UI-2025-001989

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 19 Jan 2026
• Promulgation date: 26 Jan 2026
• Publication date: 10 Feb 2026
• Last updated on: 10 Feb 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001989


First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55465/2024
LH/00226/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26 January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Appellant
and

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Biggs, Counsel instructed by GLD
For the Respondent: Ms M. Knorr, Counsel instructed by Birnberg Peirce Ltd


Heard at Field House on 19 January 2026

­Although this is an appeal by the Entry Clearance Officer, to avoid confusion we shall refer to the parties as they were in the First-tier Tribunal. The Entry Clearance Officer shall be referred to as the respondent and SS shall be referred to as the appellant.

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.   No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.  


DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is a decision of the Tribunal to which both Judges have contributed. It is to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in allowing the appellant’s human rights appeal.

2. The respondent appeals against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the Judge”) promulgated on 3 March 2025 in which she allowed the appellant’s human rights appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds.

3. The appellant is a citizen of the Occupied Palestinian Territory who was displaced from her home in Gaza due to the conflict there arising from the events in October 2023. The appellant was able to leave Gaza on 31 January 2024, gaining entry to Egypt where she currently lives alone. The appellant made an entry clearance application on 15 March 2024 to join her family members in the United Kingdom which was refused by the respondent on 7 May 2024.

4. The appellant sought entry clearance to join her adult daughter and sponsor (“WS”), her daughter’s husband and children, and her adult son (“MS”). The appellant’s daughter is a British citizen, and her son has refugee status in the United Kingdom.

5. Following a hearing held in the First-tier Tribunal IAC at Hatton Cross on 29 January 2025, the Judge allowed the appellant’s appeal on the grounds that the respondent’s decision to refuse entry clearance would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant and for her children in the UK and consequently amounts to a disproportionate interference with their right to family life under Article 8.

The decision

6. At [8] of the decision the Judge records that the parties agreed that the following issues required determination:

1) Whether there was family life under Article 8(1) between the appellant and her family in the UK?
2) If yes, did the decision interfere with that family life?
3) If yes, was the decision proportionate?

7. The Judge found that the appellant enjoyed family life with her daughter and son. She found that the appellant relies on the financial support of her children to meet her essential needs. There was evidence of visits made by the appellant to her family in the UK for three months in 2011, to care for WS when she was having surgery for a cyst, and for a six-month period in 2019 during her daughter’s cancer treatment and to help care for her grandchildren. There was also evidence of multiple visits since 2009 made by WS to the appellant whilst she was in Gaza, and visits by both WS and MS since the appellant has been in Egypt.

8. There was, the Judge found, evidence of very regular contact by WhatsApp and phone calls between the appellant and her children and there was “mutual emotional dependency” between them and “ample evidence” of emotional ties “beyond the norm”- [39]. The Judge concluded that family life currently exists between the appellant and her two children in the UK having directed herself at [34] as follows:

It is for the appellant to establish that she currently enjoys family life with her family in the UK. Family life is not established between adult children and a parent unless something more exists than normal emotional ties of love and affection. It is not necessary for the appellant to establish dependency but such ties may exist if there is dependency between the appellants and their sponsor or vice versa. Dependency should be read as real or committed or effective support.

9. The respondent’s position in the refusal decision states that refusal of entry clearance did not interfere with any current family life because the appellant and her sponsor daughter had not lived in the same household for sixteen years and could maintain family life by way of remote means and occasional visits. In respect of this issue the Judge found that the respondent’s decision did interfere with the appellant’s family life with her children at [40 - 41]. The Judge referred to the positive obligation to promote family life; that there was ample and unchallenged medical evidence to show that the separation of the appellant from her children in the UK is damaging to her and both her children; and that the ability of the appellant’s children to continue to visit her in Egypt, where she was now living illegally, was in doubt.

10. The Judge went on to conduct the proportionality assessment. It was accepted that the appellant could not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules which “carried great weight” against her in the proportionality balancing exercise, as did the fact she does not speak English and the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls - [42].

11. Weighing in the appellant’s favour in the balancing exercise included her medical conditions and “extreme psychological vulnerability”, and the medical conditions of the appellant’s children. There was “significant medical evidence to show that allowing the appellant to join her children in the UK would be beneficial both for their mental health as well as her mental health” - [43]. In relation to WS, the expert evidence indicated that “the possibility of being reunited with her mother in the UK holds great potential for substantial psychological relief”- [47]. Similar observations were made in the expert evidence regarding MS - [46].

12. The Judge also weighed in the appellant’s favour her current living circumstances: that she has no legal status in Egypt and is liable to arrest and detention by the Egyptian authorities; she is unable to work and access healthcare; she lives alone when she has previously always lived with her family (as was the cultural norm); and, that there is no real prospect at present of the appellant being able to safely return to Gaza.



13. At [44 - 45], referring to the expert evidence and strong recommendation of Jane Bartlett, independent social worker, the Judge found that it was in the best interests of the sponsor’s children to be reunited with their grandmother referring to evidence of the “exceptional and genuine relationship between them”.

14. The Judge noted as weighing in the appellant’s favour the “particularly strong relationship” between the appellant and WS, not only because of the support the appellant had provided her daughter through her ongoing cancer treatment, but also because, in accordance with the cultural norms of their society, as the eldest child of the family, WS had assumed responsibility for the appellant, who was widowed in 2000.

15. Having conducted the Article 8 balancing exercise, the Judge found that the refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant and for her children in the UK and there were compelling circumstances in the case sufficient to outweigh the significant public interest in maintaining effective immigration controls.

The grounds and permission

16. The respondent seeks to appeal the decision on the following grounds:

1) The Judge erred;

i. in respect of her finding that there was family life protected by Article 8 ECHR and, in any case,
ii. by failing to consider factors relevant to the assessment of the nature and quality of the family life interfered with by the refusal of entry clearance.
2) The Judge’s finding that the refusal of entry to the UK engaged a right protected by Article 8 is inadequately reasoned and is undermined by the Judge failing to apply the correct legal principles.

3) The Judge’s assessment of proportionality for the purposes of Article 8(2) is vitiated by a failure to consider material matters and is perverse including:

i. a failure to properly appreciate the strength of the public interest supporting the refusal decision; and
ii. a failure to recognise that the appellant's family life was ''precarious" and was “precarious” in a particular way.

4) The Judge erred by giving any or substantial weight to the appellant’s circumstances in Egypt and Gaza when considering whether Article 8 would be breached by refusing the appellant entry to the UK.


5) The Judge erred in considering the Article 8 rights of the appellant, rather than only considering the Article 8 family life rights of her adult children in the UK, given that she resides outside the UK and has no sufficient connection to the UK.

17. In a brief decision, permission to appeal was granted on all grounds by the First-tier Tribunal on 5 May 2025, the reasoning limited to stating that “[t]he grounds disclose arguable errors of law and permission to appeal is granted”.

Rule 24 response

18. The appellant filed a Rule 24 response on 29 May 2025. In summary, the Rule 24 response asserts that the Judge directed herself correctly, considered the relevant evidence, resolved the very limited evidential issues in dispute, took all relevant matters into account, and made findings open to her on the evidence.

19. The Rule 24 response and the skeleton argument filed on behalf of the appellant assert that the respondent’s grounds seek to introduce a range of points which were not in issue before the First-tier Tribunal. In this regard the appellant relies on Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC) (“Lata”) which states at [28]:
If follows that unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a Judge’s decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a Judge failed to take account of a point that was never raised for their consideration as an issue in an appeal. Such an approach would undermine the principles clearly laid out in the Procedure Rules.

Proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal

20. In light of the submissions in the Rule 24 response and appellant’s skeleton argument, that the respondent now seeks to advance a case which is fundamentally different to that before the First-tier Tribunal, it is relevant for us to examine the respondent’s refusal decision and the appellant’s appeal skeleton argument (“ASA”) from the First-tier Tribunal proceedings, to assess the case advanced by the parties before the Judge. Regrettably, despite being directed to do so by no later than 4pm on Wednesday 12 February 2025, the respondent failed to provide a review in response to the appellant’s ASA in the First-tier Tribunal.

21. In addition to the Upper Tribunal decision in Lata, we have also considered the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal of 1 November 2024, in particular concerning the requirements of an appeal skeleton argument, the substantive hearing and the “issues based approach”.

22. At [11.1] the Practice Direction requires that the parties should come to the substantive hearing ready to “identify the disputed issues that the Tribunal is being asked to decide in the case”. At [11.4] the Practice Direction states:

The outset of the substantive hearing is the final opportunity to refine and further narrow the disputed issues or agree issues or matters that are in dispute. Once settled, the disputed issues define the scope of the appeal hearing and confine the territory to be explored in the evidence, submissions and decision.

Refusal decision dated 7 May 2024

23. The decision states that the appellant’s application was considered under the Immigration Rules and that consideration was also given to whether leave should be granted “Outside of the Rules”. The refusal decision states that the appellant is unable to satisfy the requirements of the Rules set out in FRP 1.1 in Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) because her sponsor is a British citizen and because she does not satisfy the relationship requirements of 4.1 to 6.2 of Appendix FRP because she is the sponsor’s mother. It states that there may be other application routes more appropriate to the appellant’s circumstance.

24. Applying the principles from Kugathas [2003] EWCA Civ 31 and Singh [2015] EWCA Civ 630, the decision states that the appellant and her sponsor do not enjoy family life together such as to engage Article 8 ECHR. The decision acknowledges the various trips that the sponsor has made to visit the appellant since 2009, and the trips by the appellant to the UK to visit the sponsor. The sponsor’s financial support for the appellant is also acknowledged. The decision notes that the sponsor has lived apart from the appellant since 2008 when she came to the UK and has formed an independent family unit with her husband and children. The decision states that the appellant and sponsor have maintained their relationship with remote contact and visits for around sixteen years.

25. The decision states that the appellant and her sponsor have a “normal mother-and-daughter relationship” and the evidence does not demonstrate “a level of emotional or financial dependency which would mean that Article 8 of ECHR is engaged”. It also states that the appellant has not provided evidence to demonstrate that she is dependent upon the sponsor in her daily life or that there is something more than the “normal emotional ties” between the appellant and her sponsor. The decision states that even if Article 8 is engaged the refusal does not amount to an interference with current family life since the appellant and sponsor have not lived together in the same household since 2008.

26. The remainder of the reasoning in the decision relates to the proportionality question in the event that Article 8 is engaged. Reference is made to the ability of the appellant and sponsor to maintain communication and that the sponsor had recently visited the appellant in Egypt. It was considered that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control outweighed any interference with the appellant’s family life with the sponsor.

Appellant’s appeal skeleton argument dated 28 January 2025

27. The ASA sets out the three issues in dispute which were identified by the Judge as agreed between the parties in the decision (set out above at [6]).

28. The ASA is detailed. It submits that there is clear evidence of exceptionally close relationships between the appellant and her two adult children in the UK which are consistent with their culture, their particular family history, and the significance of family support in the context of armed conflict and risk of serious harm. It is submitted that it is not essential that members of a family live together for there to be family life, and what may constitute family life can fall well short of what constitutes full dependency. The support that the appellant’s adult children and the appellant provide for one another amounts to “real, committed or effective support”. The ASA also refers to the Article 8 private life rights of the appellant’s children in the UK which, it is claimed, are engaged as a result of the ongoing separation from the appellant which is impacting their mental health.

29. In relation to interference with the appellant’s and her children’s Article 8 rights by the refusal, the ASA avers that the refusal prevents the appellant living with the sponsor and seriously inhibits the ability of the appellant’s children to provide her with the care she now needs.

30. The ASA sets out detailed submissions on the proportionality issue which are addressed in the First-tier decision under appeal. In summary, the ASA submits that the only prospect now for safe reunification is admission of the appellant to the UK. Amongst many other factors, the appellant asserts that it is in the best interests of her minor grandchildren for the appellant to be admitted to the UK. The ASA acknowledges that on the other side of the balance in the proportionality assessment is the public interest in immigration controls, although it asserts that the appellant will be financially supported by her family.

Procedural history in the Upper Tribunal

31. Following a case management review hearing on 30 June 2025, the Upper Tribunal determined that the appeal should not be stayed at that stage pending the decision of the Court of Appeal in appeal CA-2025 000713: Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘SSHD’) v IA & Ors (‘IA’) in which permission to appeal had been granted by Dingemans LJ on 6 May 2025. At that time, IA had been listed for hearing at the end of January 2026. In a decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Grey issued on 1 July 2025, at [23], it was recorded that the position on a stay on proceedings would be kept under review.

32. The error of law hearing was listed before a Presidential panel for 15 and 16 October 2025. By the time of that hearing, the hearing of IA in the Court of Appeal had been brought forward to be heard on 4 and 5 November 2025. Having considered the grounds of appeal in IA and in this appeal, and the proximity in time of the Court of Appeal hearing in IA, the Upper Tribunal decided, in accordance with the Overriding Objective, to stay the proceedings in this appeal pending the handing down of the Court of Appeal decision in IA. It was considered that if the Secretary of State was successful on her grounds before the Court of Appeal in IA, it was likely to have a critical impact on the similar grounds raised in this appeal.

33. The Court of Appeal handed down judgment in IA on 26 November 2025 and the error of law hearing in this appeal was re-listed for 19 January 2026.

The Court of Appeal decision in IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516

34. This case concerned the appeal of the Secretary of State against the decision of the Upper Tribunal allowing the appeal of a family of six in Gaza who had appealed the refusal of entry clearance applications to join the brother of the father of the claimant family.

35. At this juncture we merely set out the summary of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on the three grounds of appeal in IA. We refer below to further relevant passages from the Court’s judgment in our analysis of the grounds in this appeal.

36. In relation to the grounds pursued by the Secretary of State in IA these were summarised at [5] of the judgment as follows:

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (the SSHD) is appealing the UT’s decisions as to the existence of family life and its conclusions on the proportionality balance under article 8(2). The SSHD contended that: (a) on a proper understanding of the law as to the meaning of “family life”, the family and the sponsor did not enjoy family life under article 8(1), (b) even if such family life did exist, the UT was wrong at [166] to consider the free-standing article 8 rights of the family, rather than just those of the sponsor, in undertaking the proportionality balance required by article 8(2), and (c) the UT gave the wrong weight to the risks to the lives of the family and their dire situation in the Gaza warzone, and gave the wrong weight to the importance of UK immigration control and the short-lived family life that had existed in this case.

37. In summarising the Court’s conclusion on these grounds, the judgment states:

9. We have decided that the SSHD’s appeal should be allowed on grounds 1 and 3 and in part on ground 2. Our reasons can be summarised briefly here.

10. First, the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has been that “family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”” (see Kumari v. The Netherlands 44051/20, 10 December 2024 (Kumari) at [35], and Beoku-Betts v. SSHD [2008] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 115 (Beoku-Betts) at [39]). The FTT did not apply that test, but instead asked itself whether the sponsor had provided “real, effective or committed support” to his brother and the family (see [18] and [25] of the FTT decision). The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test. Applying the proper test, neither the brother nor his family had shown that they had family life with the sponsor for the purposes of article 8(1).

11. Secondly, if there had been family life between the sponsor and his family (as found by the FTT), it would have been appropriate to have regard to the unitary nature of that family life (see Beoku-Betts at [4], [20] and [41]-[43]). We accept, however, that, in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2), the court is looking primarily at the article 8 rights of those persons within the jurisdiction of article 1 of the ECtHR (in this case, the sponsor).

12. Thirdly, we have concluded that the UT made several errors in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2). Even if, contrary to what we have decided, family life had existed between the sponsor and the family, the balance should not have been determined in favour of granting the family entry clearance. Very exceptional or compelling circumstances had not been shown. The UT was wrong to pay so little regard to the immigration control policies of the SSHD and the UK Government, as reflected in the Rules, as expressing what was necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK and for the protection of the rights of the citizens of the UK. The UT wrongly over-stated the importance of the family’s short-lived family life with the sponsor (had it existed at all), the best interests of the children of the family and the admittedly serious risks faced by the family in Gaza.

Error of law hearing

38. The parties provided detailed updated skeleton arguments in advance of the hearing and both Mr Biggs and Ms Knorr addressed us at length. We are grateful for their helpful submissions. We will not rehearse the content of the oral and written arguments here but, in our analysis of the grounds of appeal, where necessary to do so.

39. Mr Biggs advised us that the respondent no longer pursued ground 5. We should add that Ms Knorr reiterated that a series of new points had been taken by the respondent which had not been raised below in the First-tier.

Analysis

40. We remind ourselves that restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by the First-tier Tribunal Judge for her decision. There are several authorities on the point, but we particularly have in mind what Lord Hamblen said in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, at [72] that:

It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

i. They alone are the Judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

ii. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

iii. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.

Ground 1 (i) – whether the Judge erred in finding there was family life

41. Mr Biggs’ central argument is that the Judge made the same error as identified by the first ground of appeal in IA, in that a test of “real, committed or effective” support was applied in substance by the Judge to determine whether the appellant enjoyed a family life with her adult children in the United Kingdom, and that the Judge did not address the correct test of “additional elements of dependency”.

42. At this juncture we consider [122 & 123] of IA:

122. The real, committed or effective support test is, in our judgment, as we have already intimated at [68], on a proper analysis different from the additional elements of dependency test. Dependency may in one sense be the other side of the support coin. But “real support” may be provided without any serious dependency. Even “effective support” might be provided without there being meaningful dependency. As Sedley LJ himself acknowledged in Kugathas, the real, committed and effective support test was a reading down of the additional elements of dependency test. The FTT said the same at [25] where it acknowledged that the sponsor’s real, committed and effective support of family was short of the family being dependent on the sponsor.

123 In our judgment, it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. But real, committed and effective support is not the test itself, because the level of real support, for example, may be minor or insignificant, whereas the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship. This is not a semantic point. The ECtHR used the word “dependence” in S v. UK in the context of “cohabiting dependents”, which were its starting point (see [42] above).

43. Mr Biggs places particular emphasis on the last two sentences of the Judge’s findings at [34], which we repeat here:

It is not necessary for the appellant to establish dependency but such ties may exist if there is dependency between the appellants and their sponsor or vice versa. Dependency should be read as real or committed or effective support.

44. It is further argued on behalf of the respondent that the Judge did not just identify, but applied a test of real, committed or effective support, which led her to conclude at [39] that this test had been met. Indeed, at [39], the Judge states, “There is support which is real, effective and committed”. We take account of what was said about that test in IA at [122].

45. A further related point made on behalf of the respondent is that the Judge erred in failing to apply the principles in Kumari v The Netherlands (Application 440151/20). Mr Biggs argued that Kumari stated that the relevance of serious illness was limited in assessing the existence of family life, owing to a heightened threshold in health cases, and this factor alone, or financial dependency, was insufficient to establish family life between relatives. Mr Biggs rightly did not pursue this matter to any great extent in his oral submissions given what the Court said in IA at [120] regarding financial dependency and dependency created by disability playing a part in the evaluation. This was the first of the many new points raised on behalf of the respondent which was not made before the First-tier Tribunal.

46. In terms of materiality of the alleged error, Mr Biggs submits that the test applied by the Judge sets the bar lower than the additional elements of dependency test and that had she considered the correct test, the Judge might not have accepted that it was met. Therefore, it could not be said that the outcome would inevitably have been the same but for the alleged error. Mr Biggs contends that the aforementioned error suffices, by itself, to require the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to be set aside.

47. The First-tier Tribunal heard the appellant’s appeal during February 2025, without the benefit of the guidance in IA. Nonetheless, we find that the Judge made no error in coming to the conclusion that there was family life in this case.

48. The Judge has, in substance, applied the additional elements of dependence test from IA. This can be seen from [34] of the decision, where she states that “Family life is not established between adult children and a parent unless something more exists than normal emotional ties of love and affection”. While that sentence marked the beginning of the Judge’s assessment of the existence of family life, it is preceded and followed by extensive factfinding on the question of dependency and family life. The Judge recorded that family life had been conducted by way of lengthy visits by the widowed appellant from Gaza to the UK, WS’s visits to Gaza and more recently to Egypt, and MS’s visits to Egypt. Also considered was the medical evidence relating to the appellant, WS, and MS, along with MS’s immigration status; information about the appellant’s other children; details from one of the appellant’s grandsons; the conditions under which the appellant left Gaza (at the time of the appeal she had lost 90 members of her family owing to conflict); her circumstances in Egypt; evidence that she was financially dependent on her children for her essential needs; and evidence of very regular contact by WhatsApp and phone calls.

49. The evidence before the Judge was that the appellant was suffering from very severe symptoms of mental health owing to trauma as a result of the loss of family members, concerns as to her two sons and grandchildren still in Gaza, being isolated and living alone in Egypt where she lacks status and having always previously lived with her children, and that separation from a source of daily care was contributing to her very poor mental health and self-neglect.

50. While Mr Biggs understandably focused on the Judge’s direction that dependency was not necessary, that direction made no difference in the circumstances of this case because the Judge found that there was dependency for all the reasons set out between [10 - 39] of the decision.

51. Those reasons included that the appellant had fled the war in Gaza for Egypt; diagnoses for the appellant of very severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder complicated by disabling survivor guilt; diagnoses for the appellant's daughter, WS, with severe Major Depressive Disorder and a severe Generalised Anxiety Disorder; diagnoses for the appellant's son, MS, of moderately severe Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder; the sponsor’s cancer diagnosis; support provided by the appellant to the sponsor during her treatment for cancer; the emotional dependency of the appellant on her daughter; the emotional dependency of the appellant on her son, as well as financial dependency of the appellant primarily on her daughter but also on her son. In finding additional elements of dependency the Judge therefore took into account financial dependence, mental disability and related mutual emotional dependency.

52. In light of the unchallenged expert evidence on the role of family in Palestinian and Gazan culture, the Judge made no error in taking into consideration cultural and social traditions as well as the fact that until recently the appellant had never lived alone. That evidence spoke of the expectation among Gazans that the appellant would live with her daughter in the United Kingdom who was living in relative security and that it would be considered “unusual and improper” for the appellant to be living alone. Not doing so would be “viewed as the failure to honour the family and elicit censure and condemnation”.

53. The Judge’s assessment of the existence of family life was informed by the evidence of experts including a psychotherapist, a psychologist, an independent social worker and two country expert reports on Egypt and Palestinian culture. None of that evidence was subject to any challenge on behalf of the respondent. We particularly note the extracts in the decision from the report of the psychologist, including at [36]:

It is a close, emotionally interdependent bond forged through shared hardship, mutual caregiving and the strong cultural ties of Palestinian family life. In my opinion, the current separation is not simply a matter of distance; it is an emotional rupture that has profound psychological implications for WS.

54. At [35 - 36] of the decision, the Judge focuses on the relationship between the appellant and WS. The medical evidence before the Judge in relation to WS was that her existing psychological distress (which initially stemmed from her cancer diagnosis), has been heightened not only by the war in Gaza but by the separation from the appellant whose mental and physical health condition had “deteriorated drastically”. That evidence further identified the strain on WS of trying to care for the appellant from a distance, while working, recovering from cancer and looking after her minor children.

55. At [37], the Judge refers to the opinion of the psychologist that the emotional dependency of the appellant on her son, MS, is also significant and that they both rely heavily on each other for emotional support. The tenor of the evidence was that separation of the appellant from her children was harmful to the mental health of all three family members. This evidence also goes to another complaint raised in the grounds by the respondent that the focus of the Judge was solely on the appellant’s living conditions in Gaza and Egypt, or that she attached too much weight to this matter (see ground 4 below).

56. Notwithstanding the Judge’s reference to the real, committed and effective support test, she did not, as Mr Biggs submits, read down the additional elements of dependency test. On the contrary, the Judge found there to be additional elements of dependency, in the form of considerable emotional dependency between the appellant and her children in the United Kingdom as well as financial dependency. At [39] the Judge emphasises in her conclusion on the topic of family life that there is “mutual emotional dependency between them and ample evidence of emotional ties that goes beyond the norm”.

57. That the Judge mentioned the support summarised in the above paragraphs was “real, effective and committed” does not serve to undermine those findings. However, if we are wrong in finding that the alleged error in ground 1(i) is not made out, we conclude that it was not material as we find that on these facts it is inevitable that the Judge, absent the misdirection alleged, would have reached the same conclusion.

Ground 1 (ii) and Ground 2 - whether the Judge erred in respect of the nature of family life, and whether it would be significantly interfered with

58. Mr Biggs made somewhat lengthy submissions addressing a comment of the Judge at [40], under the heading “Does the decision interfere with family life?”. Mr Biggs took issue with the Judge’s statement that there was a “positive obligation” on the respondent to “promote family life”. A particular focus of the respondent’s submissions was that this comment was made prior to the Judge’s proportionality assessment rather than while addressing proportionality or at the conclusion of such analysis. The point being that a positive obligation only arose if it would be disproportionate not to grant entry clearance. Among several authorities referred to, reliance was placed on [41-44] of Tuquabo-Tekle and Ors v The Netherlands (Application no. 60665/00).

59. We do not accept the submission that the Judge erred in her mention of the said positive obligation. What the Judge said was uncontroversial given that it has been established in a number of cases including Ahmadi [2005] EWCA Civ 1721, that there is a general obligation to respect family life in appropriate cases either by not interfering with existing family life or not inhibiting the development of family life.

60. Contrary to what is argued by Mr Biggs, the Judge did not state that the respondent was obliged to grant entry clearance but essentially paraphrased long-established case law. In any event, it is apparent from [40], that before making the comment in question, the Judge was responding to the submissions made on behalf of the respondent, to the effect that there would be no interference because family life could continue in the same vein that it had to date. Thus, the Judge’s comment was made in that context rather than as a freestanding point or a ‘launchpad’ for her proportionality assessment as Mr Biggs put it. Regardless of that comment, the Judge proceeded to carefully consider whether the decision under challenge amounted to an interference with family life and provided clear and adequate reasons for concluding that it did.

61. The Judge concluded that it was doubtful that the family would be able to continue their family life in the same way. That was a conclusion to which the Judge was entitled to reach based on the evidence that psychological harm was being caused by the separation of the family, the fact of the appellant’s illegal presence in Egypt, as well as the undisputed fact that WS, who has minor children, financially supports the appellant and other close relatives from her employment in the United Kingdom, is herself experiencing serious mental health issues.

62. We conclude that the comment made by the Judge regarding promotion of family life had no material effect on her ultimate finding on the issue of interference with family life, and without it her decision would inevitably have been the same.

63. The suggestion in the grounds of appeal that WS could simply relocate to Egypt was not one which was made by the ECO or before the First-tier Tribunal and ought not to have been made, applying Lata. The facts found by the Judge easily demonstrate that this is not a serious proposition.

64. The second complaint made in ground 1(ii)/ground 2 that there was no “adequate” assessment of the nature and quality of the family life, also lacks merit. On this point, Mr Biggs relies on an extract from Arshad [2025] EWCA Civ 355 at [118], as well as a similar passage from IA at [151]:

Had such family life existed, the tribunals would have been entitled to consider, in determining how much weight to accord to it in the article 8(2) balance, the circumstances in which it had come into existence, the type of family life that was concerned, the length of time it had existed and its likely future development.

65. Contrary to Mr Biggs’ submissions, it is apparent from a fair reading of the decision that the Judge demonstrated that she had fully and adequately considered the nature and quality of the family life she found to exist between the appellant and her children. The background to the family life was set out in considerable detail in the appellant’s witness statement and her credibility was not in issue. There is no obligation for the Judge to replicate that level of detail in the decision.

66. As to the likely future development of family life, the Judge explained why she found that it was unlikely that family life could continue “in this way” that it was at the time of the hearing. Those reasons included the medical evidence as to the damaging effect of the separation on the appellant and her children, the significant financial cost of support, the appellant’s lack of lawful immigration status in Egypt, her tenuous status there and concerns as to the sponsor’s ability to continue to visit the appellant in Egypt.

67. In Mr Biggs’ submission the Judge did not explain what was meant by the words “in this way”. In our view it is patently clear that the Judge was referring to the status quo in respect of which the Judge had already made extensive findings of fact, and the thrust of which were summarised at [40] of the decision.

68. Furthermore, Ms Knorr drew our attention to advice in the respondent’s guidance to caseworkers that, unsurprisingly, the ability of a family to legally reside together in another country is a relevant factor.

69. The third point Mr Biggs makes under this heading suggests that the Judge was wrong to rely upon the unchallenged medical evidence that it was the separation of the family unit which was damaging, on the basis that it was not a salient factor. The Judge was plainly required to consider this evidence and accord suitable weight to it. To do otherwise would have amounted to a material error. During his submissions, Mr Biggs suggested that it is the situation in Gaza and the appellant’s living arrangements that have caused distress to appellant and her children. This submission fails to engage with the totality of the evidence considered by the First-tier Tribunal. We conclude that the Judge provided wholly adequate reasoning for her findings on this matter which were founded in the extensive evidence before her.

Ground 3 – the proportionality assessment

70. In this ground it is argued, firstly, that the First-tier Tribunal failed, in substance, to properly identify and weigh the strength of the public interest supporting the decision. In Mr Biggs’ submission the Judge “seriously underestimated the public interest supporting the Decision”.

71. The respondent acknowledges that the Judge recognises the appellant’s inability to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules at [42] and, furthermore, at [48] identifies three factors which support the public interest. Those factors being the failure to satisfy the Rules, the maintenance of effective immigration controls being in the public interest, and that the appellant does not speak English. The respondent’s position is that there is a further matter which weighs against the appellant, that of financial independence (or lack thereof), which is the subject of the third complaint within this ground. We discuss this matter below, but it suffices at this point to say that we have rejected it, finding that the Judge was entitled to consider the issue of financial independence in the appellant’s favour rather than that of the respondent and therefore it should be a ‘neutral’ factor in the balancing exercise rather than a matter which weighs against the appellant (in accordance with Rhuppiah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58).

72. Mr Biggs fairly submits that the Judge returns to consider the public interest factors later in the decision at [51-52]. Nonetheless he argues, with reference to IA at [157-161] that there was very little reasoning showing how the balance has been struck as well as a failure to identify and weigh the strength of the public interest against the strength of the family life.

73. We find that there was no error in the Judge’s approach to the strength of the public interest. She correctly directed herself at [42], noting that the appellant’s inability to meet the Rules was a factor which carries “great weight” in the proportionality exercise. In the same paragraph, the Judge also finds that the appellant’s inability to speak English was a factor which weighs against her. As stated above, the Judge returned to the factors supporting the public interest at [48]. The Judge proceeded to review the evidence and listed, at [50], the factors which she found to weigh in the appellant’s favour. Having firstly set out the public interest factors and the strengths of the appellant’s case, at [51], she again reminds herself of the “significant public interest” in maintaining effective immigration controls as well as the appellant’s inability to meet the Rules, prior to finding that the refusal of entry clearance would result in “unjustifiably harsh consequences for this appellant and for her children in the UK”.

74. At [52], the Judge reiterates the test which she has employed, that of considering whether there were compelling circumstances and balancing these against the public interest. Here, the Judge demonstrates that she appreciates the “strength of public policy in maintaining immigration control”, in advance of her conclusion that the decision amounts to a disproportionate interference with the right to family life. It is difficult to see what more the Judge could have done to consider and weigh the public interest factors in this case. Having regard to the totality of the decision and the Judge’s reasoning we do not find merit in the submission that the Judge’s reasoning was “spartan at best” or that she failed to honour her self-direction on the significant weight to attach to the public interest represented by the Secretary of State’s policies as reflected in the Immigration Rules.

75. The second point made under this ground, is that there was a failure by the First-tier Tribunal to identify the precariousness or tenuousness of the relevant family life and factor this into the proportionality assessment. This is a further point which was never raised in the respondent’s decision under challenge or before the First-tier Tribunal. We refer, once more, to Lata.

76. The short answer to this complaint is that the First-tier Tribunal made no error in not considering a point which was never raised and that there is no merit to the respondent’s assertion on the facts of this case, in light of the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that there was a strong family life between the appellant and her children.

77. While we are under no obligation to engage with this point, we do so to demonstrate its inapplicability to the circumstances of this case. Mr Biggs accepts that the Judge was not assisted with this point by the respondent’s representative before the First-tier Tribunal, but he contends that as an expert tribunal it ought to have been considered and that there are clear authorities stating that precariousness is a mandatory consideration. We are not persuaded that this principle applies in the context of this case involving an entry clearance application, where the sponsor is a British citizen and where the First-tier Tribunal accepted there was a strong family life.

78. While the authorities relied upon by Mr Biggs make mention of precariousness in relation to family life, none of them provide any support for Mr Biggs’ submissions in the circumstances of this case. Mr Biggs particularly relies on Arshad [2025] EWCA Civ 355. However, that case involved a claimant who developed their family life in the United Kingdom while being a long-term overstayer [119]. Similarly, in Jeunesse v The Netherlands (GC) 12738/10, 3 October 2014, (2015) 60 EHRR 17, the reference to family life being precarious was linked to the immigration status of a family member.

79. Lastly, there are no parallels to be drawn between the circumstances of the claimants in IA and the appellant’s case. In this case, the appellant previously lived with her son and daughter in Gaza in the family home and has maintained contact with them during their frequent long visits to Gaza and Egypt, and her own long visits to the UK during which she cared for WS when she was unwell. The evidence shows that the appellant and WS speak numerous times a day and that WS and MS visit the appellant in Egypt when they can. The evidence before the Judge was of mutual dependence and of the appellant having substantial ties to her children and grandchildren. By contrast, in IA the family in Gaza had not cohabited with their sponsor, who had not seen the claimants for seventeen years, the relationship was short-lived and it was only after the start of the war in Gaza “rekindled in the knowledge that the family had no right to enter the UK” IA at [151].

80. We do not accept Mr Biggs’ submission that the Judge was required to identify a point in time when family life between the appellant and her children “crystalised”. In this human rights appeal the Judge was required to assess whether there was family life at the date of the hearing.

81. As Mr Biggs accepts, a further new point raised for the first time before the Upper Tribunal, is the contention that the First-tier Tribunal did not sustainably assess a mandatory factor relevant to the public interest, that factor is said to be that the need for NHS treatment must be taken into account in the assessment of financial independence for the purposes of section 117B(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”). We refer, once more, to Lata and state that we are not required to even consider this point which is far from Robinson-obvious, R v SSHD, IAT ex parte Anthony Pillai Francis Robinson [1997] EWCA Civ 2089.

82. It would have been obviously unfair for the Judge to have taken the issue of whether the appellant would need NHS funded medical care into consideration under 117B(3) NIAA 2002 without the matter having been one of the principal issues in dispute. Had this issue been of sufficient concern to the ECO to have been mentioned in the decision letter, it could have been addressed with evidence and argument at the First-tier Tribunal hearing.

83. We were referred to no authority to show that financial dependency on the state is found where a person has treatment on the NHS. If such treatment was a relevant consideration to financial independence, it is surprising that it was not mentioned in UT (Sri Lanka) [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 and Rhuppiah where the issue of financial independence was discussed at length.

84. There was sense in Ms Knorr’s submission that a wealthy citizen of the UK who used the NHS would not ordinarily be described as being dependent upon the state. Ms Knorr also made the point that had the issue of NHS treatment been raised, submissions could have been made, including as to the availability of treatment for the appellant’s mental health conditions from charities such as Freedom from Torture or the Helen Bamber Foundation, or for the arrangement of private health insurance.

85. We note that there was no challenge on behalf of the respondent to the ability of the appellant’s children to adequately maintain and accommodate her and thus there was no challenge to the appellant’s claim to be financially independent as required under section 117B (3).

86. We do not find any merit in the submission made at [38] of the respondent’s skeleton argument, that there is a tension between the Judge’s finding that the appellant will have adequate support and accommodation in the UK at [49], with the finding at [40] regarding the significant financial cost involved in the appellant living alone in Egypt and the family continuing to visit her there, and whether this could continue. We accept Mr Knorr’s submission that the cost of funding separate accommodation and living expenses for the appellant in another country together with costs of family visiting her there, are likely to greatly exceed the minimal costs involved in the appellant sharing living accommodation and meals with WS and her family in the UK.

Ground 4 – the Judge gave undue weight to the appellant’s circumstances in Egypt and Gaza

87. The basis of this ground is that the First-tier Tribunal erred by giving too much weight and emphasis in the proportionality assessment to the appellant’s quality of life in Egypt (or Gaza) and to the conditions there. In the grounds of appeal this challenge was originally founded on the respondent’s submissions regarding the territorial scope of the Human Rights Act 1998 and ECHR, and the fact that the appellant is outside of the jurisdiction. This is a further point which was not raised before the First-tier Tribunal.

88. In the respondent’s most recent skeleton argument, at paragraph 44, another new point is raised that was not previously raised in the grounds of appeal. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the First-tier Tribunal erred in so far as it treated the best interests of the appellant’s grandchildren as a “determinative consideration”. We observe that this submission echoes that made by the Secretary of State in IA before the Court of Appeal in relation to a very different set of facts, in which the proportionality assessment conducted by the Upper Tribunal was described as “driven by its view about the best interests of the children and the risks they faced in a war zone” ([152] of IA).

89. We note that Mr Biggs resiled from this challenge in response to questions from the bench, when he accepted that the Judge “may not have done so”. We find no merit in the assertion that the best interests of the appellant’s grandchildren were in any way “determinative” or “crucially influenced” the proportionality assessment in this appeal. The Judge was required to consider the best interests of these UK based British children as a primary consideration under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. In our view the children’s best interests were appropriately factored into the proportionality balancing exercise alongside other relevant factors.

90. Returning to the main argument under this ground, Mr Biggs contends that the summary of factors considered on the appellant’s side of the balance at [50] of the decision, did not demonstrate that the Judge properly assessed whether family life between the appellant and her children could continue without a grant of entry clearance. He further argues, with reference to IA from [151] onwards, that the Judge only focussed on the impact of refusing entry clearance on the appellant and her children with the result that the Judge’s assessment of proportionality was distorted.

91. We find that the Judge made no error in taking into consideration the appellant’s circumstances in Egypt and experiences in Gaza. We can find no indication that the Judge attached too much weight to these matters. Those conditions were not considered in isolation but together with the accepted facts including that the appellant was living alone, is seriously mentally unwell, her condition is not improving, she requires ongoing medical treatment which is unlikely to be effective while she remains in Egypt and separated from her family, she is self-neglecting and is emotionally and financially dependent upon her children in the United Kingdom to an unusual degree. Given the unitary nature of family life and the interconnectedness of this family unit, the appellant’s circumstances were also found to impact on the mental health of WS and MS to a significant degree. We find that the Judge was entitled to accord the degree of weight she did to these matters on the particular facts of this case.

92. Ms Knorr relied on the respondent’s guidance, including the Family Reunion guidance, to make the point that exceptional circumstances are defined therein as those which would make a refusal of the application result in unjustifiably harsh consequences “for the applicant or their relevant family member”. We find that the Judge did not commit the error identified in IA of preoccupation with the conditions in Gaza (or Egypt). Unlike the claimants in IA, the appellant was no longer in a war zone. She was, however, for the first time living apart from her family and is unable to reunite with her remaining family in Gaza. It is apparent from this detailed decision, that the Judge’s conclusions were based on the expert evidence as to the particular circumstances of the appellant and her family members, given that it was not in dispute that family life could not be conducted in Egypt.

93. The Judge’s finding that it was “unlikely” that family life could continue in the same manner in the future, by means of remote communication and occasional visits, was one which was open to her, as was her conclusion that the respondent’s decision would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for this appellant and for her children in the UK and that there are “compelling circumstances in the particular facts of this case” at [51-52].

94. We conclude that there was no material error of law in the balanced and careful decision of the Judge.


Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.


T. Kamara
S. Grey
Judges of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 January 2026


NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).