UI-2025-002016

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 19 Nov 2025
• Promulgation date: 17 Feb 2026
• Publication date: 6 Mar 2026
• Last updated on: 6 Mar 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002016

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63288/2023
LP/10069/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 February 2026


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

M A M A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Bandegani, Counsel instructed by Taylor Rose Limited.
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 19 November 2025


Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This decision is the re-making, under s.12 (2) (b) (ii) Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) decision promulgated on 6th March 2025 but set aside by the Upper Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 8th October 2025 (‘the error of law decision’). This decision is appended as a separate annex.
2. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s fresh protection and human rights claim is dated 27th November 2023.
3. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
The hearing
4. The Appellant attended the hearing together with his witnesses. A court interpreter was also in attendance to facilitate the taking of the Appellant’s and his witnesses’ evidence. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Ojo, following pre-hearing discussions with Mr Bandegani, confirmed that he did not wish to cross-examine either the Appellant nor any of his witnesses. The hearing proceeded therefore on submissions only.
5. Following both parties’ legal submissions, I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions. I am sorry for the time that it has taken me to issue this decision, which has been as a result of my professional and other commitments in the time that has passed since the hearing.
The evidence
6. I had before me the consolidated bundle (‘TB’) prepared, filed and served by the Appellant in advance of the error of law hearing on 15th July 2025, consisting of 287 pages. This also included the Appellant’s application under Rule 15(2A) of the procedure rules to adduce evidence that was not before the FtT. The evidence in question comprised of a witness statement from the Appellant’s immigration solicitor, which also exhibited several pieces of correspondence (e-mails) from the solicitor to the Kuwaiti Embassy and screenshots of WhatsApp messages, again from the solicitors’ firm to the same Embassy. I granted permission under Rule 15(2A) in my error of law decision at para 27 for this evidence to be admitted.
7. At para 28 of my error of law decision, I also directed both parties to file and serve any further evidence upon which they each may wish to rely in support of their respective positions. Save for a skeleton argument, helpfully prepared by Mr Bandegani dated 16th November 2025, neither party sought to adduce any further updating evidence. Neither did Mr Ojo have any objection to my admitting the Appellant’s skeleton argument, which was duly admitted on that basis.
8. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in the composite bundle, to the Appellant’s written evidence before me and that of his witnesses and to the parties’ oral submissions. I do not summarise the contents of the evidence and submissions separately but refer to these, where necessary and relevant, in my analysis below.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
9. No findings of fact from the FtT’s 2025 decision were preserved.
10. I summarised the relevant factual and procedural history at paras 3-4 of my error of law decision but set this out again for ease of reference. The Appellant is a citizen of Kuwait and claims to be of Bidoon1 ethnicity. The Appellant first entered the UK in 2010 and thereafter claimed asylum. His appeal against the refusal of that protection claim was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in 2012 (‘the 2012 appeal’).
11. Whilst no findings of fact were preserved from the FtT’s decision of 6th March 2025, I note that following consideration at [43]-[47] by the FtT of the 2012 appeal determination, the FtT took that decision as their starting point, pursuant to the Devaseelan principles. The FtT then concluded that the central issue of the credibility of the Appellant’s account of being a Bidoon needed re-visiting. This was because, in the FtT’s view, the Respondent now accepted in her decision of 27th November 2023 that the Appellant was from Kuwait. That was a fact disputed in the 2012 appeal proceedings and a fact that was not found in the Appellant’s favour by the earlier judge in the 2012 appeal.
12. I agree that that is the correct approach – the Appellant has produced further evidence in response to the Respondent’s decision of 27th November 2023, which includes that before the FtT in these proceedings and that included in the Appellant’s Rule 15(2A) application. In addition, it has now been approximately 13 years since since the Appellant’s claims were considered and I am satisfied that it is justified and fair therefore to re-visit the core aspects of his claim. As already referred to, one core aspect of his claim has since been accepted by the Respondent – that the Appellant is from Kuwait (TB [245]).
13. The essence of the Appellant’s claim and appeal is whether or not, it is reasonably likely the Appellant is of Bidoon ethnicity notwithstanding the adverse findings contained in the 2012 appeal determination.
Is the Appellant of Bidoon ethnicity ? If so, is he at risk ?
14. I summarise the findings of the Judge in 2012, which form my starting point, as follows:
(a) At [16], the Judge concluded in 2012 that the Appellant has not provided a credible account of his claim to be a stateless resident of Kuwait. His various accounts were contradictory regarding material issues and the Judge concluded that the Appellant was falsely claiming to be a Bidoon. The Judge did not also accept that the Appellant was born in or lived in Kuwait for any significant period of time;
(b) At [18]-[20], the Judge considered it significant, and adverse, to the Appellant that despite his claim to have worked in a café in Kuwait for approximately seven years, he was not able to satisfactorily answer questions about Kuwaiti money denominations. The Judge considered that this undermined his claim to have lived and worked in Kuwait;
(c) At [21], the Judge considered other answers of the Appellant relating to his geographical knowledge of Kuwait and his claimed town of origin to be vague and lacking in detail;
(d) At [22]-[23], the Judge considered the Appellant’s explanation – that he had a lack of education – not to amount to a reasonable or credible explanation for the above findings, due to found inconsistencies in the same;
(e) The Judge then went onto consider at [23]-[25] that there were also inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account of events that led to his leaving Kuwait and the date upon which he left.
15. After the 2012 appeal, the Appellant continued to reside in the UK before travelling, he claims, to France for a short period in the summer of 2021. On the Appellant’s attempted return to the UK in 2012, he was stopped and the Appellant claimed asylum again. It is this claim that the Respondent treated as a ‘fresh claim’ in her decision of 27th November 2023.
16. The Appellant has set out that there appears to have been no enforcement action taken against the Appellant between 2012 and when the Appellant claims he left the UK for France in 2021. The Respondent has not offered any information or evidence to dispute this.
17. I first summarise the relevant guidance and principles that assist my task in assessing whether the Appellant is a Bidoon and if so, any risks to him that may arise from this. Those are usefully set out in the Appellant’s skeleton argument at paras 2-11 but I only summarise those that directly relate to the Kuwaiti-Bidoon context with the others being well-established and more general principles for assessing protection claims.
18. It is also the case that the statutory provisions contained in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 for the assessment of protection claims do not apply to this appeal since the Appellant applied for asylum/submitted his fresh claim in 2021.
19. The Country Guidance decision of NM (documented/ undocumented Bidoon: risk) Kuwait CG [2013] UKUT 35 applies. The judicial head-note reads as follows:
(1) The distinction made in previous country guidance in respect of Kuwaiti Bidoon, between those who are documented and those who are undocumented, is maintained, but the relevant crucial document, from possession of which a range of benefits depends, is the security card, rather than the “civil identification documents” referred to in the previous country guidance in HE [2006] UKAIT 00051. To that extent the guidance in HE is amended.
(2) The evidence relating to the documented Bidoon does not show them to be at real risk of persecution or breach of their protected human rights.
(3) The evidence concerning the undocumented Bidoon does show them to face a real risk of persecution or breach of their protected human rights.
(4) It must be assumed that Bidoon who did not register between 1996 and 2000, and hence did not obtain security cards, are as a consequence undocumented Bidoon, though this must be seen in the context of the evidence that most Bidoon carry security cards. 
20. The parties agree that there is no good reason, supported by cogent evidence, not to apply or to depart from the country guidance set in NM. The parties also agree that the findings in the 2012 appeal form my starting point.
21. It is correct that the Respondent’s position in disputing the Appellant’s claimed Bidoon ethnicity is not based on any steps taken by her to secure evidence from the Kuwaiti Embassy or any other relevant body to help establish whether the Appellant is an unregistered or undocumented Bidoon. Her very brief reasons under the heading ‘credibility’ in her decision are as follows:
“It is considered that you have not provided any evidence that contradicts the opinions of the IJ (from 2012). Given the IJ initial findings, there is no further evidence to suggest that there are any circumstances which depart from those considered in the original judgement and, as such, it is considered that the original judgement must stand and that you are a national of Kuwait.”
22. No other reason is given from that set out above for disputing the credibility of the Appellant’s account on his ethnicity and origins.
23. The Respondent has maintained before me that the evidence submitted by the Appellant, particularly that submitted with his further submissions and within these proceedings, does not dislodge the previous adverse credibility findings. I disagree.
24. Firstly, it is clear from my summary above at para 14 and my assessment at para 26(a) below that the previous credibility findings were largely grounded in concerns over the Appellant’s knowledge of Kuwaiti geography and Kuwaiti money denominations. These have however been superseded by the Respondent’s own view since then that the Appellant is from Kuwait.
25. The Respondent has not otherwise offered or attempted to address why she says that the evidence (summarised and considered below) is not sufficient to consider a departure from the previous finding that the Appellant is not Bidoon and why the evidence does not support the Appellant’s claim in this respect. Save for bare assertions, the Respondent has not provided any reason why the evidence that I have summarised below at para 26 is somehow undermined, not capable of belief and/or of corroborating the Appellant’s claim.
26. I assess the subjective evidence that the Appellant relies upon and which was not before the Judge in 2012 as follows:
(a) As referred to already, the Respondent now accepts, as set out in her decision of 27th November 2023, that the Appellant is from Kuwait and that he previously lived there. That in itself therefore permits me to depart from the Judge’s findings in 2012 summarised at para 14(b) and (c) above;
(b) The Appellant relies on the evidence of AH (TB [225]). In his written statement, AH confirms that he came to the UK as an undocumented Bidoon and was subsequently granted refugee status due to his statelessness and the challenges he faced as a member of the Bidoon community. AH also states that he has known the Appellant since 2012 and over the years, they have developed a strong friendship together. Importantly, at para 3 of his statement, the witness confirms that the Appellant and him are both from Jahra and they have often reflected on their shared experiences of life there. The witness also states that he is absolutely confident that the Appellant is Bidoon like him.
AH attended to give oral evidence at first instance and attended the hearing on 19th November 2025 to do the same again. As recorded above at para 4, Mr Ojo did not require the witness for cross-examination. I have reminded myself that AH may have an interest in supporting his friend and so his evidence may not be entirely independent and free of any conflict of interest but I am reassured by the fact that AH made himself available to have his evidence tested again. This is after the also attended and was cross-examined in the FtT. The Respondent was also aware of the Appellant’s intention to call AH and to rely on his evidence, as he had done so at first instance. The Appellant, through his counsel, had confirmed this again at the conclusion of the error of law hearing.
Despite this, the Respondent has not offered any evidence to otherwise undermine the witness himself or the contents of his statement. The Respondent chose not to cross-examine the witness. Neither were any submissions made before me against this witness’ evidence. I consider that such evidence, or submissions, would have been available to and possible for the Respondent, had she wished to obtain and present these, considering that she was the one who granted refugee status to the witness and she was aware of his written evidence as already addressed.
I have also considered the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Kuwait: Bidoons’, August 2024 (‘the Respondent’s CPIN’) at para 7.2.3, to which I was taken by the Appellant in his skeleton argument. This states as follows:
“The Bidoun mainly reside on the outskirts of Kuwait City, in the towns of Tayma, Sulaibiyya, Ahmadi or Al-Jahra.”
I do not consider that there is any significance to the fact that AH refers to his and the Appellant’s place of origin as ‘Jahra’ vs that in the CPIN as ‘Al-Jahra’. My understanding that ‘Al’ is a prefix often functioning as the definite article in Arabic. The Respondent has not sought to suggest otherwise.
Thus, with the evidence of AH standing effectively unchallenged and the background evidence available to me concerning Jahra/Al-Jahra, I attach significant weight to the evidence of AH and I consider this to justify any departure from the findings in the 2012 appeal;
(c) The Appellant also relied on at first instance the evidence of a second witness, that of YK whose statement appears at TB [228]. I have carefully considered the contents of that statement but attach less weight to this since YK does not confirm his own origins, nor those of the Appellant. The witness provides details as to his friendship with the Appellant, having known him since 2011, and their social and private lives established in the UK. I consider that this is more relevant to any Article 8 grounds pursued by the Appellant rather than the issue of disputed Bidoon ethnicity. The Appellant did not also expressly rely on YK’s evidence of the issue of ethnicity before me;
(d) Through the Appellant’s Rule 15(2A) application, the witness statement of the Appellant’s immigration solicitor has been admitted into these proceedings (TB [51]-[52]). She exhibits correspondence from her to the Kuwaiti Embassy (TB [53]-[55]). This correspondence, together with the details provided in her statement, sets out the solicitor’s numerous attempts to clarify with the Kuwaiti Embassy in the UK whether there is any process by which the Appellant could obtain either a passport or official confirmation of his status as far as his citizenship is concerned.
Those attempts were undertaken between 22nd May and 26th June 2025, by either the solicitor herself or her assistant. The attempts ranged between sending e-mails to several different addresses obtained, which were not answered and sending WhatsApp messages to the enquiry number which the solicitor had managed to obtain, which also went un-answered save for an automated acknowledgment of receipt. Several telephone calls made were not answered either and when the solicitor’s assistant managed to get through on the telephone on 13th June 2025, the solicitor reports that the Embassy staff refused to speak to the assistant about this matter or to provide an e-mail address to which the firm could write.
On 26th June 2025, the solicitor states that she made a final attempt to contact the Embassy and spoke to a representative in the Consular Section. The person declined to give their name. The solicitor asked whether there is a process for applying for a Kuwaiti passport, and the person at the Embassy informed the solicitor that one can only apply if they already possess a Kuwaiti passport or a Kuwaiti national ID. They further stated that an individual must first prove that they are a Kuwaiti national before submitting a passport application. Lastly, that no application can be made without prior confirmation of Kuwaiti nationality. The solicitor then asked whether there is a mechanism or application process to confirm whether someone is a Kuwaiti national. The person stated that the Embassy does not have such a process and cannot provide any evidence or documentation to confirm whether someone is or is not a Kuwaiti national. The e-mails and WhatsApp messages sent are exhibited by the solicitor witness at [53]-[55].
The Appellant’s solicitor witness also attended the hearing on 19th November 2025 making herself available to the Respondent for cross-examination, which - as I have already addressed - was not required by Mr Ojo on behalf of the Respondent. This evidence was not before the Tribunal at first instance. Again, as this evidence stands before me effectively unchallenged, I attach significant weight to this. Moreover, this evidence stems from the Appellant’s solicitor, who is an officer of the Court and for that reason, I consider that I can attach very significant weight to it. I also consider that this evidence also justifies any departure from the findings in the 2012 appeal.
27. For the reasons set out above at paras 24-26, I attach significant weight to the evidence of AH and very significant weight to the evidence of the Appellant’s solicitor and take this, and the other aspects of the evidence considered in those paragraphs, forward in my assessment of the evidence before me, in the round, pursuant to the established principles and authorities briefly referred to at para 17 above.
28. Alongside this body of evidence, I also take into consideration the following:
(a) The Respondent does not otherwise assert that the Appellant holds any other nationality. Had the Respondent held concerns in respect of the Appellant being a national of any other country (other than Kuwait), I consider that she has had ample time to obtain and present such evidence. As I have briefly addressed above at para16, the Respondent does not appear to have taken any enforcement action against the Appellant including the obtaining of any emergency travel documents for him. Nor does she assert that the Appellant otherwise absconded between 2012 and 2021. The Respondent has certainly been aware of the Appellant’s whereabouts since his re-entry into the UK in 2021;
(b) It is a relevant factor in this appeal that the Respondent does not assert that the Appellant holds any other nationality since Bidoons also originate from other countries, such as Iraq, and are not therefore stateless – see the Respondent’s CPIN at para 1.1.4. Whilst the burden of proof does rest with the Appellant, the above is significant in my view since the difficulties of proving a negative have to be acknowledged;
(c) The Appellant has remained in the UK primarily since 2010 without being in a position to assert himself socio-economically due to a lack of national identity documentation and he has been consistent throughout this time in his claim to be stateless as a Kuwaiti undocumented Bidoon. I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that the Appellant would have obtained national identity documentation from any nationality that he was entitled to, so as to avoid the lengthy and significant periods that he has experienced in a state of uncertainty. I also consider it more likely than not that the Respondent would have obtained, or attempted to obtain, emergency travel documentation for the Appellant so as to progress any proposed removal, had she been in a position to obtain and progress this. The absence of such documentation, whether obtained by the Appellant or the Respondent, is in my view indicative and strongly supportive of the Appellant’s claim to have been undocumented and to remain so;
(d) The Appellant has set out in his own witness statements that he has recently gone to the Kuwaiti Embassy to ask if they can issue him with documents and he was told that they cannot – para 15 of his statement dated 26th March 2024 (TB [68]). The Appellant gives little detail in his statement of this attempt and of what exactly he was told but I consider that his evidence is consistent with the much more detailed enquiries and responses received recorded in his solicitor’s statement;
(e) Even if the Appellant had a “security card” issued to him previously by the Kuwaiti authorities, at some point when he lived in Kuwait, the Respondent’s CPIN documents numerous difficulties being experienced by Bidoons when seeking to renew these, which for many resulted ultimately in a failure to have these renewed. The CPIN also records the shortening of validity periods for the issuing of the security cards to three or six months becoming more common – see paras 3.1.12-3.1.16.
The CPIN also details in these same passages the following conduct from the authorities: “pressure to sign various types of documents in exchange for a renewed card, including declarations renouncing their claim to citizenship, confirmations of information not divulged to the Agency previously and signing blank pieces of paper (which are then used as a confession of having another nationality).”
29. Considering all of the above in the round, I am satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated that he is undocumented and unregistered with the Kuwaiti authorities and is of Bidoon ethnicity. In this respect, I am satisfied that the evidence submitted, and which I have accepted, together with the Respondent’s own acceptance that the Appellant originates from Kuwait, justifies my departing from the findings in the 2012 appeal.
30. I am satisfied of the above on the lower standard of proof that applies in protection claims. Even if I am wrong about the Appellant not having been documented or registered to date before, I am satisfied to the same lower standard of proof that any previous security card held has long expired and the Appellant is at a real risk of not being able to renew any card previously held.
31. Flowing from this, the applicable country guidance of NM and the Court of Appeal’s guidance contained in EB (Ethiopia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 809  at [66]-[70] and [75]-[76], it follows that the Appellant faces a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm on grounds of race or membership of a particular social group.
32. I am also satisfied that the Appellant cannot secure effective or sufficient protection from the Kuwaiti authorities nor can he safely or reasonably internally relocate with Kuwait either. The same is accepted by the Respondent at paras 4-5 of the CPIN.
33. For the reasons above, the Appellant M A M A’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 27th November 2023 stands to be allowed under the Refugee Convention.
Notice of Decision
34. The decision of the FtT dated 6th March 2025 did involve the making of material error(s) of law and has been set aside, pursuant to my decision dated 8th October 2025, which is also annexed here.
35. I re-make the decision by allowing the M A M A’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 27th November 2023 on Refugee Convention grounds


Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


03.02.2026



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002016

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63288/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 08 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

M A M A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Lay, Counsel instructed by Taylor Rose Limited.
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 15 July 2025


Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS


1. The Appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 6th March 2025. In this decision, the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT / the Judge’) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 27th November 2023, to refuse the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim.

2. I have decided to maintain the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I have determined that the specific facts of this appeal justify derogation from the principle of open justice. In particular, the Appellant has raised a claim to international protection, which remains unresolved.

Factual and procedural background

3. The Appellant is a citizen of Kuwait and claims to be of Bidoon ethnicity. The Appellant first entered the UK in 2010 and thereafter claimed asylum. His appeal against the refusal of that protection claim was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in 2012. The Appellant continued to reside in the UK thereafter before travelling to France for a short period in the summer of 2021. On the Appellant’s attempted return to the UK, he was stopped and the Appellant claimed asylum again. It is this claim that the Respondent treated as a ‘fresh claim’ in her decision of 27th November 2023 and which the Appellant appealed to the FtT, with the hearing having taken place on 4th February 2025.

4. It is also relevant to note that within his first appeal in 2012, the Appellant’s claimed Kuwaiti nationality was not accepted by the Respondent and this was upheld by the Judge who dismissed the Appellant’s appeal in 2012. Since then however, as part of the Respondent’s consideration of the Appellant’s further submissions, the Respondent accepts that the Appellant is from Kuwait but she continues to dispute that he is a Bidoon.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal

5. The Judge recorded at [40]-[42] that the central issue in dispute to determine was whether or not it was reasonably likely that the Appellant is a Bidoon. The Judge also noted the relevant application of the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Kuwait: Bidoons’ of August 2024 and the relevant country guidance of NM (documented or undocumented Bidoon: risk) Kuwait CG [2013] UKUT 356, recording accordingly from this guidance that if the Appellant is successful in demonstrating that he is a Bidoon, he would be at risk on any return to Kuwait.

6. Following consideration at [43]-[47] by the Judge of the earlier appeal determination from 2012 as their starting point, pursuant to the Devaseelan principles, the Judge determined that the central issue of credibility needed re-visiting. This was because, as I have referred to above, the Respondent now accepted that the Appellant was from Kuwait, which was a fact disputed and not found in the Appellant’s favour in his appeal in 2012.

7. Insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions on the central issue include the following:

a. In respect of the Appellant’s evidence of having attended the Kuwaiti Embassy, the Judge found at [49] this to be vague and lacking in detail, with no documentary or other evidence (such as having filled a form in or e-mail correspondence with the Embassy) to substantiate his account;
b. The Judge considered at [50] that it was insufficient that the Appellant made no attempt to find out any information online. This was in light of the fact that the Appellant claims to be undocumented and he was advised to get documents for that reason, the issue being essential to his claim;
c. In relation to the Appellant’s witnesses and letters of support, the Judge was concerned at [52] and [58] that there was no proof of the Appellant living together with his witness, MT, beyond the oral evidence and MT did not actually know whether the Appellant was a Bidoon. The Judge considered that pictures or any other evidence would have been easily obtainable if they had such a long history together of knowing each other for 13 years, as claimed. The Judge added that the Appellant had a pattern of not providing evidence to support his claim. Other findings were made at [54] by the Judge concerning the Appellant’s other witness, YT, concerning his inability to know if the Appellant left the UK;
d. Concerning the Appellant’s third witness AH, the Judge considered AH’s evidence at [57] finding that AH was not very knowledgeable about the Appellant himself and his evidence also lacked credible detail. The Judge noted AH’s oral evidence that they were “not really close friends” and that AH had himself been accepted to be a Bidoon and had been given refugee status. The Judge added that AH may be sympathetic to the claim set out but that does not mean he can confirm the veracity of the claim;
e. Following further consideration of the earlier appeal determination of 2012, the Judge concluded at [61] that he could only place little weight on the supporting witnesses for the reasons summarised above (set out at [52]-[59]) and their evidence and the evidence of the Appellant was not such as to persuade the Judge to depart from that earlier determination. This was notwithstanding the Respondent’s concession that the Appellant is in fact from Kuwait. The Judge did not find any reliable evidence that allows them to conclude that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant is a Bidoon.

8. The Judge went onto consider the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim finding in favour of the Respondent’s decision, this not resulting in unjustifiably harsh consequences such as not to breach the UK’s obligations.

9. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

10. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal raising initially three grounds of challenge. He was however only permitted to pursue two of those grounds when permission to appeal was granted by a different judge of the FtT. An attempt to renew the Appellant’s application for permission to appeal with the Upper Tribunal did not result in the remaining ground securing permission to appeal – this sought to challenge the Judge’s approach to the earlier 2012 decision following the Devaseelan principles (see UI-2025-002126).

11. Thus, the two grounds of appeal that the Appellant has been permitted to pursue are as follows:

a. Ground 2: The Judge irrationally tasked the Appellant with “proving a negative” and, further, made assumptions about the operation(s) of the Kuwaiti embassy in the UK without an evidential foundation;
b. Ground 3: The Judge failed to have regard to a central feature of an oral witness’s evidence when evaluating credibility.

12. In response, the Respondent lodged a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules dated 15th May 2025 defending the Judge’s decision and conclusions.

13. At the hearing, Mr Lay on behalf of the Appellant, confirmed that the application made by those instructing him under Rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules was not pursued for the purposes of the errors of law argued and I was asked to consider this in the event that I found in favour of the Appellant on his appeal for the purposes of any re-making.

14. Otherwise, both parties made further oral submissions addressing the Appellant’s two grounds of appeal and in the case of Mr Wain defending the Judge’s decision. I have addressed the parties’ respective written pleadings and oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons.

Analysis and conclusions

15. With regards to the Appellant’s Ground 2, I agree that the Judge has fallen into error in requiring the Appellant to provide supporting or corroborating documentary evidence of his ethnicity as a Bidoon and/or of his attempts to demonstrate this fact. At [50], the Judge has clearly required the Appellant to provide documentary evidence, or “any other evidence” to substantiate the Appellant’s own account. The Judge also recorded at [51] that the Appellant was advised to get documents - it is implied - to support the Appellant’s claim that he was undocumented. I am satisfied that, in the particular context of Bidoon claims, the Judge erred materially in failing to ask themselves whether or not it was reasonable to expect such documentary evidence to be available to the Appellant.

16. Furthermore, the Judge concluded that the attempts of the Appellant to attend the Kuwaiti Embassy, summarised at [51] were insufficient. Again, the Judge appears to suggest that had the Appellant asked for an appointment with the Embassy, it would have been reasonable to expect him to receive this or reasonable to expect the Appellant to have documentary evidence of his attempts. Similarly, that had he liaised with the Embassy in writing, that it would have been reasonable to expect the Embassy to respond, thus resulting in documentary evidence relevant to the Appellant’s claim. There was no evidence before the Judge to support the matters explored in this paragraph by the Judge.

17. As pleaded by the Appellant at para 23 of the grounds, there was no evidence before the Judge that there is a “form” that can be filled out (for Bidoons or anyone else) nor an email address for consular assistance nor any suggestion that the Kuwaiti authorities assist Bidoons abroad to prove that they are not Kuwaiti passport or other Kuwaiti national identity card holders. A copy of the Respondent’s Country Policy Information Note, which the Judge had before them, is silent on this. There is further no attempt by the Judge to consider whether the background information and country guidance concerning the difficulties experienced by Bidoons was consistent with the difficulties described by the Appellant.

18. I have very carefully considered Mr Wain’s submission that the Judge was entitled to consider the lack of documentary evidence of the Appellant’s attendance at the Embassy and that this did not amount to the Judge requiring the Appellant to prove a negative. However, as addressed above, it was necessary for the Judge to consider the Appellant’s evidence of attending the Embassy in the manner that he did and the consequent absence of documentary of the same, in the context of the background information that is available on how the Kuwaiti authorities engage (or rather arguably do not engage) with claimed Bidoons.

19. On the Appellant’s Ground 3, I am also satisfied that the Judge has failed to have regard a key aspect of the evidence of the Appellant’s witness AH. The Judge has summarised the evidence of AH at [28]-[31], noting at [28] that AH was born in Al Jahra in Kuwait and was granted refugee status on the basis of being an undocumented Bidoon at [28]. Whilst the Judge had concerns in relation to other aspects of AH’s evidence, set out at [55]-[57], I am satisfied that the Judge has failed to consider the evidence of AH to have been born in the same claimed region as the Appellant. This was arguably the central aspect of this witness’ evidence as this formed the basis of his own claimed knowledge and experience of the Applicant as being Bidoon from that particular region. The witness’ claimed knowledge of this is capable of standing in isolation to his evidence on the nature of their relationship and subsequent contact with each other in the UK, which the Judge clearly had reservations about.

20. Whilst I have reminded myself, pursuant to Mr Wain’s submissions, that the weight to be placed on a witness’ evidence is ordinarily a matter for the fact-finding judge, I am satisfied that the Judge’s approach to AH’s evidence - in particular that he and the Appellant originate from the same region in Kuwait - was relevant to the issue in dispute. The evidence of AH required more nuanced consideration therefore and I am satisfied that the Judge has erred materially in this respect.

21. In light of the above, I am satisfied that material errors of law were made by the Judge as pursued by the Appellant in each of his two grounds of appeal and I am therefore satisfied that the Judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal should be set aside pursuant to Section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 with no findings of fact preserved.

22. I have considered and applied the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement as well as the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). I am satisfied that it is appropriate to retain this appeal for re-making in the Upper Tribunal, to which both parties agreed when I asked them to address me on this in principle should I find in favour of the Appellant on either or both of his grounds of appeal.

23. Both parties are to pay particular attention to the directions set out below.

Notice of Decision and Directions

24. The decision of the FtT dated 6th March 2025 contained material errors of law and is set aside, with no findings of fact preserved.

25. The appeal will be listed for a further hearing, for re-making, in no earlier than four weeks from the date of this decision. A separate Notice of Hearing will be sent out to the parties. The time estimate for the appeal hearing will be three hours and will be heard by Judge Pinder.

26. The Appellant’s solicitors are to confirm within 7 days of this decision being sent to the parties whether or not the Appellant will require a court interpreter at the next hearing and if so, the language and any dialect preferred.

27. The Appellant has permission to rely on the evidence already filed and served under cover of his application under Rule 15(2A) at pp.49-55 (pdf) of the Appellant’s consolidated bundle prepared for the hearing on 15th July 2025.

28. Both parties are to send in to the Tribunal any further evidence upon which they wish to rely in support of their respective positions within 21 days of the date on which this decision is sent to the parties.

29. I am sorry for the time that it has taken for me to prepare and send this decision, I was on leave shortly after the hearing and did not manage to get this finalised before-hand.



Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


22.09.2025