Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001968

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01363/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

MS UAVANGUA KAURA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Talacchi, Counsel instructed by Samars Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Namibia, aged 30, who appeals with permission granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Barker, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the Judge”) promulgated on 28 February 2025 to dismiss her appeal against the decision of the Respondent to refuse her protection and human rights claim on 21 February 2024 (“the refusal letter”).
2. The Appellant says, inter alia, that she fears persecution and/or serious harm in Namibia on the basis of gender-based violence due to threats emanating from her uncle and from the adult son of her late husband. The Respondent in the refusal letter accepted that there had been an incident with the son of the Appellant’s late husband, which had been reported to the police, but did not accept the Appellant was credible with regard to other aspects of her case: specifically the Respondent did not accept that the Appellant was unable to access sufficient protection from the state, or that she faced a risk of ongoing violence and forced marriage on return to Namibia.
3. The Appellant appealed; and filed an Appellant’s bundle and witness statement. She gave evidence before the Judge at the appeal hearing and answered questions. In his decision the Judge set out and summarised some of the evidence before him. He found that the Appellant was not credible and dismissed her protection claim.
4. At the error of law hearing on 22 October 2025 I heard submissions from both sides, after which I ruled that the Judge materially erred in law in failing to give adequate reasons, which I explained briefly at the hearing and which I amplify here.
5. It is well established (see paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22) that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49; at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19, at para 25 per Lord Hope.
6. I remind myself that in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC) it was held in the headnote that, “It is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case. This leads to judgments becoming overly long and confused and is not a proportionate approach to deciding cases. It is, however, necessary for judges to identify and resolve key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons, so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.”
7. The Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal of the Senior President of Tribunals dated 1 November 2024 states (inter alia):
“15.4. Where written reasons are given, they must be concise and focused upon the disputed issues on which the outcome of the case has turned.
15.5. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate to the significance and complexity of the disputed issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved. It follows that the Tribunal need not identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, or elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law.
15.6. Stating reasons at greater length than is necessary is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time, does not assist either the parties or an appellate Court or Tribunal, and is therefore inconsistent with the Overriding Objective. In some cases, succinct paragraphs containing the necessary self-directions and addressing the disputed issues will suffice. For a procedural decision the reasons required will usually be shorter still.”
8. Here, the Judge’s credibility findings are set out at paragraph 18 of his decision:
“18. I have not found the appellant's account to be credible. I accept that she sought asylum at the earliest possible opportunity, and there is written evidence that she reported the alleged assaults by Cliff to the local police. However, she confirmed that there was not an issue as to her late spouse's inheritance, nor did she explain satisfactorily why she could not return to live with her mother and her three young children. She previously returned to her uncle despite his alleged power and the threat of another forced marriage. Nor was there any reason why she cannot relocate internally within the country.”
9. With regard to sufficiency of protection, the Judge stated:
“19. I accept that there are issues as to gender based violence within Namibia, but there is protection from the authorities according to the CPIN (2.5.3, 4.2.6, 4.2.7, 5.4.7).”
10. Brevity is to be commended when adequately reasoned, but I am compelled to find that this three-and-a-half page decision does not contain adequate reasoning on material matters. The Judge said he had not found the Appellant’s account to be credible, but in my judgement, given that some aspects of the Appellant’s case were accepted by the Respondent in the refusal letter (the fact of her complaint to the police regarding her late husband’s son), it was incumbent upon the Judge to more clearly delineate what parts of her case he accepted and what he did not, and he failed to do so with sufficient clarity or detail.
11. Despite referencing, at paragraph 11 of his decision, the Appellant’s evidence regarding her efforts to report her problems with her late-husband’s son to the Traditional Court, (which she said failed to take any action), the Judge failed to make a clear finding on whether he accepted this had happened.
12. The Judge held against the Appellant there not being an issue as to her late spouse’s inheritance, but as set out in the grounds for permission to the Upper Tribunal (and not disputed by the Respondent in any Rule 24 response or otherwise), the Appellant had explained that, while she had not made any claim against her late husband’s estate, his son believed that she would because he perceived her as thinking she had an entitlement to do so. The Judge failed to make a finding on whether this belief existed in the mind of the Appellant’s late husband’s son, even if the Appellant said that there was no issue from her perspective regarding making a claim on the estate.
13. The Judge said the Appellant had failed to explain satisfactorily why she could not return to live with her mother and children. He did not set out what he considered was the Appellant’s explanation and why he considered it to be unsatisfactory. It was the Appellant’s evidence (see paragraph 12 of the Judge’s decision) that, despite her efforts to relocate and to seek protection from the authorities, the threats still persisted from her late husband’s son. In my judgement it was incumbent upon the Judge to resolve this part of the evidence and he failed to do so, or do so adequately.
14. The Judge also held against the Appellant’s credibility her returning to her uncle who had previously subjected her to a forced marriage. However it was the Appellant’s evidence that she felt compelled to do so, because her other efforts at seeking protection and relocation failed to prevent her late husband’s son from continuing to pose a threat to her. Again, in my judgement, the Judge ought to have grappled with this part of the evidence and failed to do so.
15. I am not satisfied that the Judge adequately reasoned his findings on sufficiency of protection. He cited four paragraphs of the Country Policy and Information Note for Namibia: “Women fearing gender-based violence – September 2021”, (“the CPIN”) - (see above) - as authority for his finding that there was sufficiency of protection. However a focussed analysis of that evidence does not adequately justify his finding.
16. Paragraph 5.4.7 of the CPIN referenced the Namibian state’s efforts to combat gender-based violence being deemed by the UN as insufficiently effective. Paragraph 2.5.3 of the CPIN did deal in general terms with the issue of sufficiency of protection, but a number of shortcomings were noted; for example with regard to (i) access to justice in rural areas, (ii) the belief that police would be unhelpful, lack empathy and not give due attention and urgency to the case, (iii) inadequate police training, (iv) the length of the criminal justice process, and (v) family and/or community influence upon victims to withdraw cases, or so they can be settled through traditional dispute resolution - features which the Appellant asserted were relevant to her case. The Judge failed to consider these shortcomings, I find, and ought to have made findings on them with reference to Chapter 7 of the CPIN which considered them in greater depth. Paragraphs 4.26 and 4.27 of the CPIN do not, in my judgement, set out the extent to which the authorities in Namibia are willing or able to provide adequate protection to women fearing gender-based violence; rather they deal with social attitudes and cultural practices:
4.2.6 Namibia’s 2019 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NNAPWPS) noted: ‘Gender based violence… [has its] roots in gender-based inequalities, gender stereotypes, patriarchal social norms and attitudes and harmful cultural practices.’
4.2.7 The UN Human Rights Council in its Compilation on Namibia for the Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 3–14 May 2021, dated 26 February 2021 (UN HRC Compilation on Namibia) stated: ‘The Independent Expert on older persons noted the persistence of certain harmful traditional practices and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men within the family and society at large.’
17. I find that the Judge did not adequately reasoned his finding that internal relocation was an option, which he expressed in a single sentence “Nor was there any reason why she cannot relocate internally within the country”. In my judgement the Appellant had advanced reasons (at paragraph 31 of her witness statement and elsewhere) why it would be unreasonable to expect her to relocate; including (i) her uncle’s power and influence; (ii) her late husband’s son’s ability to track her down when she previously relocated, (iii) the difference between cities and rural areas and impact of tribal influences, (iv) her personal characteristics as a single woman with children, and (v) her mental state. It was, I find, incumbent upon the Judge to engage with and make clear findings on these features of the Appellant’s case (and balance these against any factors pointing the other way) before reaching a decision on whether or not it would be unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to relocate.
18. Because of these deficiencies, I find that the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal was not adequately reasoned and it must be set aside.
19. Applying the relevant principles in Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, given the nature and extent of any necessary fact finding, it is appropriate (having regard to Paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements dated 11 June 2018) to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a different Judge.

Notice of Decision
The decision contains a material error of law.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, with no findings of fact preserved, to be heard afresh by a different Judge.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4.11.25