Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002018

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63986/2023
LH/06889/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

MDJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Uddin, Syed Shaheen and Partners
For the Respondent: Miss Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant entered the UK on a student visa in February 2021 and claimed asylum on 19 July 2021. The appellant’s application to the respondent for asylum and humanitarian protection was refused in a decision dated 21 November 2023. The appellant appeals against the subsequent decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 3 March 2025 in which the Judge refused the appeal.

2. Permission to appeal was granted on grounds dated 17 March 2025. The grounds of appeal contained four grounds, which can be summarised in claiming that the FtT erred in:

a. Requiring corroboration in respect of various parts of the appellant’s evidence.

b. Approaching a document in the wrong way – a letter naming the appellant as human rights affairs secretary on the Bangladesh Hindu Student Council in 2016 was not accepted by the FtT as supporting his claim to be in that position in July 2017.

c. Failing to consider material evidence and making irrational assessment of the evidence regarding the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum.

d. Apportioning little weight to a country expert report.

In the Upper Tribunal

3. The appellant submitted a skeleton argument three days before the Error of Law hearing before me.

4. The respondent invited me to take the view that there were four grounds of appeal for which permission to appeal was granted, to come to the conclusion that the skeleton points are similar to those, but contained differences. The fourth ground in particular, says the respondent, was completely different.

5. The fourth ground in the appellant’s skeleton is styled as follows: The FtTJ did not make any findings with reasoning as to why the appellant’s father business was not believed to have been forced to close down due to being a member of religious minority.

6. Subsequent to the respondent’s submission, the opponent applied to merge the fourth ground in the skeleton into the first ground. I asked the appellant what their approach was to the fourth ground as expressed in the application to appeal. Whilst I did not receive a clear answer, it was clear that the appellant still relies on this ground and the appellant made oral submissions on the ground.

7. In my assessment, the grounds which were advanced in the skeleton are different to those advanced in the grounds of appeal. I gave a short decision in the hearing to the effect that I noted the skeleton was served late, that the function of a skeleton is to give further clarity to the grounds of appeal and to develop arguments on the grounds, and not to change or increase them. I took the view that the overriding objective would not be served by allowing the appellant to expand the grounds of appeal at this late stage, and with such short notice, and therefore I approach the rest of the appeal on the basis that the grounds for which permission was given are the grounds of appeal.

Requiring corroboration in respect of various parts of the appellant’s evidence.

8. In the first ground of appeal, the appellant states that the judge fell into error by giving too much emphasis on corroborative material. In oral submissions, I was directed to [25] where, the appellant says, the judge finds that they were 100 people who witnessed the assault of the appellant on his account and the judge concluded that they would have given evidence. In my judgement this submission misunderstands the judge’s words. The judge says “in his witness statement at paragraph 7 the appellant stated that the event was stormed and that he was attacked whilst others fled. The appellant has provided no witness statements from others who attended the event to confirm that he was attacked at the event.” This is not the judge concluding that the people who the appellant says were present would have given evidence. Nor does the judge go so far as to say that this sort of evidence would have easily been available and the absence of this evidence is therefore waited against the appellant. It is merely an observation that the apparent had not provided any witness statements from the people he claims were at the event that he spoke at.

9. The appellant states that the judge’s intention is unclear when they comment in the final sentence of [28] that one of the witnesses referred to in the FIR has a name indicating that they are Muslim. In my judgement, the judge was entitled to highlight that one of the witnesses identified by police appears to be a Muslim as the appellant’s case is that he was at risk of persecution because he is a Hindu. I find that the judge was justified in highlighting it as one of the factors in this case, which was born in mind when considering the credibility of the appellant’s claim overall.

10. The appellant’s written submission is that the judge erred at [18] in rejecting the appellant’s claim of having entered the UK at least partially for the purposes of studying. The appellant states that the judge took no account of the fact that the appellant arrived in the UK when there were significant restrictions relating to covid, including at a time when there were difficulties in registering with a GP and seeking medical support. In my judgement any such difficulties, if they are in evidence, do not undermine the judge’s finding. This is because the judge’s finding is to reject the appellant’s claim that he entered the UK at least partially to study. The ground of appeal in this respect is nothing more than a disagreement with the finding of the judge.

11. Equally, the disagreement with the judge’s finding at [22] that there was no credible evidence to support the appellant’s assertion that the police refused to record the complaint, is a disagreement with the judge’s finding and does not identify an error. There is no implication in that finding that the judge expected such evidence to be available. The judge’s observation that there is no credible evidence to support this assertion is, in my judgement, nothing more than the judge assessing whatever evidence is, and is not, available.

12. The appellant submitted that the judge noted there was no reference in the police report to the appellant being attacked because of his religion, and therefore concluded there was no credible evidence that the appellant was attacked because of his religion. This is not a correct representation of the judge’s finding. The judge’s finding at [29] that there is no credible evidence the appellant was attacked because of his religion is clearly a conclusion that the judge reaches after analysis of various pieces of evidence.

13. I agree that the judge has taken into consideration that the appellant provided no evidence beyond his own witness evidence (including in asylum interview) that people came to his home and threatened to kill him for making a complaint to the police. The assertion in the grounds of appeal that the judge’s conclusion was based entirely on the fact that the appellant had provided no evidence to support that claim is not reflected in the judge’s judgement. The judge identifies the evidence that there is, and confirms that there is no other evidence to support it, coming to the conclusion that the evidence available is not of sufficient weight to persuade the judge of the appellant’s version of events. This is not introducing a requirement of corroboration.

14. For those reasons, I do not read the judge’s words as indicating that they did not accept the appellant’s account because there was no corroboration. I do not accept the appellant’s assertion that the judge’s determination relies in the main on a lack of corroborative evidence to rejected the app appearance account. The judge is entitled to highlight what evidence is and is not available to them, in order to show on the face of the judgement that they have not ignored, or failed to identify, commonly encountered types of evidence.

Approaching a document in the wrong way.

15. The second ground of appeal on which the apparent was given permission is that the judge erred in concluding that a letter, dated 31 October 2016 and confirming the appellant as the Human Rights Affairs Secretary to the Bangladesh Hindu Student Council, did not support his claim to have held a position in July 2017.

16. The appellant points to documentary evidence of membership of the student council and submitted orally that the judge made no finding on whether that documentary evidence is accepted before going onto find that the appellant was not still a member in 2017. The appellant also states that the judge failed to consider an expert report which confirms that the appellant continued to hold the relevant position.

17. I find that the judge does in fact engage with the approach in the expert’s report. The judge notes that the report states that fear and insecurity had gripped some Hindu communities, that this is mostly in rural areas and that the appellant had not provided credible evidence that he comes from a rural area. The judge reminded themselves that they are not bound to accept expert evidence, even if the expert witness is not cross-examined. Indeed, the judge goes onto assess the report in its entirety but attaches limited weight to it primarily because the expert accepted the appellant’s claim at face value. I find out the submission that the judge failed to have regard to or consider the contents of the expert report is plainly unfounded. The judge identifies succinctly why they do not feel they can give more than limited weight to the expert evidence and I find that the judge was entitled to come to that conclusion.

18. The appellant is correct to submit that the judge does not give an explicit finding on whether the document from 2016 is accepted. However, the judge does note that the document from 2016 does not indicate that the appellant continued to hold a position in 2017. Combined with the other evidence, notably the expert report to which minimal weight is attached, I find that the judge approached this issue in an appropriate way. The judge clearly took the letter into account, and simply came to the conclusion that it did not assist the judge’s assessment of whether the apparent held an appointment in the year following the letter being written.

Failing to consider material evidence and making irrational assessment of the evidence regarding the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum.

19. The appellant submits that the judge fell into error by failing to take into consideration the appellant’s evidence that he contacted a solicitor to assist him with his asylum claim but was advised to wait until things reopened after the pandemic before making a claim. The judge found the appellant’s credibility was damaged on the section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 because he failed to claim asylum at the airport on arrival in the United Kingdom.

20. In relation to this submission, I look to the wording of s8(2) of that Act. The construction of the subsection is such that once a judge concludes that an appellant has behaved in a way designed or likely to conceal information, or designed or likely to mislead, the judge is obliged to take that as damaging the appellant’s credibility. The judgement was not required to address the reasons given for delay. The judge did not fall into error in disrespect.

21. The appellant states that the judge reached a perverse conclusion on the 2017 attack on the appellant in that the judge finds that “the police did record the previous complaint and made efforts to pursue the matter”.

22. I do not find that this submission is well-founded. Not only did the police record the 2017 attack (the FIR is in evidence) but also the judge notes at [27] that the appellant’s account in cross-examination was that the police had attended the scene of the attack on him. Had the judge come to the conclusion that the police had pursued the matter to prosecution it may be that this was not supported by the evidence, however the judge’s limited finding that the police had made effort to pursue the matter is sufficiently grounded in the evidence.

Apportioning little weight to a country expert report.

23. In considering what weight to give the expert’s report, the judge reminded themselves of the guidance in MS (Zimbabwe) [2021] EWCA Civ 941 at [61] that “a tribunal of fact is not bound to accept expert evidence if it disagrees with that evidence. That is so even if the expert witness is not cross-examined. The tribunal of fact is entitled, and obliged, to examine the analysis and reasoning in the expert's report. It is obliged to reach its own conclusions on any questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and law, which it must decide in order to determine a case. It may accept guidance from an expert on those questions, but is not obliged to accept it”.

24. The appellant asserts that the judge erred in not giving weight to the expert’s evidence that the expert had phoned the phone number on the letter stating the appellant was a member of the student council, had spoken to someone claiming to be the chairman, and that that person had confirmed the appellant’s membership on the committee, “that the committee list exists to this day as there not been a new committee formed. He has further confirmed Manna’s active participation and voluntary involvement in this organisation as a Human Rights Affairs Secretary”. In my finding, the judge would have been unable to apportion any meaningful weight to this evidence, which is from a person of unverified identity, answering questions which are not before the judge, and where it is unclear whether the person on the other end of a telephone understood their answers would be presented to a tribunal.

25. I also find that the evidence of the expert is not inconsistent with the judge’s finding on the appellant’s membership by 2017. The evidence is that “the committee list exists to this day”, not that the committee is still in existence. The confirmation of the appellant’s involvement in the organisation makes no reference as to when that involvement was.

26. The judge states that they have read the report in its entirety. The judge gives, in my assessment, sufficient analysis of the expert’s report to come to the conclusions on the report that they do. There is no error disclosed in the weight apportioned to the report.

Other submissions

27. In oral submissions, the appellant drew my attention to an item that was not in the evidence before the judge, but which was one of the items in the bibliography of the CPIN presented to the judge, that item being the hyperlink to The European Agency for Asylum (EUAA), COI Report – Bangladesh – Country Focus July 2024. The appellant submitted that, as is in the public domain and is relevant, the judge should have followed the link and was under a duty to investigate. If it is in the public domain, said the appellant, the judge could have taken notice of it, and should have taken judicial notice of it.

28. I asked Mr Uddin if the judge had been asked to follow the link provided in the CPIN bibliography, or had this entry in the bibliography brought to their attention by the appellant in the FtT. Mr Uddin was not in a position to tell me whether either of these things had happened.

29. I find the submission that the judge was under a duty to investigate the case before them, and that they should have done this by following a link (one of many) in the bibliography of a CPIN to discover what was in the linked document, without having apparently heard arguments on this, to be wholly without merit. The judge did not err in this respect.

30. I accept the respondent’s submission that the ground advanced in the IAUT1 that the judge failed to take judicial notice of news reports of attack on Hindus in Bangladesh cannot succeed. These articles do not appear to have been in evidence before the judge and the concept of judicial notice does not function so that a judge can be expected to have knowledge of every news article available.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.

The determination of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

D Cotton

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 November 2025