UI-2025-002011
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002011
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64201/2023
LP/02461/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
31st July 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT
Between
RB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms U Miszkiel, Counsel instructed by MTC Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 3 July 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Webber (the Judge) to dismiss his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim. The Judge made an anonymity direction and because this appeal involves a claim that the appellant is at risk of harm from the state authorities in his home country we maintain that order lest anything said or done in these proceedings gives rise to such a risk.
2. The appellant is a 33 year old citizen of Sri Lanka of Sinhalese ethnicity from Nikaweratiya. He came to the United Kingdom in June 2018 having been granted a visa to work as a seaman. In October 2020 he claimed asylum. He was interviewed by the respondent on 20 November 2023 and on 23 November 2023 the respondent issued a decision refusing his protection and human rights claims. The appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal and his appeal was considered by the Judge at a hearing on 13 February 2025. A month later, on 18 March 2025 the Judge issued his decision dismissing the appeal. The applicant was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision by another First-tier Tribunal Judge and thus the matter comes before us.
The Appellant’s Protection Claim and the Respondent’s decision
3. The appellant claimed he had a well-founded fear of persecution by the government authorities in Sri Lanka because he is perceived to be a political supporter of Tamil separatism. He stated that in 2007 or 2008 he had helped a Tamil family escape Sri Lanka in a boat and that years later he discovered that family were members of the LTTE. He said that ten years later in December 2017 he was arrested by plain clothed officers from the army intelligence unit, the CID. Those office held him for four days during which he was tortured and questioned. At the end of the four days they left him in the middle of nowhere. When he got home his family decided he needed to flee Sri Lanka and raised funds to pay for an agent to get him out of the country. While this happened the appellant went to hide at his uncle’s house and during the time he was away the authorities were calling his house trying to find him. The agent arranged the appellant’s documents and ensured he passed through immigration control at Colombo airport.
4. Having arrived in the United Kingdom the appellant claims that he was forced to work on a boat in horrible conditions receiving only rice and potatoes to eat and having his freedom restricted. This continued for two years before in August 2020 he escaped from the boat. The appellant has subsequently been referred to the Single Competent Authority as a potential victim of modern slavery during those two years. He was homeless for a few weeks before being advised to claim asylum. Having done so in October 2020 the appellant says that he has found solace by demonstrating against the Sri Lankan government. He has attended demonstrations at 10 Downing Street, Parliament Square and elsewhere that were organised by the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) and the British Tamil Forum. He claimed that as a result of his past arrest and detention and his participation at demonstrations in the United Kingdom it is likely the Government of Sri Lanka will perceive him to be a supporter of Tamil separatism and persecute him if he returned to Sri Lanka.
5. The respondent did not believe the appellant’s account about events in Sri Lanka, pointing to the long delay between the events the appellant described happening in 2007 and his claim to have been arrested in 2018. Whilst the respondent did not dispute the fact the appellant had attended demonstrations in the United Kingdom she did not accept that the appellant’s attendance at those events was likely to have come to the attention of the Government of Sri Lanka who were not likely to perceive the appellant to be a supporter of Tamil separatism. On this basis the respondent concluded the appellant did not have a well founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka and that he would not be at risk on his return to the country.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and the Judge’s Decision
6. The appeal took place in person. The appellant was treated as a vulnerable witness following evidence from psychiatrist Dr Galappathie that he suffered from an adjustment disorder which lead to him being prescribed medication to help him sleep. The appellant gave oral evidence with the assistance of an interpreter and the Judge heard submissions from the parties. In his comprehensive decision the Judge made a number of factual findings having assessed all the evidence that had been submitted.
7. At [20] the Judge rejected the appellant’s account of events in Sri Lanka finding that he had not been arrested, detained and tortured as claimed and that the authorities in Sri Lanka had not shown any interest in him prior to his departure. The Judge explains that finding in the preceding paragraphs finding at [17] that: the appellant had given (1) an inconsistent account about the fact of and reasons for his claimed arrest in 2018; (2) inconsistent evidence about who was responsible for the arrest; (3) inconsistent evidence about how he came to be released from detention; (4) inconsistent evidence about who arranged his escape from Sri Lanka; (5) inconsistent about whether extra money was paid to get him through the airport in Colombo; (6) and (7) inconsistent evidence about what has happened to his passport, concluding that in fact the appellant still has his passport. At [18] the Judge found the appellant’s credibility to be undermined by his failure to make an asylum claim until after he had received an immigration decision and at [19] the Judge found that the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence were not explained by the adjustment disorder he suffers, noting that Dr Gappathie had concluded the appellant has a reasonable short-term memory.
8. At [23] the Judge acknowledged photographs of the appellant attending protests in 2023, 2024 and 2025 holding the Tamil Eelam Tiger Flag, pro-Tamil banners and placards and a TGTE scarf. At [26] however the Judge concluded that the appellant does not have a genuine belief in the Tamil separatist cause and that he had attended the demonstrations and posed for photographs to bolster his asylum case. The Judge explains those conclusions by reference to the appellant’s ambivalent answer when asked if he supports Tamil separatism in the hearing, the fact the appellant is not Tamil, his lack of involvement with Tamil separatism apart from attending the demonstrations.
9. At [27] – [28] the Judge considered the argument pursued on behalf of the appellant that regardless of his motivation for attending, the appellant’s participation in the demonstrations, his wearing of the Tamil Eelam scarf and holding of the flag which are proscribed under terrorism legislation in Sri Lanka meant that the appellant will have come to the adverse attention of the Government of Sri Lanka and as a result is at risk of persecution if he was removed to Sri Lanka. The Judge referred to the Country Guidance case of KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130 (IAC) and then conducted an analysis to determine the likelihood of the appellant being of adverse interest to the authorities in Sri Lanka at [28] (1) – (11).
10. In sub-paragraph [28(5)] the Judge considered the matter identified in headnote 10 of KK as those the Sri Lankan government are reasonably likely to have obtained information about. At [28(5)(i) and (ii)] the Judge found that the appellant had not attended events organised by the TGTE but that even if he had he will not be perceived as being associated with the TGTE; at [28(5)(iii) - (v) the Judge found that the appellant had attended around 10 events, that he did not play a prominent role at those events and was not an organiser or promoter of them, but he did wear a Tamil Eelam scarf and hold a Tamil Eelam flag which are proscribed items. At [28(5)(vi)] he found the appellant attended Heroes Day events and other events that are not tolerated by the Sri Lankan government. At [28(5)(vii) the Judge found the appellant has not fundraised, authored articles, been present on social media, conducted political lobbying or signed relevant petitions.
11. At [28(6)] the Judge finds that the Sri Lankan authorities will not infer from his attendance at around ten events that the appellant is a member of the TGTE or associated with that or any other proscribed organisation and finds that the appellant will not have come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities by virtue of his activities in the United Kingdom.
12. Referring to headnote 16 of KK the Judge states that as the appellant has his passport he will only be questioned on arrival in Sri Lanka if he appears on a stop list or watch list. At [28(7)] the Judge concludes that the appellant is not on a stop list. Having considered whether the appellant has undertaken a significant role in Tamil separatism and that he is unlikely to be perceived to have undertaken such a role the Judge finds at [28(9)] that the appellant is not on a watch list either. The Judge then concludes at [28(11)] it is not reasonably likely that the appellant will be detained by the Sri Lankan authorities on his return to the country or that he will be subjected to any persecution or serious harm by them. Accordingly and having concluded that the appellant is not a genuine supporter of Tamil separatism, the Judge dismissed the appeal.
Grounds of Appeal and Rule 24 Response
13. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on a single ground which argues that the Judge erred by failing to reasonably assess the real risk of future persecution on account of the appellant’s sur place activities. There has been no attempt to challenge the Judge’s findings about the appellant’s account of events in Sri Lanka, the finding that the appellant has his passport and would be able to return to Sri Lanka using that passport, the finding that the appellant’s attendance at around ten demonstrations was to bolster his protection claim and not because of a genuine political belief, or the finding that the appellant is not on the stop list that is in use in Sri Lanka.
14. In her oral submissions to us Ms Miszkiel clarified that the appellant’s submission is that the conclusion reached by the Judge at [28(6)] that the appellant will not have come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities was irrational. She argued this in light of the country guidance provided in KK and the fact the Sri Lankan authorities are known to monitor demonstrations, that the appellant wore proscribed scarf and held a proscribed flag at the demonstrations and that at least three of the demonstrations the appellant attended were organised by the TGTE, a proscribed organisation.
15. In a written response to the appeal provided in accordance with rule 24 of The Tribunal (Upper Tribunal) Procedure Rules, the respondent seeks to uphold the Judge’s decision arguing that the Judge has correctly considered KK and that his conclusion that the appellant is not likely to have come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities is well reasoned. In her oral submissions Ms Tariq relied on this written response and asserted that in reality the grounds of appeal are no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s decision.
Analysis
16. We begin our analysis by reminding ourselves of the very high hurdle that a claim of irrationality involves. This was recognised by Lord Justice Brooke in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [11] where he also described it as a demanding concept. It was also acknowledged by the House of Lords in Edwards v Bristow [1956] AC 14 where perversity (which was found in R (Iran) to encompass irrationality) was defined as a case in which the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could come to the determination under appeal.
17. Turning then to analyse the appellant’s assertion that this high hurdle and demanding concept has been established in this case, we consider what was and what was not the guidance given in KK about the ability of the government in Sri Lanka to identify those participating in demonstrations in the United Kingdom.
18. Headnote [8] to KK states that:
(8) GoSL continues to operate an extensive intelligence-gathering regime in the United Kingdom which utilises information acquired through the infiltration of diaspora organisations, the photographing and videoing of demonstrations, and the monitoring of the Internet and unencrypted social media. At the initial stage of monitoring and information gathering, it is reasonably likely that the Sri Lankan authorities will wish to gather more rather than less information on organisations in which there is an adverse interest and individuals connected thereto. Information gathering has, so far as possible, kept pace with developments in communication technology.
This headnote reflects the Tribunal’s findings at [405] - [406] about the extent of the monitoring of pro-Tamil activities in the United Kingdom by the Sri Lankan government, including the fact that there is photographing and videoing of demonstrations.
19. The tribunal did not however find that the fact and extent of the monitoring that takes place means that everyone who attends a pro-Tamil demonstration in the United Kingdom will be identified. The guidance in KK recognises that the position is far more nuanced and requires a far more evaluative approach to determine whether the extensive monitoring that takes place will have led to an appellant coming to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. That evaluation begins with the question whether the person is able to travel using their own identity document or alternatively will need to be interviewed at the Sri Lankan High Commission for the purpose of obtaining a temporary travel document.
20. As a result of the Judge’s finding that the appellant still has his Sri Lankan passport he comes in the former category of being a person able to travel on his own passport. The tribunal in KK said the following about such a person at 416 - 418 of the judgment (repeated at headnote 11 and 12):
416 The absence of an interview at SLHC does not, however, discount the ability of GoSL to obtain information on the matters set out in paragraph 414 in respect of an individual with a valid passport using the other methods employed as part of its intelligence-gathering regime, as described in paragraph 405.
417 When considering the case of an individual in possession of a valid passport, a judge must assess the range of matters listed above and the extent of the authorities’ knowledge reasonably likely to exist in the context of a more restricted information-gathering apparatus. This may have a bearing on, for example, the question of whether it is reasonably likely that attendance at one or two demonstrations or minimal fundraising activities will have come to the attention of the authorities at all.
418 Whichever form of documentation is in place, it will be for the judge in any given case to determine what activities the individual has actually undertaken and make clear findings on what the authorities are reasonably likely to have become aware of prior to return.
21. What is clear from this guidance in KK is that it is not inevitable that the government of Sri Lanka will be aware of a person’s participation in pro-Tamil demonstrations in the United Kingdom. Instead, this is a matter that a Judge must make clear findings about having evaluated all the evidence.
22. We are satisfied that the evaluative exercise that the Judge set out in the lengthy paragraph [28(1) – (6)] of his decision is exactly the analysis that those paragraphs of KK envisage. The Judge considered:
• The fact the government of Sri Lanka is an authoritarian regime intent on preventing any resurgence of a Tamil separatist movement
• The fact that there is an extensive intelligence gathering regime in place which includes photographing and videoing demonstrations
• The small number of events (around 10) the appellant has attended while in the United Kingdom
• The fact that some of the events the appellant attended had been arranged by the TGTE and some were commemorating events that the Sri Lankan government does not tolerate,
• The appellant’s limited involvement at those events (which though it did include the appellant wearing proscribed emblems, was not a prominent, organisational or promotional role but was for the sole purpose of bolstering his asylum claim) ,
• the fact that other than attending those events the appellant had no other involvement with the TGTE or any other organisation proscribed or not proscribed
• The fact that the appellant’s attendance at the events was not published on social media or elsewhere
• The fact that the appellant has no relevant history in Sri Lanka
23. Having considered these factors the Judge explains at 28(6) his conclusion that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant will have come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. Ultimately, the Judge found the appellant’s cynical attendance at a small number of demonstrations where his participation did not extend beyond having his photograph taken, would not have brought him to the attention of the Sri Lankan government notwithstanding their interest in preventing a resurgence in Tamil separatism and notwithstanding the extensive monitoring that takes place.
24. We have no hesitation in finding that, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, this was a conclusion that a person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could reasonably come to. The submissions made about the appellant wearing proscribed emblems and attending demonstrations organised by proscribed organisation do no more than repeat factors which the Judge explicitly considered in his evaluation. These factors do not lead to there being only one rational answer to the question of whether, applying the lower standard of proof, the appellant’s activities will have come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. In reality the appellant’s submissions were no more than disagreement with the Judge’s assessment. The Judge was well placed to make that assessment having heard and seen the appellant give evidence in person and he undertook that assessment correctly following the guidance in KK. The disagreements raised do not identify an error of law and they come nowhere near the high hurdle of establishing the conclusion was irrational.
25. The references to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in the written grounds of appeal and in the submissions made to us do nothing to indicate that the Judge made an error of law when assessing the likelihood of the Sri Lankan authorities being aware of the appellant’s attendance at the demonstrations. The Judge recognised in his evaluation that the PTA proscribed emblems which the appellant is photographed wearing or holding up (see [28(5)(iv)]). It was therefore a factor that the Judge took into consideration before concluding that the appellant will not have come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. The complaint that the Judge did not assess the risk of the appellant been arrested and detained for breaching the PTA as a result of him wearing and holding proscribed emblems ignores the Judge’s central finding that the Sri Lankan authorities are not aware of him doing so.
26. The grant of permission to appeal raised concerns about the adequacy of the Judge’s reasons for the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant will not have come to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. We do not share those concerns. The requirement to provide adequate reasons for a factual conclusion is precisely that, no more and no less. It does not provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits - see the judgment of Lord Justice Singh at [26] of MD (Turkey)v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1958. Here the Judge identifies the factors he has considered. Some of those pointed towards the appellant’s proposition that the activities will have come to the attention of the authorities (e.g. the extensive monitoring of demonstrations that takes place) and some factors point away from that proposition (e.g. the appellant’s limited involvement at the demonstrations). Having identified all the factors he has considered the Judge gives an explanation at [28(6)] which allows the appellant to understand why the Judge has concluded his actions will not have brought him to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. In this way the reasons meet the requirement for adequacy.
27. Overall, the Judge’s comprehensive evaluation and reasoned conclusion that the Sri Lankan authorities will not be aware of the appellant’s limited and cynical attendance at pro-Tamil demonstrations in the United Kingdom and his reasoned conclusion that the appellant would be able to travel using his own passport were dispositive of the appellant’s appeal. As KK identifies at headnote [17], those returning with no entry on the government of Sri Lanka’s general database storing relevant information held about an individual, will in general be able to pass through the airport unhindered on their return to Sri Lanka and to return to their home area without being subject to any further action from the authorities. On the Judge’s findings of fact that is the situation for the appellant.
28. That being the case, it was unnecessary for the Judge to go on, as he has done at [28(7) – (11)], to additionally consider whether the appellant would be perceived as having undertaken a significant role in Tamil separatism. That issue would apply if the appellant is likely to be on a “watch list” held by the Sri Lankan government but having found that the appellant had not come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities either in the United Kingdom or in Sri Lanka there was no prospect of him being on such a list. The Judge’s considerations in those paragraphs about whether the appellant would be perceived as having undertaken a significant role in Tamil separatism however, whilst unnecessary, are entirely consistent with his earlier conclusion that the appellant will not have come to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. They do not disclose a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
29. Bringing this together, it is apparent from the Judge’s decision that he has conducted the evaluative exercise which KK says is necessary in order to determine whether a Sri Lankan national in possession of his passport will have come to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. Contrary to the assertion made by the appellant, the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s limited and cynically motivated attendance at around ten demonstrations will not have brought him to the adverse attention of those authorities was one which a person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could come to. The decision of the Judge did not contain an error of law.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Webber did not contain an error of law.
Luke Bulpitt
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
21 July 2025