Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001993
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51931/2024
LH/01054/20254

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

MOHAMMAD MUSHFIQUR RAHMAN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel instructed by City Taylor Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lloyd-Lawrie (“the Judge”) to dismiss his human rights appeal. In Pursuant to section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the issue for me is whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

Background

2. The appellant is a 45 year old citizen of Bangladesh. He entered the United Kingdom as a student in 2011 but an application to extend his leave to remain was refused in April 2016 and his appeal against that decision was dismissed, meaning that by December 2018 at the latest, he had no permission to remain in the United Kingdom. Despite this he remained in the United Kingdom as an overstayer, making two further applications for leave to remain in 2019 and 2023 both of which were refused.

3. In November 2023 the appellant made a third application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom this time on the basis of his relationship with Shajia Nasreen Chowdhury (“the sponsor”), a British citizen whom he had married in a religious ceremony in January 2020. The respondent refused this application in a decision dated 15 February 2024. The respondent accepted that the appellant and sponsor were in a genuine and subsisting relationship, but concluded that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted leave to remain on the basis of the relationship because he was in breach of immigration laws and there would be no insurmountable obstacles to the relationship continuing in Bangladesh. The respondent further concluded that there were no other compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s removal.

4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and his appeal was heard by the Judge on 6 March 2025. The appellant and the sponsor each gave oral evidence and submissions were made by representatives for the respondent and the appellant. At the end of the hearing the Judge reserved her decision.

The Judge’s Decision

5. The Judge identified that she was dealing with a human rights appeal in which the appellant was asserting that his removal was incompatible with his right to respect for his private and family life by virtue of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Judge explained that Article 8(1) of the Convention provides a qualified right to respect for private and family life and that where such a private and family life is found to exist, the issue will be whether interference it is justified under Article 8(2). The Judge identified that where an appellant meets the requirements of Immigration Rules for being granted the leave they seek on the basis of their private and family life, interference will not usually be justified but where an appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the public interest is normally in leave being refused, unless refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or their family members (see [9] of the Judge’s decision in particular.)

6. To determine whether interference with the appellant’s private and family life would be justified, the Judge identified at [6] that she had to resolve disputes about: (a) whether there were insurmountable obstacles to the appellant’s family life with the sponsor continuing outside the United Kingdom, (b) whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Bangladesh. The Judge also identified at [7] that she would need to consider the “Chikwemba principle” when considering the proportionality of interference with the appellant’s private and family life.

7. At [10] and [11] the Judge considered the evidence concerning the sponsor (although in a slip of the pen she occasionally refers to the sponsor as the appellant). The Judge found that the sponsor was born in Bangladesh, lived there for the majority of her life and that she is highly educated, speaking English in addition to her first language. The Judge further found that the sponsor is suffering from adjustment disorder in the form of anxiety and depression for which she is taking the antidepressants Mirtazapine and Sertraline and is receiving care from the community mental health team. The Judge found that the sponsor’s mother and son were living in Bangladesh and that the sponsor as in regular contact with them. The Judge found that the sponsor would be able to source work in Bangladesh, that the sponsor could find medical help in Bangladesh, including the medication she currently receives and that the stigma attached to having a mental health condition in Bangladesh would not prevent the sponsor from seeking that help.

8. At [12] the Judge considered evidence about attempts by the appellant and sponsor to have children. The Judge found that the sponsor had sadly suffered two miscarriages but that the couple were not currently having fertility treatment. The Judge found that the sponsor was awaiting surgery to remove fibroids but there was no evidence that that surgery could not take place in Bangladesh. The Judge concluded that the appellant and sponsor could continue to try to have children together in Bangladesh.

9. At [13] the Judge found that the mothers of the appellant and the sponsor were living in their own homes and that the sponsor’s son was living with her mother. The Judge found that their mothers could help the appellant and sponsor on their return to Bangladesh.

10. At [14] the Judge found that the appellant could find work in Bangladesh. The Judge then concluded that while it would be easier for the appellant and sponsor to continue living in the United Kingdom, and they would face some obstacles, namely finding new jobs and a new doctor, on return to Bangladesh, those would not be insurmountable obstacles to their family life continuing in Bangladesh. The Judge found that if they were to return to Bangladesh, the sponsor’s son could live with them and that this would be in his best interests.

11. At [15] the Judge considered an alternative scenario in which the appellant returned to Bangladesh without the sponsor. The Judge found that in this situation the sponsor could support the appellant and family life could continue using modern methods of communication or a holiday visit from the sponsor, while the appellant made an application for entry clearance to return to the United Kingdom.

12. At [16] the Judge found that the appellant was still speaks regularly to his family in Bangladesh and that he could rely on that family to help him re-integrate on his return. The Judge found that the appellant had retained cultural ties to the country and speaks the local language. In those circumstances the Judge determined that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh.

13. Having regard to those findings of fact that she had made, at [18] – [19] the Judge balanced the public interest in the appellant’s removal against the weight of his private and family life in the United Kingdom. The Judge found that the public interest in removal was increased by the fact the appellant had remained in the United Kingdom without having leave to do so since 2018. The Judge gave weight to the sponsor’s life in the United Kingdom including her employment and the medical treatment she is receiving. The Judge concluded that the significant weight to the public interest in effective immigration control, outweighed the appellant’s private and family life which attracted little (not no) weight because it was established during a time his stay was either precarious or unlawful.

14. At [20] the Judge noted submissions made about the “Chikwemba principle” but concluded that the fact the appellant is likely to be granted entry clearance to return to the United Kingdom does not allow him to circumvent the immigration processes of the United Kingdom, given the facts of the case.

The appeal to this Tribunal

15. The appellant was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision by Upper Tribunal judge Kamara in July 2025 but for reasons which are unclear to me (but which were not the responsibility of either party) there was a long delay before this hearing was listed. On behalf of the Tribunal I apologise to the parties for that delay.

16. Permission was granted on four grounds. In the first ground of appeal it is averred that when finding that there would not be insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Bangladesh, the Judge failed to engage with evidence that had been adduced about patriarchal attitudes and discrimination against women in that country. In the second ground of appeal it is averred that when finding that there would not be insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Bangladesh, the Judge failed to appreciate the difference in the medical treatment the sponsor would receive in Bangladesh compared to the treatment she currently receives and to factor that into the assessment of the proportionality of interference with the family life between the appellant and sponsor. In ground three it is averred that the Judge erred when considering the “Chikwamba principle”, which had been raised by the respondent in her decision letter, by failing to consider the impact of temporary separation from the appellant on the sponsor and finding that separation in those circumstances would only last a few months. In ground four it is averred that the Judge failed to consider the volatile political situation in Bangladesh when considering the proportionality of interference with family life.

17. Mr Karim adopted those grounds of appeal and made helpful submissions in support of them during the hearing which I shall not repeat here but will refer to them where necessary to explain my decision. In anticipation of the hearing the appellant served further evidence and made an application in accordance with rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 for permission to rely on that further evidence in this appeal. Mr Karim however acknowledged that the evidence all related to events after the hearing before the Judge and so would not be relevant to the issue of whether the decision of the Judge contained an error of law. In those circumstances it was agreed that the application to rely on further evidence would only be relevant should an error be found and the decision need to be remade.

18. The respondent has not provided a written response to those grounds of appeal but Mr Sheikh confirmed that the appeal was opposed by the respondent. In his oral submissions Mr Sheikh asserted that the Judge’s assessment of whether there would be insurmountable obstacles to family life did not involve an error of law and that any error in the Judge’s assessment of the Chikwamba principle was immaterial because the Judge had already found that family life could continue in Bangladesh.

19. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now provide together with my reasons.

Analysis

20. It is important to begin analysis of the Judge’s decision with a reminder of the need for judicial caution and restraint when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. The Supreme Court made this point at [72] of HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 making the following particular points:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.

21. Lord Hoffman made a similar point at [45] of Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 a passage quoted by McCombe LJ in an immigration context at [31] of Lowe v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62:

“the need for appellate caution in reversing the judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la verite est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation…”

22. It is with these reminders in mind that I consider the complaints made about the Judge’s decision in each of the four grounds of appeal.

Grounds one, two and four
23. It is convenient to take these grounds of appeal together because they all relate to the Judge’s assessment of the obstacles that the appellant and the sponsor would face to continuing their family life outside of the United Kingdom.

24. Relying on [45] of Lal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1925, Mr Karim submitted that the Judge was required in that assessment to identify all the significant difficulties the appellant and the sponsor would face if required to move to Bangladesh, and to ask whether, taken together they would entail very serious hardship for them. Mr Karim submitted that the Judge failed to conduct such a cumulative assessment of the difficulties the couple would face in Bangladesh. In in particular, he submitted that the Judge failed to take any account of patriarchal attitudes and discrimination of women that the sponsor would face (ground one) failed to consider the difference in the medical treatment the sponsor would receive (ground two), and failed to consider the volatile political situation in Bangladesh (ground four) each of which were specifically advanced by the appellant as obstacles to family life continuing in Bangladesh.

25. Whilst it is correct to note that the Judge does not refer to the evidence of widespread societal prejudice and discriminatory laws affecting women in Bangladesh, which formed part of the case advanced by the appellant, I am not persuaded that I should infer from that fact that the Judge did not take that evidence into account when considering the obstacles to family life the couple would face in Bangladesh. The Judge did refer at [10] to evidence of good employment rates for women in Bangladesh making clear that opportunities for women in general in Bangladesh and the sponsor in particular was something that was very much at the forefront of the Judge’s consideration. It was on the basis of that evidence, the sponsor’s high level of education and her ability to speak English that the Judge concluded the sponsor would be able to source work in Bangladesh. There is no reason to infer that when coming to that conclusion the Judge ignored the other generalised evidence of patriarchal attitudes and discriminatory stereotypes.

26. The context for the Judge’s consideration of the treatment of women in Bangladesh was the fact that the sponsor was born in Bangladesh, had lived in that country until she was twenty nine years old, that her mother continues to live there, and that appellant’s mother also continues to live in Bangladesh without encountering any apparent problems or issues. The fact that the Judge focused on this evidence when giving her reasons for her decision, does not mean that she ignored the general evidence of societal attitudes towards women in Bangladesh. Instead it demonstrates that the Judge was properly concentrating on the individual circumstances of the appellant and the sponsor when assessing whether being a woman would present an insurmountable obstacle to the sponsor returning to Bangladesh with the appellant.

27. Similarly I am not persuaded that the Judge failed to take account of the difference in the standard of medical care that the sponsor would receive in Bangladesh as opposed to the United Kingdom. The Judge plainly gave careful consideration to the sponsor's health at [11] and [12] of her decision, again focusing her attention on the sponsor’s individual circumstances rather than the generalised position in Bangladesh in the abstract. The Judge relied upon the Country Policy Information Note Bangladesh: Medical Treatment and Healthcare (“medical CPIN”) to find that the specific anti-depressants the sponsor has been prescribed are available in Bangladesh. Referring to the same medical CPIN the Judge found that “mental health care is generally inadequate in Bangladesh, but is available” (my emphasis). The Judge also noted that the sponsor’s condition is not complex and that while the medical CPIN indicated that social stigma meant people in Bangladesh do not seek help, the Judge found that the sponsor, as an educated woman, would seek help and that help would be available “particularly in the cities”. Within this paragraph therefore, the Judge demonstrated consideration of both the care the sponsor receives in the United Kingdom and also the care that she would receive in Bangladesh.

28. In my assessment it is clear from a fair reading of this paragraph of her decision, that the Judge’s conclusion was that while mental health provision in Bangladesh is generally inadequate, in the sponsor’s specific circumstances care would be available and the sponsor would utilise that care. This again demonstrated a focus on the particular circumstances of the sponsor rather than a generalised consideration of the situation in Bangladesh in the abstract. The Judge’s reasoning does not suggest that the Judge has ignored, societal attitudes to mental health issues in Bangladesh or any difference in the standard of care provided in the two countries, and I do not consider that such an inference could properly be drawn. Instead the Judge has applied the general evidence about healthcare to the sponsor’s individual circumstances and concluded that in her particular situation, the necessary care would be available and would be accessed.

29. The Judge does not mention the general political situation in Bangladesh, but this was not something that featured in the skeleton argument advanced by the appellant before the Judge. The submission that the Judge erred by failing to refer to FCO guidance to travellers to Bangladesh, does not therefore reflect the way the case was advanced in the hearing and again fails to recognise the individualised assessment that the Judge undertook. The Judge refers to the mother of the appellant and the mother of the sponsor both living in their own homes in Bangladesh and found that the appellant and sponsor could live with either of them at least in the short term. It is significant that there was no evidence presented to the Judge and no suggestion made that the political situation in Bangladesh had caused any of the appellant or sponsor’s families difficulties.

30. I do not therefore find the submissions in grounds one, two and four, that the Judge failed to consider or have regard to relevant factors advanced as part of the appellant’s case when considering the obstacles to family life continuing in Bangladesh, persuasive. Instead I am satisfied that the Judge did have regard to all relevant factors when assessing the obstacles the appellant and sponsor would face to continuing family life in Bangladesh, and that the Judge undertook an individualised assessment of the impact those factors would have on the family life of the appellant and sponsor in Bangladesh.

31. I agree with Mr Karim that, as identified in Lal v Secretary of State for the Home Department, there was a requirement on the Judge to consider those factors cumulatively. It was necessary to consider all the difficulties to family life continuing in Bangladesh that were advanced by he appellant and the sponsor, and to determine whether together they amounted to unsurmountable obstacles. I am satisfied however that when read fairly, the Judge’s decision adequately demonstrates that is what the Judge did.

32. The Judge assessed the sponsor’s history, education and abilities to re-integrate in Bangladesh at [10], she considered the obstacles that the sponsor’s mental health issues would present at [11], she considered the obstacles that the sponsor’s physical health would present and whether the couple’s attempts to have children would pose obstacles to family life in Bangladesh at [12], and she considered the support that the couple would receive from their family at [13]. It was only after considering all these factors that at [14] the Judge concluded that the obstacles the couple would face were not insurmountable. That paragraph, whilst necessarily an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon her by the primary evidence, was in my assessment adequate to show why the Judge reached the conclusion that family life could continue in Bangladesh and that she did so having considered all the relevant factors.

33. Having concluded that there were no insurmountable obstacles to family life between the appellant and sponsor continuing in Bangladesh, the Judge correctly carried that finding into her proportionality assessment, in which she balanced the public interest in effective immigration control against the weight of the appellant’s private and family life. There was no requirement that the Judge refer to the factors she had already considered when determining that obstacles were not insurmountable, again at this stage of her analysis. In reality the finding that family life could continue in Bangladesh without the couple suffering very serious hardship was dispositive of the appeal. As the Judge identified, the appellant has never been on a route to settlement in the United Kingdom having arrived as a student and at the time of the hearing had spent more than six years in the United Kingdom without any leave to do so. In those circumstances, as the Judge identified, the public interest in his removal was particularly weighty and the appellant’s private and family life, established while in the United Kingdom either precariously or unlawfully could not outweigh the public interest.

Ground 3
34. In the light of the Judge’s conclusion that family life could continue in Bangladesh, I agree with Mr Sheikh’s submission that any error made by the Judge in seeking to apply the “Chikwamba principle” was immaterial to her decision.

35. In Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 189 Lady Justice Laing clarified at [5] that following her earlier judgment in Alam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 30, there was now no confusion and that:

“…..the only case in which the reasoning in Chikwamba is potentially relevant now is if the Secretary of State expressly refused leave to remain solely on the narrow procedural ground that the applicant must leave the United Kingdom to apply for entry clearance; and even then, it is necessary for the F-tT to make an overall assessment of the strength of the applicant’s article 8 case….”

36. Although, as Mr Karim pointed out, the respondent did raise the possibility of the appellant making an application for entry clearance from Pakistan in her decision, this was not a case where the respondent refused leave to remain solely on the narrow procedural ground that he do so. Instead, the respondent’s decision to refuse the application was made on the basis that family life could continue in Bangladesh. That remained the respondent’s case throughout the proceedings and ultimately it was the conclusion reached by the Judge. In these circumstances the reasoning in Chikwamba was of no relevance to this case. The Judge was required to balance the public interest in effective immigration control against the appellant’s private and family life and determine whether the strength of the family life was such that the public interest was outweighed. As I have already identified, that is exactly what the Judge did.

37. That may well be the point the Judge was seeking to make at [20] of her decision when she sought to address Chikwamba and said that “the fact that the appellant is likely to be granted entry clearance is (sic) he left the UK does not allow him to circumvent the immigration processes of the UK, given the fact of this case”. Whether the appellant is likely to be granted entry clearance having left the United Kingdom, whether it would take a matter of months for that to happen and whether family life could be maintained during the period when an application was being considered were in reality all irrelevant once the Judge reached the conclusion that family life could continue in Bangladesh.

Conclusion
38. For all these reasons I am satisfied that the decision of the Judge did not contain an error of law and that there is therefore no legitimate reason to interfere with the decision. The Judge took account of all relevant factors before deciding that family life between the appellant and sponsor could continue in Bangladesh and in reality, given the appellant’s long period of overstaying, the fact he has never been on a route to settlement and the fact the relationship was established when the appellant was in the United Kingdom unlawfully, that finding meant that the public interest in immigration control was bound to outweigh the appellant’s Article 8(1) Convention rights.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lloyd-Lawrie did not contain a material error of law and shall stand.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 September 2026