Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002015

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64203/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

HO
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr. D. Katani, Katani & Co.
For the respondent: Ms. L. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrelly (the “Judge”), dated 13 March 2025, in which he allowed HO’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim. The appellant is a national of Iraq. His wife and two sons are dependent on his appeal.

2. For the purposes of this decision I refer to HO as the appellant, and to the Secretary of State as the respondent, reflecting their positions before the First-Tier Tribunal.

3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan in a decision dated 27 June 2025 as follows:

“1. The judge found that although it would be safe for the appellant and his family to relocate internally it would not be reasonable for them to do so. The reasoning on internal relocation is succinctly set out in paragraphs 20 – 21. In summary, the judge found that it would be unreasonable for the appellant to relocate internally because he is 60, has lost his business, is poor, has poor health, and it would not be in the best interests of his children.

2. Ground 2 argues that the judge erred by not considering the availability of health provision in Iraq. This is arguable because if the appellant can access adequate healthcare in the city to which he relocates that would arguably undermine the finding that internal relocation would be unreasonable.

3. Grounds 3 and 5 argue that the judge erred by considering the best interests of the appellant’s children in the context of internal relocation. It is arguable that the judge erred because (a) the best interests of his children is arguably not relevant to the assessment the reasonableness of relocation; and (b) the children were over 18 at the date of the hearing.

4. It is also arguable that not treating the failure to claim asylum in safe countries as relevant to credibility was inconsistent with section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. Ground 6 is therefore arguable.

5. Permission is granted on all grounds.”

4. There was no Rule 24 response.

The hearing

5. The hearing was a hybrid hearing, with the parties attending remotely.

6. At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Katani stated that he accepted that the Judge had materially erred, and agreed that the decision should be set aside.

7. I heard brief submissions on the extent to which any findings should be preserved, and therefore whether the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing, or retained in this Tribunal for remaking. I set out my decision on those issues below.

8. Given the concession by Mr. Katani, this decision will not be overly long.

Error of law

9. I find that the grounds are made out. I find that there are contradictory findings in relation to the appellant’s ability to internally relocate to Baghdad. As set out in Ground 1, it is not consistent to find that he can live there safely, but then to find that it would not be reasonable for him to do so, as well as finding that his private life can be replicated in Iraq. Ground 2 is also made out, as there is no proper consideration of the appellant’s ability to access healthcare in Iraq, which in turn affects his ability to work, both of which are relevant factors to the consideration of internal relocation.

10. In relation to the consideration of the appellant’s sons, I find that the Judge materially erred in his consideration of section 55 given that the appellant’s sons were aged 20 and 22 at the date of the decision.

11. I have considered whether any findings can be preserved, with particular reference to Ground 6. Mr. Katani submitted that the respondent’s challenge focused on internal relocation, and the position of the appellant’s sons. Therefore there were material findings of fact which could be preserved, and the decision could be remade in relation to internal flight. Ms. Clewley submitted that the respondent had also challenged the decision on the basis of the consideration of section 8. As this went to credibility, this affected the Judge’s findings overall. She submitted that the entire credibility assessment was flawed, and that the decision should be set aside in its entirety and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo.

12. Ground 6 submits, with reference to [14], that section 8 is a statutory requirement, and “the Judge cannot choose to state that credibility is not undermined by failing to claim in the first safe country”. It was submitted that it was a material misdirection to consider the appellant’s action in uprooting himself and his family as an event which could “discount the requirement to claim in the first safe country”.

13. In the renewed grounds to the Upper Tribunal the respondent submitted that “even if the appellant’s friend indicated that the UK was preferable for relocation (which suggests a potential economic element rather than protection based reasons), this does not detract from the requirement of the appellant to claim in the first safe country he arrived in and therefore to simply disregard the appellant’s actions in failing to do so, rather than weigh any failure in the assessment of credibility, must be materially misdirected in law”.

14. Paragraph [14] states:

“In the circumstance, I do not find his failure to claim in other safe countries detracts from its truthful (sic). For the appellant to uproot his entire family and head to Europe was a momentous event. I accept he was guided by his friend that their best interests lay in the United Kingdom and in the circumstance I do not find it unreasonable for him to follow that.”

15. I find that the Judge has erred in his consideration of section 8. While section 8 has to be considered in the round as part of an holistic assessment, I find that the Judge has failed to factor it into his assessment, stating that the appellant’s act of uprooting his family, and the fact that he was told that his best interests lay in the United Kingdom, was enough. The appellant’s failure to claim in a safe country was a relevant consideration which the Judge has not taken into account in the assessment of credibility. I find that this is a material error of law.

16. I find that the Judge’s failure to correctly assess section 8 means that the credibility findings cannot stand. I have taken into account the case of Begum [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC).  At headnote (1) and (2) it states:   

“(1)    The effect of Part 3 of the Practice Direction and paragraph 7 of the Practice Statement is that where, following the grant of permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal concludes that there has been an error of law then the general principle is that the case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision.

(2)    The exceptions to this general principle set out in paragraph 7(2)(a) and (b) requires the careful consideration of the nature of the error of law and in particular whether the party has been deprived of a fair hearing or other opportunity for their case to be put, or whether the nature and extent of any necessary fact finding, requires the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.”     

17. I have carefully considered the exceptions in 7(2)(a) and 7(2)(b).  Given that the credibility findings are affected, and no findings can be preserved, I find that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.     

Notice of decision

18. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of material errors of law and I set the decision aside. No findings are preserved.

19. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo.

20. The appeal is not to be listed before Judge Farrelly.

21. The appeal is to be listed at Glasgow.   

Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
14 November 2025