Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002019

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66058/2024
LP/00928/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 30 October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SILLS

Between

ND
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Badar instructed by Hawkins Law
For the Respondent: Mr Tufan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals against the decision (the Decision) of the First Tier Tribunal (the FTT) dated 11 March 2025 dismissing his appeal.

2. I have decided to maintain the anonymity direction made by the FTT because the importance of fulfilling the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.

Factual Background

3. The Appellant is a Turkish national of Kurdish origin. He claimed asylum in October 2022 on the basis that he would be at risk due to support for the People’s Democratic Party (the HDP). He claimed that he was a member and had assisted the party in collecting donations and attending meetings and demonstrations. He claimed to have been threatened by a local leader of the MHP, a far right group in Turkey. The Appellant was fired at by men on a motorbike, and detained by the investigating police. While detained he was mistreated and forced to act as an informer. Two months after his release he was detained again and mistreated, and gave the police some names. He then left Turkey and came to the UK.

4. The FTT Judge dismissed the appeal. The FTT Judge identified matters that damaged the Appellant’s credibility. The Appellant had been inconsistent about how many times he had been arrested and when this was. The Appellant had failed to claim asylum in safe European countries such as France despite having a reasonable opportunity to do so. The FTT Judge found that the Appellant’s account was not credible. While it was accepted that the Appellant was a HDP supporter, it was not accepted that he had the problems claimed as a result. The FTT Judge found that the Appellant’s support for the HDP would not place him at risk as a result.

5. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal raising three grounds of appeal:

a. The FTT Judge erred in assessing the Appellant’s evidence. The FTT Judge was wrong to state that there was nothing to show that the photographs were of CD and EC. The FTT Judge had erred in requiring the Appellant to provide supporting evidence. It was irrational to expect the Appellant to obtain evidence connecting him to the leaders.
b. The adverse credibility findings made against the Appellant were irrational given that they were based on two inconsistencies.
c. The FTT Judge erred in failing to give a ‘Lucas’ direction

6. Permission to appeal was refused by the FTT and granted by the UT on 15 July 2025. The UT Judge found ground 1 was ‘just arguable’. While Grounds 2 and 3 were less persuasive, permission was not limited.

7. The Respondent’s Rule 24 Response opposed the appeal. There was a balanced assessment of the evidence. The decision was not irrational. The ‘Lucas’ principle did not apply.

The Hearing

8. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings. I heard submissions from the representatives. I reserved my decision.

Legal Principles

9. In HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72] the Supreme Court stated that:

"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead."

10. In relation to mistake of fact as an error of law, the case of E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49 held:

66.. In our view, the time has now come to accept that a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness is a separate head of challenge in an appeal on a point of law, at least in those statutory contexts where the parties share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result. Asylum law is undoubtedly such an area. Without seeking to lay down a precise code, the ordinary requirements for a finding of unfairness are apparent from the above analysis of CICB . First, there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been “established”, in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not been have been responsible for the mistake [sic]. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the Tribunal's reasoning.

Findings

Ground 1

11. I have considered the FTT Judge’s treatment of the photographs. The grounds rely on what the FTT Judge states at para 42:

‘42. I put little weight on the photographs. Apart from what the appellant says there is
nothing to show that the photographs are of CD and EC. There is nothing in the
photographs to connect them to the appellant.’

12. It is clearly right that the only person who says that the photograph is of CD is the Appellant. The name has been handwritten next to the picture at Combined Bundle 55 (CD55), I understand by the Appellant or on his instruction.

13. The group picture at CB54 appears to be from a social media account. The account is in a similar, but not identical, name to EC. Again, EC has been handwritten on the document, I understand by the Appellant or on his instruction, and there is an arrow indicating who EC is in the crowd. The document provided is of poor quality. It does not in my view show that the person highlighted in the group picture is the same as the person in the picture attached to the social media profile. So, the evidence may suggest that the group photograph has been posted on a social media account with a similar name to EC. But it remains the case that it is only the Appellant’s annotation of the picture that shows who EC is said to be in the picture. The fact that the social media account is in a similar name to EC does not show that the person highlighted in the group photograph is EC. I consider it was open to the FTT Judge to state that apart from what the Appellant had stated, these was nothing to show that the photograph was of EC.

14. In any event, I do not consider that the FTT Judge’s failure to refer to the identity of the social media account undermines his decision to place little weight on the photographs. It was not necessary for the FTT Judge to deal with every detail. Mr Bader did not draw to my attention anywhere where this feature of the evidence was highlighted in the evidence or written submissions before the FTT Judge. It was not suggested that this was drawn to the FTT Judge’s attention at the hearing. There was no need to set out the entire interstices of the evidence presented or analyse every nuance between the parties. I do not consider that the name on the social media account was compelling evidence that the judge was required to address. The fact it was not expressly mentioned does not mean it was not taken into account.

15. Further, I do not consider that the failure to note the name of the social media account played a material part in the FTT Judge’s reasoning on the issue. The FTT Judge was entitled to find that there was nothing in the photographs to connect them to the Appellant. On this basis alone, the FTT Judge was entitled to place little weight on the photographs. Exercising appropriate judicial restraint, I find that the FTT did not misdirect himself or make any material error in relation to this issue.

16. I do not accept that the FTT Judge erred in requiring corroboration. Mr Badar did not take me to any part of the Decision where the FTT Judge did this. The FTT Judge performed the task required of him in relation to this evidence, which was to assess and determine the weight to attach to the corroborative evidence relied upon by the Appellant.

17. Overall, having assessed the pictures, the FTT Judge was entitled to place little weight on them. The FTT Judge did not act irrationally, misdirect himself, or give inadequate reasons in doing so.

Ground 2

18. As to Ground 2, I do not accept that the findings on credibility were irrational. The FTT Judge sets out the Appellant’s claim in some detail at paras 11 to 18. Along with the matters disputed by the Respondent, the FTT Judge also records the matters accepted by the Respondent at paras 19 to 20. The FTT Judge considered a number of criticisms made by the Respondent at paras 24-28 but found that they did not damage the Appellant’s credibility. The FTT Judge then considered matters that did damage the Appellant’s credibility. The FTT Judge at para 41 states that ‘I take into account all the above matters’.

19. As found above, the FTT Judge was entitled to place little weight on the photographs. There is no merit in the challenge to the FTT Judge’s reliance on the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum prior to his arrival in the UK. The grounds refer to the Appellant’s claim in his screening interview that he didn’t stop in any other countries. However, at the Appellant’s substantive interview, the Appellant, when asked what countries he travelled through on his way to the UK at AI90, stated:

‘I made uk decision in turkey before I left [sic]’

This is in line with the Appellant’s explanation at the hearing that he did not claim asylum in France or on route to the UK because he wanted to come to the UK. The FTT Judge was therefore entitled to find that the Appellant had a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum in a safe country and that his failure to do so damaged his credibility.

20. The FTT Judge was entitled to rely on the inconsistencies between the Appellant’s screening interview and his substantive interview. At his screening interview on 25 October 2022 the Appellant referred to being detained only once, on 19 April 2022, and released immediately. At his substantive interview on 9 May 2024 the Appellant stated that he was detained for the first time on 15 May 2022 and detained overnight and mistreated, and then detained for a second time on 2 August 2022. The FTT Judge noted that the Appellant had had the opportunity to correct any errors in the screening interview at the end of that interview, and at the beginning of the substantive interview, but did not do so. The FTT Judge considered the nature of the screening interview in assessing the significance of the inconsistency. The FTT Judge noted how the Appellant stated he was treated on the first occasion he was detained. The FTT Judge was entitled to find that the discrepancies arising from the screening interview were significant and went to the heart of his account.

21. Ground 2, challenging the FTT Judge’s credibility assessment, does not identify any error of law. I am satisfied that the FTT Judge’s findings were not irrational. They were open to the FTT Judge on the evidence and adequately reasoned.

Ground 3

22. Ground 3 argues that it was not clear whether the FTT Judge had applied the Lucas approach relying on MA (Somalia) [2010] UKSC 49. I do not accept this. MA (Somalia) at [33] states that the significance of lies will vary from case to case. It is clear from the Decision that the FTT Judge assessed the significance of the inconsistency concerning his detention. At [35] the FTT Judge states that the Appellant’s answers go to the heart of the Appellant’s case. At [43] the FTT Judge again states that: ‘These are significant discrepancies which go to the heart of his account.’ In line with the guidance from MA Somalia [2010] UKSC 49, the above shows that the FTT Judge considered the significance of the inconsistency. The FTT Judge was entitled to find that the inconsistency went to the heart of the account. Ground 3 identifies no error of law.

Conclusion

23. The Decision does not contain any error of law. I therefore dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed

Judge Sills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 October 2025