Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001996
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/00273/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

OA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Vokes, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 21 September 2021 and claimed asylum on 6 October 2021. By a decision dated 14 December 2023, the respondent refused his protection and human rights claims. His appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Khan (“the Judge”), who, in a decision promulgated on 13 February 2025, dismissed the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
2. The appellant’s case is that he and his family would be at risk on return to Iraq because, after posting material on Facebook supportive of President Erdogan and critical of the PKK, he received threats said to emanate from the PKK, including from an account styled “The Lions of Qandil”. He further asserted that he could not safely relocate within Iraq and that return would breach Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR. The Judge rejected the core account as inconsistent, incoherent or implausible, found that the appellant and his family were not at real risk on return, and concluded that they could return to Iraq, including to their home area.
3. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the Judge. My task is to determine whether that decision involved the making of a material error of law.
Grounds and Permission
4. The appellant relies on four grounds. He contends, first, that the Judge erred in the credibility assessment by treating there as being an inconsistency between the appellant being threatened by the Lions of Qandil and by the PKK, when his case was that they were, in substance, the same organisation or that the account so named was operated by PKK members; secondly, that the Judge made a speculative finding in concluding that the PKK could readily have located him because they knew his shop and telephone number; thirdly, that the Judge failed to consider whether the appellant would need to conceal his political views on return, given his claim to have been threatened for expressing them; and fourthly, that the Judge’s reasoning on internal relocation was inadequate, and that there was no clear alternative finding on sufficiency of protection.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens on 28 August 2025. Judge Owens considered it arguable that the Judge had erred at paragraph 25 in finding that there was an inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence between being threatened by the Lions of Qandil on the one hand and the PKK on the other, when these were said to be in reality the same organisation. It was also considered arguable that the Judge’s finding that the PKK would have been able to locate the appellant at his home was speculative. Judge Owens further observed that she could not see a finding that there would be sufficiency of protection in any event and that the reasoning in respect of internal relocation at paragraph 58 was arguably inadequate.
Rule 24 Response
6. By a Rule 24 Response dated 16 September 2025, the respondent opposed the appeal. The respondent submitted that the grounds mischaracterised the inconsistency identified at paragraph 25, which concerned the appellant’s shift from attributing threats to unknown individuals to asserting their PKK affiliation, rather than any distinction between the Lions of Qandil and the PKK. It was said that this issue had been raised in interview and in the refusal letter. Although the Judge made no alternative findings on internal relocation, the respondent contended this was immaterial given the rejection of the core claim, and that the determination disclosed clear and rational reasoning, with the grounds amounting to disagreement only.
The Hearing
7. At the hearing before me, the appellant was represented by Mr Vokes and the respondent by Ms McKenzie. Mr Vokes, who is not the author of the grounds, made clear that ground 1 was his principal point. By reference to the appellant’s witness statement and the asylum interview record, he submitted that the Judge had misunderstood the evidence and wrongly treated the Lions of Qandil and the PKK as though they were different organisations, when the appellant’s case had been consistent throughout that the account from which the threats were sent was so named but was operated by PKK members. He submitted that this misunderstanding materially infected the credibility findings.
8. Mr Vokes also pursued the remaining grounds but without vigour. In relation to ground 2, he submitted that the Judge’s finding that the PKK could have located the appellant was speculative, given that the evidence showed only that the appellant’s business and telephone number were known, not his home address. In relation to ground 3, he submitted that, even if the appellant were not politically active in any organised sense, the Judge had failed to consider whether he would be required to suppress or conceal his political views on return, having already expressed them publicly. In relation to ground 4, he submitted that the reasoning on internal relocation was inadequate and that the issue of sufficiency of protection required separate consideration, particularly in light of the respondent’s position in the refusal letter and review.
9. For the respondent, Ms McKenzie relied on the Rule 24 Response. She submitted that paragraph 25 had been misread by the appellant, and that the Judge had not treated the Lions of Qandil and the PKK as different entities but had instead identified an inconsistency between the source being described as anonymous and later being said to be the PKK. She submitted that the appellant had been on notice of that issue from the outset. She further submitted that the remaining grounds were, in substance, disagreements with the Judge’s factual evaluation; that the Judge had rejected the core claim as not credible; and that any deficiency in the treatment of sufficiency of protection or internal relocation was immaterial in light of those primary findings.
10. In reply, Mr Vokes maintained that there had been a misunderstanding of the evidence and submitted that the Judge’s reasoning at paragraph 35 and following, particularly in relation to the appellant remaining at home and the ability of the PKK to locate him there, rested on a mistake of fact as to what was known to those threatening him.
11. Both representatives agreed that, if a material error of law were found, the appropriate course would be to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
Consideration
12. I have considered the composite bundle filed by the appellant’s representatives and the submissions of the representatives made at the hearing. For the reasons which follow, I am not satisfied that the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law.
13. The Judge rejected the protection appeal primarily on adverse credibility findings, concluding that key elements of the appellant’s account were “inconsistent, incoherent, or so implausible as to be capable of belief” ([18]). Central to that assessment was the appellant’s claim to have been threatened following the posting of a pro‑Erdogan music video. The Judge accepted that the appellant had posted the video but found it to be “a generalised video, available in the public domain” ([23]) and not, of itself, an act likely to attract adverse attention.
14. The Judge identified a material inconsistency in the appellant’s account as to the identity of those issuing threats, noting that the appellant states “[o]n the one hand, …that those threatening him were from the ‘The Lions of Qandil’ and that they were anonymous, however he later state[d] that they made themselves known to the Appellant as members of the PKK” ([25]). Having examined the translated messages, the Judge found “no direct reference to the PKK within the messages” and concluded: “I do not accept that the PKK were messaging, contacting or threatening the Appellant” ([25]). Similar reasoning applied to alleged telephone threats, which the Judge rejected as implausible, stating: “I do not accept that they identified themselves as PKK members over the telephone” ([27]).
15. Building on those findings, the Judge concluded there was no ongoing adverse interest in the appellant. She noted that once the appellant blocked the relevant Facebook account, “he received no further messages online” ([29]), and that he had never been threatened in person, which “indicates that the Appellant was of no ongoing interest to anyone, specifically the PKK” ([32]). The Judge rejected the appellant’s explanation that the police were unwilling or unable to act, describing that view as “based on pure speculation” and finding instead that the police response was reasonable given the anonymity of the alleged threats ([34]).
16. The account of the family remaining in hiding was found implausible, the Judge observing that if the PKK had a genuine interest, they could have located the appellant “with significant ease” ([36]). Further adverse credibility findings were made in relation to travel through checkpoints without ID ([40]) and the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in Italy and France, which the Judge found “damages his credibility” ([41]). Taking those matters together, the Judge found that there was “no risk to the Appellant on return” ([42]).
17. On internal relocation the Judge reasoned that, given the rejection of the core claim that there was no basis for finding a real risk anywhere in Iraq. She concluded that the appellant and his family could relocate within Iraq if they chose to do so and that there was “no reason as to why the Appellant cannot return to his home area” ([58]).
18. Claims relating to lack of documentation were rejected, the Judge finding that the appellant did have access to documents and could rely on family support in Iraq ([45]). Additional claims, including the risk of FGM to daughters, were dismissed as lacking credibility, the Judge stating that such assertions were raised “in order to bolster his claim” ([50]). For completeness, the Judge rejected risk based on race or religion, finding that Kurdish ethnicity and Muslim faith did not place the appellant at risk. Applying the same credibility findings, she dismissed the asylum, humanitarian protection, and Articles 2 and 3 claims, and went on to reject the Article 8 appeal, concluding that there were “no insurmountable obstacles” to return and that removal would not result in “unjustifiably harsh consequences” ([69], [79]). The article 8 ECHR findings do not form the basis of any challenge before me.
19. In my judgment, the respondent’s submission is to be preferred. Read fairly and in context, paragraph 25 does not proceed on the footing that the “Lions of Qandil” and the PKK were necessarily different organisations. The Judge recorded that the appellant said the threats came from an account styled “The Lions of Qandil”, that the source was anonymous, and that he later said those responsible were the PKK. The inconsistency identified by the Judge was, therefore, that the source was described as anonymous whilst at the same time being said to have been identified as the PKK. That was a point the Judge was entitled to take. It is also consistent with the materials relied upon by Mr Vokes himself: the witness statement said that the account was called “The Lion of Qandil”, that the appellant did not know who was operating it, but that the operators identified themselves as PKK members; and the asylum interview shows the appellant giving a number of explanations as to how he knew the source was the PKK, including what the police allegedly said and what could be inferred from references to Apo. That evidence was capable of being seen as equivocal or inconsistent on the question of attribution.
20. Nor do I consider that there was any procedural unfairness in the Judge taking that point. The refusal letter had already identified this aspect of the appellant’s account as a credibility concern, and the same issue was expressly explored in the asylum interview, in particular questions 59 to 63. The appellant was therefore on notice that the respondent disputed the basis upon which he said he knew that the threats came from the PKK. In those circumstances, I do not accept the submission that the Judge took an unheralded or unfair point against him.
21. Further, paragraph 25 did not stand alone. The Judge went on to inspect the translated messages and noted that they did not directly refer to the PKK. The Judge concluded that this was insufficient to establish that the messages came from PKK members. That finding was open to the Judge on the evidence before her, and it formed part of a wider assessment of the credibility of the claim. For those reasons, I am not satisfied that ground 1 is made out.
22. Ground 2 challenges the Judge’s reasoning that, if the PKK had a genuine ongoing interest in the appellant, they could have located him with relative ease, given that his sandwich shop and telephone number were known, such that the absence of any face-to-face threat undermined his account. Mr Vokes submitted that this was speculative because the business details and telephone number did not establish that the PKK knew the appellant’s home address. I do not accept that this ground identifies a material error of law. The Judge’s reasoning at paragraphs 31 to 38 was directed more broadly to the absence of satisfactory evidence of any ongoing interest: the online threats ceased once the account was blocked; there were never any in-person threats; and the claim that the family remained in hiding at home was found implausible. The observation that the appellant could have been found if the PKK were genuinely interested in him was part of that broader evaluative reasoning. Even if that single point were open to criticism when viewed in isolation, it was plainly not material in light of the Judge’s wider findings.
23. Ground 3 contends that the Judge failed to consider whether the appellant would need to conceal his political beliefs on return, with reference to the principle in RT (Zimbabwe) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38. Mr Vokes submitted that, although the Judge found that the appellant did not have a political profile, she failed to engage with the fact that he had nevertheless expressed his views on Facebook and to friends, and that this might place him at risk if repeated on return. I do not accept that submission. The Judge’s reasoning was that, although the appellant may hold political views and discuss them with friends, she did not accept that he was politically active in a way that would place him at risk and, crucially, she did not accept that the claimed threats from the PKK were genuine. Once those findings were made, the factual premise necessary to engage an RT (Zimbabwe) analysis had been rejected. In those circumstances, the Judge cannot be said to have materially erred by not undertaking an express analysis on that footing.
24. Ground 4 concerns sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. Judge Owens, in granting permission, observed that she could not see a finding that there would be sufficiency of protection in any event and that the reasoning at paragraph 58 was arguably inadequate. Mr Vokes relied on that observation. Ms McKenzie submitted, however, that any such omission was immaterial, because the Judge had rejected the core protection claim and had expressly found that there was no reason why the appellant could not return to his home area.
25. In my judgment, the respondent’s submission is correct. Having found that the appellant was not at real risk from the PKK, the Judge was not required to make elaborate alternative findings on sufficiency of protection or internal relocation. Paragraph 58 is brief, but it makes clear both that the appellant and his family could relocate elsewhere in Iraq if they chose and, more significantly, that there was no reason why they could not return to their home area. That was the operative conclusion. The same approach is reflected in the refusal letter, which proceeded on the basis that sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would only arise if the key facts of the claim were accepted. Ground 4 is therefore not made out.
26. Drawing these matters together, I am not satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law. Ground 1 was the principal point advanced by Mr Vokes, but, for the reasons given, I do not consider that the Judge misunderstood the appellant’s evidence in the manner alleged or reached a conclusion that was not open to her. Grounds 2, 3 and 4 do not fare any better. The decision, read fairly and as a whole, discloses no material legal error.
Conclusion
27. The grant of permission properly recognised that the points raised by the appellant were arguable. Arguability, however, is not the test at this stage. Having considered all of the points advanced in the written and oral submissions, I am not persuaded that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
28. It follows that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

R. Bagral
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
6 May 2026