Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002002

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58453/2022
LH/01774/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GILL

Between

A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E. Wilford, of Counsel instructed by Zahra & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant, his stepchild and any member of the child’s family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and his stepchild. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hamilton (‘the Judge’) dated 28 October 2024, which dismissed the appellant’s human rights claim. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 7 August 2025 and was not restricted to any grounds.
Background
2. The parties agreed the background to this case as set out at [3] of the Judge’s decision. I therefore need not rehearse the detail here. In short summary the appellant met his partner, the sponsor (S), in August 2019, they started living together in October 2021 and married on 27 April 2023. The Judge at [26] made a finding that the appellant and S have a genuine and subsisting relationship, no issue is taken by either party in respect of this finding. S has a child (D), born on 21 June 2012, who is a British Citizen. The Judge did not find that a parental relationship exists between the appellant and D.
Grounds of Appeal
3. Ground 1 – misapplication of the test under Article 8(1) family life
4. Ground 2 – misapplication of the test for parental relationship
Discussion
5. I was provided with a Composite Bundle (732 pages), which included the respondent’s Rule 24 Response, dated 19 August 2025. Having heard submissions from both parties I reserved my decision which I now set out below.
6. In respect of Ground 1, Mr Wilford, on behalf of the appellant, argued that the Judge applied the wrong test by looking for more than emotional ties, and financial dependence, referring to [35] – [53] of the Judge’s decision. Furthermore, given the Judge had found family life between the appellant and S at [55] and where there was family life between S and her child D, then it was argued there was only one family. Therefore, it was submitted the Judge erred in law by segmenting these relationships (ZB (Pakistan) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 834 at [41]) and failing to find family life engaged between the appellant and his stepdaughter D.
7. With regards to Ground 2, Mr Wilford argued that the Judge had misapplied the ‘stepping into the shoes test’, as set out in R (RK) v SSHD (s117B(6); “parental relationship”) IJR [2016 UKUT 00031 (IAC), and did not go on to properly consider on the facts, as required by the case of Ortega (remittal; bias; parental relationship) [2018] UKUT 00298 (IAC), whether the “quasi-parental” role he found the appellant to have is a parental relationship.
8. Mr Tufan on behalf of the Respondent relied on the Rule 24 response. He argued that the two grounds were related and submitted that the Judge had correctly applied the test under Article 8(1) and the test for parental relationship. He submitted that the Judge clearly considered the relationship between the appellant and D, making fact sensitive findings regarding this relationship having considered the evidence and properly concluding that a parental relationship does not exist between the appellant and D. He argued that the Judge referred to and properly applied the cases of R (RK) and Ortega.
9. In considering whether the Judge misapplied the law the decision must be read and understood in the round. The Judge was required to make a finding as to whether the appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, namely his stepdaughter, D. I consider that the Judge correctly identified the relevant provisions at [16] of the decision and the relevant cases of RK and Ortega. At [36] the Judge correctly identifies “the authorities are clear that I have to look at all the circumstances” and goes on to make a fact sensitive decision.
10. At [36] – [40] of the decision the Judge considers the factors in favour of the appellant’s assertion that there exists a genuine subsisting parental relationship, for example, being likely to help S with day to day care such as taking her to school, possibly cooking for D, helping with homework (unless a reasonable command of English is required), and playing with her. The Judge acknowledges that D may like the appellant and may feel affection towards him. However, the Judge also considered the factors against the appellant’s position, for example, that the appellant took no part in making the important decisions about D’s life, that he was not D’s primary carer, that D’s primary attachments were to her biological parents (correctly bearing in mind that D’s parental relationship with her biological father does not prevent her having a parental relationship with A), that the appellant has not provided ‘sufficiently reliable evidence’ (emphasis added) to demonstrate that D has a parental relationship with the appellant, having given limited weight to the letter from D and the photographs [38] and against the backdrop of adverse credibility findings (which are not the subject of challenge in this appeal). The Judge also stated “I find on balance that although the appellant may have a quasi parental relationship with D because he is her stepfather, he has not shown the nature and degree of this relationship is such that he has effectively “stepped into the shoes” of a parent.” Ultimately concluding, “on the evidence available” that the appellant has not shown that a parental relationship exists between the appellant and D, [40]. The decision, taken as a whole, does not disclose any errors in the Judge’s application of the law.
11. With regard to the segregation argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, it should be noted the Judge determined that Article 8 family life was not engaged. This finding is based on the Judge’s earlier determination in respect of the nature of the appellant and D’s relationship, namely that it does not “go beyond the relationship that might normally exist between a child and her mother’s partner, where the child has a pre-existing parental relationship with her biological father” [53] and does not amount to a parental relationship [40]. Whether Article 8 is engaged in any particular case is fact sensitive, there may well be similar cases where an appellant lives with his stepchild, is married to their mother and can demonstrate that he has established an Article 8 family life with the stepchild. But that does not automatically follow in every such case. The Judge was entitled to reach the fact specific findings he made in this case. I do not find any error in the Judge’s application of the law.
12. I find that the grounds amount to nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings and do not disclose any error of law.
Notice of Decision
13. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve an error of law, and I dismiss this appeal.

A. Gill

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 November 2025