Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001987

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/69568/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20 October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MAS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms Farrell, instructed by Peter G Farrell, Solicitors

Heard in Edinburgh on 11 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction & Background
1. The appellant is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The respondent is a national of Egypt born on 15 July 1986. The appellant appeals with permission granted on 4 May 2025 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 5 March 2025 to grant the respondent’s appeal against the refusal of his asylum claim.
2. The basis of the respondent’s claim for asylum was that he had come to the adverse attention of the Egyptian authorities who suspected the respondent of being involved with the Muslim Brotherhood. He alleged that he was arrested and detained on three occasions and subjected to torture. He left Egypt in August 2021, travelled through Libya, Italy and France and arrived in the UK on 3 November 2021.
3. The appellant accepted that the respondent is an Egyptian national and accepted that he had the characteristic of imputed political opinion as a Convention reason. The appellant rejected the respondent’s application for asylum on the basis that the respondent had failed to establish that he was arrested, detained and tortured or that the Egyptian authorities have any interest in the respondent.
4. The FtT allowed the appeal by the respondent concluding that it accepted the credibility of the account by the respondent and that he had established that he had a genuine fear of persecution and would be persecuted on return to Egypt for the Convention reason of imputed political opinion.
5. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal at an error of law hearing on 11 September 2025. At the hearing I heard submissions from the parties and reserved my decision. For the reasons set out below, I find that there was no error of law and I dismiss the appeal.
6. The FtT made an anonymity order in this appeal, and I have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). Having taken into account Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the respondent has made an application for international protection and I consider that the UK’s obligations towards applicants for international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings.
Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions
7. At the commencement of the hearing Mr Mullen explained that he did not intend to pursue ground of appeal (c) in his grounds of appeal (which essentially dealt with TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40) and that he was not insisting upon the point contained in ground of appeal (e) regarding BT (Former Solicitors alleged misconduct) Nepal 2004 UKIAT 00311.
8. Mr Mullen clarified that there was essentially one ground of appeal that being that there was a failure to provide a properly reasoned judgement. His position was that there had been a failure by the Judge in the FtT (“the Judge”) to clearly set out his reasons explaining why the losing party had lost. Although there was a reference in the grounds of appeal to the standard of proof he accepted that that was not particularly relevant here.
9. In Mr Mullen’s submission there had been a failure by the Judge to deal with the conflicts in the evidence and to clearly set out why he had come down on the side of the respondent and accepted his version of events. The grounds of appeal reference that the Judge had criticised a number of aspects of the respondent’s evidence e.g. the chronology of events, the documentary evidence and it appeared the Judge had relied on a medical report and plausibility alone to find in favour of the respondent. In Mr Mullen’s submission that was not sufficient.
10. Ms Farrell in her submissions relied upon her Rule 24 response of 4 June 2025 and in addition submitted that there was clear evidence that allowed the Judge to come to the decision that he had – in particular the Judge was entitled to rely upon the medical report of Dr Dignon (“the Dignon’s Report”) and on the CPIN Egypt: Opposition to the state, December 2023 Version 4.0.
11. In deciding whether the FtT’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114]. In particular I bear in mind the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Ullah [26] (i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First-Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law.
12. The appeal in this case is focussed very firmly on whether there were sufficient reasons set out by the Judge to support his decision to allow the respondent’s appeal. It is clearly established law that a determination should disclose clearly the reason for a tribunal’s decision (MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 (IAC)).
13. In arriving at his decision to find the respondent’s account credible the Judge clearly sets out at paragraph 14 of the determination that he has considered the credibility of the respondent’s claim in terms of the amount of detail given; its internal and external consistency; and its plausibility. On the issue of detail, the Judge notes at paragraph 15 that the respondent has given a reasonably detailed account and that there is no challenge to his credibility on that score. I also accept that the Judge will have had the benefit of hearing first hand from the respondent in answering questions under cross examination.
14. Having considered the issue of detail the Judge goes on to consider internal consistency. There is some discussion in the determination about whether any inference should be drawn from the failure by the respondent to attend at an earlier interview. The Judge decides to draw no inference from that and Mr Mullen has confirmed that he is no longer taking issue with this point. The only other point that the Judge makes on internal consistency relates to the timeline. The Judge accepts that there was an inconsistency in the account from the respondent in that in his witness statement he claimed he left Egypt after release from detention in August 2021 whereas at the hearing he stated he was at large in Egypt for about three months before going to Libya. The Judge at paragraph 20 did attach some weight to this inconsistency.
15. The Judge then goes on to consider External Consistency. At paragraph 21 he considers the documentary evidence produced by the respondent and decides for the reasons set out in paragraph 21 to attach no weight to that evidence. I should pause here to say that the fact that the determination is made to attach no weight to this evidence does not mean that it weights in the balance against the respondent. It is simply of no weight.
16. The only other matter that the Judge considers is relevant under this heading is the Dignon Report (note that the Judge does deal at paragraph 23 with the lack of any witness statements from the respondent’s family – he attaches no inference to that and Mr Mullen has confirmed that the appellant no longer challenges on this point). With regard to the Dignon Report the Judge notes that in respect of both the arm injury and the scarring he puts these at level B on the Istanbul Protocol – and that he therefore finds that the Dignon Report provides some support to the respondent’s account and he attaches some weight to that report.
17. On Plausibility the Judge refers to CPIN Egypt: Opposition to the state, December 2023 Version 4.0. and in particular paragraph 15.1.4. as supporting the kind of treatment in prison that the respondent alleged. I note that paragraph 15.1.4 does specifically reference methods of torture such as electric shocks and suspension by the limbs. However, the Judge does then go on to state that he does take into account the respondent’s failure to take advantage of the opportunity to claim asylum in Italy or France – in accordance with section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
18. At paragraph 26 the Judge sums up his decision on the issue of genuine fear of persecution as follows:-
“Looking at all of the evidence in the round I consider that notwithstanding the inconsistency around the period from when he was released from prison until his flight to Libya and his failure to claim asylum when in a safe country, the account the appellant has given is not lacking in detail; is largely consistent; is supported to some extent by the report of Dr Dignon and is plausible in the light of the background evidence. For these reasons I find that the appellant is credible and has established on the balance of probabilities that he fears persecution for a Convention reason in the event of his return to Egypt.”
19. This is a case where the evidence before the Judge was quite limited. Once the documents referenced at #21 are discounted there is only the evidence of the respondent, the Dignon Report and the country evidence. Whilst the onus is on the respondent to establish his case – it is established law that corroboration is not required (MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216). The Judge has clearly set out why he has accepted the account of the respondent – it is not lacking in detail, it is consistent and supported to some extent by the Dignon Report and the background evidence. He does reference the inconsistency point and the failure to claim asylum in a safe country. I consider that he has taken both these points into consideration and that considering matters in the round he has set out why he has come to the decision that he has.
20. Paragraph 26 of the determination deals only with the issue of genuine belief – the so called subjective question. He correctly sets out the standard of proof in accordance with JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100. At paragraph 27 he deals with the second issue of whether it is reasonably likely (applying the lower standard) that he would be persecuted for that Convention reason – and finds in the affirmative that he would be in light of his credibility findings on the first issue. In my view it is clear why he has come to that determination.
Conclusion
21. I accept that this is a case that turned on credibility. The Judge has set out why he has accepted that the appellant was a credible witness. I accept that it may well be a case that, as highlighted in Ullah, a different Tribunal may have come to a different conclusion on – but that does not mean that there has been any error of law. In reviewing the determination by the Judge I consider that sufficient reasons are set out to explain the outcome and accordingly I find that there is no error of law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
03.10.25