Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001976
UI-2025-001977

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/65159/2023
PA/65164/2023
LP/07081/2024
LP/07082/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 3rd of December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

KQ (1)
NQ (2)
Appellants
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr Holmes of Counsel, instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 12 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. In this matter the Appellants appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bennett who by way of a decision dated 12 March 2025 dismissed the Appellants’ protection and human rights claims. The Appellants had sought permission appeal, and permission had been granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Saffer by way of a decision dated 2 May 2025 in which the learned judge said, “It is arguable that the judge may have materially erred in requiring corroboration. All grounds may be argued.”
3. At the hearing before me today I heard submissions from Mr Holmes. He had also appeared at the First-tier Tribunal and he had also drafted the grounds of appeal, which if I may say so were set out in a clear and understandable format, as were his submissions before me today. I am also grateful to Dr Ibisi for her clear oral submissions.
Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal
4. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal contended in summary that the Judge had materially erred in law on two grounds.
5. Ground one contends that the Judge had required corroboration and had failed to give adequate reasons for his decision.
6. Ground two contends that there was procedural irregularity because the Judge had tacitly suggested that the Appellant’s witness had been dishonest, but in circumstances where the evidence stood unchallenged by the Respondent.
The Judge’s decision
7. I turn to the Judge’s decision and I refer in part to some of the paragraphs. Paragraph 15 says:
“I find it surprising that there is no corroborative documentation to support the Appellants’ account of the accident and the death of a member of AS’s family, especially in circumstances where substantial documentation to evidence Appellant 1’s profession has been obtained and where the asserted accident would be expected to be reasonably high profile given the importance of AS’s family.”
At paragraph 16 the Judge said:
“It is also striking that there is no documentation to support Appellant 1’s account of his incarceration and trial. Appellant 1’s oral evidence was inconsistent regarding whether, regarding a police report, ‘they sent the report to my home’, as he first said or whether ‘They didn’t send the report to the home, they just showed them’ as he said later on. In circumstances where he says he asked a friend to obtain evidence of his profession as an ambulance driver I consider he could have asked for evidence to support his account of the accident and the court proceedings and I find it implausible that none would be available.”
At paragraph 30 the Judge said:
“I am not satisfied that it is reasonably likely that Appellant 1 was involved in an ambulance accident whereby he killed a pedestrian, that he was subsequently incarcerated, that there was an accident involving the nephew of AS, or that the Appellants received adverse attention from AS and his family. I consider the absence of corroborating documentation a weighty factor against the Appellants in this regard.”
The Hearing Before Me
8. Mr Holmes said that although the Judge accepted certain parts of the first Appellant’s account at paragraphs 13 and 14, the Judge erred at paragraphs 15, 16 and 30. That was because the Judge had gone on to conclude that, due to the absence of what she considered to be necessary and corroborative evidence, thereby it led to a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
9. Dr Ibisi, who appears on behalf of the Secretary of State, resisted the appeal. She relied on a Rule 24 response dated 22 May 2025. The Rule 24 states in relation to Ground 1 in summary that the Judge did not materially err in requiring corroborative documents, particularly in the context where the Judge found it reasonable to expect that the omitted documents could have been readily obtained. The Judge had provided adequate and recent findings when concluding that there were elements of the Appellant’s account which were inconsistent, thereby undermining their credibility.
10. The Respondent had relied on a decision of the Court of Appeal in TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40; [2009] Imm. A.R. 488 and also a decision of the AIT in ST (Corroboration, Kasolo) [2004] UKIAT 119. The Rule 24 response said that the decision affirmed that it would be reasonable to expect corroboration in certain circumstances.
11. Dr Ibisi submitted and read out the Rule 24 that the Judge noted that the Appellant was able to produce a substantial volume of documentary evidence to support other aspects of his claim. It was therefore open to the Judge to seek documents relating to the alleged incident and documents to prove the first Appellant’s subsequent incarceration.
12. In respect of ground 2, the Rule 24 response said in summary that this was no more than a mere disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the witness evidence whereby it was open to the Judge that the witness’s evidence appeared to be “highly convenient” particularly when considering the brevity of the witness statement dated 11 April 2024 and the inconsistencies.
Consideration and Analysis
13. I turn to the authorities which have been relied upon by the parties. TK (Burundi) was a case at the Court of Appeal in which Thomas LJ gave the only reasoned judgment and with whom Waller and Moore-Bick LJJ agreed. The Secretary of State relies on this decision heavily her within a Rule 24 response. The Rule 24 response does not refer to any particular paragraphs of the judgment, but it is probably the following, which is relied on by the Respondent, being paragraph 20 of Thomas LJ’s judgment where his lordship said:
“20. The importance of the evidence that emerged in this Court is to demonstrate how important it is in cases of this kind for independent supporting evidence to be provided where it would ordinarily be available; that where there is no credible explanation for the failure to produce that supporting evidence it can be a very strong pointer that the account being given is not credible. It is clear in the circumstances of this case that the Judge was in fact right to disbelieve the appellant. If the appellant had asked the mother of his second child, Ms Ndagire to give evidence, the truth about her immigration status would have emerged and his claim to base an entitlement to family life on his relationship with her and the child by her would have failed. That that was the inevitable consequence was made clear by the fact that his counsel accepted before us that he could no longer rely upon the relationship with Ms N and her daughter and the sole ground on which an Article 8 claim could be advanced was the relationship to his daughter by his first partner.
21. The circumstances of this case in my view demonstrate that independent supporting evidence which is available from persons subject to this jurisdiction be provided wherever possible and the need for an Immigration Judge to adopt a cautious approach to the evidence of an appellant where independent supporting evidence, as it was in this case, is readily available within this jurisdiction, but not provided. It follows that where a Judge in assessing credibility relies on the fact that there is no independent supporting evidence where there should be supporting evidence and there is no credible account for its absence commits no error of law when he relies on that fact for rejecting the account of an appellant.”
14. Mr Holmes stresses that that was a judgment which can be distinguished from the appeal before me because that was not a protection claim. Mr Holmes states that was an Article 8 ECHR decision.
15. In my judgment in any event, TK (Burundi) has to be considered alongside the Court of Appeal’s more recent decision not cited to me: MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713. Singh LJ gave the only reasoned judgment with whom King and Warby LJJ agreed. At paragraph 86 his Lordship said,
“86. It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal. On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) at para. 46(iv).
87. I accept Mr Jones's submissions on Ground 3. Although the UT directed itself, at paragraph 84, that there is no legal duty on the Appellant to corroborate his claim, that was in substance the basis on which it proceeded. Each of the three perceived deficiencies in the evidence adduced on his behalf was to the effect that he could have but had not obtained corroborative evidence to support his claim. In the circumstances of this case, bearing in mind both the relatively low standard of proof and the fact that the Appellant had adduced positive evidence which supported his claim (as the UT recognised), evidence both of what he had himself witnessed and evidence of experts which was consistent with his claim, I have reached the conclusion that the UT required more of him than was necessary. It then fell into error by concluding that the failure to adduce corroborative evidence undermined his credibility with the result that his evidence was found not to be ‘truthful’, at paragraph 87.”
16. Importantly for the instant appeal before me, Singh LJ said in MAH (Egypt) that which is apposite because the same error has occurred in this Judge’s decision. The Judge in the instant appeal was specifically seeking corroborative evidence. The Judge had made a material error because she had referred to a failure by the Appellants to adduce corroborative evidence. She said the failure to do so had undermined the Appellants’ credibility. This is precisely the error which the Court of Appeal said that the Upper Tribunal had made in MAH (Egypt).
Conclusion
17. I explored with Mr Holmes paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Judge’s decision and whether they showed on their own a material error of law. I have to agree with Dr Ibisi that in many instances words such as those at paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Judge’s decision will not necessarily show a material error of law. However, when I assess paragraphs 15, 16 and 30 of the Judge’s decision together, along with the Judge’s decision as a whole, especially where there is no reference by the Judge to Court of Appeal authority in respect of corroboration, in my judgment, it shows the Judge materially erred in law.
18. In the circumstances it is not necessary to consider Ground 2 because the error in Ground 1 is of such a fundamental nature that the whole decision has to be set aside.
19. I had canvassed with the parties what their submissions were if I was to find that there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Both parties had agreed that upon setting aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal that the matter ought to be remitted for hearing before the First-tier Tribunal.
20. I have considered whether or not this is a matter which ought to remain for consideration here at the Upper Tribunal or be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I conclude that the appropriate decision in this case is that I remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
The matter will be considered afresh at the First-tier Tribunal on all issues with no retained findings.
The Anonymity Order is continued.

Abid Mahnood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 September 2025