Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001985

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51382/2023
LP/00650/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 July 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PARKES

Between

BT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Lewis (Counsel, instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP)
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 2 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The is a citizen of Albania, his immigration history and the basis of his claim are set out in full in the Tribunal papers. The Appellant's application for international protection was rejected by the Secretary of State. The Appellant's appeal was heard by Judge Gray at Hatton Cross on the 15th of November 2024. The appeal was dismissed for the reasons given in the decision of the 1st of December 2024. By notice of the 13th of January 2025 the Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal which was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on the 24th of April 2025 leading to the hearing on the 2nd of July 2025.
2. The grounds are comprehensive and can be summarised. It was accepted that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking. It was argued that the Judge had not engaged with the country guidance and evidence relating to internal relocation, that victims can be tracked down by word of mouth and the difficulty of living anonymously in the country. It is also argued that the Judge did not engage with the evidence relating to the risk of re-trafficking and the risk factors in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), it was argued that even if the Appellant could find work he would not earn enough to live on.
3. In submissions reliance was placed on the grounds and reference was made to paragraph 41(b) of the decision. It was submitted that there was an error in the approach of the Judge and there was risk of tracing in the Appellant's circumstances. Reference was made to Albania being a small country, there was a lack of contact with the Appellant's family and the Judge had not considered the issue, the Appellant would be unsafe.
4. Regarding ground 2 reference was made to paragraph 41(c), it was argued that the Judge did not have regard to the objective evidence which was counter to the conclusions reached. The decision had to be looked at in its entirety. Employment was fundamental to the Appellant's ability to avoid the risk. There were significant difficulties. The Judge had relied on the expert report but, it was argued, he had misunderstood it.
5. For the Secretary of State it was argued that all the points had been considered by the Judge and that the Judge had considered all the relevant factors and was entitled to make the findings set out. The risk factors were set out with the Judge having regard to TD and AD, the expert’s report and the observations about vulnerable young men. The Judge had quoted the background evidence and had considered it all.
6. Turning to ground 2 again the Judge had considered the background evidence. Reference was made to paragraphs 31 to 42 and Volpe. The decision does not need to be elaborate, referring to paragraph 41(c) of the decision the risk factors were considered and the Judge found that they were outweighed by the positive factors the Judge had identified. This was a rational decision.
7. It is not necessary for a judge to set out each and every part of the evidence that is being considered or to give every reason that underpins the decision made. The question for the Judge was whether the Appellant's features meant that there was a real risk to the Appellant on return. It is not a simple equation that leads only to the conclusion that a person from Albania who has been trafficked is at risk.
8. The Judge had regard to the Appellant's personal background, how he came to be in the UK, the expert evidence and the applicable case law and was clearly aware of the risk factors that had to be addressed. The Judge considered not only the possibility of being located by others but also motivation and the evidence relating to the Appellant's employer and father and their contacts. The burden is on the Appellant to show that he would be at risk and on the information available the Judge concluded that he would not.
9. The decision has to be read fairly and as a whole without taking aspects of it out of context. I bear in mind the guidance in EA v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 10 at paragraph 27 where Burnett LJ made the following observation: “Decisions of tribunals should not become formulaic and rarely benefit from copious citation of authority. Arguments that reduce to the proposition that the F-tT has failed to mention dicta from a series of cases in the Court of Appeal or elsewhere will rarely prosper. Similarly, as Lord Hoffmann said in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360, 1372, "reasons should be read on the assumption that, unless he has demonstrated the contrary, the judge knew how he should perform his functions and which matters he should take into account". He added that an "appellate court should resist the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own discretion for that of the judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables them to claim that he misdirected himself". Moreover, some principles are so firmly embedded in judicial thinking that they do not need to be recited. For example, it would be surprising to see in every civil judgment a paragraph dealing with the burden and standard of proof; or in every running down action a treatise, however short, on the law of negligence. That said, the reader of any judicial decision must be reassured from its content that the court or tribunal has applied the correct legal test to any question it is deciding.”
10. The decision read as required by the guidance does not show that the Judge erred in the approach taken to the evidence presented or in the conclusions drawn from the discussion that followed. There is no error in the decision which stands as the disposal of the Appellant's appeal.

Notice of Decision
11. The decision does not contain an error of law, the appeal is dismissed. The decision of Judge Gray stands.

Judge Parkes

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16th July 2025