of the FtTJ applying general plausibility as to what the FtTJ expected to happen and not by assessing what reasonably could have been done.
33. The FtTJ set out the issues in dispute at paragraph 7 which included 7 (a) - is the appellant credible and reliable that he had a sexual relationship outside marriage. When assessing that issue, the FtTJ set out the evidence he had regard to which included the appellant’s witness statement in particular by reference to paragraphs 12 – 16 which referred to the claimed relationship, the contents of the screening interview at 4.1, and also the FtTJ had the advantage of considering the oral evidence of the appellant’s account on the core issues.
34. The FtTJ also referred to his consideration of all the documents submitted by both parties which included the objective material in the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note ‘Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal Violence, July 2024’ which was exhibited in the appellant’s bundle and relied upon by both parties, including being featured in the ASA, although that referred to the 2021 CPIN (see paragraph 10).
35. The FtTJ plainly had regard to the CPIN which formed the context of his assessment of the facts and expressly referred to that at paragraphs 16-17 and in his general recitation of the evidence he had considered at paragraph 10. In particular the FtTJ assessed the appellant’s account and the particular factual background he claimed to exist. This included that they both lived in a neighbourhood where they belonged to different tribes, they were from a different socio-economic background and lived against a background of intertribal conflict and that intertribal marriage was not approved of.
36. That was what the FtTJ was assessing between paragraphs 18 – 19 and the appellant’s account of the claimed relationship against the background given by the appellant. It was not as submitted considered in the light of the FtTJ’s own assessment of what was or what was not credible and applying his own view but was set against the background expressly advanced by the appellant and in the light of the CPIN background evidence.
37. The FtTJ assessed the evidence given and his explanation that he and A lived in the same area and were neighbours which is why he asked his own family to ask A’s family for her hand in marriage, but the FtTJ did not find that explanation to be credible or reasonably likely when set in the context of other parts of the factual claim that they were of different religions, from different tribes and that intertribal marriage was not approved of. At paragraph 19 the FtTJ gave further reasoning for his finding and that on the appellant’s own evidence, no intertribal marriages were allowed and therefore the appellant would know that the proposal would fail and that this was likely to be wholly disapproved of and/or forbidden by their respective tribes. The FtTJ therefore assessed the appellant’s account of having sought the approval to marry a woman in the light of his own background context to the claim and on the specific context of tribal honour in Iraq.
38. At paragraph 20 the FtTJ assessed the differences of the 2 families and the socio-economic circumstances which were entirely different and at paragraph 21 the FtTJ assessed the position of the appellant in the context of the objective evidence known about Iraq and Kurdish culture and that the appellant would be fully aware that in Kurdish culture A was expected to uphold a family’s honour, obey her father and her tribal customs and that there would be a risk of being killed if she entered into a premarital sexual relationship with the appellant who was from a tribe her own was in conflict with. As Mr Tan submitted those findings were all consistent with the objective evidence in the CPIN between paragraphs 3.2.6 – 3.2.8 and in the section of “tribal conflict”.
39. At paragraph 22, the FtTJ assessed the appellant’s evidence confirmed in his interview at question 54 ( not question 45) that A’s family “they are very powerful in the government and historically they have always been against my tribe” but did not find his account to be credible that when he discovered the A was a tribe which was in conflict with his tribe that he would risk his own safety by continuing the relationship.
40. The FtTJ also gave a 2nd reason at paragraph 22 (see the end of that paragraph). Whilst Mr Dingley submitted that it made no sense because the FtTJ appeared to be considering the position of the appellant being removed to the IKR, that was not what the FtTJ was stating but that according to the appellant’s own evidence the family was so influential that wherever in the IKR the appellant went, they would be able to find him therefore pursuing a relationship/eloping would be bound to fail. The second finding could have been clearer but it is tolerably ascertainable from reading the finding in the light of the appellant’s account of the power and influence of A’s family what the FtTJ was taking into account when assessing the credibility of his claim.
41. At paragraph 23, the FtTJ made a finding of fact that was reasonably open to him on the evidence. The FtTJ set out that the background context of the appellant’s claim was that A’s family were powerful and influential and that theirs was a tribe who his own family tribe were in conflict with, and they were of different Muslim faiths. The FtTJ assessed his claim against that background and against the background set out in the objective country material which stated that “Iraq, including the KRI, is a patriarchal society. Violence against women is deeply ingrained in society. Women have a lower status in the family and are expected to be subservient to men and are frequently stereotyped as housewives and mothers” ( see paragraph 3.6.2) and paragraph 9.6.5 The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in their report entitled 'Human Rights and Democracy: the 2022 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office report' published 13 July 2023 stated: 'Women and girls continued to be marginalised by conservative social, religious and tribal norms, with high reported rates of gender-based violence, including honour killings.)
42. The FtTJ’s assessment that his account was not credible that she would be permitted outside a home without any male relative, was consistent with the status of women in a patriarchal society as evidenced in the background material. In other words it was not a finding made solely on the basis of general plausibility but in the context of the factual claim made by the appellant and against the background of the position of women in Iraq and in the IKR. Mr Dingley submitted that the questions from the appellant’s interview cited in paragraph 23 were not relevant. However the questions from the interview relates the appellant’s account of the girls family status, how women are kept apart and the general inaccessibility of young women in the position of A. The FtTJ considered that the girl’s circumstances seen in the light of the objective evidence was not consistent with the way in which the appellant claimed to have conducted himself.
43. The findings of fact between paragraphs 24 and 25 should be read together. The FtTJ set out question 36 as follows:
“When we arrived to my sisters house with my girlfriend and my uncle came and spoke to us. My uncle decided we shouldn't be together but at beginning it would be safer to be in separate places. We were supposed to leave together but her family found her and I don't know how they found her. It has been really really hard for me because I wanted to start a life with her and we were planning quite a lot. I know she is in great danger and have probably killed her by now and she had lost her virginity to me. I don't feel guilty that I have been with her and I don't regret it and we were a couple of young people who wanted to start a life together. We're all victims of regression and everything is based on tribe and tribal rules.”
44. The FtTJ’s assessed his evidence but did not find it credible that when he arrived at his sister’s house that he would have agreed to be separated from A if he thought she would be killed by her own family and in the light of his claim that his own family was not supporting the continuation of the relationship. The FtTJ also did not accept the appellant’s evidence as credible that he would have agreed to being separated in the knowledge that his own family could have informed her family where she was given that they were also against his actions. At paragraph 25 the FtTJ gave reasons for rejecting his account that he did not feel guilty about the relationship despite the obvious risks he claimed that she faced.
45. I agree with submission made by Mr Tan that the findings made at paragraphs 33 and 34 (which are not challenged in the grounds) are also consistent with the earlier adverse findings made by the FtTJ. Whilst they were made in the context of the evidence in the sur place claim they are relevant to his factual account that A’s family were powerful and influential and continuing to search for him. The FtTJ set out the appellant’s evidence when asked if the appellant’s family had threatened him since he arrived in the UK. It was his claim in interview that the family were still looking for him ( see Q57).It is recorded at paragraph 33, “no because I am not using any social media or platform they could find me. They only have the number I gave my girlfriend but I do not have it anymore. What happened in Kurdistan I did not have Facebook and in the UK I am posting about the government are corrupt in Iraq”. The FtTJ assessed that evidence but found that it was wholly inconsistent with his account of them having power and influence and that they would be able to find and threaten him wherever he was and because also as they knew him by name it would assist in being able to find the appellant’s Facebook account if it was open to the public and available for everyone to read.
46. In conclusion the findings of the FtTJ are not based on inherent plausibility or what the FtTJ thought would be credible based on his own perceptions but was an assessment of the appellant’s own account of his factual circumstances and those of A and her family set against the background evidence and in particular the position of women in Iraq, Kurdish culture and tribal/cultural expectations. The CPIN provided the relevant cultural background and the FtTJ assessed the appellant’s account in terms of credibility and reliability of that account in that context. Ground 2 is not made out.
47. A s regards ground 3, it is advanced on the basis of grounds 1 and 2 being made out and that if the assessment of credibility is flawed, then the reasons that followed the assessment of events in Iraq are also flawed and not sustainable. As Mr Dingley submitted ground 3 is parasitic on grounds 1 and 2. However for the reasons given above, grounds 1 and 2 were not made out therefore ground 3 also fails.
48. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FtT, particularly where the judge below was heard and assessed a range of evidential sources relating to the reliability of an account. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons to why he did not believe the core aspects of the appellant’s account and reached an decision that was open to him on the evidence.
49. Consequently for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand. The appeal is dismissed.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

26 August 2025